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ABSTRACT 
Established in 1925, the Dominions Office (DO) existed as a separate Whitehall 
body for just twenty-two years. The primary reason for its creation was to provide 
a dedicated conduit through which the British government could communicate with 
its counterparts in the now semi-autonomous Dominions. At the request of these 
self-governing colonies, a section of the Colonial Office (CO) had performed a 
similar role since shortly after the turn of the century. But in certain British quarters 
it was believed that the Dominions required still greater recognition, something 
which separate representation would help promote. During the 1930's, as the British 
Empire continued its slow contraction, the DO enthusiastically embraced its new 
task despite criticism of its performance from both home and abroad. However, 
with the outbreak of a second World War the requirement placed upon it became 
much more urgent and extensive. In an environment in which disagreements 
increasingly emerged between the central authority in London and its Dominion 
counterparts, the department repeatedly found itself handling the crisis management 
of events. Indeed on such occasions, during a number of which it seemed the unity 
of the Imperial coalition was wavering, it was the DO's skill which proved decisive. 
By 1942, thanks largely to these efforts and the perceptive leadership of the 
Dominions Secretary, Lord Cranborne, there appeared little danger of the Anglo- 
Dominion alliance collapsing. The political connection between the centre and the 
distant `Dominions over the seas' had however irrevocably changed, a reality that 
would soon be demonstrated following the war's eventual end. 
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In recent years there has been something of a resurgence of interest in attempting to 
define the Dominion 'concept' or 'idea'. ' Since the late 1930s and the first serious 
attempts by K. C. Wheare and W. K. Hancock, it has been clear that discussion of the 
subject has often been both complicated and open to wide and varying interpretation. 
Indeed amongst even contemporary observers there was a great deal of reluctance to 
settle upon a precise definition. During a parliamentary debate in 1921, when David 
Lloyd George asked for an explanation he was told that to provide one would be 
dangerous. 3 A decade later, a leading Australian politician expressed a commonly held 
view when he compared his own country's connection with Britain to that of a family. 
And as such he did not 'want the relations of myself and my children to be determined 
by rules written in a book, to which each of us must refer to discover who is right and 
who is wrong' 4A plethora of articles from the period, such as 'The Riddle of the 
Commonwealth', only serve to make it clear, however, the considerable confusion that 
5 existed about the exact nature of the relationship. 
Following the First World War however it was certainly the case that the relationship 
had altered not least because of the Dominion contribution to the Allied war effort. At 
the beginning of the conflict the British Empire covered some 13 million square miles 
within which there were nearly 500 million inhabitants. From this total the four white 
Dominions alone provided over 1,309,000 men sending troops to fight not just in 
France but to every front in which fighting took place, from Samoa to Siberia. Vimy, 
See John Darwin, `A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in British Politics' in Judith 
M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds. ), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV - The 
Twentieth Century (Oxford: 1999) pp. 64-87; W. David McIntyre, `The Strange Death of Dominion 
Status' in Robert D. King and Robert Kilson (eds. ), The Statecraft of British Imperialism: Essays in 
Honour of Wm. Roger Louis (London: 1999) pp. 193-195; also Fred Nash, 'Salutem adferre 
reipublicae' (Cicero): the Dominion Concept and the Empire (BISA/PSA Political Science Group 
Workshop Conference) July 1998 
2 See K. C. Wheare, The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status (London: 1942); W. K. Hancock, 
Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Nationality, 1918-1936 (London: 1937); also 
D. K. Fieldhouse, `Autochthonous Elements in the Evolution of Dominion Status: The Case of New 
Zealand', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Volume 1 (1961-1963) pp. 85-87 
3 K. C. Wheare, The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth (London: 1960) pp. 10-11 
4 J. D. Latham speaking in the Australian federal parliament in 1931 quoted in W. R. Brock, Britain and 
the Dominions (Cambridge: 1951) pp. 415-416 
s W. Y. Elliot, `The Riddle of the British Commonwealth', Foreign Affairs, Volume 8, Number 3 
(1930), pp. 442-464 
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Gallipoli and Delville Wood were just some of the celebrated battles in which the 
Dominion forces played a prominent part. New Zealand alone voluntarily sent about 20 
percent of its male population abroad. And with such a high level of involvement 
casualties were high with 150,000 Dominion troops dead or missing by the conflict's 
conclusion. Australia, with a total population of only about five million people, suffered 
more casualties than the United States. " This in part was because, as one commentator 
writing in 1939 put it, Dominions forces were used as 'shock troops'. Field Marshal 
Douglas Haig was even said to have considered the Dominion units to be his most 
prized assets with the New Zealanders at the head of the list. 7 Indeed they were 
recognised in some quarters to have excellent 'mental as well as physical qualities' and 
their prominent role was 'an unconscious tribute to the democratic spirit that animated 
them all'. ' 
The war also highlighted the need for a far more serious approach to Imperial economic 
questions. Figures for trade between Britain and its Empire before 1914 reveal a mixed 
picture. Just under one quarter of all imports came from the Empire: staples were 
especially significant with foodstuffs such as tea, cheese and spices all being major 
imports; certain raw materials were also significant most obviously jute and tin. Exports 
were different however with just under 200 million pounds, or 37.2 percent of all 
goods, going to the Empire. Although India was perhaps the largest market, the 
Dominions also took a significant share. The Empire was useful as a market for goods 
that faced major international competition. The point has been made however that the 
pattern of imports was such that the Empire could not offer any real measure of 
independence to Britain in terms of a guaranteed supply of essential imports-9 
The Final Report of the Dominions Royal Commission, released in 1917, recommended 
that there be greater exploitation of Dominion resources. To better do this, it called for 
6 Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset, Volume One: Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921 (New York: 1970) 
pp. 191-193 
See Robert Holland, `The British Empire and the Great War, 1914-1918' in Judith M. Brown and 
Wm. Roger Louis (eds. ), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, pp. 125-130 
"The Dominions at War', United Empire, Number 30 (1939), pp. 1054-1057 
See D. K. Fieldhouse `The Metropolitan Economics of Empire' in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger 
Louis (eds. ), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, pp. 98-102 
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the formation of an Imperial Development Board to ensure closer co-operation between 
the different parts of the Empire. The 1917 Imperial War Conference adopted a similar 
approach agreeing the creation of an Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau. It was believed 
that this would help ensure there was no longer just a reliance on the central industrial 
base in Britain. It has been argued that despite these efforts, the results were mixed 
such was the growing strength of nationalism within the Dominions. 1° Nonetheless it is 
clear that after 1919 the 'white Empire' did play a much greater role in Britain's trade. 
At the Imperial Conference of 1923, the Dominions had been urged to accumulate 
sterling assets as London funds. At the, same time there was a steady growth in trade 
throughout the 1920s, the advantages given to the Dominions at the 1932 Ottawa 
Conference had a considerable impact; the year before the British authorities had also 
imposed a 10 percent duty on all goods imported from non-Commonwealth countries. 
Following Ottawa there was a considerable increase in trade with 41.2 percent of all 
Britain's exports between 1934 and 1938 going to the Dominions and one-quarter of all 
goods imported into the British market. 
In the case of the most recent published discussions of the subject, whilst each adopts 
a generally different approach, a consensus emerges in the suggestion that 'Dominion 
Status', as it was to become known, was a halfway house between colonial and 
independent status. The Imperial Conference of 1926 certainly appeared to offer a 
similar assessment. Lord Balfour's famous declaration, later embodied in the Statute of 
Westminster, identified Great Britain and the Dominions as autonomous communities 
within the British Empire, united by a common allegiance to the Crown, but freely 
associated and equal in status to one another in all matters domestic and external. " Six 
countries, aside from Britain, helped make up this unique group. Previously considered 
as 'self-governing colonies', at the 1907 Colonial Conference it had been agreed that 
the term 'Dominion' was to be used when referring to Canada, the Commonwealth of 
Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Cape Colony, Natal and Transvaal. The last 
three joined together with the Orange Free State in 1910 to form the Union of South 
Africa, creating a single Dominion. Twelve years later the creation of the Irish Free 
State would bring with it the last of the pre-war Dominions. 
1° Conelli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London: 1972) p117-120 
11 See Patrick Walker, The Commonwealth (London: 1962) pp. 97-116 
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The management of this group, which together were known as 'the British 
Commonwealth of Nations', has been a far less popular subject for study. 12 With its 
establishment in 1925, it was in fact the intended role of the Dominion Office's (DO) to 
secure the co-operation of these Dominions, where necessary, in carrying out British 
policies. From the outset however the department faced considerable challenges. 
Perhaps the most immediate was the fact that, according to one of the DO's own 
people, not everybody in Whitehall was willing 'to accept the full implications of equal 
partnership'. 13 Put in another fashion, this meant that for the majority of the twenty- 
two years it existed, with only limited resources and manpower, the department's often 
difficult job was to try and reconcile the agendas of seven different governments, its 
own being one of them. Indeed the DO often found itself having 'to act as the 
conscience of the British government to ensure that they lived up to their part of the 
bargain'. 
Making matters worse, if the new department were to have any chance of success it 
was essential that is maintained a strong voice in the decision-making process of the 
British government and at the earliest possible stage. Only then could it keep policy- 
makers informed of any difficulties that it believed their proposed approach might 
create. Instead, the DO found itself often faced by a certain degree of distrust and even 
disdain from within Whitehall, with the commonly made complaint that it was 'much 
too inclined to take the extreme Dominion, as opposed to the Imperial, point of view'. 14 
Hostility such as this made it hard for the department to secure any real measure of 
influence at the critical stages of policy formulation. Certainly in its early years even 
some of those who were generally supportive could see the new office as no more than 
'a quasi-diplomatic machine', to be short-circuited on urgent occasions. '5 Faced by 
growing Dominion requests for information from London, the DO almost inevitably 
therefore tried to achieve a compromise between those parties concerned. But 'where 
12 The term `Commonwealth of Nations' was first used in a speech made by Lord Roseberry in 1884; 
it was not officially used until 1921 when it featured in the Irish Treaty 
Joe Garner, The Commonwealth Office, 1925-68 (London: 1978), p. 26 
14 (*A11 footnotes are taken from the Public Record Office, Kew unless otherwise stated) 
Hubert Montgomery to Foreign Secretary, 23 July 1926, F0372/2216 
15 H. V. Hodson, `British Foreign Policy and the Dominions', Foreign Affairs, Volume 17 (July 1939), 
pp. 762-763 
4 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
Introduction 
differences could not be reconciled, the Office was in danger of being caught between 
two fires, exposed to complaints from each side that its case was not being sufficiently 
16 pressed'. 
The often apparently complicated national characteristics displayed by the different 
Dominions only served to exacerbate the difficulties facing the DO. This problem was 
fully demonstrated by Canada who, with its proximity to the North American continent, 
increasingly held the view that the United States had become more important to it than 
Britain. " Added to this was the fact that by 1939 over one-third of the population were 
French-speaking, the vast majority of these living in Quebec. Although liberal opinion in 
the country as a whole was generally internationalist in outlook, this province tended to 
be far more isolationist, saving its energies for promoting the idea of the Canadian 
nation. This meant that in terms of the Dominion idea there was scant support within 
the province. It was perhaps not really surprising therefore that during the 1930s wide 
schisms developed between the English- and French-speaking populations, especially 
over foreign affairs. To reconcile the French-dominated province and maintain a sense 
of national unity, successive Canadian leaders chose to keep consultation with Britain 
and the other members of the Commonwealth of Nations on an informal level. And 
such an approach obviously made the DO's task more difficult. 
The situation in the Union of South Africa, which had been created only following a 
protracted and often bitter conflict between Britain and the Boers, showed considerable 
similarities. In the first instance, from a total population of just over 11 million people, 
less than one quarter were of European origin. 18 Of these some 60 percent were 
Afrikaans-speaking against 40 percent English-speaking. But in proportion to numbers 
the latter played a comparatively small part in politics, their interests instead lying 
predominantly in the domination of industry and commerce. 19 This meant that many of 
16 Garner, The Commonwealth Ofce, p. 26 
17 See C. P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 1921-48 (Toronto: 1983) p. 117 
18 The relationship between the DO and the coloured population within the Union of South Africa was 
often complicated by the idea that `it was basic to the political rhetoric of southern Africa that it was a 
"white man's country"'. See Martin Chanock, Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia and South 
Africa, 1900-1945 (London: 1977) p. 13 
19 `... the tradition of leaving politics to the politicians (who are mainly Dutch) is so ingrained in South 
Africa that the average Englishman out there is quite content to cheer General Smuts, without 
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the key figures dealing with Whitehall were men with' distinctly Anglophobe outlooks 
amongst whom there was considerable opposition not just to the Dominion idea but to 
the British Empire as a whole. Generals Hertzog and Smuts, the old Boer war 
colleagues, existed in an often uneasy coalition, the United Party overseeing a country 
which reflected the government, a sometimes unstable collection of peoples differing in 
language, religion and outlook . 
20 Even those individuals who were committed supporters 
of Britain, most notably Smuts, had deep reservations about the best stance for the 
Union to adopt in the event of another war in Europe? ' 
Australia's approach to its relationship with London differed considerably from that 
adopted by both Canada and the Union as its connections with, and indeed 
dependence, on Britain was far more pronounced. With its 'White Australia' policy 
actively discouraging the immigration of non-British Europeans, by 1939 nearly 90 
percent of the country's population came from the British Isles. Although the 
government in Canberra remained proud of the autonomy attached to its Dominion 
status, during the inter-war years there was a lack of interest in foreign affairs and a 
general willingness to defer to British policy. The only noticeable exception to this rule 
was the situation in the Far East. In neighbouring New Zealand, held by many within 
Whitehall to be 'the dutiful Dominion', there was an even greater sense of commitment 
to the Imperial idea. 2 Without representation in foreign capitals and happy to rely on 
the Governor-General in Wellington for communication with the British government, it 
would not be until 1947 that the country's parliament finally enacted the Statute of 
Westminster. It however maintained a pronouncedly different interpretation of 
international affairs from Britain and after 1935 a broadly socialist Labour government 
held power in Wellington. Nonetheless it continued to be the most firmly supportive of 
the idea that the Dominions should automatically participate in any war in which Britain 
was involved. 
watching what he is doing, and was, even at one time, anxious to get on with General Hertzog'; see 
`South Africa: The British', That National Review, Number 116 (January 1941), pp. 23-24 
20 See W. K. Hancock, Smuts, The Fields of Force, 1919-1950 (London: 1968) pp. 318-325; C. M. Van 
der Heever, General J. B. M. Hertzog (Johannesburg: 1946) pp. 278-283 
21 See W. H. Clark, `Race Relations and Political Trends in the Union of South Africa, 1935-1940', 
April 1940, Clark Papers (University of Cape Town) 
22 See Angus Ross, `Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter? New Zealand and the Commonwealth 
in the Inter-war Years', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Volume X (1972), pp. 28-44 
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It is clear therefore that, for the DO, the inter-war' environment it faced was a 
complicated one. Indeed this was especially the case with the questionable enthusiasm 
for its mission amongst those who surrounded it. In light of this it seems hard to 
disagree with those who have wondered how the department was able to function at 
all, prior to 1939, other than in 'mounting salvage operations to limit the harm caused 
by differences between the Dominions and the British Government'. 3 At the war's 
outbreak, with a staff of less than one hundred and a ramshackle collection of offices, 
it faced an enormous challenge to overcome the prejudices of the many that continued 
to dismiss it as 'a Post Office'. 
This did not mean however, as has recently been suggested, that the DO lacked any 
sense of purpose. 24 With the worsening of the war, the pressure quickly increased on it 
to protect the relationship with the Dominions. This meant dealing, amongst other 
things, dealing with a growing collection of politicians, both at home and abroad, 
whose actions and comments seemed intent on creating a disastrous rift. In this 
requirement the DO was not to be found wanting and, although it had no previous 
experience of operating under wartime conditions, with each dispute its own 
confidence in its abilities appeared to grow. At the same time, as the military situation 
deteriorated, by chance a Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs was appointed in 
London who was determined to prevent any collapse. By 1942, when Lord Cranborne 
was moved from the DO to head the Colonial Office (CO), he left behind him a 
department which was playing a key role in the Allied war effort, namely the effective 
maintenance of the Anglo-Dominion alliance. 
The department's role and its importance during the early years of the war is undeniably 
a subject that has been overlooked in most examinations of the British Empire and the 
Second World War. It has in fact been common for many imperial historians of the 
period to have entirely failed even to acknowledge the DO's existence. 25 Others, in 
" John O'Brien, `Conditional Loyalties: Australia, Ireland and the Decline of the Dominions Office', 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies Seminar Paper (1990), p. 2 
24 See Ronald Hyam, `The British Empire in the Edwardian Era' in Brown and Louis (eds. ), The 
Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, p. 256 
25 For example James Morris, Farewell the Trumpets (London: 1978); Bernard Porter, The Lion's 
Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1983 (London: 1975); David Reynolds, Britannia 
Overruled (London: 1991); P. J. Cain & A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 
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mentioning its activities, have done so only in referring to Britain's waning power or 
when dealing with specific incidents which produced clashes between key individuals. 26 
An exclusive focus on the military achievements of the combined Imperial forces, which 
ultimately proved instrumental in helping secure victory on all fronts, have provided 
others with their subject matter. 7 Where the DO does secure a mention it is most often 
in the form of, at most, a few pages but, in some cases, it merits no more than a mere 
footnote. 28 
The exceptions to this general rule are rare. Unquestionably the most important of these 
is the autobiography written some twenty-five years ago by Joe Garner. 29 Baron Garner 
of Chiddingly was the only civil servant to publish an account of his experiences in the 
department. This began in the DO where he started the war as a principal and 
continued through to recount his experiences in the department's successors, the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and the Commonwealth Office where he finished his 
career as Permanent Under Secretary. 30 As he himself recalls, when he was first 
assigned to the department in October 1930, it was a part of Whitehall 'of whose 
existence up till (sic) that time I had been sublimely ignorant'. Undoubtedly the best 
published source of information about the DO's operational machinery and the people 
who manned it, there is a wealth of anecdotes and personal detail about his time in 
what he, and those around him, affectionately called 'the Office'. Less than five 
percent of the text is devoted to the wartime period, however, and much of that deals 
1914-90 (London: 1993) 
Z6 See Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, John Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the 
British Empire (London: 1982); Colin Cross, The Fall of the British Empire (London: 1968); David 
Day, Menzies and Churchill at War (New York: 1988); David Day, The Great Betrayal, Britain, 
Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War 1939-42 (Melbourne: 1988) 
Z' For example Glen St. J. Barclay, The Empire is Marching (London: 1976); William Elliot and 
H. Duncan Hall (eds. ), The British Commonwealth at War (New York: 1943); F. W. Perry, The 
Commonwealth Armies, Manpower and Organisation in Two World Wars (Manchester: 1988) 
28 For example J. D. B. Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions (London: 1966); W. David McIntyre, 
The Commonwealth of Nations: Origin and Impact (Minneapolis: 1977); Paul Knaplund, Britain, 
Commonwealth and Empire, 1901-1955 (London: 1956); Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial 
Experience (London: 1996) 
29 See Garner, The Commonwealth Office 
30 One of Garner's colleagues did produce an unpublished memoir for which Batterbee wrote a 
foreward; The Memoirs of Sir Charles Dixon, Batterbee Papers (Rhodes House Library) Box 20/5 
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with events post-1942 and the expansion of the war. At the same time, although there 
is reference to primary documentation, greatest emphasis is placed on Garner's 
personal recollection and mistakes sometimes occur when describing the precise details 
surrounding certain events. Nonetheless The Commonwealth Office offers an excellent 
perspective of wartime DO operations. 
Aside from the above account, every other contemporary autobiography broadly relates 
to the workings of the CO, a much larger and older department that enjoys a far more 
comprehensive level of coverage. Although its focus lies with the CO's role and 
function, the two volumes produced by Sir Charles Jeffries do however make useful 
references to events within the DO. 31 Sir Cosmo Parkinson, who frequently moved 
between both departments during the early war period, also produced a slim volume 
offering some interesting descriptions of the prevailing atmosphere. 32 Whitehall and the 
Commonwealth, written thirty-five years ago by John Cross, is useful in terms of 
tracing the DO's evolution but again treats the Second World War as something of a 
footnote. 33 
Robert Holland's Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance remains perhaps the key study 
of Anglo-Dominion relations during the inter-war period. With his extensive reference to 
the primary source material then available, he concentrates on the economic 
relationship between the different governments. Holland also illustrates the degree to 
which, from the Locarno Treaties onwards, Britain and the Dominions no longer shared 
a common approach towards international questions. Although generally sympathetic 
towards its achievements with only limited resources and support, he concludes that 
the DO 'never developed the political muscle to affect British policy-making 
generally-and had perforce to concentrate on tactics rather than strategy'. 34 The other 
study of note in this regard is Ritchie Ovendale's, Appeasement and the English 
Speaking World in which the emphasis is placed on the Dominion's role in the years 
31 Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service (Cambridge: 1938); Sir Charles Jeffries, 
The Colonial Office (London: 1956) 
32 Cosmo Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within (London: 1947) 
33 John Cross, Whitehall and the Commonwealth: British Departmental Organisation for 
Commonwealth Relations, 1900-1966 (London: 1967) 
34 Robert Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-1939 (London: 1981) p. 172 
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immediately prior to September 1939 and the outbreak of war. 35 
Of course, no study such as this could be attempted without a thorough examination of 
the various relevant volumes produced by Nicholas Mansergh. 36 Having briefly served in 
the wartime DO, as Smuts Professor of the History of the British Commonwealth at 
Cambridge University he went on to become one of the dominant forces in the study of 
imperial history. Once again however, although there is considerable discussion about 
'Dominion status', the workings of the DO appear as little more than a page of 
explanation in which the department's role is portrayed as the movement of information 
between the various Dominion capitals. He does however recognise that those 
individuals staffing the DO needed to be able to do more than act simply as 
administrators, the essential criteria required for working in the CO, they also needed to 
be diplomats. 
With so little published material, this study has been dependent on the information 
contained within the DO's own files and especially the D035 class of 'General 
Correspondence'. Although the Public Record Office holds in excess of 40,000 DO 
files, nearly half of which are in the D035 class, it seems clear that following the 
passage of the Public Records Act in 1958 a widespread destruction of documents took 
place. A number of those that remain carry hand-written comments stating that they 
had been deemed to be of historical value and were thus saved. Despite the 
suggestions of some Dominion historians that there was a deliberate pattern intended to 
hide a variety of alleged intrigues, no evidence has emerged to support such claims. 37 
Whilst a 1941 defence regulation allowed for the early destruction of sensitive 
documents, what instead seems to have happened is that owing to constraints of time 
and space the procedures for reviewing records allowed the individuals involved a great 
35 Ritchie Ovendale, Appeasement and the English Speaking World (Cardiff: 1975) 
36 Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth and Nations (London: 1948); Nicholas Mansergh, Survey 
of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy, 1931-39 (London: 1952); Nicholas 
Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and 
Post-War Change, 1939-1952 (Oxford: 1958); Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience 
(London: 1969) 
37 E. M. Andrews, The British Commonwealth and Aggression in the East, 1931-1935 (Sydney: 1987) 
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10 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
Introduction 
deal of autonomy of action 38 As a result certain subject areas are well covered with 
files copied in triplicate, in others there is virtually no saved material. 
Indeed whatever the exact reason behind the gaps which now exist in the records, in 
some categories and for certain years there are considerable omissions. Although it is 
impossible to say with any real degree of accuracy just how many files were destroyed, 
an examination of the D03 hand-written indexes to the D035 class would place the 
figure in excess of 50 percent. It should be remembered that many of these could have 
been of little or no historical value, whilst some were undoubtedly copies which have 
been saved elsewhere. It should also be noted that this study has been greatly aided by 
the opening of hitherto closed DO files, such as the papers of Sir Eric Machtig, a key 
figure in the wartime department. Nonetheless it has been necessary to undertake an 
exhaustive survey of other primary sources in an attempt to circumvent the 
deficiencies. Official Foreign Office and Cabinet records held in London along with a 
wide variety of overseas archives, especially the Public Archive of Canada in Ottawa, 
have proven invaluable; the latter contains extensive microfilm copies of the DO35 
class taken from the originals in London. Personal archives throughout the UK and 
abroad have also contained copies of missing official documents along with diaries and 
letters that have provided an excellent source of information. Together these have 
allowed for a comprehensive reconstruction of events. 
Although they both achieved Dominion status, this study makes no specific reference 
to either Newfoundland or the Irish Free State. The former, Britain's oldest colony, was 
badly hit by the global economic Depression and the fall in international fish prices, and 
in 1933 the government was unable to pay the interest charges on its national debt. 
Subsequently it continued within the DO's remit but in place of responsible government 
it was instead administered by a 'Commission of Government', appointed by a Royal 
Commission and consisting of a mixture of British and Newfoundland civil servants, 
technically making it no longer a Dominion. 39 
38 See Anne Thurston, Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations 
Office and Commonwealth Office (London: 1995) pp. 57-59,63-67 
39 See Empire Information Service, Origins and Purpose: A Handbook on the British Commonwealth 
and Empire (London: 1946) pp. 66-68 
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The DO's wartime relationship with the Irish Free State is a much more complicated 
issue, one surely meriting its own dedicated study. In December 1936, the Irish 
government had passed the External Affairs Act and, thus, only recognised the British 
monarch for certain limited purposes in external affairs. The following year a 
referendum accepted the proposal of a new constitution and, in July 1937, a new 
country came into existence. With the creation of Eire, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, 
which had given the Irish Free State the same position in the Commonwealth as the 
other Dominions, ceased to have any real meaning. The Governor-General was replaced 
with a President elected by national suffrage whilst the British High Commissioner in 
Dublin's title also changed. Nevertheless Britain and the other Dominions continued to 
regard Eire as a member of the Commonwealth and its constitution as that of a 
Dominion. However the Government of Eire, headed by Eamon de Valera, neither 
acknowledged any allegiance to the Crown nor would it accept the Dominion 
conception of the unity of the Commonwealth 40 A number of contemporary observers 
pointed to the decision to remain neutral in September 1939 as the most conclusive 
evidence that Dominion status equated fully with independent status. But in terms of its 
dealings with the DO, this caused numerous complications and a wartime relationship 
entirely different from that existing with the other Dominions. In light of the recent 
opening of numerous documents at the Public Record Office, this area is now ripe for 
detailed examination. 
In terms of structure, following a description of its evolution and operation, this study 
has chosen as its starting point the uncertainty which surrounded the outbreak of the 
Second World War and whether the Dominions would again side with Britain as they 
had done twenty-five years before. Proceeding forward from September 1939 it 
examines various episodes and incidents in a loosely chronological manner, in each case 
highlighting the efforts made by the DO to defend the Anglo-Dominion relationship. Its 
skills at crisis management reached their zenith following the Japanese attack in the Far 
East in December 1941 as the department attempted to prevent what seemed a 
potentially devastating rupture in Anglo-Australian relations. The eventual re-shuffle of 
the British War Cabinet shortly after the February 1942 surrender of the Imperial forces 
40 See Dierdre McMahon, `Ireland and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1900-1948' in Brown and Louis 
(eds. ), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, pp. 155-158; Mansergh, Survey of British 
Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy, pp. 270-328 
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in Singapore is taken as the end point. With the war rapidly widening, this point 
represents the beginning of a new relationship for the British Commonwealth of Nations 
as the role of the United States quickly grew and the Dominions looked increasingly 
towards Washington and not London for guidance. 
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The Evolution of a Dominions Office 
In the Seventeenth century, concerted attempts began to develop some form of 
organization through which Great Britain could administer effectively its expanding 
Empire. ' The first step taken in July 1660, the year of the Restoration, was the 
establishment of a Committee of the Privy Council, the role of which would be to deal 
with the colonies. Initially it was referred to as the 'Council of Foreign Plantations' and 
was for the most part composed of Members of Parliament. But within twelve years it 
had expanded and, as the 'Council of Trade and Plantations', its regular meetings were 
attracting the attention of King Charles II. This combining together of trade and colonial 
affairs lasted, with short temporary interruptions, for more than a century during which 
time the Council remained London's principal method of governing its overseas 
possessions. 2 
In 1768 a Secretary of State was appointed to head the now renamed 'American or 
Colonial Department', the Earl of Hillsborough being the first tasked with handling the 
Sovereign's Affairs. This arrangement only lasted for fourteen years when it was 
abolished following the loss of the American colonies. During the final two years, a 
'Council of Trade' was revived but it had little real authority on colonial questions. In 
1794 'Colonial Office' became an accepted term following Henry Dundas's 
appointment as Secretary for War with nominal responsibility for the Colonies. This 
arrangement was also relatively short-lived as, in 1801, the colonies were included 
within the expanded remit of the renamed Secretary of State for War. From 1815 
onwards and the end of the long-running Napoleonic Wars, the Secretary for War and 
the Colonies, as he was now termed, became increasingly concerned with the latter 
alone. 
By 1854 military affairs had been removed to a newly created War Office while the 
Colonial Office (CO) was formerly constituted as a separate and independent 
Department of State. In the first instance it was presided over by a new Secretary of 
' See Sir George Fiddes, The Dominions and Colonial Offices (London: 1926) pp. 264-277; Jeffries, The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service, pp. 206-210; Jeffries, The Colonial Office, pp. 13-26; The Commonwealth Office Year Book 1967 (London: 1967) pp. 5-7; `FCO and its buildings: a 
chronology', a document prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London (1999) 
"Draft notes of a lecture given by Sir John Shuckburgh at Oxford University', July 1937, C0886/32 
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State for Colonies, the Rt. Hon. Sir George Grey, formerly the Home Secretary. The 
new office was initially divided into four geographical divisions, with general business 
being entrusted to the chief clerk. In 1869 an Accounts Branch was set up, while the 
following year a General Department assumed some of the chief clerk's work. 
The first key stage in the creation of an independent Dominions Office (DO) was a 
'Colonial Conference' held in London in 1907 that was attended by delegates from all 
of the self-governing colonies. 3 The fourth conference of its kind to be convened in 
twenty years, it was presided over by the prime minister of the day, Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman. This was the first occasion that Britain's senior Minister had 
taken the chair. Held against a background of growing calls, some of them deemed to 
be quite controversial, for some attempt to be made to rationalise the relationship 
between Britain and the self-governing colonies, a number of far-reaching points were 
agreed. ` 
There was an acceptance that subsequent meetings of this nature would take place 
every four years and be referred to as 'Imperial Conferences'; the idea of the 
establishment of some form of 'Imperial Council' was however roundly dismissed. An 
informal acknowledgment was also agreed that the term 'Dominion' should be adopted 
to differentiate the then self-governing communities of Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, Union of South Africa and Newfoundland from the dependent crown colonies. 
The Confederation of Canada had been created in 1867 with the formal title of 
'Dominion of Canada' and it was successfully argued by representatives from Ottawa 
that the same description should apply for all of the other self-governing colonies. 
Of perhaps greater significance though, in terms of the development of the relationship 
between the Great Britain and the now newly recognised Dominions, was a pledge 
made during the conference by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin. Given largely in 
deference to calls from the overseas politicians present and phrased in very general 
terms, the British government announced its intention to create a department to deal 
3 Overseas Information Leaflet (Number 31), `'The Dominions Office', PRO; ibid, `Minutes of 
Proceedings of the Colonial Conference', 1907, Cd. 3523; `Papers laid before the Colonial 
Conference', 1907, Cd. 3524 
See W. K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Volume I, Problems of Nationality 
1918-1936 (London: 1937) pp. 46-47; Judd, Empire, pp. 220-221 
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exclusively with the Dominions. Much of the impetus' for this move came from the 
knowledge that many Dominions' statesmen had grown to dislike having to deal with 
the CO. Typical of this was Alfred Deakin, Australia's second prime minister, who 
believed the department to have 
... a certain impenetrability, a certain remoteness, a certain weariness of people much 
pressed with affairs and greatly overburdened, whose natural desire is to say `kindly 
postpone this; do not press this; do not trouble us; what does it matter? We have 
enough to do already' ?5 
With such complaints in mind, at the beginning of December 1907 a re-organisation of 
the CO was undertaken. ' Three departments or divisions were created, one of which 
was to be solely responsible for administering the relationship with the Dominions! 
Despite this change, calls continued, both at home and abroad, for further reforms to 
be carried out. First raised during the 1911 Imperial Conference, amongst the most far- 
reaching of these was the suggestion of a complete re-allocation of ministerial 
responsibilities and the creation of an entirely separate Dominions' department. e There 
was scant support for such proposals within Whitehall, although during the years 
immediately prior to August 1914 and the outbreak of hostilities with the Central 
Powers a mounting sense of interest in the Dominions did develop. This saw 
something of a challenge to the CO's authority emerge from both the Foreign Office 
(FO) and the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID). Created in 1904, the latter was a 
purely advisory body headed by the British prime minister, its role being 'to investigate, 
report [and] recommend' on matters which affected the Empire. ' 
s Quoted in `Whitehall and the Commonwealth: The Distribution of Department Responsibility', 
Round Table, Volume 45 (1954/1955), p. 234 
6 `Lord Elgin's Despatch on CO Reorganization', September 1907, Cd. 3795, PRO 
Cross, Whitehall and the Commonwealth, pp. 14-16; Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth 
Alliance, pp. 40-45 
8 See Frederick Madden & John Darwin (eds. ), Select Documents on the Constitutional History of the 
British Empire and Commonwealth, Volume VI, The Dominions and India since 1900 (London: 1993) 
pp. 16-26; I. R. Hancock, `The 1911 Imperial Conference', Historical Studies, Volume 12, Number 47 
(October 1966), pp. 15 6-172 
9 See Cecil Hurst (et al. ), Great Britain and the Dominions (Illinois: 1928) pp. 39-41 
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Whilst the experiences of the First War World highlighted the continued need for 
change within the Anglo-Dominion relationship, both the Asquith and Lloyd George 
governments steadfastly rejected the need for a separate administrative body. Even the 
more modest suggestion that the title of the Colonial Secretary might be altered to 
encompass a reference to the Dominions was roundly dismissed. Such intransigence 
helped ensure that, by the war's end, the CO appeared to have once more asserted its 
dominance over the various Imperial branches. When changes finally came during the 
inter-war years, Leopold Amery was the man who deserves much of the credit for the 
radical re-organisation, although he did have some support, notably from the South 
African Jan Smuts. 1° 
One of the most significant catalysts was the inability or unwillingness of successive 
post-war governments in London to consult the Dominions over vital foreign policy 
decisions. " This had caused mounting tensions, most notably in 1922 during the 
dispute between the British and Turkish governments known as the Chanak crisis. 12 
The disagreements which this caused were not the only source of complaint; Ramsay 
MacDonald's first Labour government recognition of the Soviet Union in 1924, without 
any prior discussion with the Dominions, caused great upset. But with the 
announcement in November of the same year that Amery was to become Colonial 
Secretary in the new Conservative government, change would not be long in coming. 
In accepting the position Amery had stipulated to the prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, 
that he 'should be allowed to create a new and entirely separate office to deal with the 
Dominions'. The new Secretary of State had long been a critic, amongst other things, 
of the CO's continuing responsibility for Dominion affairs. His argument in fact called 
for London to make it far more apparent that it held its dealing with the Dominion 
10 See Wm. Roger Louis, 'In the Name of God Go! ' Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of 
Churchill (London: 1992) pp. 75-89; H. Duncan Hall, `The Genesis of the Balfour Declaration of 
1926', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Volume 1 (1961-1963), pp. 173-77; Colin Cross, 
The Fall of the British Empire, 1918-68 (London: 1968) pp. 172-73; Sir Keith Hancock, `Empire, 
Commonwealth, Cosmos and His Own Place: The Smutsian Philosophy', Round Table, Volume 60 
(1970), pp. 444-445 
11 See Philip Wigley, `Whitehall and the 1923 Imperial Conference', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume 1 (1972-1973), pp. 223-236 
12 See David Walder, The Chanak Affair (London: 1969) pp. 215-216,229-230,353; Mark Arnold- Forster, `Chanak Rocks the Empire: The Anger of Billy Hughes', Round Table, Volume 58 (1968), 
pp. 169-177 
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governments to be 'wholly different in character from the administration of the 
dependent Empire', going so far as to call for relation to be placed on an equal level. 13 
A series of lengthy post-war memorandums ultimately produced, at the beginning of 
1925, a document outlining his proposals to form the Dominions and Colonial 
Offices'. " Contained within was a summary of significant events that had occurred 
since the 1907 conference. There then followed a lucid argument placing considerable 
emphasis on the heavily increased workload within the Dominions' Division and the 
changes this should precipitate. As far as Amery was concerned the essential point to 
be borne in mind was that 
... the Dominion and Colonial work are essentially different in character, as different as 
the work of the Foreign Office from that of the Admiralty. The Dominions work is entirely 
political and diplomatic. The Colonial work is administrative and directive. The one calls 
for great insight and infinite tact. The other for initiative and drive. 
However, it was not until the middle of June 1925, eight months after he had first 
been appointed, that the 'sudden' announcement was made to the House of Commons 
of the establishment of a separate DO. 
Much of the delay had been caused by the debate taking place within Westminster 
which followed the release of the Scott Committee's report. This panel, comprising 
three members of the Treasury, had looked into the financial implications associated 
with the establishment of a new department. 15 The determination of the Exchequer, 
and in particular its Permanent Secretary Sir Warren Fisher, to keep expenditure on the 
formation of the new department to a bare minimum nearly proved insurmountable. 1e 
The argument put forward by Treasury Chambers was that a separate department was 
merely duplicating existing duties and so adding to costs. In defending the necessity 
13 L. S. Amery, My Political Life: Volume II, War and Peace 1914-1929 (London: 1953) p. 335 
" Memorandum prepared by Amery, `The Dominions and Colonial Offices - Proposals for Reorganisation', 20 February 1925, DO121/1 (see Appendix One) 
15 `Report by R. R. Scott, H. P. Hamilton and R. V. Nind-Hopkins to Baldwin', 20 February 1925, DO121/1 (see Appendix Two) 
16 See John Rimington, `Sir Warren Fisher's Civil Service', The Source Public Management Journal 
(19 January 2000) 
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for change however, both Amery and the prime minister were quick to point to the 
differences in the nature of the departmental work involved in Dominion relations, on 
the one hand, and colonial administration on the other. " 
The Colonial Secretary's cause was helped, not just by the strong backing he enjoyed 
from Baldwin, but also the high profile he had established for himself in the public 
eye. 18 But it was Amery's sheer determination to see Dominion affairs separately 
managed which in many ways ultimately enabled him to overcome the many obstacles 
he faced. Such was his passion that he even managed to persuade at least some of his 
opponents to soften their hostility towards the 'Foreign Office with a family feeling'. 19 
It would still take another five years though before his desire for a truly separate 
ministry responsible for the Dominions would be fully realised. 
The DO's Early Development 
From the date of its establishment in June 1925 the new department operated out of 
the 'Government Offices, Whitehall, North Block', a building of five floors, one below 
ground level, located at the corner of Whitehall and Downing Street. 2° Known 
affectionately by those who worked within it as 'the Office', the DO remained here for 
the whole of its short existence. The building had originally been erected between 
1862 and 1875, the famous architect Sir George Gilbert Scott presiding over a 
controversial project which suffered repeated delays from the interventions of the then 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston. During the thirteen year construction period, the 
CO's staff petitioned their Secretary of State on the unsatisfactory conditions in which 
they found themselves required to work. At this time the greatest complaint was that 
'the sky was visible through a large hole in the roof with rain and snow running down 
" Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-1952, pp. 398-401; Garner, The 
Commonwealth Office , pp. 10-12 
IS For example Amery to General Sir C. Ferguson, 19 March 1925, DO121/1; ibid., Amery to Bruce 
and Massey, 19 March 1925; see Louis, 'In the Name of God Go! ', pp. 88-89 
" Sir Walter Runciman quoted in Gerald Palmer, Consultation and Co-operation in the British 
Commonwealth (London: 1934) p. 24 
20 Memorandum prepared by Robinson (CO), 12 May 1937, C0886/32 
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into one room'. Z' But despite expenditure on the interior being kept to a bare minimum, 
a report prepared just before the outbreak of the Second World War nevertheless 
proved quite complimentary about the building's structure and its well-built, thick, solid 
walls and high ceilings. 22 
In order that a self-contained area might be found for its new, junior colleague, the CO 
was reorganised. Although Amery thought it would not create 'the slightest difficulty 
or possibility of friction', for many years to come some of those moved would 'look 
with envious eyes at the comparatively few rooms [the DO] occupied'. 23 Indeed, in 
what was described by the first Secretary of State as 'a purely housekeeping matter', 
the DO took rooms in the basement, ground and first floors on the Whitehall front of 
the building. The majority of the department's staff were however actually located in a 
cluster of rooms on the ground and first floors. 24 Some of these overlooked Whitehall 
and the Cenotaph, the remainder the prime minister's residence at No. 10 Downing 
Street. 25 Above these rooms there was the library and below the Telegraph Section, 
both of which were common to the two departments. 
The usual entrance for DO staff was through a small doorway in Downing Street, 
although there was a more imposing doorway from the inner quadrangle leading to a 
pillared hall on the ground floor. From this a massive spiral staircase went as far as the 
second floor. 26 In the first floor corridor a partition was erected, largely for the benefit 
of outsiders, although it was said to be difficult to point to an actual boundary 
between the two departments. 27 As for the room for the Secretary of State of 
Dominion Affairs, on the Whitehall front, it was said to 'lack the splendour of the 
Colonial Secretary's room and was apt to be noisy'. 
21 Memorandum prepared on the Building of the Colonial Office by Sir Frank Baines, Office of 
Works, 9 October 1925, C0886/32 
22 Memorandum prepared by Ministry of Works, January 1938, DO35/548D 
23 Amery to Baldwin, 23 May 1925, DO121/1 
24 Ibid., Amery to Baldwin, 23 May 1925 (see Appendix Three) 
25 See Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within, pp. 12-13; Garner, The Commonwealth Office, 
pp. 15-16; `The Buildings of the FCO , httn: //193.114.50.10/directorv/dvnpa! e. asp? Page=611 
26 Jeffries, The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service, p. 208 
27 Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 15 
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Conditions in this setting were often difficult as space was at a premium and the 
enforced under-spending that had taken place during the original construction in the 
1860s meant there were few luxuries. During the early years the main room used by 
the department's clerks was 
... uncomfortably full with its present staff, especially 
in the winter. Only the part near 
the windows is adequately lighted while the hot water system, the temperature of which 
cannot be controlled, renders that part of the room almost unbearably stuffy. 28 
By 1941 the situation had become so bad that the lighting in the telegraph section was 
deemed as being responsible for the poor eyesight of those who were obliged to work 
there. 29 The amount of free space had also not improved, it being recorded in the same 
year that eight clerks had a space of only four hundred square feet in which to work, 
not allowing for filing cabinets and volumes of letters and cables. 3o 
Despite opposition from their own Secretary of State, two years previously some of 
the CO's more senior members had proposed major changes, more for the benefit of 
their colleagues than those within their sister Office. 31 The suggestion was put forward 
that two of the DO's internal sections should move from North Block to Parliament 
Square House, three minutes' walk away, leaving just nine thousand square feet within 
the Whitehall offices in which to accommodate the department's remaining ninety-five 
staff. The Ministry of Works was opposed to the idea however as it intended to move 
the DO into refurbished offices in Whitehall Gardens. These would not be ready for 
occupation though until 1943 at the earliest. 32 Although the proposal was strongly 
rejected by the DO's senior officers and even a growing number of CO staff, the then 
Secretary of State of the former surprisingly offered little comment other than to signal 
his agreement. 33 But the war intervened and it was not until mid-1940 that two 
28 Minute by R. Hamblin, 10 April 1929, D035/73 
29 Minute by Costley-White, 5 August 1941, D035/548D 
30 Minute by Howard, 26 September 1941, C0886/24 
31 Ibid., minute by MacDonald, July 1939 
32 Ibid., First Commissioner of Works to MacDonald, 10 July 1939 
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sections, D and E, were finally moved on, for''safety *reasons', ' to a building in Park 
Street, Mayfair. There they remained, later being joined by the CO's Economics and 
Social Services Department. 
Only shortly before this re-organisation was completed, a memorandum had been 
approved within Whitehall entitled 'Maintenance of Government Machinery in a Special 
Emergency'. This was intended to assist in the event of government being reduced to 
the barest minimum following an attempted German invasion. As far as the DO were 
concerned, it called for thirty-two of their staff to work, eat and sleep in five protected 
rooms of the North Block basement. 34 Lists of those personnel who would be affected 
were kept up-to-date until 1943, but the plan was never fully implemented. 
Nonetheless DO staff continued regularly not just to work but also to live within the 
building. 
In the summer of 1941 it was once again proposed that further changes should be 
made to the organisation of the offices at North Block. On this occasion however it 
was not the CO but the Air Ministry seeking greater space. The DO again resisted 
these proposals falling back on the argument first advanced two years before. This 
was that the existing site offered 'special advantage... particularly in the case of crisis 
when it is necessary to maintain contact at all hours of the day and night with the 
Foreign Office and with No. 10'. 35 After considerable discussion, some of which 
appears to have been quite heated, it was agreed to maintain the existing 
arrangements and the bulk of the DO remained based in and around North Block for the 
duration of the war. 36 The only exception was 'the sphere of Tait- Ewbank-Wiseman- 
Macleod', a small group who carried out practically all of the pre-war duties at the 
" Minute by Stephenson, 9 February 1939, C0886/23; minute by Howard (CO), 25 May 1939, 
C0886/24; Duff (Office of Works) to Jeffries (CO), 28 August 1939, D035/548/30; ibid., Jeffries to 
Duff, 11 September 1939 
34 Memorandum `Maintenance of Government Machinery in a Special Emergency', February 1940, 
CO886/37 
31 Minute by Stephenson, 9 February 1939, C0886/23 
36 Memorandum prepared by Stephenson, 25 August 1941, D035/548D; minute by Stephenson, 27 
August 1941, D035/548/30; Sub-committee Report on Accommodation, 26 August 1941, 
D035/548D; minute by Dixon, 20 September 1941, D035/548/30; J. M. Lee & Martin Petter, The 
Colonial Office, War and Development Policy (London: 1982) p. 32 
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corner of Park Street and Park Square 'where they might as well have been a separate 
department'. 37 
The close relationship with the CO meant that the DO's creation did not involve any 
really fundamental change in the crucial area of administrative organisation. 38 For 
several years the department shared, not only, its Secretary of State with its older 
colleague - between 1925 and 1930, and for short periods in 1931 and 1938-39 - but 
also the same building, the same registry, legal staff, library, accounts and even 
printing. There was even a common cafeteria and bar. The enforced bonds between 
the departments did however lead to certain difficulties, particularly in terms of 
promoting any individual sense of character. This subsequently led one senior CO 
officer to compare the DO to 'a wayward child. .. which perhaps suffered... 
from an 
inferiority complex'. 39 With what was clearly felt in certain quarters to be a somewhat 
distorted identity, the Office therefore needed staff of the highest quality. 40 
Following the Labour Party's success in the 1929 General Election, Amery was 
replaced by Lord Passfield. As the renowned social reformer Sidney Webb, he had 
begun his political career within the CO. He took charge for the 1930 Imperial 
Conference at which, according to one of its attendees, it was clear that 'the 
Dominions Office was practically made a Foreign Office dealing with international 
matters within the Empire'. " But aged seventy at the time of his appointment, the 
Secretary of State left little real mark on the DO and headed the still-united 
departments for just twelve months. 
His successor, Jimmy Thomas, had the distinction of becoming the first Minister to 
hold the individual post of Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Now headed by a 
Labour minister, the Treasury, which had been so obstructionist about the funding for 
the new department five years before, on this occasion amended its earlier objections 
37 Shannon to Batterbee, 2 July 1941, Batterbee Papers 
3e Commonwealth Relations Office Handbook, 1952 (London: 1951) p. 7 
39 See Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within, pp. 96-97 
ao See Garner, The Commonwealth Office, pp. 15-24,25-32,137-148,159-175 
41 Sir Fabian Ware quoted in W. J. Harte, The Control of Foreign Policy in the British Commonwealth 
of Nations (London: 1932) p. 29 
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to the change. As Lord Privy Seal, Thomas had'struggled unsuccessfully with the huge 
growth in unemployment brought about by the Depression and his move to the DO 
was clearly seen as a demotion by many of his Cabinet colleagues. Nonetheless he 
tackled his new role with great vigour, announcing upon his arrival that he had been 
sent to the Office 'to see that there's no mucking about with the British Empire'. His 
distinctive approach however proved to be something of a challenge for his new 
colleagues although, with time, the relationship did improve. "' An example can be 
found in the comment of a senior DO official whose task was to 'mind' the Secretary 
of State during the 1932 Ottawa Conference. He privately recorded that, although 
initially 'he would not keep his mouth shut', Thomas' final contribution to proceedings 
was 'an admirable speech in which he said nothing very nicely'. 43 
In 1935, at the age of just thirty-three, Malcolm MacDonald, the son of Ramsay, was 
appointed to head the department, his first Cabinet post. Despite his relative youth and 
the Office's short existence, the new Secretary of State already had a good knowledge 
of his charge, having previously served first as Parliamentary Private Secretary and 
then Parliamentary Under-Secretary to Thomas. He seems to have been well regarded 
by many of those in the DO with whom he worked on a daily basis, and the first since 
Amery to have inspired any real measure of confidence. But within a matter of years 
assessments of MacDonald's abilities would not be so flattering, a number of those 
who later worked with him complaining of his 'less than inspiring character' and an 
'ability to do the minimum amount possible'. 44 He nonetheless appears to have led the 
department well until January 1939, the last six months in an acting capacity after 
Lord Stanley, who had been appointed as Dominions Secretary in May 1938, 
unexpectedly died shortly afterwards. 
The final pre-war Secretary of State, Thomas Inskip, cannot claim to have shared 
MacDonald's general appeal. This despite the fact that, as the Solicitor General in 
'Z James L. Sturgis, `What's in a Name? A Perspective on the Transition of Empire/ Commonwealth, 
1918-50', The Round Table, Number 334 (1995), p. 197 
43 Whiskard to Harding, 13 August 1932, DO121/61; ibid, Whiskard to Harding, 23 August 1932 
" Pearson Diary, 12 September 1939, Lester Pearson Papers (National Archives, Ottawa) Vol. 1-2, 
MG26, N8; Diary, 25 September 1939, Hubert Cowell Papers (Rhodes House Library, Oxford) 
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1931 he had passionately defended the Statute of Westminster, describing it as 'a 
landmark in the constitutional history of the British Empire'. "' 
Opinion was mixed within Whitehall about the calibre of the staff supporting the 
various Secretaries of State. In such a small department the professionalism of its 
personnel was of course critical. According to one retired FO official however, 
reminiscing about attitudes in the department in the late 1930s, the DO and CO 'were 
regarded almost as lesser breeds without the law'. 46 As Lord Chancellor in 1932, Lord 
Sankey also maintained that 'the Dominion Office [did] not contain the best brains in 
the civil service'. 47 Such views apparently persisted, even long after the DO had ceased 
to exist. But these comments failed to recognise the difficult nature of the task facing 
the new Office, not least that from the outset it was only very modest in size. 
The DO was made up of a Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS), an Assistant Under- 
Secretary (AUS), three Assistant Secretaries each in charge of a department, four 
Principals and four Assistant Principals, an administrative total of just thirteen people. 
With no more than eighteen individuals in the clerical grades, most of them registry 
clerks, it would have in fact been impossible for the Office to have functioned as a 
separate body from the CO. The much more senior of the two departments often 
complained during the early years about the inconvenience caused by its colleague's 
demands for typists and clerks; the DO did not even have its own Establishment 
section and relied upon the CO for all 'house-keeping' duties until just before the war. 48 
But within the ranks there were some key individuals, who remained in, or near, to the 
DO throughout its relatively short existence. 'Competent and conscientious rather than 
brilliant', these figures played an influential role in the infant department's 
development. 
"s See A. Berriedale Keith, Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions, 1918-31 (London: 
1932) pp. 285-297 
46 Geoffrey McDermott, The Eden Legacy (London: 1969) p. 36; comments to author by Sir Geofroy 
Tory, May 2000 
"Quoted in O'Brien, `Conditional Loyalties: Australia, Ireland.... ', p. 1 
49 Minute by Fiddian (CO), 24 August 1925, C0866/2 
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The new post of Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Dominion Affairs saw a rapid 
turnover, with eight occupants up to 1940 alone. The first, Sir Charles Davis, had 
headed the CO Dominions' Division and was an old college friend of Amery. He was 
therefore an obvious selection, but the widely respected individual was forced to retire 
in 1930 through ill health. During his time in charge he was supported by Sir Edward 
Harding as AUS and Sir Harry Batterbee, who was appointed to be the department's 
senior Assistant Secretary. Upon Davis' retirement his 'assistants' were quickly 
promoted upwards to replace him, Harding becoming the DO's new senior civil servant. 
This vicar's son, invariably known from his initials as 'E. J. ', Harding was a figure who 
'defended unflinchingly the interests of the Office as he understood them'. "' But at the 
same time he was someone who had 'no gift for getting on with people', his own 
private secretary describing him as 'dedicated, efficient but unattractively self- 
important' and someone who was 'dry, humourless and out of touch with the real 
world'. 5° Despite his then relatively junior position, the prominent role which he had 
established for himself whilst preparing the report for the Dominions Royal 
Commission, released in February 1917, helped mark him for rapid promotion. Indeed 
the knowledge and experience that he gained during the various overseas visits 
connected with the Commission ultimately helped him to secure a position in the new 
DO well above what he might have normally expected. 5' Once the department had 
been formed, his presence could be seen in all of the most significant events. One 
colleague went so far as to argue that 'no state servant played a greater part in 
bringing about' the successful negotiations held during the 1926 Imperial Conference 
and the later Statute of Westminster. 52 PUS until 1939, he then moved to the Union of 
South Africa to become the United Kingdom's High Commissioner, a position he held 
until ill health finally forced his retirement five years later. 
49 Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 21 
50 Comments to author by Sir Geofroy Tory, May 2000 
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His deputy for the duration of his charge in Ldndon, his brother-in-law Batterbee also 
moved in 1939 to become an overseas High Commissioner, the first member of the DO 
to be sent to New Zealand. Up until that point in his career he had held a variety of 
positions and carried out a wide range of different roles: he had paid a secret visit to 
Eire in 1936 to hold discussions with Eamon de Valera, the Irish prime minister; in the 
same year he was despatched to Newfoundland to resolve that Dominion's financial 
crisis; at both Imperial Conferences he fulfilled the pivotal role of Deputy Secretary. 53 
Almost completely the opposite in character to Harding, the 'White Knight', as he was 
fondly known, was perhaps the more likeable of the two and he was pleased to go to 
Wellington as 'official telegrams and dispatches [could] never take the place of 
personal discussion'. For him being High Commissioner was an opportunity to 
'encourage in every way all those means by which we can get to know one another 
better, to appreciate one another's point of view, to realise one another's aspirations 
and difficulties'. 54 
Aside from the obvious family connection, the striking point about these two men, the 
most influential figures in the DO throughout the 1930s, was the common purpose 
they shared and the mutually supportive approach they pursued. Both had attended the 
same Oxford college, both had joined the CO directly upon graduating, both had little 
or no exposure to the reality of the First World War - Harding, who spent much of the 
war touring the overseas Dominions, served for four months - and both were amongst 
the first in 1925 to enter the DO. At this stage Harding, then 45 years of age, had 
already served within the CO for twenty-four years while his brother-in-law, although 
the same age, had four years less experience. 55 In short they were career civil servants 
for whom the maintenance of the standards and practices with which they were 
familiar was an essential parameter of their position. It was their unequivocal support 
of Amery's vision which was their most important strength, in particular, their shared 
conviction that the Dominions required separate representation in Whitehall. This was 
 Biographical notes, Batterbee Papers (Introductory Sheet) 
s' Speech given by Batterbee to Victoria League Overseas, London, 14 December 1938, Batterbee 
Papers (Box 15/2) 
55 See The Colonial and Dominions Office List, Number 79 (London: 1940) pp. 15-17 
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vital during a period when it has been said *that the DO existed only because of 
'flanking movements [and] the deflection of attacks and the search for compromise'. 56 
As the debate during the mid-1920s had revealed, there were no shortage of those 
willing to challenge the DO's existence. During the years that followed an obvious 
priority for the Office therefore was the establishment of sound relationships, wherever 
possible, with its governmental colleagues in Whitehall. While its inter-departmental 
relations appeared sound in many cases, there were some that proved more delicate to 
maintain than others. A common tradition and interests ensured that generally strong 
bonds were kept with the CO. But in the years immediately prior to the outbreak of 
war in 1939, a small measure of resentment began to surface at what was seen to be 
continuing, but now unnecessary, tutelage given by the older of the two. The FO 
meanwhile was much more problematic, for a variety of reasons, although by-and-large 
the association between the two functioned in a broadly effective manner at the 
working level. At the Treasury however there remained many whose original objections 
could not be overcome and who still viewed the newcomer as an unnecessary drain on 
government expenditure. Relations with the Board of Trade were also often strained 
when the subject of Dominion trade, especially with Australia, was at issue. 5' 
Despite the opposition that existed, the Office nonetheless continued to develop and 
by 1938 administrative and other staff numbers had more than doubled. A second 
AUS post had been created in 1931 and filled by Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, another of the 
'old school', who remained in the role until his appointment as High Commissioner to 
Australia five years later. Eric Machtig - himself later knighted - replaced him, being 
once again promoted in early 1940 to PUS. As the senior civil servant within the 
department, this 'man of many parts' would prove one of the key figures in the 
wartime DO, his influence looming large at every juncture. 
There were other individuals whose influence was important. By 1938 aside from the 
PUS and the two AUS's, there were five Assistant Under-Secretaries each in charge of 
a department, thirteen Principals, ten Assistant Principals and thirty-eight other staff. 
56 Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, p. 45 
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There were three notable figures amongst the Assistant Under-Secretaries, each of 
whom would go on to more senior positions within the wartime department. John 
Stephenson, who had fought with distinction throughout the First World War, was held 
to be 'essentially an adviser rather than a strong administrator'. Charles Dixon was 
recognised as the constitutional expert who 'for half a century acted as the guardian 
and conscience of the Office'. And finally there was Percivale Liesching, another 
decorated survivor of four years of military service on the Western Front, who 
ultimately would prove the most successful of the group. 58 
With New Zealand still preferring not to have a British High Commissioner, of the 
thirteen Principals in 1938 three were serving in the Dominions. This latter group 
formed what was described as 'the DO's overseas service', acting as United Kingdom 
High Commissioners in the Dominions. When the Office was set up, the official 
channel of communication between Britain and the Dominions was from the 
Dominions' Secretary to the appropriate Governor-General. However at the 1926 
Imperial Conference it was agreed that Governor-Generals should no longer be regarded 
as the agents of the British government and in future communication would be direct. " 
Traditionally having combined the functions of head of state and British 'diplomatic' 
representative, the Governor-Generals had come to be generally ignored by their 
respective Dominion governments. This was because they either proved difficult of 
character or more commonly because they was seen as 'officials appointed by another 
government for that government's purposes'. B° 
Two fundamental changes were therefore made post-conference. First, in each of the 
Dominion capitals the Minister for External Affairs replaced the Governor-General as the 
sender and recipient of messages, though it would not be until 1942 that New Zealand 
finally chose to make the change. Second, the British Government began the process 
of appointing High Commissioners in each of the Dominions. The emphasis the DO 
attached to having its own representation marked another considerable change from 
the approach the CO Dominions' Division had adopted. Whilst the latter had not seen 
58 See Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 54, p. 290 
s9 See Denis Judd, Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874-1932 
(London: 1968) pp. 328-333 
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any great importance in its staff having a personal knowledge of Dominion conditions, 
the DO saw it is a vital method of establishing a close, working relationship. 
The decision to create such posts also marked another hard-fought victory for Amery, 
once again in the face of determined FO and Treasury opposition, and in April 1928 Sir 
William Clark assumed the first appointment in the Canadian capital. 8' Indeed, although 
the FO had been desperately keen to send its own officials to the Dominions, as it put 
it, as a method of 'keeping the different Gov'ts (sic) of the Empire in step', there was 
much opposition within the DO against such a move. 62 This view was held in part 
because of a desire to see the department develop independently as rapidly as 
possible. It was also felt that the FO's diplomats had little real understanding about 
what the still evolving Anglo-Dominion relationship entailed. Even as late as 1938, 
Batterbee's departure for his new post in Wellington was in part attributed to the 'vital 
[need] that High Commissionerships should not consistently pass to persons drawn 
from other Departments or services'. 63 
It was also felt to be essential that these posts should be filled by informed individuals 
who knew something of the countries to which they were sent. It was also important 
that they should know something about the personalities within them who were 
politically important. Despite having been in Wellington for some time, Viscount 
Galway, the Governor General in New Zealand, still knew so little about his Dominion 
that when the prime minister died in early 1940, he sent a telegram of condolence to 
his widow not realising that he had actually been a bachelor. 64 Exceptions drawn from 
outside of the DO were therefore rare, Sir Gerald Campbell in Ottawa being the obvious 
one. Not until the wartime years, when British High Commissioners occasionally were 
selected from the ranks of Westminster politicians, would the 'unwritten rule' be 
broken, although their subordinate staff still nearly always came from within the 
Office's ranks. 
61 See Norman Hillmer, `Anglo-Canadian Relations 1927-1929: Representation and Responsibility in 
the `New Era' of Empire', Institute of Commonwealth Studies Seminar Paper (1971), pp. 13-18; 
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62 Anonymous Minute, 7 December 1928, F0372/2444 
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Responsibilities and Structure 
The day-to-day methods of conducting business adopted by the DO were for the most 
part inherited from the CO. This meant that formal minuting and all official 
communications were sent in the name of the Secretary of State. Also a high 
proportion of work was generally done on paper, whether it be information for 
superiors, preparing internal memoranda or drafting communications. This would be 
placed in a jacket along with any previous correspondence on the subject and sent on 
to the appropriate department. If the question was not of a purely routine character the 
officer dealing with it would set out various points which he thought might need to be 
taken into consideration along with a recommended course of action. This would then 
be passed along to his senior who could choose to accept the advice already offered, 
adding any comments he thought necessary, seek alternative opinions from his 
colleagues or instead pass the matter on to a higher authority. This process would, if 
need be, repeated until the words 'at once' were added, signifying that that particular 
officer had taken a final decision. 
This may have sounded a relatively straight-forward, if labourious, system but the 
question of assuming responsibility for the final decision was one which required a 
great deal of thought. An officer who signed last had to be prepared to take full 
responsibility for his actions. This meant considering whether a question he tackled 
was 'one which he may properly give a decision or whether it is one which may affect 
matters outside his own particular sphere'. 65 It also meant that the formulation of 
internal policy was an incredibly convoluted, time-consuming process and, by the 
war's outbreak this was the system that still, essentially, remained in place. 66 
The department's early organisation also drew heavily upon its immediate past, it being 
originally designed around the pattern of the old CO Dominions' Division. The work 
was divided into three departments and assigned partly on a subject basis and partly 
on a geographical one. With the passage of time though it became clear that business 
in the DO was increasingly being conducted by subject rather than by area. This 
approach allowed for greater speed and efficiency when it came to ensuring that each 
65 Memorandum prepared by Robinson, 12 May 1937, C0886/32 
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of the Dominions received messages from London at the same time. In so doing 
individuals could monitor reactions from each Dominion capital simultaneously, an 
advantage when it came to trying to provide a timely response. In the 1930s two new 
departments were consequently added to help deal with some of the increased 
responsibilities the Office had gained. " With the outbreak of war and a dramatic 
increase in workload further changes would take place as departmental responsibilities 
became blurred. 
A source of additional support was the FO's Dominions Intelligence Department (DID), 
established in 1926 with the primary function of preparing information on foreign 
affairs for the DO to distribute to the Dominions. With a staff comprising of a Head of 
Department, one assistant and three juniors, it prepared so-called 'Intels' for the DO. 
These provided a survey of the international situation for Dominion governments, each 
of which at this stage had only the most rudimentary of External Affairs departments. 
With the growing tension in the 1930s, the service was substantially stepped up so 
that by 1939 huge numbers of documents were being generated for Dominion 
consumption. But 'in the stress of war... [the DID] virtually ceased to exist' and by mid- 
1940 it no longer provided any real coverage of events. "' This would remain the case 
until early 1943 when a specific liaison officer with the FO was finally appointed. In 
the interim however the DO was forced to look elsewhere for its information. 
Recruitment, unlike for potential members of the FO, was conducted through the Home 
Civil Service examination, placing the DO on the same footing as the other Home 
Departments in Whitehall. The reasoning behind this was to ensure that recruits were 
selected on their potential as administrators rather than as diplomats, even though their 
appointment involved a potential requirement to serve overseas where their duties 
would be predominantly diplomatic in character. One senior departmental member 
publicly argued however that 'when one talks about Dominions Office administration, 
67 See Appendix Four. Also `the only information available for the period 1940-1946 is as follows. 
During the war the boundaries of the departments altered frequently and new quasi-departments were 
added. In 1940 Department C split into Cl and C2'; see Thurston, Records of the Colonial Office, 
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one is really talking about something which i§ almost* non-existent'. 89 Whatever the 
case, once recruited in this manner a great deal of time was spent by a new Office 
member learning his job. From appointment as Assistant Principal, the average 
recorded time to achieve promotion to Principal was a little under six years; during the 
first four years it was said that an officer had virtually no responsibility to take action 
on his own authority and there was little room for individual initiative. Only with 
approaching war and its unique demands would this system change, and throughout 
1939 a whole series of Acting Principals were appointed. 
Despite later being described as 'a department full of bachelors', the CO and DO were 
prominent among those Whitehall departments which refused to accept women within 
their ranks, a reflection perhaps of the dominance of Harding and Batterbee and their 
'establishment' backgrounds. "' Not until 1938 with Malcolm MacDonald at the helm - 
and whilst his Parliamentary Under-Secretary was carrying out an overseas tour - did 
first the CO and then the DO allow women entrants from the Home Civil Service 
examination. Very few applications were received before the onset of war. Even then 
the few entrants appear to have maintained an almost entirely periphery role, the 
comment being made in 1941 that there were 'some young women nominally juniors 
but they might just as well not be there, except that they are quite decorative'. " The 
war also led to four coloured men being employed for administrative work and one 
coloured woman taking a position in the Library. 72 It was said that no actual 'bar' 
existed within either department but it was noted at the war's end that it was not 
expected that coloured officers would remain once the examination procedure was 
resumed, the clear inference being that any such candidates who applied would not be 
selected. 
In terms of the working day, before the outbreak of hostilities there was some measure 
of flexibility, it tending to begin very late with senior officers frequently not arriving at 
their desks before 1 lam. Here they normally stayed beyond 7pm each evening. The 
69 Sir Herbert Stanley (Governor of South Rhodesia), `Colonial and Dominion Office 
Administration', Public Administration (October 1938), pp. 420-421 
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standard working week operated over five and' a half days with every member of the 
Office working at least part of the Saturday. For some though the DO never closed and 
to ensure a twenty-four hour service, essential for dealing with messages from all parts 
of the world, quarters were made available for the Resident Clerk who would normally 
'live-in' for a two week period. 
Indeed as the DO developed so did its workload. Whether it be messages of the most 
formal kind, routine enquiries on individual matters or even personal notes between 
prime ministers, communications could be sent by mail or by telegraph and, in the 
latter case, in plain code or secret cypher. From the first week of November 1924 to 
the middle of July 1925, a total of 115 telegrams mentioning foreign affairs were sent 
out to the Dominions. 73 Just three years later, the total number of papers dealt with by 
the department's registry clerks had increased over thirty percent in the Office's first 
year of existence. 74 A telling indication of the amount of work involved at moments of 
the greatest pressure was given by MacDonald. In November 1938 he informed the 
House of Commons that 'the number of circular telegrams sent to each of the 
Dominion Governments on foreign affairs since the beginning of [the year]... had been 
398', some 150 of these being sent during September and the Munich crisis. 75 Within 
less than a year by September 1939 there had been a dramatic increase and 
approximately 17,000 letters and telegrams had either been sent or received during the 
last eight months. 78 
Despite this volume of work, and all of the other pressures placed upon the officers 
who worked within the DO, at the outbreak of war morale was generally excellent. 
According to one of its members, summing up his feelings, life 
" Minute by Harding, 17 July 1925, D035/1 
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... was never dull - on the contrary this relatively tiny Department was called upon to 
handle work of a high degree of interest and variety, since it was concerned with the 
whole gamut of governmental business... together with the prospect of a posting 
overseas, this gave [it] something of the aura of an elite service and made it especially 
attractive. " 
It was therefore an essentially positive attitude that prevailed in September 1939, 
when the department found itself facing what would prove to be its first and only war. 
Its role in this conflict, the significance of which Amery had pointed to only fourteen 
years before, would be to manage the wartime relationship between the Dominions 
and the British government and, where necessary, resolve problems to everybody's 
mutual satisfaction. There was no guarantee that this would be an easy task, with 
criticism ringing in its ears from individuals such as former Australian prime minister 
William Hughes with his argument that the 'department was as obsolete as the muzzle 
loading rifle and the hansom cab'. "' But drawing upon what it had managed to learn 
during its relatively short existence and the knowledge of a few of the older members 
of the Office who had some memory of the CO's Dominions' Division during the First 
World War, it nonetheless embarked upon this wholly new experience. 
Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 32 
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Preparations for War and the Role of the Dominions 
A Common Imperial Foreign Policy 
In August 1914 the British government announced that it intended to defend Belgium's 
recently violated neutrality. Although this committed it to war with Germany, none of 
the Dominions hesitated in offering their broadly unconditional backing of the decision. 
Even in the case of the Union of South Africa, which had itself been involved in a 
conflict with Britain just twelve years before, the authorities readily acquiesced. The 
only stipulation from Pretoria was that their involvement in the new war should be 
restricted solely to matters of national defence. This support came after a period during 
which a number of senior Dominion figures had expressed growing anxieties about 
their relationship with London. Few doubts existed within the British government 
however that Dominion assistance would be offered. ' With large populations of, in 
many cases, only recently arrived British settlers, emotional ties and moral concerns 
about the wider implications of German actions provided obvious stimuli for 
participation. ' But there were, in fact, more compelling reasons which encouraged the 
Dominions not to hesitate in their decision. 
In 1897 Canada had been the first of them to introduce a conditional form of Imperial 
Preference into its tariff. From this point onwards, escalating economic dependency 
effectively required all of the far-flung Dominions to retain the closest possible link with 
the fiscal actions of the authorities in London. 3 Also to be considered were the 
comments made at the 1911 Imperial Conference by the British foreign secretary, Sir 
Edward Grey. Dire warnings had been given to the visiting Dominion leaders about 
Germany's European intentions and what, if they proved successful, this would mean 
for the British Empire. Having, for the first time, been 'initiated into the secrets of the 
foreign policy being pursued', for the Dominions to have then stood by and not 
supported Britain in the summer of 1914 would have been surprising. ` For it must 
See Hyam, `The British Empire in the Edwardian Era' in Brown and Louis (eds. ), The Oxford 
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surely have been recognised throughout the respective Dominion capitals that if the 
centre were to collapse their position would be tenuous at best. ' 
The horrendous casualty figures of the 1914-18 war were to alter irrevocably the 
relationship placing enormous strains on the unity of the wartime coalition. Hence the 
introduction of Resolution IX at the specially convened 1917 Imperial War Conference, 
a hurried attempt at controlling what had become a growing diplomatic crisis. 
Reflecting the shared responsibility created by wartime pressures, this for the first time 
defined the Dominions as 'autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth' taking 
part in military operations only as a result of 'mutual consultation'. 
' Much of the reason 
behind the authorities in London agreeing to this description was the need to placate 
the concerns of the Dominion leaders who had temporarily relocated to the Empire's 
capital. It was also done, however, to assist the British government's guests in finding 
some measure of succour from the domestic criticism they faced. 
Both aims were successfully accomplished but, with its formal elucidation of what had 
previously been a sometime vague relationship, the resolution also ensured that the 
Dominions would approach their future dealings with Britain in quite a different 
manner. Indeed, following the war's end, London's wartime allies were quick to 
demonstrate their strong desire to build upon this newly secured status. Resolution IX 
had stated that foreign policy would no longer be made solely by Whitehall but, 
instead, would be based upon 'continuous consultation'. 7 And for the peace 
conferences that followed the war's end, despite some reluctance by the British prime 
minister David Lloyd George, who had first invited them to London, the right to 
separate Dominion representation was secured. As a consequence, for the first time, 
each attending delegate signed the official documents on behalf of his own 
government. Whilst there continued to be differing interpretations of what the new 
relationship entailed, as the signing of the Locarno Treaty in 1925 again showed, each 
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of the Dominion governments was now prepared to exercise to the full the widely 
accepted autonomy from British policy it felt it enjoyed. ' 
At the same time lengthy negotiations were being conducted behind the scenes 
between the FO in London and various Dominion politicians. In these some sympathy 
was shown towards claims that the Dominions should now have a more developed role 
in international affairs. But in many cases the Whitehall department's support was not 
offered out of any real conviction for the proposal. The rationale was, instead, a belief 
that the Dominions should take greater responsibility for their own problems leaving the 
British authorities free to focus on more important 'Great Power' issues. These 
negotiations saw their conclusion at the 1926 Imperial Conference with the celebrated 
opening address given to the Committee of Inter-Imperial Relations by the Lord 
President of the Council, Lord Balfour. Coming so soon after Lord Byng, the Governor- 
General in Ottawa, had chosen to intervene directly in Canadian domestic politics, this 
provided a forceful description of the wide-ranging nature of Dominions' autonomy. 
Crucially, in Balfour's opinion, this was also 'the only constitution possible if the British 
Empire is to [continue] to exist'. ' With the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which 
attempted to formalise it and other, earlier statements, the Balfour Declaration provided 
the basis from which analysis of the inter-war Anglo-Dominion relationship would be 
conducted. 7° 
Whilst such developments were portrayed as official policy, the British government, no 
doubt wary about the wider implications of its wartime promises, had already settled 
on a quite different private method for consulting with the Dominions. This was based 
on a simple premise, spelt out at the 1923 Imperial Conference, that 'a Government 
contemplating any negotiation should consider its effects upon the other Governments 
B See Darwin, `The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics' in Brown and Louis (eds. ), The Oxford 
History of the British Empire: Volume IV, pp. 67-69; Robert Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness, 
Britain and the World Role, 1900-70 (London: 1991) pp. 87-120; Norman Hillmer, `The Foreign 
Office, the Dominions and the Diplomatic Unity of the Empire, 1925-29' in David Dilks (ed. ), Retreat 
From Power, Volume One (London: 1981) pp. 64-65 
9 Speech at Edinburgh, 27 January 1927, quoted in George Bennett (ed. ), The Concept of Empire 
(London; 1953) pp. 398-402 
10 See Keith, Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions, pp. 16-47; B. E. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour, 1906-30 (London: 1936) p. 381; Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1939, pp. 1-88; Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-1952, pp. 11-16; Harvey, Consultation and Co-operation, pp. 1-10 
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and keep them informed'. With this in mind if, having 'been informed of its proposed 
intentions, no unduly adverse comments were received from the Dominion capitals, the 
authorities in London deemed themselves consequently free to proceed with policy as 
they saw fit. " During the 1930s, with the Union of South Africa and Canada both 
often preoccupied by distracting internal issues and New Zealand, and to a lesser but 
still significant degree Australia, both still captivated by the Imperial concept, critical 
responses were therefore a rare phenomenon. 12 And, in any case, as far as foreign 
policy was concerned the Dominion governments, with their undermanned and under- 
funded external affairs departments, seemed content to still depend on London's 
resources. " 
The global financial crisis that worsened at the beginning of the 1930s only confirmed 
this, now placing even greater emphasis on the role played by the British government. 
With the world's economies in turmoil, at the Imperial Economic Conference held in 
Canada in September 1932, the importance of protective 'Imperial Preference' 
measures was re-endorsed by all sides. This took place against a backdrop of generally 
deteriorating political relations and the raising of more questions about the durability of 
the Dominion idea. 14 But there seemed few economic alternatives to the Ottawa 
agreements and although future commercial relations were often worse rather than 
better, the fiscal policies accepted by the Dominion governments kept them close to 
London, in mind if not always in heart. Despite the appearance of measures being 
implemented to update the Anglo-Dominion relationship, by the Second World War's 
outbreak the Dominions were therefore effectively no less financially dependent on 
Britain than they had been twenty-five years before. 
" Hankinson to Harvey, 28 March 1939, F0800/310 
12 MacDonald to Halifax, 23 March 1938, D035/576; see Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand 
(London: 1959) p. 277; F. L. W. Wood, `The Dominion of New Zealand at War' in Elliot & Duncan 
Hall, The British Commonwealth at War, pp. 407-412; Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth 
Affairs, 1939-1952, p. 16 
" Lorna Lloyd, Loosening the Apron Strings: the Dominions and Britain in the Inter-War Years, p. 9 
(BISA/PSA Political Science Group Workshop Conference) July 1998; see John Hilliker, Canada's 
Department of External Affairs, Volume One (Montreal: 1990) pp. 111-213; R. G. Neale (ed. ), 
Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937-1949: Volume Two, 1939 (Canberra: 1976) pp. 13-14; 
Paul Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941-1947 (Melbourne: 1980) pp. 3-16 
" See Cain & Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990 (London: 1993) 
pp. 96-135; Denis Judd & Peter Slim, The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth (London: 1982) 
pp. 73-78 
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By the late 1930s however the political relationship between the British government 
and its often disadvantaged and more often disinterested Dominion counterparts had 
changed. Indeed by this stage, as international tensions worsened, its conditional 
nature was now increasingly clear as was the requirement that no significant threat 
should exist which might test the unity of the so-called Commonwealth of Nations. /5 
When meeting in London for the 1937 Imperial Conference, with Germany's 
increasingly belligerent attitude much in the minds of those present, just such a 
challenge appeared to have emerged. So, with a majority of Dominion statesmen 
thinking squarely in terms of conciliation, within the DO the focus moved to 
considering what might happen should this approach fail. 1e 
Thoughts About the Future 
The probable attitude of the Dominions to their involvement in a second conflict fought 
by the United Kingdom in Europe had first been studied by the DO in 1935, just prior 
to the start of the Abyssinian crisis. This followed a post-Statute of Westminster 
review which had been carried out four years before leading to a memorandum on the 
likely procedure required for any future declaration of war. ' 7 Colonel Sir Maurice 
Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary and secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
had also made a tour of the Dominions between September and December 1934, 
visiting the Union of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 18 It was in early 
1937 though that Sir Grattan Bushe, the department's long-serving legal adviser, 
revived the DO's interest in the question. In February of that year he had approached 
colleagues in the FO about concerns he held in regard to the Dominions' contemporary 
S Keith Middlemas, `The Effect of Dominion Opinion on British Foreign Policy, 1937-1938' Institute 
of Commonwealth Studies Seminar Paper (1971), p. 47 
16 See David Carlton, `The Dominions and the Gathering Storm', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Volume 6, Number 2 (Jan 1978), pp. 172-175; Max Beloff, Dream of 
Commonwealth, 1921-42 (London: 1989) pp. 270-298; Ritchie Ovendale, `Why the British 
Dominions Declared War' in Robert Boyce and Esmonde Robertson (eds. ), Paths to War: New 
Essays on the Origins of the Second World War (New York: 1989) pp. 276-296; Ovendale, 
Appeasement and the English Speaking World, pp. 3 8-63 
" Dixon to Batterbee, 14 December 1937, D035/543/28/5; ibid., letter from Malkin to Bushe, 18 
February 1937, D035/543/28/2 
18 See Ann Trotter, `The Dominions and Imperial Defence: Hankey's Tour in 1934', Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume 2 (1974), pp. 318-332 
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views towards the question of 'common belligerency'. 19 The response he was given 
revealed doubts within the DO's sister department about the long-held principle that 
each Dominion was bound by the indivisibility of the King. Any discussions on the 
issue of continuing common allegiance to the British monarch were thought to be an 
'appalling prospect', about which little could be done in advance to avoid or make 
easier. It was nonetheless agreed that some consultation about the procedure to be 
adopted would be beneficial for all concerned. But, overwhelmed with arrangements 
for the Imperial Conference due to be held that summer, the DO found scant free time 
at this stage for the consideration of any other matter. " 
By the time the London gathering had been concluded and the department had returned 
to full strength in September 1937 following summer leave, Bushe's original enquiry 
had now taken on a more urgent tone. Having had an opportunity to consider the 
various notes the PUS, Sir Edward Harding, was clear that discussions which focussed 
on form 'would be a waste of energy' obscuring the government's most important 
objective, ensuring the Dominions' active support in the event of war. 2' Consequently, 
as an initial measure he directed that an updated assessment of the Dominions' state 
of readiness for war be prepared, placing Sir Harry Batterbee, his deputy and brother- 
in-law, in charge of the task. 22 
Utilising the considerable skills of Charles Dixon, a senior AUS whose other duties 
included monitoring Dominion foreign policy and defence matters, a draft memorandum 
entitled 'Probable Attitude and Preparedness of the Dominions in the Event of War', 
was ready for in-house inspection shortly before Christmas. 23 As its co-author himself 
admitted, it was broadly based on the conclusions made in the earlier 1935 document, 
the only significant alterations being in terms of detail and the addition of an individual 
study of each of the Dominions. 24 After further revision by Batterbee, this document 
19 Bushe to Malkin, 8 February 1937, D035/543/28/2 
20 Ibid., Malkin to Bushe, 18 February 1937 
21 Ibid., minute by Harding, 18 September 1937; see also Garner, The Commonwealth ice, pp. 20 
22 Dixon to Batterbee, 14 December 1937, D035/543/28/5 
23 Ibid., `Memorandum prepared by Batterbee', December 1937 (see Appendix Five); Dixon 
Memoirs, Batterbee Papers (Box 20/5) 
24 Ibid., Dixon to Batterbee 
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was handed to the FO for further comments before being submitted to Malcolm 
MacDonald, the then Dominions' Secretary. 25 A second paper, prepared entirely by 
Dixon, which looked in more detail at the question of 'common belligerency', was 
reserved solely for internal DO distribution. 26 
Together the two documents totalled some fifteen pages. After a lengthy introduction, 
in which it was made clear that a truly definitive answer to the question was not 
possible, an analysis followed of what kind of conflict could be expected and how, 
specifically, Britain might become involved. The stark conclusion was that a war in 
defence of European commitments, but without any direct attack on Britain in the first 
instance, would very likely place considerable strains on the Anglo-Dominion 
relationship. And, if there had been no international effort to find a peaceful solution 
involving Britain and the Dominions beforehand, these strains would be considerably 
more difficult to manage. Already at this first drafting stage it was clear that whatever 
situation might develop, while there were few concerns over New Zealand and 
Australia providing support, it was the active participation by Canada and the Union 
that was considered to be a matter of real debate. Indeed, Dixon, in his internal 
comments, was so concerned about what might lie ahead that he urged upon his 
colleagues 'a certain fluidity of conception with regard to [assessing] the 
Commonwealth relationship'. In his estimate 'true wisdom seemed to lie in our 
recognising the facts and seeing how best we could get the maximum of advantage 
from the new situation', a sombre but perhaps entirely realistic appraisal. 27 
In his explanation of the memorandum's origins, Batterbee was more optimistic 
though, informing the Secretary of State of his hope that 'it will be alright on the 
night'. " At the same time he understood that it was impossible to ensure what was 
going to happen, and to not make provision accordingly would be 'foolish', adopting 
25 Dixon to Malkin, 23 December 1937, D035/543/28/4 (see Appendix Six) 
26 See Garner, The Commonwealth Office, pp. 91-93; in comparing his account of events with that 
contained within the DO's original correspondence files, Garner, who had no involvement in the 
preparation of these documents, seems to have become a little confused in his narrative, at least in the 
earlier stages 
27 Ibid., `Memorandum prepared by Batterbee', December 1937; Note prepared by Dixon, `Position 
of the Dominions on the Event of War', December 1937, D035/543/28/5 (see Appendix Seven) 
28 Ibid., Batterbee to MacDonald, 7 January 1938 
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'the policy of the ostrich'. Recognising that the assessment he had been given was 
'very important', MacDonald's own views seem to have held a greater affinity with 
those held by the more junior of the two members of the department. He therefore 
urged the department's legal advisers to press on with their examinations 'as rapidly as 
is convenient in these rather hectic days'. However, despite these instructions and the 
Secretary of State's desire to avoid 'being caught napping on this point', following a 
second meeting with the FO at the end of January 1938 further progress was to prove 
difficult to achieve. 29 
According to the department's unofficial historian, this was because of continuing 
disagreements within Whitehall over the memorandum's wording and content. 30 
Certainly the initial meetings held between the DO and the FO indicated that the issue 
was a contentious one likely requiring considerable further bilateral discussions over 
the best procedure to be pursued. 3' Complicating matters further, from the outset the 
Admiralty had also been interested, expressly in what the implications were for the 
various agreements they held with the Dominions for access to port facilities. It was at 
this stage that Sir Maurice Hankey, with his Australian background and extensive 
knowledge of Anglo-Dominion affairs, became involved. Holding a genuine desire to 
secure a greater role for the Dominions in policy formulation, he found himself asked to 
organise inter-departmental management and ensure that input was received from all 
interested parties. 32 His appointment only served, however, to aggravate an already 
complicated process, subjecting it to still further delays. 33 
The main barrier to progress though must surely have been international events 
themselves as Germany pushed its claims more and more forcibly during the course of 
29 Ibid., minute by MacDonald, 21 January 1938; ibid., Malkin to Dixon, 11 January 1938 
3o Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 94 
" As part of the on-going review process of internal files adopted by the DO, in 1957 the majority of 
files D28/6 to D28/20 contained within D035/543, covering approximately one year of the 
memorandum's progress, were deemed to be of insufficient historical interest to merit not being 
destroyed; see Thurston, Records of the Colonial Office, Dominion Office..., pp. 62-64 
32 See P. G. Edwards, `The Rise and Fall of the High Commissioner: S. M. Bruce in London, 1933-45' 
in A. F. Madden and W. H. Morris (ed. ), Studies in Commonwealth Politics and History: Australia and 
Britain (London: 1986) p. 54 
33 Batterbee to MacDonald, 7 January 1938, D035/543/28/5 
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the year, placing serious pressures on the DO's resources. Although the department 
had doubled in size by the end of 1938, the total manpower available for dealing with 
all matters was still under seventy people. "' Indeed, following Germany's union with 
Austria in March 1938, MacDonald warned the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, just 
how hard the department was having to work to keep the Dominion governments fully 
informed. As he would later recount, his staff found themselves in 'perpetual, non-stop 
touch with all [of the Dominions] on all international questions', leaving little spare time 
for other tasks. 35 
The crisis later in the year, which followed Germany's claims on Czechoslovakia's 
Sudeten areas, provided still more disruption to the memorandum's preparation. 36 The 
degree to which the Dominions played an active role in helping shape British policy 
during the Munich crisis continues to be a well-explored subject. 37 What does seem 
fairly certain though is that all of the Dominion governments, with the exception of 
one, were resolute supporters of a policy based upon the offer of concessions to the 
German leadership. New Zealand alone still clung to the League of Nation's 'collective 
security' banner. 38 With stark warnings filling the press of 'the potential collapse of the 
British Empire', there was therefore great pressure on a generally agreeable government 
in London to avoid war at all costs. 39 
" See Cross, Whitehall and the Commonwealth, p. 52; G. M. Carter, British Commonwealth and 
International Security (Toronto: 1947) pp. 300-302 
33 MacDonald to Halifax, 10 April 1938, CAB123/246; also MacDonald, `Interview to the Oxford 
Colonial Records Project' (Rhodes House Library) p. 3 
36 See R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second 
World War (London: 1993) pp. 156-182; Keith Middlemas, The Diplomacy of Illusion (London: 
1972) pp. 21-23; H. Duncan Hall, Commonwealth (London: 1971) pp. 753-762; Correlli Barnett, The 
Collapse of British Power (London: 1972) pp. 228-229; Holland, The Commonwealth Alliance, 
pp. 200-202; Ovendale, Appeasement and the English Speaking World, pp. 210-211 
" See Michael Graham Fry, `Agents and Structures: The Dominions and the Czechoslovak Crisis, 
September 1938', Diplomacy and Statecraft, Volume 10, Numbers 2&3 (1999); Ovendale, 
Appeasement and the English Speaking World; Middlemas, The Effect of Dominion Opinion, pp. 51- 
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38 See The Earl of Halifax, Fullness of Days (London: 1957) pp. 197-198 
39 Lord Rothermere to Wickham Steed, published in the News Chronicle (London), 16 August 1938, 
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This was felt by some contemporary commentators to be 'the nearest [the Dominions] 
had come to sharing a common foreign policy with Britain since 1919'. 40 For 
MacDonald, temporarily heading both the CO and DO, such was the interest that he 
was obliged to agree to requests by the hitherto largely dormant London-based 
Dominion High Commissioners for meetings, 'sometimes more than once a day', to 
brief them fully on developments. 4' These daily gatherings were in addition to the 
overwhelming flow of messages and telegrams already being provided by the DO to 
the Dominion governments. And, requiring a good deal of advance preparation by a 
variety of officials, not to mention actual attendance by others, they accounted for 
much valuable time. 
A final reason for the memorandum being delayed may well have been provided by 
Batterbee himself. In July 1938 it was confirmed, after several months of rumours, 
that the last Dominion to rely solely on a Governor-General for communication with 
London had agreed to the DO sending out a High Commissioner. `Z As can be seen in 
his personal correspondence, following the announcement that it would be the 58-year 
old AUS making the long journey to New Zealand, Batterbee's attention seems often to 
have been distracted. And it was not just by the considerable relocation he and his 
wife were facing, but also the amount of work that he would be required to undertake 
prior to his departure. 43 Added to a genuine desire to avoid war, shared with Harding 
and the other senior staff at this time, there were clearly other factors to be considered 
which almost certainly added to the delays. 44 
Whatever the exact reasons, it was undeniably difficult to make any real headway. The 
only development of any note came when, following approval from the Attorney 
General in late September 1938, a preliminary summary was sent to the British High 
Commissioners in their respective capitals outlining a few of the department's more 
40 Elliot and Duncan Hall, The Commonwealth in War and Peace, p. 13 
Dixon Memoirs, Batterbee Papers (Box 20/5); see Malcolm MacDonald, Titans and Others 
(London: 1972) pp. 80-1 
Liesching to Batterbee, 28 July 1938, Batterbee Papers (Box 9/1) 
" Batterbee Papers (Box 6); minutes and correspondence regarding supply of papers to the UK High 
Commissioner in New Zealand, October/November 1938, D035/548F 
" See Gamer, The Commonwealth Office, pp. 88-89 
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general thoughts and asking in turn for their comments. But with the growing 
possibility of war with Germany at the forefront of discussion and the Dominions' 
reaction uncertain, at this stage this appears to have been the extent of what the DO 
could hope to achieve. " 
Arguments about 'Common Belligerency' 
Not until the beginning of 1939 did any really visible signs of progress begin to appear 
as, immediately following his return from Christmas leave, Batterbee cleared his desk 
ready for his imminent departure for Wellington. 46 In a meeting held without him at the 
DO in the first week of January, a much greater sense of departmental urgency was 
already on display. Involving representatives from the FO, Cabinet Office and 
Admiralty, the main topic for discussion was whether there could be 'a half-way house 
between neutrality and participation with the United Kingdom in war'. "' Sir Edward 
Bridges, the Cabinet Office representative, had begun by speculating that, at most, the 
more reticent Dominion governments might merely mark time before joining Britain. The 
comments which followed from the DO must therefore have come as something of a 
shock to him, especially the suggestion that, in the event of war, the Royal Navy might 
even find itself forced to seize South African ports in order to guarantee unhindered 
access to them. In addition, although he had little to say on the merits of making 
further concessions, in chairing the meeting Harding was certain about one thing. This 
was the inadvisability of letting the Dominion governments know that the possibility of 
their remaining neutral was even being considered. 48 
Whilst continuing to claim to be fully aware of the need for the closer involvement of 
the Dominions in defence preparation, the FO nonetheless appeared to be as 
's DO to British High Commissioners, 28 September 1938, D035/543/28/8; MacDonald, Dixon and 
Garner all make it clear in their respective works that, if war had arisen, of the Dominion countries 
only New Zealand was guaranteed to fight. Of the remainder Australia would probably have fought, 
but only reluctantly, Canada after some consideration would have decided not to, while the Union of 
South Africa would have almost certainly remained neutral 
' Batterbee to Clark, 4 January 1939, Clark Papers (London School of Economics' Archives) 
47 'Note of a meeting on 5 January 1939', D035/543/28/21 
48 Although it is not within the remit of this study, Harding's warning extended as far as to also 
keeping the information from the Irish authorities 
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uninterested as it had been twelve months before. Its 'subsequent assessment of the 
meeting's conclusions, that its junior colleague should arrange another so as 'to settle 
a revised draft.. . for a document which might ultimately provide the basis of instruction 
to the High Commissioners', hardly appeared the most decisive of contributions. "' It 
was not for them to decide upon how events should proceed however and John 
Stephenson, who had assumed Batterbee's role, now began to push Bridges for some 
agreement as to what should be done. As he did this though, further significant 
departmental changes were taking place around him. 5o 
Sir Thomas Inskip, who as Minister for Co-ordination of Defence had berated the 
Dominions at the 1937 Imperial Conference for encouraging others to make heroic 
sacrifices on their behalf, was suddenly moved to what Chamberlain described to him 
as the '[not] very absorbing [Dominions] Department'. 5' Publicly it was understood that 
'Honest Tom', as his barrister colleagues had long before nicknamed him, was the 
scapegoat for increasing dissatisfaction over government policies. Privately though it 
appears that much of the reason for his demotion was because he had come to believe 
that war was now certain to happen leaving him at odds with the prime minister. 52 
Whatever the exact case, although surprised by the decision, he claimed he 'was not 
sorry to give up this former job) for a most interesting but less exposed position'. 53 
Whilst the department set about acquainting its new head with current business, the 
more pressing task for the senior staff was contacting the High Commissioners in the 
Union of South Africa and Canada. This was done to inform them that 'matters were in 
hand', provide them with the complete draft memorandum of the anticipated 
'9 Donald Lammers, `From Whitehall After Munich: The Foreign Office and the Future Course of 
British Policy', The Historical Journal, Volume 16, Number 4 (19731 p. 832; Malkin to Dixon, 10 
January 1939, D035/543/28/21 
so Ibid., minute by Stephenson, 26 January 1939; Bridges to Dixon, 24 January 1939 
" Holland, The Commonwealth Alliance, pp. 198-199; Diary, 17 January 1939, Inskip Papers 
(Churchill College, Cambridge) INKPI/2 
SZ See Sean Greenwood, 'Caligula's Horse Revisited: Sir Thomas Inskip as Minister for the Co- 
ordination of Defence, 1936-1939, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 17, Number 2 (June 1994), 
pp. 17-38; `Cato', Guilty Men (London: 1940) p. 79 
 Inskip to Simon, 31 January 1939, Simon Papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford) Box 85 
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Dominions reaction in the event of war and ask' in return for their expanded opinions. 54 
At the same time, apologising for his 'having been rather long in writing', by mid- 
February Bridges was finally able to inform the DO of his views. 55 These were generally 
optimistic, indeed perhaps even overly so, the Cabinet Office official choosing to 
believe that the Dominions 'would surely, when the time comes, be prepared to 
recognise... that supreme control can only be exercised by those at the centre'. This 
was much, the same argument as he had given two months before. 
Aside from the long delay, a further cause for anger within the DO was that, despite 
repeated pleas that the matter required complete secrecy, Harding had had to intervene 
during the interim to prevent the Cabinet Office from approaching the Service 
Departments directly to obtain their views. 58 This clearly pointed to a potential for later 
difficulties. And, although the War Office and Air Ministry were 'probably willing to fall 
in line' with the DO's suggested approach, the same was not true of the Admiralty. 
The latter 'tended in the direction of attempting to force the hand of the Dominions', 
warning that, if need be, the matter would have to be put before the Committee for 
Imperial Defence for settlement. This confrontational approach ran entirely contrary to 
all of the advice the DO had given over recent years. It also once more amply 
demonstrated the degree to which the department's views were still often dismissed 
by supposed colleagues. 
In exchanges such as these it was all too apparent that, despite making ever-greater 
efforts on its part, the DO was still struggling to educate some of its colleagues as to 
the reality of the Anglo-Dominion relationship. While his department heads were 
fighting to make any headway even Inskip, already 'settling in well [and] really 
studying his papers', was being advised by the foreign secretary that the Dominions 
should be expected to 'trust us to draw a just conclusion from the reports we 
receive'. 5' With assessments now being submitted by the British High Commissioners 
outlining their perceptions of the position in their Dominions, much work was obviously 
sa Harding to Campbell/Clark, 1 February 1939, D035/543/28/21 
ss Bridges to Minister, 1 March 1939, CAB21/488 
sb Bridges to Harding, 13 February 1939, D035/543/28/21 
17 Harding to Batterbee, 18 February 1939, Batterbee Papers (Box 6/4); Halifax to Inskip, 2 March 
1939, F0372/3315 
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still needed to show that 'common belligerency' had become a concept that could no 
longer be taken for granted. 58 
The Reaction to Prague 
As rumours grew towards the end of January 1939 of possible German attacks against 
Holland or Switzerland, the DO had sent out a telegram warning that Hitler would 
probably soon embark on some kind of aggression. The response of the Dominion 
governments was to complain to London that such a suggestion was unduly alarmist. 
In mid-March however this was shown to be far from the case as German troops finally 
seized the rump Czech state. Within days, and without any advance notice to the 
Dominions, although there is no evidence to suggest his personal convictions had 
changed, the British prime minister announced a radical change in British foreign policy. 
But the strategy that he now chose to adopt was one almost entirely at odds with the 
DO's assessments of what would most likely secure the Dominions' conclusive 
support. 59 
The High Commissioners in London, whose elevated role during the Sudeten crisis had 
led them to develop a much higher opinion of their own importance, were the first to 
respond. Although they had varying knowledge and experience of politics in their home 
Dominions, they did each possess equally forceful personalities. Within DO circles, the 
former Australian prime minister Stanley Bruce was seen as very down-to-earth, whilst 
the South African Charles to Water was more acute but just as well-respected. The 
Canadian High Commissioner Vincent Massey, another former prime minster, had the 
most aristocratic turn of mind; his diaries reveal someone who enjoyed golf, art, 
staying at the Dorchester and most of all anything connected with the British royal 
family. And finally there was Bill Jordan, the former London policeman turned New 
Zealand representative, who was rarely treated seriously but was liked immensely 
because of his friendliness. 60 As a group, and despite some commentators' later claims 
58 Clark to Harding, 20 February 1939, D035/543/28/23; Whiskard to Inskip, 16 March 1939, 
D0121/46; Campbell to Inskip, 24 March 1939, FO800/310 
 See Dixon Memoirs, Batterbee Papers (Box 20/5); Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, pp. 201- 
2; P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War (London: 1986) pp. 252-254 
60 Garner quoted in Cumpston, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, p. 159 
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to the contrary, these men would quickly make* it clear that the Dominions' support for 
further negotiation had not yet finished. 6' 
Six years previously to Water had bluntly informed the then Secretary of State, 
J. H. Thomas, that 'if there was another war... none of the Dominions would follow the 
United Kingdom'. " The intervening period had not seen his views alter and, with his 
Canadian counterpart in tow, he now left Inskip in little doubt as to his colleagues' 
general support for offering Germany one more 'chance of saving face'. 63 Much of the 
reason for the apparent rancour in is statements lay with Chamberlain's failure to 
provide the High Commissioners with any advance warning of his policy change. For 
those members of the DO who were still labouring to provoke any meaningful form of 
debate, it meant that the situation had become even more difficult. 84 
The department had been able to provide some indication at the end of March that it 
was intended to provide a guarantee of security to Poland, the first of a number of 
such assurances that would be given to various European states. This had done little, 
however, to relieve the tense atmosphere. Further trouble lay ahead in the debate over 
the future status of Danzig. Originally a German city, since the Versailles settlement it 
had been administered by the League of Nations and was separated by the so-called 
'Polish Corridor' from the Germany to the west. To the High Commissioners it was 
therefore seen in the same light as the Sudeten debate and any guarantee involving it 
was consequently problematic to them. Indeed, when informed of a move by the 
British authorities that wholly disregarded these concerns, Massey felt suitably 
aggrieved to complain that Danzig had always been 'a running sore which some time or 
other would be required to be cut out'. 65 
61 See Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, p. 283; Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 90; 
Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, p. 204; Lorna Lloyd, 'What's in a Name? ': The 
Curious Tale of the Office of High Commissioner, p. 4-6 (BISA/PSA Political Science Group 
Workshop Conference) July 1998 
62 Minute by Harding, 2 May 1933, D035/100 
63 High Commissioner's Meeting (hereafter 'HC'), 21 March 1939, D0121/5; Campbell to Inskip, 24 
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With the public confirmation of the Polish guarantee, although none of the Dominion 
governments chose to make any direct comment, they were clearly deeply upset about 
the news. A 'staggered' Jan Smuts, the deputy South African prime minister, felt it to 
be 'mere surrender to panic, mak[ing] war inevitable'. 66 Mackenzie King, the Canadian 
leader, thought the decision amounted to 'a conditional declaration of war'. "" Even 
worse to him though was the fact that this had 'certainly been done without anything 
in the nature of consultations with Canada or any of the Dominions'. With the idea 
being raised for the first time in the High Commissioners' meetings of offering Germany 
a non-aggression pact alongside growing requests for access to FO telegrams, 
something which it was accepted within the DO it would be hard to refuse, the strains 
68 on the department and those within it were mounting. 
Writing to his old friend recently arrived in New Zealand, Harding, who had been 
'pursued with pouches and telephones on most days', although 'not too happy at all 
these guarantees', could not see that there was any alternative. But the knowledge 
that no Dominion government had made any outward sign suggesting that this was the 
wrong policy did appear to offer him some measure of reassurance. 69 He was also 
pleased that his colleagues were 'working gallantly and the machine... [was] standing 
the strain well'. With this attitude and no shortage of evidence that defence 
preparedness was now the key issue, efforts to finalise the increasingly long-delayed, 
but now more important than ever memorandum were renewed. 7° Towards the end of 
April, with Admiralty objections seemingly calmed, the final draft was at last ready to 
be issued to the principal Whitehall departments concerned, prior to a wider 
government distribution. " 
' Smuts to Duncan, 25 April 1939, Duncan Papers (University of Cape Town); Smuts to Gullet, 6 
April 1939, Smuts Papers (National Archives, Pretoria) 
67 Mackenzie King Diary, 31 March 1939, Mackenzie King Papers (National Archives of Canada, 
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Duty: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935-39', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume 
3, Number 2 (January 1975), p. 228 
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Running to some forty pages in length and encompassing considerable discussion of 
military and economic factors, as in earlier versions and for exactly the same reasons 
the revised document made little mention of New Zealand and Australia. Once again its 
main focus remained the likely reactions of Canada and the Union of South Africa 
although, in the intervening three months, some of the earlier conclusions had 
changed. 72 Largely as a result of a series of 'solid' dispatches from Sir Gerald 
Campbell, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, it was now felt Canada would 
'participate in any circumstances in which the United Kingdom is likely, so far as can 
be seen at present, to become involved'. Sir William Clark in Cape Town was also seen 
by some observers within the DO to have cautiously improved his assessment allowing 
them to conclude, by late-April, that 'force of circumstances would probably compel 
the Union government to eventually participate (sic)'. 
With a markedly far more positive tone, this final report was therefore almost 
completely at odds with the draft analysis produced only three months beforehand. 
Indeed in arriving at its generally far more optimistic conclusions, those comments 
which could have been seen to be worrisome appeared to have been overlooked or 
ignored. This was certainly the case in regard to the various telegrams sent by Clark 
during February and March 1939 which carried warnings about almost inevitable 
'delays [and] confusion' in the Union. The report also omitted the generally negative 
outlook still affecting the Dominions High Commissioners in London. 73 By the time of 
its eventual release however new moves by the British government meant that the 
conclusions contained within the memorandum were all, once again, in any case in 
question. 
Although strongly opposed to the idea, Chamberlain had been reluctantly forced to 
accede to the House of Commons call, made in mid-April, to pursue an alliance with 
the Soviet Union in order to bolster the previous guarantees. 74 For the DO, beset by 
what Harding felt to be an 'ominous lull', the news of yet another possible guarantee 
'Z Ibid., `Memorandum', April 1939; Campbell to Stephenson, 19 April 1939; Clark to Harding, 20 
February 1939, D035/543/28/23; Clark to Harding, 28 April 1939, CAB 104/19 
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was a terrible blow as the telegrams arriving from the* Dominions over the next few 
weeks, united as they were in condemnation of the move, made only too clear. 75 Only 
New Zealand, with its broadly socialist government, welcomed the move. Even this 
support was conditional though as the authorities in Wellington placed themselves at 
odds with their Dominion colleagues warning that they would now 'regard it as 
deplorable if Russian assistance in the prevention of aggression were not secured'. 76 
As the memorandum and its predictions of unanimous Dominion support whatever the 
case went to print, such confidence from the British authorities therefore seemed 
increasingly misplaced. " 
A Summer of Inactivity 
With the High Commissioners still clinging to now well-trodden arguments and the 
Dominion governments showing little enthusiasm to make any declaration of public 
support for London's increasingly belligerent stance, at the end of May the 
memorandum was finally released. 78 So sensitive were its contents however that the 
Cabinet Office, finally perhaps recognising some of the DO's longstanding arguments, 
restricted its circulation to 'Ministers who would be mainly concerned with the conduct 
of the war'. 79 At the same time, the British High Commissioners in the various 
Dominion capitals were warned to make no mention of its existence 'until the necessity 
should arise'. 
Harding, sending a copy to Inskip who had himself had only the faintest awareness 
that such a document was being prepared, tried to attach a more optimistic appraisal 
on its contents than he had done before. Now he hoped that there would 'never be 
occasion to take action [on it] or that, if there is, the difficulties anticipated will not, in 
75 Harding to Batterbee, 4 May 1939, Batterbee Papers (Box 6/4); Aide Memoire from the South 
African Cabinet, 22 April 1939, DOI 14/98; Whiskard to Inskip, 28 April 1939, D0121/46; Campbell 
to Stephenson, 13 May 1939, CAB 104/19 
76 Telegram from New Zealand Government, 12 May 1939, DOI 14/98; see Angus Ross, `Reluctant 
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Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Volume 10, Number 1 (1972) 
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practice, prove unduly serious'. Such a reappraisal may well have been an indication 
that the DO's most senior official, despite his publicly stated support for the 
government's more recently belligerent policies, was in fact privately still hopeful of a 
diplomatic solution. The Secretary of State though, who Harding himself had described 
just a month earlier as 'not having the knowledge or the temperament [for the job]', 
appeared to have few concerns. In fact he did little more than commend the quality of 
the work and thank 'Mr Dixon for the impressive amount of trouble' he had taken in its 
preparation. 80 
In the meantime however, at least one member of the FO's Dominions Intelligence 
Department had made a radical reassessment of the situation. Following a discussion 
with the South African High Commissioner's private secretary in April, Robert Hadow 
had felt sufficiently confident to declare that 'South Africa would most certainly come 
in should we be involved in war'. This statement matched a number of optimistic 
assessments distributed internally throughout the FO during the previous months. 8' But 
now, having read the most recent correspondence from the Dominions following the 
Soviet announcement, Hadow was not so confident. "' Indeed he now advised Sir 
Alexander Cadogan, his departmental head, that in the event of an Anglo-Soviet 
alliance 'we stand the risk of South African neutrality at the outset of war, perhaps 
only for a while but with dangerous possibilities'. His concerns however appear to have 
raised few anxieties amongst his colleagues, many of whom were no doubt pre- 
occupied with the proposed Russian negotiations, and Hadow's warnings were 
dismissed as overly dramatic. 83 
Within the DO meanwhile, with the memorandum completed and its conclusions 
submitted, an exhausted hiatus now descended. Meaningful comment from the 
Dominion governments on the deteriorating international situation was still hard to 
come by, only New Zealand and Australia offering any real indication of their current 
B° Ibid., minute by Harding, 25 May 1939; minute by Inskip, 25 May 1939; Harding to Batterbee, 16 
April 1939, D035/543/28/32 
81 Minute by F. H. Cleobury, 26 January 1939, F0372/3314; ibid., minute by Cleobury, 6 April 1939 
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thinking. "' Even the High Commissioners based in London had apparently run out of 
observations to make. 85 As negotiations over possible Anglo-Soviet co-operation 
continued throughout the summer, nothing of any great significance therefore took 
place. The sole event of any consequence, although it was not yet widely known, was 
the news that Harding would soon be leaving the DO to become High Commissioner in 
South Africa, replacing Clark whose health had become questionable. With Batterbee 
already departed and his brother-in-law soon to join him in an overseas' posting, this 
meant that two of the department's founding figures would, by the war's beginning, 
be almost entirely distant from London. 86 
As August began and security arrangements within the Office were once more 
tightened, a not immediately obvious 'July rush' was replaced by a calmer environment 
as many of the department's staff went on summer leave. B' For one of the senior 
officers there was little opportunity to take advantage of the break though as 
Stephenson found himself hospitalised by an attack of piles. 88 The lull was not 
particularly long lasting however, it being quickly shattered by a surprise 
announcement. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany and the 
Soviet Union made a second war in defence of European commitments in twenty-five 
years now virtually unavoidable. 
For a quorum of the Dominion High Commissioners in London, the news was difficult 
to accept, so much so that they embarked upon one final effort to try and gain support 
for further negotiation. As part of these final efforts renewed calls were issued to the 
DO to arrange greater access to Committee of Imperial Defence meetings but to no 
avail. 89 This was in part because Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner, had quickly 
destroyed any chance of success they might have had. His clumsy attempts to 
persuade the British government to pressure its Polish counterpart into accepting 
84 Batterbee to DO, 23 May 1939, CAB104/19; Fairburn to Earl de la Warr, 9 May 1939, DOI21/46 
85 `Index of HC Meetings', D0121/5 
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Germany's demands had the effect of 'much reducing [Chamberlain's] confidence in 
him - [which] was never very high'. 9° A further seven meetings with the High 
Commissioners would take place during the following week with the efforts of certain 
of those present to find a peaceful outcome continuing to the very end. 9' But these 
would prove of little consequence in the face of the now apparently much more 
determined British governmental stance. 
For the DO however, a serious problem had developed which appeared to have the 
potential to threaten this newfound resolve. In a telegram sent during the last week of 
August, the department was again warned, only now more urgently, that in the Union 
of South Africa, Nationalists had gained ground in the preceding weeks. At the same 
time it was now thought by Clark that 'this defeat for British policy [the German-Soviet 
pact] may also influence public opinion towards neutrality owing to the feeling that 
there has been mismanagement'. 92 With this warning it was obvious that, despite the 
considerable time that had been spent in its preparation, at least some of the 
conclusions made within the memorandum were misplaced. Indeed even members of 
the hitherto confident FO were finally forced to admit that suddenly the situation had 
become not so encouraging. 93 
Throughout the previous months, Clark had actually given little reason to suppose that 
there was any real degree of certainty that the government in the Union would blithely 
follow London's lead. Indeed his reports were clear that, under the leadership of 
General Hertzog, the idea of 'common belligerency' no longer existed within sizeable 
elements of South African opinion. The Union's prime minister had made this clear 
himself as early as the 1937 Imperial Conference with his uncompromising support for 
conciliation with Germany and a firm rejection of his country's involvement in any 
future European war. But these messages had not been heeded and the result was a 
crisis that now seemed to potentially threaten Imperial unity. For the DO though, the 
90 HC, 22 August 1939, D0121/5; Dairy, 23 August 1939, Hankey Papers (Churchill College, 
Cambridge) HNKYI/7; Diary, 25 August 1939, Inskip Papers 
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most pressing problem in the first instance was that it appeared to have few solutions 
readily to hand on how to deal with the situation. 
The Union of South Africa and the Neutrality Crisis 
In September 1939 the Dominion governments did not have any particular 
commitments binding them to go to war in Europe. None had been signatories to the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, or to the renewed guarantee of Belgian neutrality in the 
same year. Nor were any of them directly involved in the negotiations at Munich two 
years later. Still more recently, no Dominion minister had put his name to the Polish 
guarantee in March 1939 or to those given to Romania and Greece in April 1939. and 
the later alliance with Turkey. Although there was every indication that this lack of 
visible participation in British policy-making would hold little actual significance for 
three of them, the potential attitude of the Union of South Africa was different. " 
Ever since the process of drafting the 'Probable Attitude and Preparedness of the 
Dominions in the Event of War' memorandum had begun in late 1937, the extremely 
complex political situation within the Union had been a prominent cause for concern 
within the DO. Many within the large Nationalist Afrikaans speaking minority, of which 
the country's prime minister General Hertzog was one of the more moderate members, 
displayed a good deal of sympathy with German actions in Europe. 95 The English 
speaking section of the population, which generally adopted a similar approach to 
Smuts, were in turn likely in most cases to support Whitehall's policies. The only point 
upon which both sides could find any measure of consensus was their desire to retain 
control of the former German colony of South West Africa, the return of which Berlin 
had demanded. 98 With the telegrams from Pretoria suggesting that the long-held idea of 
94 See H. V. Hodson, `British Foreign Policy and the Dominions', Foreign Affairs, Volume 17 (July 
1939), pp. 753-763; H. V. Hodson, `Collective Security and Empire Defence', United Empire, Volume 
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(September 1939), pp. 279-294; H. Duncan Hall, `The British Commonwealth of Nations at War' in 
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Empire unity was now under threat, the greatest concern was the fact that Hertzog 
was prime minister and Smuts only his deputy. 
The potentially adverse effect on morale throughout the Empire if South Africa failed to 
join the war was not however the sole worrying point. Although it had never been 
envisaged that they would provide a huge reserve of troops, the loss of a potential 
source of manpower remained and this was a serious blow in light of the British and 
French strategy adopted. 97 With the government in London just beginning to face up to 
the fiscal costs that another war would involve, there were also considerable financial 
practicalities to be considered. Adding to this was the knowledge that the financial 
pressure placed on the pound during 1939 had reduced Britain's war chest of gold and 
foreign securities by at least one-quarter. 98 As an internal memorandum prepared by 
the Treasury had concluded, so bad was the situation that 'unless when the time 
comes the United States are prepared either to lend or give money as required, the 
prospects for a long war are becoming exceedingly grim'. 99 The undertaking of a rapid 
rearmament, begun after the Munich settlement, had placed further strains on 
resources and the situation was only likely to get worse. " In this context exports of 
South African gold to the United States were not just extremely valuable but an 
irreplaceable economic asset. 101 
In Clark's view, the best chance of avoiding an Imperial rift lay with Smuts who was 
still 'all for bringing the Union in on our side if war supervenes'. Indeed with Hertzog's 
revealed that Hertzog had considered accepting German offers to negotiate about the future of South 
West Africa in 1937/38. Although he had kept the DO informed, the post-war department was 
worried about what effect the news might have on imperial relations and suppressed the information. 
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resolute refusal to believe that war could come, throughout 1939's mounting tension 
the High Commissioner had sought to strengthen the already close friendship he 
enjoyed with the Union's deputy prime minister. In the process he appeared to have 
developed a close understanding with Smuts. And with the onset of a crisis in Anglo- 
South African relations, it was now time for Clark to attempt to fully utilise this link. 
But South Africa's High Commissioner in London, a longstanding friend and admirer of 
Hertzog, still continued to press that the British tone should indicate a willingness 'to 
negotiate on all political and economic matters'. 1°2 Meanwhile the DO continued to 
closely monitor the now daily telegrams from Pretoria for any hopeful signs, at the 
same time supplying regular situation briefings to Clark who did not trust the Union's 
Department of External Affairs to keep Smuts fully informed. 103 
The unanticipated news that the life of the South African Senate would expire in the 
first week of September, something apparently overlooked by all sides, carried obvious 
positive ramifications as far as London was concerned. 104 Unless there was a meeting 
of both South African Houses, the Assembly and the Senate, to pass a law extending 
the latter's life, no legislation passed within the Union could be considered valid. 'o5 
With a strong belief that his prime minister would 'probably seek to play for delay by 
postponing as long as possible the summoning of Parliament', this presented Smuts 
with an opportunity to force the issue of neutrality or belligerency. 106 
By the first day of September 1939 it was clear that if, as was widely expected, 
settlement should prove impossible in Europe, three of the four Dominions could be 
counted on to declare their support for Britain. Two of these would do so at once and 
the other, Canada, after its parliament had been summoned to ratify the decision. 107 
The Union of South Africa would however face a potentially destructive debate during 
102 Minute by Cleobury, 2 August 1939, F0372/3314; ibid., HC, 26 August 1939; HC, 30 August 
1939; HC, 31 August 1939 
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which a rupture in the governing party seemedlikely to take place. What was therefore 
vital for the British government was to determine the outcome of this split and if 
anything could be done to ensure its prevention. This task was not helped however by 
the considerable confusion, first anticipated back in the Spring, which now existed. In 
the space of just a single day to Water was first reported as believing that the Union 
would join Britain despite Nationalist opposition, only subsequently for it to be said that 
he was still strongly supporting neutrality. 108 Meanwhile, according to Lady Milner, 
ministers in the Union itself were saying that the British government actually desired 
South African neutrality. These rumours led Smuts once again to approach London 
directly for advice. 109 As he did so speculation was growing that serious trouble was 
potentially imminent in the country and even a possible repeat of the events of 1914 
when an internal rebellion was attempted. In such an obviously tense environment, 
Clark had already stressed to the DO that the key factor would be whether Patrick 
Duncan, the Governor-General in the Union, would be 'strong enough to refuse the 
disastrous request [for a dissolution]'. 10 
When the South African parliament met on 2 September 1939 to extend the life of the 
Senate, it did so in the knowledge that Germany had the day before invaded Poland 
and, unless it withdrew, the British government's guarantee obliged that it would 
almost certainly soon declare war. And as the DO had anticipated, once Hertzog had 
announced the summoning of parliament from its winter recess in Pretoria to Cape 
Town, he could no longer evade a full discussion of the course that should be taken by 
the Union. Being a Saturday he was however able to adjourn the debate for two days 
giving all the parties concerned a final opportunity to consider strategies. "' This delay 
also allowed, with the expiry of the British deadline to Germany, for the long-feared 
formal declaration of a war to be made by the government in London. Chamberlain 
almost at once contacted Hertzog asking him directly that he 'do his utmost to help us 
in this critical time'. At the same time the British prime minister instructed the DO to 
contact Clark and reiterate to him that London's primary concern was the 'avoidance 
Boa Ibid., DO to Clark, 1 September 1939 
109 Clark to DO, 2 September 1939, D035/543/28/47 
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of any declaration of neutrality by the Union'. "' But as these messages were being 
dictated, the South African prime minister was still trying desperately to secure the 
support needed to keep out of the war. ' 13 
The events of the following twenty-four hours tested to the full the premise still held 
by some in Whitehall that the member nations of the British Commonwealth were 
bound together by an integral constitutional bond. ' 14 But the eventual conclusion to the 
most serious crisis to threaten the Anglo-Dominion relationship since 1917 had only 
limited input from the central government in London. With events taking place in and 
around the Parliament buildings in Cape Town at a rapid pace, the DO's representative 
was the only British figure who could play any role. One of the department's most 
accomplished and experienced members, Clark amply demonstrated why the Office had 
campaigned so vigorously at its creation that it should select future British High 
Commissioners and not the FO. 15 He remained in more or less constant conference 
with Smuts and, bearing in mind his earlier warning about who ultimately would decide 
the outcome of the crisis, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the High 
Commissioner also ensured he provided every physical assistance he could to 
Duncan. ` 
A 'modern' Governor-General in the sense that he had been chosen by the government 
of the country in which he served and not by its counterpart in London, prior to 
accepting his most recent position, Duncan had himself enjoyed a long and 
distinguished political career in the Union. During the neutrality crisis though, as the 
King's agent his loyalties had remained firmly with his regent as he met daily with 
Clark to receive guidance. Indeed, such was their contact between parliament's first 
and last meetings that one DO official, looking at events from the periphery, felt it 
12 Ibid., Chamberlain to Hertzog, 3 September 1939; DO to Clark, 3 September 1939, 
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placed 'the High Commissioner in a somewhat embarrassing position'. "' Prior to the 
last of these Clark's own notes admitted that he had both acted as an entirely 
unofficial conduit of information from Duncan to Smuts and that he had received 
specific instructions from London on how to deal with these 'altogether exceptional 
circumstances'. "' Inskip, in his last act after having been replaced as Secretary of 
State by Anthony Eden, also noted that he had worked with Eric Machtig on a 
telegram containing specific guidance 'to help Patrick Duncan to refuse a dissolution if 
Hertzog asked for one'. "' 
When the final vote came, all the effort that had been made by the DO and Clark was 
not found wanting. Smuts emerged with a clear majority and Hertzog, as he had 
intimated he would do, approached the Governor-General for a dissolution. This was in 
turn rejected and Duncan asked the former deputy prime minister to establish a new 
cabinet. This was exactly the result that London had wanted as a greatly relieved 
Chamberlain was quick to inform his new Dominion counterpart. 12° The FO was also, 
broadly, pleased with the outcome noting that it meant that Britain's 'vital needs and 
interests cannot be imperilled', although, 'in the want of a long and trying war', the 
way in which the result had emerged was most unfortunate. 'Z' Whether this referred to 
the bitter debate in the South African parliament or the actions of the British High 
Commissioner is unclear. Whatever the case, after a good deal of discussion within the 
department, the contents of Clark's lengthy despatch on the crisis were considered so 
sensitive that distribution was restricted to just the War Cabinet. t2' And, even then, 
there was no reference made to the full extent of discussions that had taken place 
involving the British High Commissioner during the crucial days. Nor for that matter 
"' Minute by Price, 7 October 1939, D035/543/28/48; Clark to DO, 4 September 1939, 
DO35/543/28/48; Clark to Harding, 5 September 1939, D035/543/28/49; `Memorandum of Events, 
September 1939', Duncan Papers (BC294. A27) 
"' Clark to Eden, 13 September 1939, D035/1003/4/1, particularly p. 12, `Implications of a 
conversation of 4 September with Pocock'; Clark to Harding, 5 September 1939, D035/543/49 
19 Diary, 8 September 1939, Inskip Papers 
'20 DO to Clark, 6 September 1939, D035/543/28/63 
12' Minute by Hadow, 7 September 1939, F0371/23964 
u2 Ibid., Clark to Eden, 13 September 1939; minute by Price, 7 October 1939; minute by Eden, 24 
October 1939, D035/1003/3/4/1 
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was reference made subsequently in 1940, in Clark's official report on his period in the 
Union. 123 
With the benefit of more detailed information since made available it seems fair to 
conclude that the DO, through its representative in situ, in fact played a pivotal role in 
helping ensure Smuts prevailed during the South African crisis. Certainly arguments in 
the country's parliament over the allegedly unconstitutional nature of the Governor- 
General's actions would rage for many months. They would also be one of the 
incidents specifically pointed to by the Nationalists during their campaign for power, 
one that ultimately proved successful in the immediate post-war period. 124 
It had been a close thing though, even Clark himself having little choice other than to 
admit to London, whilst waiting for the debate to begin, that he could only hope 
Duncan would 'stand firm, accept [Hertzog's] resignation and invite Smuts to form a 
government'. 125 And, as one of those who was a key participant in the debate in the 
South African parliament later pointed out, if the Union's prime minister had 
approached the Governor-General the evening before the debate began to inform him 
that his Cabinet was irreparably split and requested a dissolution, there was little that 
Duncan could then have done to refuse him. 126 Whilst Clark had made the fullest use of 
all his experience, the conclusion must be that Imperial unity was held together as 
much by Hertzog's over-confidence and the keen eyes of an unknown legal adviser 
who spotted that the Senate was out of time as by anything else. The value of moral 
ties which has long been championed as having had a vital role to play was in fact only 
of limited use in the highly charged atmosphere which prevailed. 127 
'2' William Clark, Race Relations and Political trends in the Union of South Africa, 1935-1940, 
Official Paper Dominions No. 192, Clark Papers (University of Cape Town) 
124 Minute by Hadow, 8 September 1939, F0371/23964; Harding to Eden, 11 March 1940, 
D035/539/70/1/3; Harding to Eden, 16 April 1940, D035/539/70/l/5; see Shula Marks, `Southern 
Africa' in Brown and Louis (eds. ), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV, pp. 554-567 
125 Clark to DO, 4 September 1939, D035/543/28/48 
'26 Nicholls, South Africa in My Time, pp. 344-345 
127 A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies (London: 1959) p. 323 
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There was however much to be gained by the 'DO from the experience, particularly in 
terms of it gaining an indication of what might be expected in the months to come. For 
Harding, who was shortly to leave for the Union, 'the last weeks of crisis.. . were a bit 
of a nightmare'. 12' Whilst recognising the overwhelming advantage that Smuts' full 
support had brought, it nonetheless appeared that he was generally pleased at how the 
situation had been handled, particularly the outcome. 12' His departmental colleagues 
did not have long though to reflect on any lessons they may have learned as there was 
now an urgent new challenge to be faced. 
128 Harding to Batterbee, 21 October 1939, Batterbee Papers (Box 6/4) 
129 Ibid., Batterbee to Campbell, 8 September 1939 (Box 6/2) 
64 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
CHAPTER THREE 
Negotiating the Empire Air 
Training Scheme 
(September 1939 - January 1940) 
Negotiating the Empire Air Training Scheme 
Initial Approaches from the Dominions 
Organising and managing the peculiar requirements of coalition warfare now became 
the immediate preoccupation of a department which had not existed twenty-five years 
earlier when the European powers had last fought one another. With the formal 
agreement of a new, more official system of High Commissioners' meetings even 
before the formalities of the declaration had been completed, it was clear though that it 
would be a keenly embraced undertaking. ' The Dominion governments were 
themselves also not lacking in enthusiasm as they quickly approached the British 
government for guidance upon how they might best develop upon their already 
adopted military preparations. 2 With South Africa's level of involvement at this time 
still considered too uncertain to gauge, the response of the Chiefs of Staff to the 
latter's enquiries was to order the readying of three separate papers outlining areas 
in 
which the British authorities would be grateful for assistance. Amongst the most 
pressing points put forward however was one which had already caused the 
DO 
considerable concern during the months immediately prior to the outbreak of war. 
' The 
repeated assessment was given by Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, Chief of the 
Air 
Staff, that, 'should intensive air operations develop in Western Europe', a shortage of 
pilots and aircrew might arise. ` In order to help remedy this he hoped that the 
Dominions would agree to host training programmes to provide a pool of personnel for 
Royal Air Force (RAF) service. 
As far back as the 1926 Imperial Conference, William Mackenzie King, the Canadian 
prime minister, had suggested that Ottawa and London might co-operate on the 
creation of a reserve of airmen. Both sides however approached the matter with little 
`First Meeting between the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Dominion High 
Commissioners', 1 September 1939, D0121/6 
Z `Action taken by the Dominions', 6 September 1939, WP(R)(39)5, CAB67/1; Campbell to DO, 20 
September 1939, D035/1003/3/1/2; Whiskard to DO, 12 September 1939, DO35/1003/3/2/3 
I See William Stevenson, The Origins of the British Commonwealth Air Training Scheme from 1923 
to December 1939 (University of London: 1981) unpublished manuscript; F. J. Hatch, The Aerodrome 
of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, 1939-45 (Ottawa: 1983) 
pp. 1-12; W. A. B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal 
Canadian Air Force, VoLll (Ottawa: 1986) pp. 200-204 
` `Canadian Co-operation-Report by Chiefs of Staff Committee', 4 September 1939, WP(39)4, 
CAB66/1 
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real sense of urgency and tangible interest in the idea of carrying out air training only 
really re-emerged in the late 1930s. In May 1938 an air mission headed by the British 
industrialist J. G. Weir was despatched to Ottawa, its mission to evaluate the 
Dominion's aircraft manufacturing potential. Two months later Weir was followed by 
Group Captain J. M. Robb, the commandant of the Central Flying School of the RAF, 
who arrived in Canada having formed the impression that he was there to work out a 
scheme for instituting formal training facilities in the country. This, apparently, was a 
view also commonly held throughout a good part of the British Air Ministry. 5 It was a 
mistaken one though, the British representative finding his trip restricted by his hosts 
solely to discussions of future requirements. Indeed, by the outbreak of war not a 
single British aircrew member had been dispatched for training in Canada. 
Responsibility for the misunderstanding lay almost entirely with Mackenzie King, a 
skilled politician with an often complex character whose actions consistently claimed to 
be 'primarily concerned to avoid any embarrassing centralisation or anything that would 
involve Canada in commitments'. As the dominant political figure in a country made up 
of two quite individual groups, one English-speaking, the other French, he was 
moreover consummate at being able to claim that he put everybody's best interests to 
the fore whenever possible. ' In terms of his dealings with the British government, this 
led to him being thought of by many within Whitehall as something of a renegade who 
kept civil servants and ministers alike guessing 'as to his real intentions. In one of the 
first reports sent home by the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, shortly after his 
appointment in October 1938, Sir Gerald Campbell had starkly warned that the 
Canadian prime minister was 'if anything, less disposed to cooperate with other 
countries in the defence of democracy than is the Government of the United States'. ' 
And in his almost point-blank refusal to accept any suggestion of an aircrew training 
scheme which, in his view, encroached on Canada's autonomy, the difficulties in 
dealing with him were all too evident. 
s `Summary of Plan for Training of Pilots for Royal Air Force in Canada', 2 September 1938, 
AIR20/434 
6 Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 138 
' Campbell to DO, 24 March 1939, F0800/310 
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Fuelling Mackenzie King's fears, the Air Ministry managed its dealings with him in a 
poor manner, maintaining a generally aggressive line that was both heavy-handed and 
antagonistic. This allowed the prime minister in Ottawa to claim that London was 
attempting to undermine his authority. This was clear displayed with the April 1939 
agreement to train just fifty British pilots per year in Canada. Only following pressure 
from its colleagues in the DO who, with their briefings from Campbell, were 
increasingly wary of the prickly Canadian, was this reluctantly accepted by the 
Ministry. But as the European situation deteriorated throughout the summer of 1939, 
the case for some form of Dominions' air training scheme became progressively more 
urgent. As a consequence, by August, an apparently already exasperated Neville 
Chamberlain wondered whether he ought to make direct representations to his 
Canadian counterpart. He could find little support for this idea though, his Cabinet 
Secretary doubting 'whether it is wise for you to do so, at any rate just now'. ' Sir 
Horace Wilson, who was held in considerable regard by the prime minister, based his 
concerns not just on doubts about Mackenzie King's character. ' He was also 
preoccupied with the financial costs of such a scheme while, along with the Cabinet 
Office, the confusing technical issues involved caused concerns; trainees would use 
American machines and not the British aircraft they would finally be called upon to fly. 
Nonetheless, as was to continue to be the case during the subsequent negotiations 
which followed throughout the Autumn months of 1939, the Air Ministry's fervour for 
the idea outweighed any diffidence. 1° For the 'Empire Air Training Scheme', as the 
proposed project had been christened, to have any chance of success, Canada's 
participation was essential, not least because it alone of the Dominions would be able 
to provide access to the modern types of American aircraft that would be needed. " 
$ Wilson to Chamberlain, 2 August 1939, PREM1/397 
9 See John Rimington, "`The New Wolsey": Sir Horace Wilson and the Appeasement of Hitler', The 
Source Public Management Journal (August 2000), pp. ] -3 
10 The scheme is referred to under a number of different guises but this is the official British title as 
used in Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-52; in Canadian texts it is more 
commonly referred to as the `British Commonwealth Air Training Plan' (BCATP) 
" See John Golley, Aircrew Unlimited (London: 1993) pp. 40-57; Spencer Dunmore, Wings for 
Victory (Toronto: 1994) pp. 33-47; C. P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 1921-48 (Toronto: 
1981) pp. 292-4; J. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada (Toronto: 1965) pp. 103-114; Desmond Morton, 
Canada and the War (Toronto: 1981) pp. 105-106; J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record. - 
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The persistent failure to take heed of any of the DO's -warnings which they had long- 
circulated about the difficult character of Canada's dominant political figure was 
therefore unfortunate and ensured that the Air Ministry's strategy was fatally 
weakened from the outset. 
The Office was only too aware of the dangers this miscalculation threatened but at this 
stage, and from its still relatively junior position, it apparently felt able to do little to 
influence policy. This certainly seemed to be the case with the response to a further 
enquiry from the Air Ministry just three weeks before the German attack on Poland. 
Having only recently completed preparing the memorandum on the 'Position of the 
Dominions in the Event of War', the advice from Charles Dixon was that the situation 
in Ottawa meant it seemed 'certain that the only answer we should get would be 
refusal [so] it is useless to pursue the matter'. 12 This view, he went on to add, was 
not just his but also that held both by Campbell and his Secretary of State, Sir Thomas 
Inskip. The clear inference of this latter comment was that, to take the idea any 
further, the Air Ministry would be obliged to raise it directly at ministerial level. But, 
before any inter-department dispute could arise, Chamberlain's announcement that 
Britain was once again at war with Germany decisively tipped the balance. Thus, the 
DO would have the Chief of the Air Staff to thank for its first major wartime test, one 
which would ultimately provide a sharp examination for a still relatively inexperienced 
department. 13 For in the negotiations which followed, a situation developed which 
threatened not just the unity of the coalition which had begun to form in defiance of 
Nazi Germany, but also future relations within the Empire itself. 
The Outbreak of War 
For the DO, as with every other department within Whitehall, the first week of 
September 1939 was a tumultuous, often hectic one. The prime minister's 
announcement of a new war cabinet, one which he intended would deal with both the 
Volume 1,1939-44 (Toronto: 1960) pp. 40-59; J. L. Granatstein, Canada's War (Toronto: 1975) pp. 43- 66; Donald Creighton, The Forked Road (Toronto: 1976) pp. 4-7; Ted Barris, Behind the Glory 
(Toronto: 1992) pp. 12-16 
12 Dixon to Abraham, 10 August 1939, PREM1/397; Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 34 
" `Memorandum on the Possibility of Increasing Training in Canada for the Royal Air Force', 2 Sept 
1939, AIR2/3206 
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challenges that the war would bring and, he hoped, help pacify at least some of the 
mounting concerns of a number of his colleagues, brought with it a new Secretary of 
State. 14 Having sat on the back-benches since his resignation as Foreign Secretary the 
previous year, Anthony Eden was now asked by the prime minister to accept what was 
still widely held to be a junior post and, in what was subsequently seen as a somewhat 
surprising move, he accepted. 'S Although his position did not warrant a permanent seat 
in the War Cabinet, it was announced that Eden would attend the majority of meetings 
of the 'inner sanctum' so he could ensure that the Dominions were properly supplied 
with information'. 'ß This was no doubt, in part, intended to deal with the warnings 
which were circulating that to not do so would be 'a political mistake of the first 
order'. " Whatever the case, with the inevitable disruption caused by a Ministerial 
change and arrangements for the Dominions' entry into the war still being finalised, it 
would therefore be some days before the DO could hold further, more formal 
discussions about the air training proposal. 
The Cabinet Office wasted little time though in pressing forward, Chamberlain 
exchanging preliminary telegrams with Mackenzie King on the subject even before 
Canada had officially confirmed its entry in to the war. " As this was taking place two 
senior London-based members of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), Wing 
Commander H. V. Heakes and Group Captain A. E. Godfrey, were invited to meet 
privately with Air Vice-Marshal Charles Portal, then in charge of Royal Air Force (RAF) 
personnel. '9 During the course of their discussions, Portal offered a sombre assessment 
of the possible developments that the Air Ministry viewed might take place in the 
future. In light of these, and in line with the Chief of the Air Staff's recent report to 
the cabinet, it was suggested that the major assistance the Dominions could offer, and 
14 See Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came (London: 1989) pp. 601-604; Parker, Chamberlain and 
Appeasement, pp. 337-342 
's See Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: Volume III, The Reckoning (London: 1965) pp. 62-68; 
V. Rothwell, Anthony Eden: A Political Biography (London: 1992) p. 51; David Carlton, Anthony 
Eden: A Biography (London: 1981) pp. 151-153 
16 War Cabinet Meeting 7(39), 12 September 1939, CAB65/1 (hereafter `WM') 
"Yates to Tucker, 3 September 1939, PREMI/384 
18 Chamberlain to Mackenzie King, 6 September 1939 in D. R. Murray (ed. ), Documents on Canadian 
External Relations, Vol. VII/1 (1939-41) (Ottawa: 1974) pp. 1301-1302 (hereafter `DCER VII/1') 
'9 'Minutes of a meeting to discuss flying training organisation', 10 September 1939, AIR20/331 
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Canada in particular, was to help rectify the RAF's current manpower shortages . 
21 It 
seems reasonable to conclude Portal might have anticipated Heakes, who was an 
attache based at Canada House, would sound out Massey, Canada's High 
Commissioner in London, about his ideas. Certainly within days the two RCAF officers, 
together with colleagues from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), had taken action. 
This was to use the information they had received to secure the support of a couple of 
well-placed, but anonymous, imperial businessmen. As a result there was now an 
expanding group anxious that air training in the Dominions should be turned into 
something really 'impressive in its magnitude'. 2' 
Along with Stanley Bruce, his Australian counterpart, Massey had particular reason to 
throw his weight behind the proposal. Passionate supporters of the imperial idea, both 
former Dominion prime ministers were men who still had a good deal of ambition and 
accompanying 'big agendas'. " But as High Commissioners the pair had found 
themselves increasingly marginalised by their respective home leaderships. Mackenzie 
King was widely rumoured not to trust his London representative because 'his 
telegrams were too English'. 23 With Bruce similarly dismissed, but for different reasons, 
this left the two men with only marginal influence in the political world. With the war 
only days old, the two aging politicians might therefore have viewed the air training 
proposals as something that could help re-establish them centre-stage in what already 
looked like being a long conflict. 
Once approached Massey was certainly quick to respond. Both he and Bruce had only 
recently requested that the High Commissioners be granted a meeting with the War 
Cabinet to discuss 'the general political and military situation'. 24 Held on the evening of 
13 September directly after they had been further briefed by their air force advisers, 
the two High Commissioners, escorted by Eden, took the opportunity to quiz the 
20 Diary, 13 September 1939, Pearson Papers (MG26, N8, Vol. 1-2) 
21 Diary, 14 September 1939, Massey Papers (Vol. 40) 
22 Cecil Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne, Man of Two Worlds (London: 1965) pp. 277-280; Vincent Massey, What's Past is Prologue (Toronto: 1963) pp. 303-306 
2' Diary, 29 October 1940, Waterson Papers 
24 `Wartime Meetings between the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Dominion High Commissioners', 12 September 1939, DO121/6 (hereafter 'WHC') 
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assembled cabinet ministers on the true state, of Britain's military position. After the 
meeting had finished Lord Chatfield, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, was 
bitterly critical about Bruce's use of 'hole-in-the-corner' methods to obtain information. 
Sir John Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, privately noted that the Dominion 
representatives 'had taken an unwarrantable, gloomy view of the situation... based on 
misleading information which they had received from certain Dominion officers on duty 
in this country'. 25 Little can the Chancellor have known though that the basis from 
which the comments had been drawn was actually a private briefing given by a senior 
British RAF official. 
Indeed, despite conflicting claims as to who was responsible for first suggesting the 
scheme, it seems fairly clear that Massey and Bruce were in fact doing little more than 
develop an 'idea' supplied to them by Portal. Certainly neither of their memoirs makes 
prior mention of any deep-seated conviction that the Dominions held great potential as 
bases for carrying out training of air force personnel. They were however now anxious 
to put their own stamp on the scheme and a busy period followed during which the 
two High Commissioners sought to promote their ideas. Two days after they had 
clashed with the War Cabinet during a meeting hosted by Newall to 'discuss secret 
information regarding the RAF', the Chief of the Air Staff tried to persuade Massey and 
Bruce that what they had been told was inaccurate. 26 Neither seems to have been 
convinced and the next day, during the Secretary of State's daily meetings with the 
London-based Dominion representatives, they announced their conclusions to those 
present. 27 
For the DO, the endeavours of the two High Commissioners, the disturbance 
associated with an internal change of senior officials and the actual requirements of 
wartime, all combined to undermine its earlier resistance to the Air Ministry's 
25 Simon to Ismay, 15 September 1939, CAB104/247; Diary, 15 September 1939, Pearson Papers; 
Bruce and Simon did not in any case enjoy a harmonious relationship, `Bruce gave me [Eden] a lift 
back to the office and on his way spoke in vehement condemnation of John Simon, at the Foreign 
Office, at the Home Office, and finally at the Treasury, his has been the greatest responsibility for the 
position in which we now find ourselves'; see Diary, 21 September 1939, Avon Papers (University of 
Birmingham) AP20/1/19; also see Bruce, `Note on the Rt. Hon. Sir John Simon', Friday 13 October 
1939, (National Archives of Australia) AA1969/275/1 
26 Diary, 16 September 1939, Pearson Papers 
27 Diary, 15 Sept 1939, Massey Papers; WHC, 16 September 1939, D0121/6 
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proposals. Indeed, the collapse in opposition was rapid and the DO's new Secretary of 
State, who had had some days to mull over what he had heard at the acrimonious War 
Cabinet meeting, was soon keen to push on with the enterprise. So much so that he 
now approached Sir Kingsley Wood, his counterpart in the Air Ministry, for guidance on 
how best to proceed. 28 Massey meanwhile continued to aid the process in whatever 
way he could, arranging a lunch meeting for Eden with a 'Canadian industrialist now in 
this country who was capable of undertaking the mass production of aeroplanes'. 29 
With the Australian government having already indicated that they were willing to 
despatch trained personnel to form a Royal Air Force squadron, Eden's note to his 
diary, that the government should 'get ahead with this Canadian business as rapidly as 
possibly', was perhaps not surprising. 30 And with the War Cabinet's backing now 
secured, by the end of the week he was in fact ready to submit a draft telegram to 
Chamberlain intended for distribution to the Dominion governments. Mackenzie King's 
copy included a separate preface in the form of a personal message from the British 
leader to his Canadian counterpart, an addition Eden believed 'would help the chances 
of the scheme being sympathetically considered'. Chamberlain concurred but, being a 
busy man, he did not write the note himself, Massey, still happy to provide 'gratuitous 
advice on how to run the kingdom', once more stepping in. 31 
The document's despatch to Ottawa was good news for the Air Ministry but not for 
the DO for whom it meant the acceptance of a scheme which less than a month before 
it had dismissed as highly impractical. 32 Although the war had started in the meantime, 
the factors influencing its initial opposition had not substantially changed, most notably 
Mackenzie King's suspicions of London's motives. But faced with a resolute, well- 
organised campaign supported by a good deal of political guile, the department's junior 
standing had been ruthlessly exposed. At the same time there were doubts about the 
28 Ibid., 19 September 1939 
29 Ibid., 20 September 1939 
30 Diary, 21 September 1939, Avon Papers; statement from Australia House, 20 September 1939, 
D035/1003/3/3 1; DO to Whiskard, 29 September 1939, D035/1003/3/36 
" Eden to Chamberlain, 25 September 1939, PREM1/397; Diary, 25 & 29 September 1939, Massey 
Papers; Massey, What's Past is Prologue, p. 303 
'Z WHC, 26 September 1939, DO121/6; Diary, 26 September 1939, Mackenzie King Papers (MG26, 
J13) 
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loyalties of its senior figure. For Eden, who according to one of the DO's principals 
continued to 'excel on any occasions when he could bring his diplomatic skill and 
experience to bear', something of the potential scope of the air training scheme could 
well have been seen as a clear opportunity to begin restoring his credentials within 
Whitehall. 33 Aside from his obvious desire to promote any project which helped 
improve Britain's rearmament plans, such an assessment would certainly help account 
for some of his enthusiasm for the scheme. But as events would soon demonstrate, if 
it was political capital he was looking to gain, both he and his department would have 
nothing but hard work ahead of them. 
The Air Mission 
For Massey and Bruce, if they were to maintain the project's momentum, time was of 
the essence, leaving both men anxious that the Air Mission required to carry out the 
negotiations should leave for Ottawa by the end of the first week of October. 34 The 
news that the Canadian prime minister had telegraphed London to accept the proposal 
in principle and confirm that he would be 'pleased to play host to a conference to 
complete arrangements' was therefore well-received. 35 There were a number of 
reasons behind Mackenzie King ending his pre-war reluctance towards the training of 
airmen. Perhaps the most important of these was that with Canada now fully 
committed to supporting London in the war, this new proposal appeared to him to offer 
potentially far-reaching political rewards. Reducing the pressure for a large army, and 
thus avoiding any repetition of the divisive conscription crisis of more than twenty 
years before, support for the plan would allow him to demonstrate his balanced 
management of national affairs to the country's French-Canadians. And at the same 
time, because the British authorities had highlighted the vital importance they attached 
to the scheme, the ever-astute Mackenzie King was also well aware of the 
opportunities this might present. 
" Garner, The Commonwealth Office, pp. 94 
'a WHC, 30 September 1939, D0121/6 
 King to Chamberlain, 28 September 1939, DCER VII/1, p. 566; Diary, 28 September 1939, 
Mackenzie King Papers 
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With Ottawa's preliminary acceptance confirmed, the following day the Air Ministry 
was able to quickly move arrangements forward. Although it had been impossible to 
persuade Lord Trenchard to agree to become Director-General of 'the Imperial Air 
Training Scheme', the Air Ministry informed Chamberlain that they had instead secured 
the services of Lord Riverdale to lead the delegation. 36 An astute and successful 
Sheffield industrialist who had much experience of public affairs, these were the 
qualities which had led to Riverdale already having been appointed as an adviser to the 
government on the purchase of war materials. However, with a manner described 
variously as 'bluff', 'hearty yet domineering' and 'offhand yet commanding', along 
with a 'Colonel Blimp' moustache which enhanced the extremely British aspect of his 
appearance, it should have been clear that he was not the man for the particular task 
at hand. 
Indeed, for the Canadian prime minister, and even more so for his Minister for External 
Affairs, O. D. Skelton, who remained bitterly opposed to greater co-operation with 
London, this English aristocrat came to personify everything they disliked most about 
the British Empire. 37 There is no evidence that the DO had even been consulted about 
the selection of personnel for the Air Mission although this was of little concern to 
Eden who, as quickly as he had offered his support for the scheme, now appeared to 
have lost all interest. 38 This ensured that during the crucial early phases of the plan, 
specifically choosing who was to be sent to Ottawa, there would be few opportunities 
for the department to make any meaningful contribution. 
This failure to secure a more significant initial role was an oversight from which the DO 
would spend the next three months trying to recover. This started almost at once as 
Mackenzie King, confident that the British were now desperate for his support, made it 
clear that he was not about to accept any statement from London or its appointed 
agents, verbal or written, with which he did not agree. A proposed public 
announcement that the British government wished to make sparked the first problem. 
It was hoped to highlight to allies and enemies alike the existence of a far-reaching, 
36 Trenchard to Chamberlain, 2 October 1939, PREMI/397; Air Ministry to Cabinet Office, 29 
September 1939, PREMI/397 
"Diary, 28 September 1939, Mackenzie King Papers 
38 Diary, 4 October 1939, Avon Papers 
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almost finalised project, which had been suggested by representatives of the 
Dominions and demonstrated Imperial unity in action. This was not possible though for, 
as far as the Canadian prime minister was concerned, the air training proposal was a 
British idea which was still far from agreed and he duly protested at the proposed 
statement's tone. Revealing once again his ignorance of Mackenzie King, Kingsley 
Wood complained to his colleagues, by way of explanation, that he had first sought 
and gained the Dominion High Commissioners' approval prior to contacting Ottawa. " 
But due to the complicated nature of the relationship between Massey and Mackenzie 
King, Canada House's support for any scheme, in reality, counted for little. ao 
Standing up in front of the House of Commons to outline the 'contribution which the 
Dominions were making to the air effort', the Air Minister's often vague speech 
represented the first in what would be a long series of British retreats in the face of 
criticism from Ottawa. " And with Riverdale and his team still en route to Canada, their 
boat having set sail from Liverpool during the first week of October, the British 
government had already been given notice that trouble lay ahead. "' The time taken up 
in settling this initial dispute did have some benefit for the DO however, galvanising 
Eden to break his ten-day lethargy and move more in step with the rest of his 
department. "' But for those below him, the incident had ominous implications. 
Stephenson, already thought of as 'the ideal deputy at headquarters', reassured Sir 
Harry Batterbee that any difficulties he thought he might be experiencing in New 
Zealand over the proposed details for implementing air training 'cannot have been 
anything like the trouble we have had here'. 44 With the matter eventually resolved and 
39 Diary, 1I October 1939, Cowell Papers 
40 Diary, 17 October 1939, Pearson Papers 
41 WM43(39), 10 October 1939, CAB65/1; Diary, 18 October 1939, Pearson Papers 
42 `Mission to Canada in connection with the Dominion Air Training Scheme', AIR8/280; the team 
initially consisted of ten people, the Under-Secretary of State for Air arriving at a later date 
" WM43(39), 10 October 1939, CAB65/1 
4° Campbell to Eden, 31 October 1939, D03 5/1071/276/119; Stephenson to Batterbee, I1 October 
1939, Batterbee Papers (Box 7/4) 
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Hitler's conditional offer to end hostilities once again -dominating the War Cabinet's 
attention, Riverdale and his Mission headed on for Canada. 45 
The British delegation had departed with little by way of an indication as to what, if 
any, their formal terms of reference would be other than that they were, in Riverdale's 
own words, 'to secure the agreement of the Dominion governments concerned as 
speedily as possible'. 46 The Air Mission's leader had not however been kept totally 
ignorant of the pertinent issues as, in a meeting held within the Air Ministry on the day 
before his departure, the significance of Britain's financial weakness had been fully 
impressed upon him. 47 This he now shared with the rest of his team, advising them 
whilst they were still at sea that money was the vital consideration when deciding 
upon the negotiating stance that should be adopted. This appears to have been the 
extent of the briefing though and although the basic proposals that were outlined by 
him to the Canadian government shortly after his arrival were quite comprehensive, no 
really substantive planning seems to have taken place beforehand. "' 
What would surely have been of even greater concern to the DO was the 'bottom-line' 
which Riverdale soon decided he would follow. The fact that the British government 
had not yet committed itself to future purchases of Canadian wheat might, he 
concluded, present an opportunity to 'make such a promise in order to facilitate 
acceptance'. 49 But the whole question of what to do with wheat, specifically Ottawa's 
as WM42(39), 9 October 1939 CAB65/1; ibid., WM43(39), 10 October 1939; WHC, 9 October 1939, 
DO121/6; ibid., WHC, 10 October 1939; Chamberlain to Canadian Government, 10 October 1939, 
DOI 14/113; Diary, 11October 1939, Avon Papers 
46 `Mission to Canada', AIR8/280; Diary, 5 November 1939, Mackenzie King Papers 
47 `Memo on the Incidence of Cost of the Air Training Scheme', 5 October 1939, AIR19/83 
48 `At a preliminary meeting on 16 October 1939, Riverdale outlined the basic proposal. It called for 
the training of 850 pilots, 510 air observers or navigators and 870 wireless operators/air gunners 
every four weeks or about 29,000 aircrew a year. Elementary flying schools would be established in 
each of the three Dominions [involved at this stage] but all advanced flying training as well as air 
observer and wireless operator/air gunner training was to be carried out in Canada. The North 
American training structure was to include twelve elementary flying schools, twenty-five advanced or 
service flying training schools, fifteen air observer schools fifteen bombing and gunnery schools, 
three air navigation schools and one large wireless or radio training school. To man these schools and 
their supporting organisation 54,000 air force personnel would be required. The number of training 
aircraft was estimated at five thousand'; Riverdale to Mackenzie King, 13 October 1939, DCER 
VII/l, pp. 580-581 
"'Note of First Meeting', 10 October 1939, AIR20/405/IIIC/3/13 
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attempts to ensure that it secured a 'favourable' price for its sales, was deemed by the 
DO as being of the utmost sensitivity. Indeed, department-wide, in all the discussions 
that were then taking place, the need for very careful consideration of Canada's 
viewpoint was repeatedly stressed. At the same time the forthcoming meeting of 
Dominion ministers, scheduled to be held in London during November, was highlighted 
as the most opportune occasion to properly address the matter. 50 Riverdale was 
ignorant to this though whilst his own thoughts, equally, were unknown back at the 
Office. 
One point upon which there was consensus between the two was the issue of the 
total proposed cost of the scheme. During the crossing the Air Mission chief had 
expressed his own doubts as to whether Canada could actually afford to train just 
under 30,000 aircrew each year. Upon his arrival in Ottawa he showed little hesitation 
in investigating this hypothesis, often by indiscreet quizzing of those who would later 
be involved in the negotiations. 51 The response was nearly always the same. One 
senior official in the RCAF, who had been asked for his views, noted that the scope of 
the British proposal was 'so far ahead of anything that we had thought of that 
everyone who had not heard details before was quite taken aback at its magnitude'. 52 
Entering his first meeting with Riverdale shortly after the Mission's arrival in mid- 
October, Mackenzie King had been fully briefed on rumours of these suggested costs 
by his Finance Minister, Colonel J. L. Ralston, another of his colleagues who was often 
critical of Britain. The Canadian prime minister had already been further annoyed by a 
press conference given by the Air Mission's chief earlier in the day. But it was 
Riverdale's weak performance during the actual meeting itself that did the most to 
compound his healthy suspicions that London was again trying to dictate policy to him. 
Privately however, Mackenzie King felt that his sternness he had shown to Riverdale 
during the first meeting had led the British to recognise that he saw through them. As 
a result he was confident that they now knew what to expect during the soon-to- 
commence negotiations. In this, and in his flawed appraisal of the potential costs 
50 'Note of a Meeting.... ', 26 September 1939, D035/1069 
51 'Note of Third Meeting', 13 October 1939, AIR20/405/IIIC/3/13 
52 `The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan', Air Vice Marshal Stedman Papers (Directorate of 
History, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa) DHist 80/412, p. 2 
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entailed in the scheme, Mackenzie King was wrong-. 53 But his was not the only 
inaccurate assessment that had been made. With some obvious relief Campbell had 
meanwhile updated the DO. Following the disastrous meeting and having listened to 
the High Commissioner's advice, he believed the Air Mission's head 'now saw the 
picture for himself [and] is going to tell the Air Ministry and the Treasury that he 
cannot put this proposal to [the Canadians]'. 54 The following day however, in his first 
progress report to be sent back to London, no copy of which the DO ever received, 
Riverdale failed to mention any need to 'change the plan. 55 Whilst Campbell had 
apparently badly misjudged the intentions of his new arrival, his deep-seated unease 
about what to expect from the negotiations remained as keen as ever. 
As the Air Mission, aided by low-level members of the RCAF, looked at producing a 
more definite set of proposed costs, the High Commissioner sent London another long 
telegram. This highlighted the fact that the suggested outlay for the scheme was about 
'twice the amount to be raised by taxation in Canada's war budget for the first year of 
the war'. 56 This warning further noted the degree to which the Canadian government 
was becoming agitated by its British counterpart's continuing perceived reticence in 
addressing its financial concerns. Riverdale's anticipated trump card was the most 
serious of these, the DO being warned that wheat had become a 'poisonous irritant' 
which, in Ottawa's view, could not be viewed separately from the air training question. 
Indeed it was now reported that the two issues were viewed as being 'intimately 
related in their mutual bearing on the question of what economic and financial effort 
Canada [could] actually make'. One final cause of worry for the High Commissioner 
was the condescending attitude of certain British officials who were felt to be 'working 
overtime to produce an unwholesome atmosphere over here, and to weaken, nay 
almost kill, the spirit of co-operation which was alive in the early days'. 57 The Ministry 
of Food, for one, seems to have often treated their Canadian counterparts in an 
s' Diary, 17 October 1939, Mackenzie King Papers 
sa Campbell to Machtig, 18 October 1939, D035/1071/276/9 
ss Riverdale to Wood, 19 October 1939, AIR20/338; handwritten comment, 29 November 1939, 
D035/1071/276/38 
56 Campbell to Machtig, 24 October 1939, D035/1028/276/16 
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arrogant manner throughout this, period, while 'the British Purchasing Mission, then in 
Ottawa to discuss future Anglo-Canadian trade, was also guilty of adopting a 
sometimes haughty manner. "' 
The tensions reported by Campbell did not however appear to be dampening 
Riverdale's spirits. In the relatively short space of time since his arrival and despite his 
clash with Mackenzie King, the leader of the Air Mission had grown increasingly 
confident. He felt sure that the will of the Canadian people, which was without doubt 
broadly in favour of the training scheme, would prove decisive in helping to carry the 
day. The first official meeting between the British government's representatives and 
the Canadian war cabinet had been delayed by Mackenzie King who had been 
distracted by potentially divisive elections in Quebec. On the eve of the rescheduled 
discussions, Riverdale still felt sufficiently confident to be able to write positively to the 
Air Ministry. This time he informed them that, although he was generally disappointed 
with the Canadian prime minister holding back the enthusiasm of the population at 
large, 'you may rely upon us to do the best we can with [him] as we find him'. 5s 
Entering the talks with such an outlook, it is little wonder that what happened next 
came as a very great shock to the British industrialist. 80 
The Beginning of Negotiations 
The first formal meeting between the two sides was nothing short of disastrous, a 
failure for which both had to accept some share of responsibility. The Canadian leader 
had forbidden any prior official contact, his apparent wish being to emphasise that it 
was an entirely British-inspired plan. This however meant that when it was announced 
by the Air Mission, in a 'sort of taken-for-granted way', that Canada would be 
expected to provide C$374 million towards the cost of the scheme, Ralston promptly 
'exploded'. 8' According to Campbell, attending as the DO's observer, 'this put 
s$ Ministry of Food to Price, 30 October 1939, CAB21/490; `Memorandum prepared by Grant 
Dexter', 30 November 1939, Pearson Papers 
S9 Riverdale to Wood, 30 October 1939, D035/1071/276/37 
60 Diary, 5 November 1939, Mackenzie King Papers 
61 Campbell to Machtig, 9 November 1939, D035/1071/276/119; `Dominion Air Training Scheme', 
WP(G)(39)105, November 1939, CAB21/499 
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Riverdale off his balance and the rest of his presentation was not so good as it should 
have been'. The furious Mackenzie King, whose comments left Riverdale 'visibly 
deflated' was now firmly convinced that the proposals in front of him were nothing 
more than 'a recruiting scheme for the British air force rather than any genuine attempt 
for co-operation'. "Z 
Back in London, looking over the High Commissioner's detailed report, there was only a 
sense of resignation amongst the department's senior officials over this most recent 
turn of events. For Machtig, who had replaced Harding as the department's official 
head, although developments were far from encouraging, he 'had not... expected 
anything very different', a view shared by his Secretary of State who found it all 
'disappointing'. The immediate conclusion of the two men was that a compromise 
would have to be reached with Britain increasing its contribution to the scheme or 
reducing the scale of the plan in some way. In the meantime, although there was felt 
to be little that the DO could do at this stage, Stephenson suggested that it might be 
prudent if copies of all correspondence were now sent to Chamberlain. 63 
If Campbell's assessment had produced a certain air of pessimism in the office, much 
worse was to come. The High Commissioner had diligently noted Mackenzie King's 
harangue of the Air Mission and, in particular, his use of the expression 'this is not our 
war'. 84 Whilst later reports by the DO would point to such language as a clear 
demonstration of the reluctance which existed across the Atlantic, the FO's reaction at 
the time was more muted as it was well recognised that the Canadian prime minister 
was prone to 'woolly outbursts'. "' But, for reasons best known to himself, Campbell 
decided that it would be appropriate in this instance to convey his shock at the 
statement to Skelton, advising him that the comments had been repeated back to 
London. Never one to overlook an opportunity that might strengthen support for his 
anti-British sentiment, having 'wisely written out some of the things said to him', the 
62 Diary, 31 October 1939, Mackenzie King Papers 
6S Ibid., Campbell to Secretary of State, 31 October 1939; minutes by Machtig, Eden, Stephenson, 2 
November 1939, D035/1071/276/7 
"Campbell to Secretary of State, 1 November 1939, DO35/1071/276/10 
65 Minute by Cavendish Bentinck, 13 October 1939, FO371/23966; `Notes by Liesching', 23 
November 1939, D035/1071/276/34 
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Minister for External Affairs dutifully reported this conversation back to his prime 
minster. 66 The rupture this caused in the relationship between Mackenzie King and 
Campbell lasted well beyond the negotiations' end and on into the following year. 67 
The Canadian leader's almost immediate response was to launch an astonishing attack 
on the DO's sole representative in the negotiations, even going so far as to approach 
the Governor-General, Lord Tweedsmuir, to urge that a formal rebuke be issued to the 
High Commissioner. 61 He also seized the opportunity to contact Chamberlain in person, 
not just to raise his personal grievances, but to formally warn him in writing of his 
conviction that military and economic questions in this war 'were inextricably 
intertwined and [could] not be dealt with separately'. 61 This was unfortunate timing as 
the visit by leading Dominion ministers to Britain was now under way, making the 
department's workload so hectic as to leave certain of its members uncertain whether 
they would get home from the office or not at the end of the day. The general reaction 
within the DO to this added complication in Ottawa was therefore one of dismay. 70 
And with discussions in London having in fact become increasingly bitter and hard- 
fought, like 'some suburban county council discussing the rates' according to one of 
the delegates, Mackenzie King's very public complaints only contributed to the 
hardening of attitudes which had become visible within parts of Whitehall. " 
Against this gloomy backdrop the arrival of the southern Dominions' representatives in 
Ottawa in early November, perhaps unsurprisingly, seemed to give Campbell cause to 
speculate that the clouds that had accompanied 'the joys and sorrows of the Riverdale 
Mission', were finally beginning to lift. 72 This assessment was to prove far from 
66 Diary, 1 November 1939, Mackenzie King Papers ; ibid., 5 November 1939 
67 Campbell to Machtig, 27 February 1940, D035/1072/276/124 
68 Tweedsmuir to Chamberlain, 2 November 1939, Neville Chamberlain Papers (University of 
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accurate though as the arrival of the delegations from-Australia and New Zealand in 
fact precipitated the onset of even greater troubles. Both potential partners wanted to 
carry out more aircrew training in their own countries, the most simple reason for this 
being fiscal considerations. Neither enjoyed particularly enviable economic positions, 
New Zealand's being by far the worse of the two. 73 The Air Mission was sympathetic 
to the arguments both countries advanced and consequently informed the Canadian 
government that changes in the financial calculations would accordingly need to be 
made. " As a result during the following week the shape and costs of the scheme 
changed time and time again. Finally, by the month's midpoint the Canadian cabinet 
was willing to accept a revised plan calling for it to contribute a total of C$313 million. 
Although he had gone further than he had originally wished, Mackenzie King felt this 
was merited so that the British government might feel its counterpart in Ottawa had 
acted generously. "' 
His support was however conditional and the two points upon which the Canadian 
leader required agreement were crucial. A guarantee of acceptance by London that the 
scheme took priority in terms of Canada's contribution to the war effort was concerned 
was the first point. The other was a satisfactory conclusion to the Anglo-Dominion 
discussions. Together these would both provide potentially great political benefits for 
Mackenzie King. 76 But, in Whitehall, there were those who were already suspicious of 
the Dominions' commitment to the war and these caveats appeared to confirm their 
doubts. The foreign secretary for one had already been quick to inform Eden of a 
complaint made by the Canadian minister in Washington. This had stated that 
volunteers at home had been told they were not immediately required and 'no stirring 
appeal had been made to deeper Canadian feeling that wished to be convinced that it 
was engaged upon a holy war'. 'During war cabinet meetings in October, at which 
" DO to Whiskard, 25 October 1939, D035/1003/3/2/19; memorandum on New Zealand by Bewley, 
October 1939, CAB21 /490 
"Mission to Canada', pp. 6-7, AIR8/280 
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War and Business', The Quarterly Review of Commerce, Number VII (Autumn 1939) 
" Note of comments made by Herridge, Canadian minister in Washington, 30 October 1939, 
FO371/23966 
82 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
Negotiating the Empire Air Training Scheme 
Eden had first pointed to Mackenzie King's manoeuvrings, both Leslie Hore-Belisha, 
Secretary of State for War, and Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, had 
expressed concerns over the lack of speed with which 'overseas contingents' were 
reaching Europe . 
73 Kingsley Wood now also privately took the opportunity to outline 
his anxieties although, having advised Riverdale that he felt the provisional agreement 
was 'a reasonable solution of a very difficult problem', he ultimately settled upon the 
same conclusion for his cabinet colleagues. 79 
The Treasury however had no intentions of being so compliant. Having had a chance to 
consider the 'extraordinary variety of telegrams, memoranda and so forth' that the 
matter had generated, and to assess the calculations of their Canadian counterparts, 
they would not countenance accepting the agreement in its new proposed form. 
Indeed their discouraging summary, that 'the whole thing seems to us mildly 
preposterous', was one which the Exchequer intended not to reconsider until after it 
had had an opportunity to discuss the many concerns which it held directly with the 
Canadian delegation visiting London. 8° This was in some ways not a bad turn of events 
for the DO as it provided the department with a breathing space to take stock of the 
situation. The Dominion ministers' visit had clearly been a trying experience, according 
to Machtig he had 'never known anything like it', both in terms of the hours being 
worked and also the intensity of the activities being undertaken. 81 During the first three 
weeks of November virtually every day had been fully occupied either with meetings or 
official functions. Eden meanwhile had been away from the Office for six days 
escorting the visiting ministers to France, ' from which many of them returned 'very 
dissatisfied' with the defences they had seen, and his absence further contributed to 
the workload of his senior colleagues. 82 So much so that attention to the training 
scheme apparently waned during these weeks, as the relative absence of internal 
minutes on the Ottawa negotiations subject reveals. 
78 WM43(39), 10 October 1939, CAB65/1; ibid., WM53(39), 19 October 1939 
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An unforseen consequence of the Treasury's 'increasingly belligerent stance was an 
acceptance within the DO that the economic question was the key aspect of 
discussions. This allowed departmental responsibility for the matter to be effectively 
turned over to Liesching who had just recently been promoted to AUS. During his 
career thus far he had prospered through his involvement in the establishment of the 
British High Commissions in Canada, Australia and South Africa, and with 'a charming 
personality [and] broad outlook' his success had apparently endeared him to the more 
senior members of the department. 83 His first fourteen-page memorandum, intended for 
circulation throughout Whitehall, fully assessed the Anglo-Canadian economic 
relationship, covering every aspect of the issue. In so doing it delivered a stark series 
of conclusions the most fundamental of which warned that so long as no agreement 
was reached about the financial relationship, no settlement of the Air Training Scheme 
negotiations could hope to be found. Indeed, in Liesching's view, 'if the present feeling 
against our wheat purchasing policy is not allayed, it may recoil upon us to our 
disadvantage in the future'. 84 Whilst the document offered no definitive answers at this 
stage, it was nonetheless a most valuable exercise, helping restore a sense of focus 
and urgency within the DO if nowhere else. And with the talks resuming again in 
Ottawa, renewed interest could not have come at a better time as an apparently 
pivotal moment now faced the Air Mission. 
The Draft Memorandum 
For the Australian and New Zealand representatives, some of whom had found their 
visit to Canada far from enjoyable, the point had arrived where they were no longer 
willing to consider extending their stay. Upon their arrival in Ottawa Mackenzie King 
had told them that they had come not as his guests, but as members of the Riverdale 
Mission. Indeed the Canadian authorities had made little effort to hide the fact that 
their Dominion cousins were held to be of a second-class in terms of the significance 
attached to them. According to the British High Commissioner, this reception had so 
angered Jim Fairburn, the Australian Minister for Air, that 'he had a hard time 
controlling his anger... and had made up his mind to get the Australian part of the 
83 G. H. Meadmore to Batterbee, 29 November 1940, Batterbee Papers (Box 8/4); ibid., Harding to 
Batterbee, 18 February 1939 
84 `Notes on Canada's War Economy', prepared by Liesching, 23 November 1939, 
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scheme mapped out as quickly as possible and then leave'. 85 Little wonder that the 
latter might have consequently chosen to adopt a 'home by Christmas attitude' to the 
proceedings. 86 But just as the Air Mission was telling London there was an urgent 
requirement to sign some form of document before the representatives from the 
southern Dominions left, Kingsley Wood's memorandum came before the War Cabinet. 
The discussion that followed quite clearly demonstrated that Eden had not grasped the 
implications contained within Liesching's memorandum. Instead the Secretary of State 
still based his entire outlook solely on his suspicions of Mackenzie King and this 
ensured that he continued only to recommend that a firm line be taken. Although the 
War Cabinet chose to ignore this advice, this came at a time when comments being 
made elsewhere by the Secretary of State suggested that he had once more adopted a 
noncommittal attitude towards the entire affair. 
This was particularly unfortunate in light of the actions of Captain Harold Balfour, 
Under-Secretary of State for Air, who had been sent out to Ottawa at the end of 
October to lend his political assistance to the Air Mission. Acting on his own authority 
he had given a guarantee to the Canadian government that C$4.5 million, which they 
agreed to advance to an American manufacturer of training aircraft, would be paid 
back at once by the British Treasury. When the DO finally heard, a fortnight 
afterwards, Machtig and Eden were both shocked, speculating as to what effect this 
would have upon the Canadians. Later however the Secretary of State thought 'it was 
none of his business' although it is unclear whether he was referring to Balfour's 
actions or to the Air Ministry's handling of the Air Mission as a whole. 87 One of the 
DO's junior officials would later write of Eden that he 'exuded an impression of 
superficiality with no profound interest in the problems of the Commonwealth', an 
assessment that certainly seemed to be true on this occasion. 88 In the meantime 
Liesching had meanwhile taken the opportunity to distribute a second internal 
memorandum within the DO, providing an exhaustive summary of events to date for 
as Campbell to Batterbee, 8 February 1940, Batterbee Papers (Box 6/2) 
86 Certainly the Australian representative was angered: `I gave a lunch for Fairburn ... 
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his peers. 89 This was the first document of its' kind prepared during the negotiations, 
and was another useful aid that would have proven useful much earlier. Eden did not 
look at it until the month's end however by which time the situation had taken another 
turn for the worse. 
The telegram sent by the War Cabinet to Mackenzie King in the hope of reassuring him 
had, in fact, achieved" the opposite effect, leaving him once again in a highly agitated 
state. "' The point of contention for both sides was the British government's concern 
about any announcement describing the Air Training Scheme as Canada's principal war 
effort. The authorities in London feared that such a move would have 'embarrassing 
effects on relations with the French'. 9' The British Ambassador in Paris had been 
advising for some weeks of the growing unease surrounding him and his most recent 
message to Chamberlain warned that questions were being raised about his country's 
commitment to the war. Indeed it was even thought in certain French circles that the 
government in London was considering 'a peace which will contain what France would 
not consider adequate political and military guarantees against any further threat. ` Put 
in such a context, Mackenzie King's continuing attempts to limit Canada's military 
contribution provided another worrying distraction. And Gallic nervousness was not 
helped when, with the continuing failure to secure any consensus, the representatives 
of Australia and New Zealand left Ottawa having signed no more than a draft 
agreement, all that could be agreed upon by the respective sides. 
Despite this potentially alarming lack of accord, Chamberlain and his cabinet were 
pleased at having secured what was felt to be a satisfactory announcement. At the 
same time it was believed that Mackenzie King now appeared satisfied with the 
assurances he had been given about the financial issues. A similarly optimistic outlook 
was held by Machtig who shared his belief with Eden that the worst had passed. 93 
Reading through all the telegrams in his ground floor office in the DO, Liesching 
"'Canadian Reservations... ', prepared by Liesching, 26 November 1939 D035/1071/276/41 
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however thought differently about the situation in Ottawa. It was obvious to him that 
the Canadian prime minister, who he noted. was still in a 'very vacillating mood', would 
categorically refuse to initial any formal agreement without the British agreeing to his 
demands that the Air Training Scheme should be regarded as Canada's 'preference of 
effort'. "' Campbell, in the High Commission in Ottawa, also was far from convinced 
and the torrid verbal blast he had endured from Mackenzie King during a meeting in the 
last week of November no doubt strengthened his views. Recognising the delicate 
state of affairs which existed, he was therefore prepared to ignore yet another attack 
made against him by the Canadian leader, putting it down to the speed of negotiations 
and the accompanying 'jagged nerves and tempers'. 95 Mackenzie King was in fact 
becoming increasingly critical, in particular in his by now only thinly veiled public 
attacks upon the hoped for goals of the Air Mission and those people within its ranks. 96 
With the start of a new month however, came the first indication that Liesching's 
memoranda might be beginning to have some impact on his Secretary of State's 
outlook. Following Mackenzie King's most recently dismissive reply to Chamberlain, 
Kingsley Wood had volunteered to assist Eden in devising some suggestions for a 
suitable reply. Sitting down to discuss these the latter, who only the day before had 
been presented with his AUS's recommendations, now entirely altered his point of 
view. As a result the suggested reply which was put forward showed no sign of his 
previous intransigence. '"' With the War Cabinet's acceptance of this draft, it was 
accepted that Mackenzie King should be free, when the agreement was finally 
announced, to state that the British government considered the Air Training Scheme to 
represent Canada's most effective form of assistance. 98 For the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, having only just concluded an acrimonious meeting with the Canadian 
delegation in London, this was a great disappointment although it had become clear, 
even to him, that 'there was no use attempting to force the Canadians to accept a 
94'Canadian Reservations... ', prepared by Liesching, 28 November 1939, D035/1071/276/41 
's Campbell to Machtig, 29 November 1939, D035/1072/276/121 
96 `Memorandum prepared by Grant Dexter', 30 November 1939, Pearson Papers 
" WM98(39), 29 November 1939, CAB65/1; Air Ministry to Cabinet Office, 30 November 1939, 
PREM I /397 
'S WM100(39), 1 December 1939, CAB65/1 
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solution on other lines'. 99 As Liesching tried to settle on a final formula which would 
allow for an initialling by all sides, the Cabinet resignedly lamented the degree to which 
Mackenzie King had used the Air Training Scheme negotiations for his own political 
ends. The episode was still however not yet resolved as the Riverdale Mission found 
itself summoned back to the negotiating table once again. 10° 
Addressing the 'Finer Details' 
With the structure of the agreement appearing to have been settled almost entirely in 
Mackenzie King's favour, and the official document already having been printed on 
special paper ready for signing, the administration in Ottawa at the last moment found 
further cause for complaint. At the end of the first week of December Norman Rogers, 
the Canadian Minister of National Defence, raised with the question of the final 
designation of Canadian personnel graduating from the scheme. Specifically he referred 
to the proposed wording of Article 15 of the as yet unsigned 'Memorandum of 
Agreement'. 1°' With no advice to the contrary from the Air Ministry, Riverdale had 
approached the negotiations from the outset believing that it was his 'endeavour to 
arrange that they [graduates] should be enlisted in the Royal Air Force'. ' 02 Such an idea 
was certainly in keeping with the operating experience of the last war. In this instance 
though the Canadian government wished that its graduates be organised in the field as 
fully homogeneous RCAF units and it was therefore now determined to press for more 
guarantees. This despite the fact that the final line of Article 15 had made it clear that 
this question would ultimately be resolved by inter-governmental discussions initiated 
subsequently by the British government. 
According to Campbell the new delay instigated by the Defence Minister was nothing 
more than a provocation designed to ensure that Ottawa maintained the whip hand. 
The answer given by Riverdale was based upon the dangerous premises instilled in him 
Ibid., WM101(39), 2 December 1939; `Questions Relating', 1 December 1939, CAB21/490 
10° `Canadian Government's Conditions', precis prepared by Liesching, 6 December 1939, 
D035/1071/276/58; WM107(39), 7 December 1939, CAB65/1 
'01 Campbell to Stephenson, 20 December 1939, DO35/539/70/1/1 
102 `Office Memorandum', AIRS/280 
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in the Air Ministry in September before his *departure. "' For the Canadian leader 
however this 'evasive' reply was once more proof that the British government was 
trying to 'keep Canadian squadrons at its disposal'. 1°4 For London the renewed verbal 
offensive it provoked represented a grave turn of events. With the British government 
having already agreed that it would be responsible for the pay of graduates serving in 
Europe, the inference was that the British Exchequer would be expected to pay for the 
maintenance of entire RCAF units in the field. Once this principle was accepted, it 
could be anticipated that the other Dominions would themselves look to seek a similar 
agreement, leading not just to a potentially disastrous financial debate but also raising 
serious administrative and constitutional questions. 
The British War Cabinet, which had clearly been shaken by Mackenzie King's earlier 
assaults, does not appear by this stage to have been prepared to engage in further 
struggles. And Eden, following his only recent, radical change of heart, offered a clear 
illustration of how little spirit remained as he urged the merits of the Canadian point of 
view upon his colleagues. 105 In Ottawa meanwhile, the British High Commissioner's 
evident sense of exasperation had turned into outright anger leaving him no longer 
willing to simply ignore Mackenzie King's actions. He thus challenged Rogers as to 
why it was deemed necessary to alter Article 15. The response given was that the 
Canadian government now wished inter-governmental discussions to include not just 
experts but statesmen as well. Having heard this Campbell's bitterness was obvious as 
he confided to his DO confidantes a belief that 'we shall have to comb the Empire for 
statesmen as I have not noticed any in Ottawa so far'. 1°6 His growing contempt for 
those he viewed as responsible for hi-jacking the negotiations for their own ends was 
all too apparent. 
With Machtig's time taken up with the increasingly strenuous day-to-day running of the 
office, by this stage only Liesching can be said with any degree of confidence to have 
103 Campbell to Machtig, 18 December 1939, D035/1071/276/100 
10` Diary, 9 December 1939, Mackenzie King Papers 
pos WMI 11(39), 11 December 1939, CAB65/1 
106 Campbell to Machtig, 12 December 1939, D035/1072/276/123 
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maintained a clear grip on his emotions and a focus on the task in hand. 1°1 Indeed the 
carefully prepared telegram he now sent to Ottawa demonstrated that he, at least, had 
not given up hope of a settlement being reached. 1°8 At the heart of this lay the 
suggestion that before Canadian graduates could be identified as RCAF squadrons they 
would need to be supported by the requisite number of Canadian ground crews, an 
idea which was even accepted by the RCAF itself. Though he privately admitted to 
Campbell his ignorance of the technical considerations involved in the agreement, 
Mackenzie King nonetheless dismissed the idea out of hand. 109 Publicly he claimed this 
was because the Canadian government had always assumed that it would fall upon the 
RAF to provide the necessary ground personnel. It was clear though that the Canadian 
leader viewed the issue as an entirely political one and he was not prepared to settle 
for a solution which might be viewed by his domestic opponents as a compromise. 
Faced by this impasse, and with the Air Mission holding crisis discussions, both 
amongst themselves and with their Canadian counterparts, the situation Liesching had 
feared was upon the DO. There was virtually nothing the department could do, 
however, to bring any influence to bear upon the final outcome. 
The Final Stages 
The individual most qualified to deal with technical matters such as that involved in 
Article 15 was Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. After a long and 
distinguished career, in 1937 Brooke-Popham had retired from the RAF and been 
appointed as Governor and Commander-in Chief of Kenya. Upon the outbreak of war, 
in September 1939 he had re-joined the RAF and shortly afterwards sailed with the 
Riverdale Mission to Ottawa. Despite his statesmanlike qualities, by the end of 
November Campbell had perceived that Brooke-Popham's subsequent role in the 
negotiations would be largely nonexistent. 10 His reasoning for this was that, practically 
from their first encounter, the Canadian prime minister had formed a poor opinion of 
1' Minutes by Liesching, 12 December 1939, D035/1071/276/82 
'08 WMI 13(39), 13 December 1939, CAB65/1 
109 Campbell to Machtig, 20 December 1939, D035/1072/276/124 
"0 Campbell to Machtig, 29 November 1939, D035/1072/276/121 
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the Air Chief Marshal, with his 'Englishman's, tranquil, self-satisfied way'. "' As the 
negotiations progressed the latter was increasingly held to be the leader of the 
'technical men' who, along with the British war cabinet, were deemed most 
responsible for providing the greatest resistance to his wishes. "' Mackenzie King 
therefore effectively chose to ignore him. Riverdale was viewed in an entirely different 
manner though and it was clear that the Canadian prime minister saw him as the weak 
link in the British delegation. As the person who he thought he could best intimidate, 
the relatively inexperienced Air Mission leader therefore became the principal focus of 
his attention. By this stage Mackenzie King was keen to push for a conclusion to the 
negotiations as he knew that his position was only good for a few more days. The First 
Canadian Division's arrival in Britain was imminent and throughout the negotiations he 
had hoped to announce the agreement of the Air Training Scheme beforehand so as to 
gain maximum publicity for his leadership skills. 
The final negotiations that covered the weekend of 15-17 December were carried out 
by just a handful of men and have been comprehensively examined by two Canadian 
authors. ' 13 Scant mention is made however of a further development which, at the 
beginning of the weekend, threatened to upset all of Mackenzie King's plans, the 
premature broadcast of a statement by the Australian prime minister, Robert Menzies, 
another aggressive self-publicist. In referring to his country's participation in an 
'agreed' Air Training Scheme, this placed a much greater sense of urgency upon the 
authorities in Ottawa to finalise the signing of an agreement. To not do so would 
doubtless lead to questions being raised domestically as to the cause of the delay. 
Nonetheless the Canadian prime minister remained uncompromising, decrying Menzies' 
broadcast as 'threatening the entire scheme [and] threatening good relations within the 
Commonwealth' and laying overall blame with the British Air Ministry who he claimed 
had authorised Canberra's actions. Riverdale at once contacted London to advise that, 
Diary, 16 November 1939, Mackenzie King Papers 
112 Minute by Arnold Heeney (King's Principal Secretary), 'Re: British Commonwealth Air Training 
Plan', 22 December 1939, DCER VII/l, pp. 669-671 
113 Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, pp. 50-59; Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 56-58 
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in his judgement, not to concede the point now ran the risk of a complete breakdown 
in negotiations. 14 
The DO, when it learned of Mackenzie King's assertion that Whitehall was responsible 
for Menzies' actions was aghast but, as was the case throughout the whole of this 
final weekend they did not find out about the allegation until after the event. 1' Indeed 
the increasingly frantic Riverdale restricted his telephone discussions principally to the 
Air Ministry. To them he urged that to save the Air Training Plan, Mackenzie King's 
objections about Article 15 had to be fully recognised. The War Cabinet would not 
accept this plea however instructing the Mission's leader to stand firm whilst 
reiterating to him their broad concerns about the financial requests being made to 
him. 1' This steadfastness only served to increase the Canadian prime minister's ire 
which was further fuelled by a comment of Brooke-Popham's which he overheard and 
construed, erroneously, as being derogatory about Canadian command qualities. "7 
With the newfound British resolve unacceptable, Mackenzie King therefore returned to 
his attempts to isolate Riverdale. On Saturday, the penultimate day of negotiations, his 
efforts became all the greater in order that he might be able to announce the 
successful completion of the plan the next day. Aside from his political considerations, 
the Sunday was also his birthday, an important date for a spiritualist who, amongst 
other things, believed in the auspiciousness of events. "8 
By the afternoon, the Air Mission chief, now a visibly tired and broken man, had been 
badgered into accepting a formula which was effectively the same as the one rejected 
by the Air Ministry the previous evening. But by this stage neither Brooke-Popham nor 
Campbell, who fully accepted that he had been dismissed by the Canadian premier as 
'an incorrigible obstructionist', would sign. 19 In his increasing desperation, the 
114 Heeney, `British Commonwealth Air Training Plan', DCER VII/1, p. 667; Riverdale to Eden, 16 
December 1939, D035/1071/276/87 
115 Machtig to Eden, 19 December 1939, D035/1071/276/99 
116 `Note of a telephone conversation', 16 December 1939, D035/1071/276/95 
"' Diary, 15 December 1939, Mackenzie King Papers 
1e See Brian Nolan, King's War, Mackenzie King and the Politics of War 1939-45 (Toronto: 1988); Norman Hillmer, "`The Outstanding Imperialist": Mackenzie King and the British' (Canada House Lecture Series), Number 4 (1978) 
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92 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
Negotiating the Empire Air Training Scheme 
'explosive' Mackenzie King therefore resorted' to once more imploring the, by now, 
dying Governor-General to assist him, asking that he send for Brooke-Popham and 
pressure him to remove his objections. This he agreed to do and in what Tweedsmuir's 
own secretary, himself a Canadian civil servant, later concluded 'was a successful 
attempt by the Government of one Dominion to use the Crown to score a point over 
another', the Air Mission's resistance was finally ended. 120 
Only Campbell still remained opposed to the Canadian leader's wishes although by this 
stage he had now been effectively sidelined. In fact during this final weekend contact 
between the two consisted solely of Mackenzie King 'venting all of his wrath' on the 
unfortunate High Commissioner. '' After six weeks of intense negotiations, the final 
document was therefore signed by representatives of the Canadian government and 
the British Air Mission shortly after midnight on 17 December. Its contents were very 
different to those first envisaged by Riverdale during his October crossing. Broadly 
speaking the number of training schools were reduced by one-third and the number of 
aircraft required had been reduced to 3450, the bulk of which would be financed by 
the British government. With it being initially envisaged that the scheme would end on 
31 March 1943 Canada agreed to pay C$287 million, nearly one-half of the estimated 
total costs. '22 
With certain of its sections still being hastily written only hours before the signing, the 
next day the telegram outlining what had been agreed reached the Air Ministry. To 
those who read it, it was obvious, as it had been to Campbell and Brooke-Popham, 
that Riverdale's revised formula was not actually that much of an improvement on 
earlier rejected versions. In fact the Air Ministry was so taken aback that there was 
uncertainty whether the War Cabinet would be able to accept the document as it 
stood. Stephenson, attending a meeting called by his Whitehall colleagues, warned 
against further rejection advising that to do so would have a serious psychological 
effect on Ottawa and probably lead to the cancellation of the entire scheme. 12' There 
120 `Memorandum prepared by Redfern', 29 December 1939, D035/1071/70/l/2 
12' Campbell to Machtig, 18 December 1939, D035/1071/276/100 
122 See Hatch, The Aerodrome of Democracy, pp. 18-20 
123 Minute by Stephenson, 21 December 1939, D035/1012/276/107 
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followed three telephone conversations between Machtig and Eden in Scotland, a 
meeting between the London departments involved and further direct consultation with 
Campbell and Riverdale before it was decided that the agreement would have to be left 
as it stood. The following day though Simon still felt sufficiently angered to point out 
that he had not sent any congratulatory telegram to Mackenzie King. 12" For 
Chamberlain, who had been in France during the weekend and was therefore entirely 
unaware of the last drama which had unfolded, the degree of bitterness apparent 
within the War Cabinet's discussions must have come as something of a shock. ' 25 Any 
confusion on his part though merely echoed that which appeared to have affected him 
throughout the Canadian-driven discussions. He had remained firmly on the periphery, 
perhaps in part as a result of his earlier experiences with the Dominion High 
Commissioners which had left him 'very upset'. 126 
The Lessons Learnt 
For the DO, with negotiations at an end, it was time to assess an experience in which, 
although sometimes only involved at the fringes, it believed its role to have been a 
significant one. Aiding this process almost at once the reports of those involved in the 
negotiations started to arrive. From the Air Mission team, Riverdale's was actually the 
last one to be submitted, providing a detailed picture which was almost entirely 
'technical' in its outlook. 'Z' Upon his return to London though he 'made no effort to 
conceal his dislike for Mr Mackenzie King' . 
12'3 Brooke-Popham meanwhile, in a letter to 
the Secretary of State for Air written on the day of the agreement's conclusion, made 
a number of more interesting points. Amongst these was the degree of blame he 
attached to the Air Ministry for not having 'thrashed out proper terms of reference 
before the Mission left', and for the distress it subsequently incurred. 129 
124 WM118(39), 18 December 1939, CAB65/1 
'Z5 Cabinet Office Minute, 29 December 1939, PREM1/397 
126 Diary, 11 October 1939, Avon Papers 
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128 Diary, 7 February 1940, Pearson Papers 
129 Brooke-Popham to Kingsley Wood, 17 December 1939, Brooke-Popham Papers (Liddell Hart 
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Campbell had proven extremely diligent with his despatches during the previous two 
months, already earning himself great praise for his 'most valuable work under 
conditions of much difficulty', and he also wasted little time in sending a 
comprehensive analysis of the affair to the DO. 130 His official despatch, written just 
two days after the signing of the agreement, provided a damning indictment of the 
behaviour of the Canadian government, specifically targetting Mackenzie King for 
special condemnation. In the High Commissioner's opinion the British government had 
been repeatedly bluffed and bullied and Ottawa's final refusal to sign, in particular, 
'was not an issue, regardless of what Canadian government may have said, on which 
they would have been supported'. 13' With Campbell using the days that followed to 
supply a steady stream of information of events that he had been excluded from at the 
time, and about which the DO had no knowledge, those who read the reports were 
shocked by what they learned. 
For Liesching, who had himself found the negotiations 'extremely difficult', the High 
Commissioner's obviously prolonged and bitter experiences more than accounted for 
his now only too apparent sense of exasperation. 132 For the more senior figures within 
the department the potential danger that the full story carried with it was clear, and 
great debate ensued over how widely it should be circulated within Whitehall. 
Ultimately it was decided that, aside from Downing Street's copy, only the Air Ministry 
would be permitted to read Campbell's words. Indeed in passing it on to Chamberlain, 
Eden warned the prime minister of its 'sharp and bitter tone', specifically highlighting 
the conclusion that 'we are not going to have a very easy job in keeping the present 
Canadian government in line and in good heart'. Having read it and already spoken with 
Riverdale, Chamberlain could do little other than agree. '33 
The affair was still not over, however, as on the day that Eden wrote to Chamberlain, a 
further supplementary despatch arrived from Ottawa. In it came a still more vivid 
"o Minute by Machtig, 23 October 1939, D035/1003/3/1/2 
"' Campbell to Machtig, 18 December 1939, D035/1071/276/100; Campbell to Eden, 19 December 
1939, D035/1072/276/115 
132 Liesching to Batterbee, 24 December 1939, Batterbee Papers (Box 6/6); minute by Liesching, 10 January 1940, D035/1072/276/115 
"' Ibid., minute by Eden, 13 January 1940, Eden to Chamberlain, 16 January 1940, Rucker to Archer, 
17 January 1940 
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account of the Air Mission's final days and proof, as far as the DO was concerned, 
that 'the Canadian Prime Minister (sic) had been definitely offensive to the United 
Kingdom High Commissioner' . 
13" There was also a renewed suggestion that Mackenzie 
King viewed the only proper channel of communication to be from prime minister to 
prime minister. In fact since shortly after his arrival in Ottawa, Campbell's telegrams 
had confirmed that Mackenzie King held Massey, his High Commissioner in London, 
with almost utter disdain; in August 1939, he had reported that he had been privately 
told his own position was similarly viewed . 
13' Following his treatment during the final 
phases of the negotiations, he was now convinced that there was a distinct problem in 
terms of Anglo-Canadian communications. 
Eden found this new report the most distasteful so far and finally resolved to do 
something, asking Machtig to write to Campbell and seek his advice upon how best he 
should proceed. His sense of disquiet was only increased by the almost immediate 
receipt of further documents showing how Mackenzie King had twice used the 
Governor-General to help secure his objectives and, in the second case, had implicitly 
threatened Tweedsmuir that a constitutional crisis was potentially in the offing. 1 ' In 
ordinary circumstances it is questionable what might have happened next. These were 
not ordinary times however, and as the weeks passed, the ardour of those involved 
rapidly diminished. By the end of February Campbell was willing to let the matter rest 
as he had ignored Mackenzie King for nearly two months and felt he had made his 
point. The DO was of a similar mind and, no doubt in recognition of the long war that 
lay ahead of them and a realisation of what a worsening argument might mean, 
Stephenson urged that the matter should be allowed to 'pass into oblivion as soon as 
possible'. Eden concurred, his attention now focussed on other matters and in the 
knowledge that Campbell was relatively happy and would shortly receive official 
recognition of his labours. Machtig had however had to talk him out of bringing the 
matter up again with Chamberlain one last time. 13" With this final note, the series of 
134 Machtig to Eden, 16 January 1940, D035/1072/276/124 
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internal DO files related to the negotiations for the Empire Air Training Scheme were 
finally closed. 
What however had the department learnt from the affair? Its handling of events up to 
and including the Dominions' announcement that they would fight alongside Britain had 
given it only the smallest indication of what it might expect from the vastly different 
wartime environment. The negotiations for' the Air Training Scheme therefore 
represented the first of these new experiences. As such, the DO responded, for the 
most part, ably and to the best of its abilities in dealing with what, largely thanks to 
the Air Ministry, quickly developed into a threatening situation. From the outset 
Mackenzie King had held a dominant negotiating position, an advantage which an 
experienced politician with his obviously highly developed sense of cunning was never 
likely to squander. This was well understood within the DO who repeatedly tried to 
warn their Whitehall colleagues what to expect. But with the Air Ministry taking the 
lead, all the department could effectively do was to monitor events, trying to ensure 
that the situation did not get too out of hand. Stephenson's involvement during the 
final meetings in the Air Ministry and his control of the more belligerent urges of some 
of those present, ensured the department ultimately proved successful in its efforts. 
Campbell himself concluded, looking back on events, the DO 'helped me out especially 
with other UK departments which would have produced secession any day of the week 
if what was once described to me as the "bloody Post Office" had not done a most 
useful job'. 138 But the negotiations also carried some stark messages for the Office. 
Drawing upon his experiences, the same High Commissioner in Ottawa who had 
congratulated his adoptive department for its professionalism, also provided it with a 
serious warning. For Campbell the only future he could foresee was one in which the 
United Kingdom would be obliged to drive along a team of four other Dominions. 
Perhaps ominously, although he did not doubt that the 'somewhat unwieldy equipage' 
would ultimately triumph, he counseled the DO that it should 
139 Campbell to Batterbee, 20 May 1940, Batterbee Papers (Box 6/2) 
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... not be surprised, or take it duly amiss, if one of the team from time to time turns round 
to argue on the subject of the road to take, the speed to be used, or even the advisability 
or possibility of proceeding further at all'. 139 
With this 'unhappy' forecast in mind, it seemed increasingly apparent that the 
department would find itself with much to do in the months and years ahead. 
Campbell to Eden, 19 December 1939, D035/1072/276/115 
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The Scandinavian Strategy 
In December 1939 the First Canadian Division began to disembark from Scottish ports, 
the first contingent of troops to arrive on British shores since the outbreak of war. 
Within weeks both the First Echelon of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force 
and Australia's Sixth Division had also sailed from their respective home ports heading 
for the European war theatre. With the commitment of these troops, it was widely 
hoped within Whitehall that the former 'self-governing colonies' would quickly develop 
a far greater interest in the war. ' Despite their increased activity however, the 
Dominion governments still displayed considerable difficulties in managing 'the 
transition of their countries from a peace to a war footing'. Pre-occupied and thought 
by certain London-based observers to be suffering from 'strong inferiority complexes', 
during this period there in fact remained a 'clear lack of active Dominion participation in 
the week-to-week direction' of the war. 2 
Domestic considerations were a significant factor behind this apparent lethargy. In 
January 1940 a general election had been announced in Ottawa as, seizing on the 
domestic goodwill generated with the agreement of the Air Training Plan and the safe 
arrival overseas of Canadian troops, Mackenzie King had sensed the moment was 
propitious to capitalise on his earlier hard-worked intrigues. ' Privately there was 
speculation within the DO that defeat for the often unhelpful Canadian prime minister 
would be no bad thing, this assessment being in part fuelled by reports from the British 
High Commissioner that his one-time adversary had 'dug his own grave'. " Meanwhile 
the authorities in the Union of South Africa were also still struggling to 'come into the 
war' as the bitterness generated during the protracted national debate in September of 
the previous year, continued to prove divisive. ' So bad in fact was this and the general 
situation so unpredictable that a commonly heard conclusion within Whitehall circles 
Peake (FO News Department) to Eden, 1 February 1940, Avon Papers (AP20/8/286) 
2 `Research Draft prepared by Mrs Agnew', August 1945, CAB 102/33; Diary, 24 April 1940, Pearson 
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was that 'if General Smuts had died before the outbreak of the war, South Africa 
would not have come in with us'. ° 
Although there was clearly therefore an obvious sense of distraction amongst many 
Dominion politicians, this did not permeate through to the War Cabinet in London 
where discussion was now focussed on British strategy in Scandinavia. Before the 
outbreak of war British planners had concluded, mistakenly as it was later found, that 
Germany would be seriously affected by any disruption of its iron ore supplies which it 
largely procured from mines in northern Sweden. Within days of being re-appointed 
First Lord of the Admiralty in September 1939 Winston Churchill had been told of 
these assessments, almost immediately making use of them to support his proposals to 
launch attacks against German forces from Norwegian and Swedish waters. ' Despite 
the rejection of his initial arguments he had persisted with similar recommendations 
and, with activity on the Western Front stalled, by January 1940 was close to 
overcoming the objections of prime minister, Neville Chamberlain. ' Two months later, 
and with the backing of a consensus within the cabinet, it seemed that an Allied 
Expeditionary Force might now actually be despatched to Scandinavia. 
In the interim period though the First Lord had broadened his aims, the already 
somewhat questionable legitimacy of his scheme having expanded to include the 
securing of the Norwegian port of Narvik. Churchill proposed that future operations 
could be launched from here, in the first instance to provide assistance to Finland 
which, in December 1939, had been attacked by the Soviet Union. But by the time of 
this debate three months later, the government in Helsinki, now nearing collapse, was 
realistically beyond assistance. When asked for their views about the War Cabinet's 
thinking on Norway and, specifically, whether a more vigorous approach was required, 
there was a guarded response from the key Dominion governments. Indeed they 
6 Minute by Bentinck, 2 February 1940, F0371/25224 
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offered little advice other than the standard rejection of anything which was believed 
might lead to a worsening of the existing situation. ' The Dominion High Commissioners 
in London had more to say about matters. But this self-acclaimed 'junior War Cabinet', 
which was constantly seeking to develop its role, took a tone little different from that 
offered by their respective home governments. 10 
Scandinavian matters dominated a week of discussions chaired by Eden, the Secretary 
of State for Dominion Affairs, in which Churchill's now formalised idea to disrupt the 
transportation of supplies to Germany by mining Norwegian territorial waters was 
exhaustively considered. " Leading the criticism of the plans was Australia's High 
Commissioner Stanley Bruce who had long regarded such an approach to be 'an 
extremely dangerous one', describing it to his Dominion colleagues as 'impracticably 
ruthless'. 12 During further meetings throughout early March, it was instead suggested 
that the best method for establishing some form of front in Scandinavia was a much 
more vigorous propaganda campaign. The aim of this, the High Commissioners 
concluded, would be to 'resist any further Russian or German aggression'. 13 Although 
widely criticised by those within Whitehall who heard it, on this occasion and with its 
attentions focused on proposals for a summer visit by Eden to Canada, the DO offered 
little comment about these proposals. 14 For Harding, now established in South Africa, 
the apparent sense of distraction he felt he detected in his former department made 
him uneasy. Writing to his brother-in-law in Wellington he could only speculate that the 
lack of 'deliberate and sound thinking' in London might perhaps be the result of 'too 
many trees and too little wood! "5 
9 Campbell to Machtig, 27 February 1940, DO35/1072/276/124; Whiskard to Eden, 22 February 
1940, DO121/111 
See Massey, What's Past is Prologue, pp. 297-298 
" WHC, 22-29 February 1940, D0121/7 
12 Lord Bruce's War Files, October 1939 (National Archives of Australia, Canberra) AA1969/275/1 
" DO internal minute, 16 March 1940, D035/1000/1/101 
14 Machtig to Eden, 2 April 1940, D0121/66; ibid., Chamberlain to Mackenzie King, 8 April 1940 
15 Harding to Batterbee, 17 March 1940, Batterbee Papers (Box 6/4) 
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Such foreboding must only have deepened at the end of the first week of April 1940 
with the announcement that German forces had landed throughout Norway. This move 
came as a considerable surprise, not just to the War Cabinet, but also to those trying 
to manage Anglo-Dominion relations. 1e As senior political figures in London scrambled 
to respond, belatedly authorising the attempted capture of Narvik, the unprepared 
Dominion governments did likewise. Menzies was keenest for direct assistance to be 
provided believing it would help overcome 'the very little realisation of the meanings 
and obligations of war' which existed in Australia. " After a minority government for 
nearly a year, it had only recently been announced that he had successfully concluded 
negotiations allowing Earle Page's Country Party United to join a coalition with his 
Australia Party. While the coalition represented an obviously positive development, the 
situation was nonetheless still fragile. '$ In Canada meanwhile Mackenzie King's victory 
in the general election had left a situation in which it was anticipated his new 
government would continue to 'remain lukewarm about war measures which cannot be 
shown to be to [his] advantage'. 19 It was little surprise therefore that both countries 
should ask for copies of Churchill's speeches to the House of Commons and an 
appreciation from the DO of 'the situation and answers to the obvious questions which 
would be asked by the public'. 20 
At South Africa House Waterson responded more optimistically to events, claiming to 
feel more cheerful because of his belief that 'we always have a kick in the pants before 
we really get down to a war'. 2' Amongst the other High Commissioners though the 
news only brought a sense of despair, one which induced little desire for activity from 
them. With the Dominions' representatives at an apparent loss about how best to 
proceed, almost by default in the days that followed the South African High 
Commissioner therefore found himself taking charge. Waterson had been an early 
beneficiary of Smuts' victory in September 1939 which led to him taking control of 
16 Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning, pp. 95-96 
"Minute by Dixon, 20 March 1940, F0371/25222 
'g Ibid., minute by Dixon, 13 March 1940 
19 Minute by Mason, 7 April 1940, F0371/25224 
20 See J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, pp. 77,107; WHC, 10/11 April 1940, D0121/7 
21 Diary, 10 April 1940, Waterson Papers 
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foreign policy; the External Affairs Department in Pretoria was, pre-war, dominated by 
officials with a pronounced anti-British outlook. " Having been moved from Paris to 
London, the South African prime minister had made it clear to the British government 
that his new representative could be entirely trusted. The latter had quickly settled into 
his role and, as an Allied catastrophe unfolded on the far side of the North Sea, the 
most important question for him now was the position of the Dominions in relation to 
the Supreme War Council. 23 
When this body had been reconstituted in September 1939 as part of the machinery to 
co-ordinate the war effort, a special committee composed of Eden, Maurice Hankey 
and Lord Chatfield, had recommended that, without any actual military participation, 
the Dominion governments should not be invited to join. 24 This limiting of numbers, 
initially accepted without complaint, might well have continued not to be challenged 
had not the Norwegian crisis intervened. But, with representatives from both Poland 
and Norway admitted to a Council meeting in the last week of April, Waterson saw an 
opportunity to press for a greater Dominion involvement. The situation had certainly 
changed since the outbreak of the war with Dominion naval and air units now actively 
engaged in operations. A small Canadian contingent had even been earmarked for 
despatch to Norway, albeit without Ottawa's prior knowledge. 25 This made it difficult 
for the DO, and Eden in particular, to dismiss the request out of hand. 26 After only a 
brief discussion the department's response, an invitation to the Dominion prime 
ministers to visit London later in the year, therefore appeared a well-calculated move as 
it effectively deferred any further discussion of the matter until such time as a 
conference could take place. 27 Also, in light of the quickly deteriorating situation in 
22 Evening News, September 1939 (undated), Waterson Papers (A8.3: Scrapbook, 1939-40); Minute 
by Dixon, 6 March 1940, F0371/25224 
23 Diary, 3 April 1940, Waterson Papers; WHC, 22 April 1940, D0121/7 
24 Note on Supreme War Council, 24 April 1940, D035/998/7/13; WM(39)15,14 September 1939, 
CAB65/1 
25 See Gilbert, Finest Hour, p. 250 
26 `A Note on Supreme War Council', 16 April 1940, D035/998/7/13 
27 Diary, 24 April 1940, Pearson Papers 
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Norway which in far-off Wellington seemed something that Whitehall 'ought to have 
known was ill-advised', there was probably little else that could have been said. Z" 
Although his efforts had thus been blocked, for Waterson they had nonetheless been 
an important confidence-building exercise. They had increased his own personal sense 
of prestige at a time when the small measure of influence the Dominions enjoyed in 
London appeared on the point of being extinguished. By the beginning of May, as the 
situation worsened further, much of the apparent stupor that in recent weeks had 
affected those around the South African High Commissioner, now vanished. In its 
place was a new enthusiasm as the daily meetings with the Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs once again became the venue for more dynamic interest in the war's 
progress. 29 This was just as well for, if the German attack against Norway had come as 
a shock to the Dominion governments, the impact of the Blitzkrieg launched against 
the Low Countries and France at the end of the first week of May can only be 
imagined. Now with a German attack underway on the Continent and the Dominion 
leaders more indecisive than ever, it was left to their respective High Commissioners to 
provide a response to the change in the war. 
From the very outset this they did, challenging Eden to involve them much more 
closely in the developing of a revised policy to deal with the situation now facing the 
Allies. 30 Whilst not unreceptive to their appeals, the Secretary of State was distracted 
by events surrounding him. The political implications of the Norwegian campaign were 
now beginning to be felt in London and, as news of the worsening situation in the Low 
Countries grew, to Waterson, observing the emergency Commons debate on Norway, 
it seemed unavoidable that Chamberlain would be replaced. 31 In his opinion, one shared 
by many others including Massey, Lord Halifax was the most likely next leader of the 
28 Batterbee to Harding, 30 April 1940, Batterbee Papers (Box 6/4) 
29 WHC, 1 May 1940, D0121/7; ibid. 4 May 1940; ibid., 6 May 1940 
30 Eden to Halifax, 9 May 1940, D035/1000/l/110 
31 See John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Volume One (London: 1985) pp. 139-144; John 
Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory (London: 1993) pp. 395-434; Robert Blake, `How Churchill 
Became Prime Minister' in Blake & Louis (ed. ), Churchill, A Major New Assessment, pp. 257-274; 
Sir John Wheeler-Bennett (et al), Action this Day: Working with Churchill (London:. 1968) pp. 203- 
204 
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country. 32 It is perhaps odd therefore that when the new Cabinet was revealed, the 
announcement that the prime minister would not be the Foreign Secretary but instead 
Churchill, 'the greatest adventurer of modern political history', left the South African 
representative in London with little to say. 33 There is also scant comment to be found 
from the other High Commissioners or any of the principals within the DO, a silence 
which, in the light of what was to follow, was a little surprising. 
A Change in Leadership 
Churchill's relationship with the British Empire has been well examined, a sort of 
'romantic Disraelianism' according to one view, and his approach to the Dominions 
was entirely consistent with his wider Imperial beliefs. 34 Having asked in 1906 for a 
position within the CO, as parliamentary under-secretary he opposed some of the 
earliest discussions about giving the Colonies, as they then were called, a foreign 
policy role. 35 According to the frustrated Amery, who had first proposed the expansion, 
Churchill's approach was that 'the Colonial PM's should be given a good time and sent 
away well banqueted, but empty-handed'. 36 Although they were friends of a sort, the 
two men often clashed. So much so the individual who can take much of the credit for 
creating the DO would later complain that the wartime prime minister, 'Congenitally 
Little England' as he once referred to him, 'never really possessed an "imperial" or 
"commonwealth" intellect'. 37 
32 Diary, 8 May 1940, Waterson Papers 
31 Ibid., Diary, 12 May 1940; ibid., 13 May 1940 
34 For example see Ronald Hyam, `Churchill and the British Empire' in Blake & Louis (ed. ), 
Churchill, A Major New Assessment , pp. 167-186; 
D. C. Watt, Personalities and Policies, p. 162; 
Machtig had `some most interesting stories' about the prime minister's relationship with the 
Dominions but he could not be induced to share them, instead preferring to keep them to himself, 
even after Churchill's death; Dixon to Batterbee, 21 March 1968, Batterbee Papers (Box 20) 
35 Sir Evelyn Wrench, `Churchill and the Empire' in Charles Eade (ed. ), Churchill by His 
Contemporaries (London: 1953) p. 288 
36 Leo Amery, My Political Life: Volume 1, England Before the Storm (London: 1953) p. 196 
37 Wm. Roger Louis, In the Name of God Go!, p. 89; Wm. Roger Louis, `Churchill and Egypt' in 
Blake & Louis (ed. ), Churchill, A Major New Assessment, p. 486 
105 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
A Change in Britain's Government and the Role of the Dominion High Commissioners 
Despite a second term at the CO in 1921-22, this time as Secretary of State, as with 
most things Churchill's attitude towards the Empire was based largely on personal 
experience and in this respect his contact with the Dominions had been limited. He had 
gained first hand knowledge of South Africa from his soldiering days during the Boer 
War, developing a strong relationship with Jan Smuts in the process. This endured to 
the latter's death and ensured that Churchill was perhaps freer with his time and 
information with his friend in Pretoria than with any other Dominion figure. 38 Although 
the South African prime minister was a regular wartime correspondent, he was 
nonetheless not blind to the strengths and weaknesses of his old friend's character. 
His advice to Waterson was that 'Winston is an actor, an artist, and in this war he is 
playing his part and no one can stop him'. 39 In the case of New Zealand, although he 
had never met any of its key politicians prior to the war, much of the reason behind his 
favourable wartime attitude also came from a personal relationship, This time it was 
with General, later Field Marshal, Bernard Freyberg. As with Smuts, here was an 
individual whose exploits during the First World War, when he had been awarded a 
Victoria Cross, helped guarantee Churchill's lasting admiration. To be deemed brave 
and possessing of a forceful conviction in the prime minister's eyes was often the key 
to enjoying some lasting form of his patronage. 40 
As for the other Dominions, although Churchill had first met Mackenzie King in London 
in November 1906 and had been a regular visitor to the North American continent, he 
had virtually no knowledge of Australia, a deficiency which would leave him seriously 
disadvantaged. With nothing else on which to base an assessment, his enduring belief 
in Australian troops as 'brave men', which he first gained during the Boer War and 
maintained, almost without exception, to his death, therefore was critical. "' His only 
political contacts had come in the form of Australian censure for his Dardanelles 
strategy and protests against his decision when Chancellor of the Exchequer to return 
Britain to the Gold Standard. Such criticism did not endear the authorities in Canberra 
to him; and he had first noticed Menzies, who later described him as 'the Englishman 
38 `Winston Churchill', Round Table (March 1965), p. 104 
39 Diary, 3 November 1942, Waterson Papers 
40 I. Stewart, The Struggle for Crete (London: 1966) p. 51 
" See Roland Quinault, `Churchill and Australia, 1899-1945', War and Society. Volume 6, Number 1 
(May 1988), pp. 41-49 
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par excellence', when the Australian had supported the -Munich settlement. 42 Although 
the two would profess great friendship for one another, it was at best only conditional, 
as Churchill never really came close to grasping the different nature of Australian 
politics to that which he experienced daily in London. 
For an individual who preferred the term 'British Empire' to 'British Commonwealth' it 
was perhaps not surprising that he had opposed the DO's creation from the outset, 
arguing that the handling of Dominion affairs required, at most, 'the deliberate and 
reflective study of two or three selected and experienced officials'. "' He had 
subsequently gone on to raise serious objections about the Statute of Westminster, 'a 
clumsy attempt to remove imaginary grievances', which he feared would provide an 
undesirable precedent for India and Eire. 44 Even in an article written shortly prior to the 
war's outbreak, his conclusion still remained that 'in questions of war and peace, the 
Dominions trust the Mother Country'. "' For one official within the DO these were 
'quaint notions about the Commonwealth.. . harking back to the Empire at its apogee as 
[Churchill] knew it in his early manhood'. "' Garner thought that this led the wartime 
leader to 'sometimes treat [the Empire] with more rhetoric than realism'. His 
assessment was also agreed with by one of Churchill's military advisers who thought 
'he found it difficult to remember that the leaders of the Dominions required handling 
rather differently... from the way in which they were handled thirty years before'. "' 
Whilst there was silence within the Dominions' ranks about Britain's new leader, this 
was not matched by any shortage of comment from them about the choice as new 
Secretary of State. Eden had failed to impress at least two of the High Commissioners, 
Waterson having felt him to be 'modest, sincere and well-bred, the stuff of which 
42 Robert Menzies, `Churchill and the Commonwealth' in Sir James Marchant (ed. ), WSC: Servant of 
Crown and Commonwealth (London: 1954) p. 92 
" Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 16; Churchill to Amery, 7 December 1924, DO 121/1 
" Winston Churchill, `The Statute of Westminster' (undated draft manuscript) Chartwell Papers 
(Churchill College, Cambridge) CHAR8/565 
as Ibid., `The Mystery of Empire', Sunday Dispatch, published 17 March 1940 (CI IAR8/166) 
46 Garner, The Commonwealth Office, pp. 13,55,153 
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Englishmen like their political leaders to be made' but 'not ruthless or tough enough for 
war', a view generally shared by his Australian counterpart. 48 Nonetheless, and despite 
his initial reluctance at being sent to what he feared would be a backwater, the 
departing Secretary of State was 'genuinely sorry to leave' for the War Office, 
although grateful that he no longer had to endure 'Bruce's daily catechism'. "' It took 
three days to find his replacement, the delay arising in part from the difficulties facing 
Churchill in creating a balanced Cabinet politically acceptable to everybody. Further 
disruption occurred however when his first choice, Oliver Stanley, turned down the 
appointment. 50 This, as he later confided to Hugh Dalton, was because he had seen 
how Churchill had treated Eden and concluded that it would be impossible to work 
with the new prime minister. 51 Churchill's second selection was Lord Caldecote, 'that 
amiable inflated barrage balloon' and 'relic of the old deal' who as Thomas Inskip had 
occupied the position prior to Eden. With his acceptance of the post, this allowed the 
former Chancellor of the Exchequer John Simon, a staunch Chamberlain supporter, to 
be given the Lord Chancellorship. 52 
Whilst Sir Cosmo Parkinson, the DO's PUS who was poised to return to the CO, was 
delighted upon hearing of Caldecote's return and the New Zealand High Commissioner 
Bill Jordan felt sufficiently confident to disappear from London for a few days, the 
other High Commissioners were far from pleased. 53 Indeed, both Bruce and Massey lost 
little time in offering their views on his earlier performance to Waterson, who had been 
absent from the British political scene during the Secretary of State's previous period in 
charge. 54 Amongst the most alarming incidents they pointed to was in April 1939 
during the Prague crisis when 'the door mouse-dead from the neck up' had apparently 
48 Diary, 17 April 1940, Waterson Papers; ibid., 11 May 1940; `Conversation with Neville 
Henderson', 13 October 1939, Lord Bruce's Files 
49 Diary, 12 May 1940, Avon Papers 
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fallen asleep whilst sitting next to Chamberlain 'at a meeting. Although Massey claimed 
not to dislike Inskip personally, he was not happy about giving the leadership of the DO 
as 'a consolation prize' to 'a second rate politician who had peacefully ascended the 
ladder as a good party man'. 55 Bruce meanwhile complained to Canberra that the 
appointment of 'a discarded Lord Chancellor' was less than complimentary to the 
Dominions. Even Pearson, whose opinions were periodically relayed back to his 
colleagues in Ottawa, felt that Caldecote's appointment was the clearest indication yet 
of the lack of importance attached to the Dominions' portfolio within the Cabinet. 56 
This assessment was in fact only all too accurate, certainly in the context of on-going 
events at the DO which, although it was doing 'all it could to get information and pass 
it on' to the Dominion governments, remained entirely 'dependent on others for the 
material'. 57 The High Commissioners viewed the degree of information available to 
them to be so poor that they had taken to attending the Canadian Military 
Headquarters every day to better track developments. Indeed there were clearly still 
obvious shortcomings as was evident from Menzies' complaints upon officially being 
advised that the French might collapse. 58 His remonstrations had first begun in mid- 
May about what he then saw as a failure to receive 'sufficiently comprehensive 
reviews of Allied operations and strategy'. 59 This most recent update however led him 
to now comment that the latest turn of events 'must have been due to sudden 
developments for it has apparently not been possible for us to be supplied with facts or 
an appreciation which supports this view'. Although the British prime minister 
responded that day, warning his Dominion counterparts of the possibility of 'an early 
heavy attack' on Britain, it would still be some time before he agreed that they might 
be informed of the seriousness of the situation in France. 60 Even this decision, 
however, came only after Chamberlain, now Lord President of the Council, had 
ss Diary, 15 May 1940, Waterson Papers; Diary, 15 May 1940, Massey Papers 
56 Bruce to Menzies, 15 May 1940 in R. G. Neale (ed. ), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 
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explicitly raised the point, enquiring in front of the entire War Cabinet what information 
could be given to the Dominion governments. 
Despite his concerns, both about being kept uninformed and regarding the final 
destination of Australian troops already under sail for Europe, Menzies nonetheless lost 
little time in pledging 'the whole of the Commonwealth's resources to victory'. 6' With 
Mackenzie King already having authorised the despatch of four Canadian destroyers to 
Britain, Peter Fraser, who had only recently become New Zealand prime minister 
following Malcolm Savage's death, also telegraphed to London with a commitment to 
'be with you to the last, come what may'. 62 The South African response was more 
tempered, however, with Smuts recognising France's likely denouement to mean that 
'the British Commonwealth will be left alone to continue the struggle'. 63 The High 
Commissioners in London also seemed to be in more questionable spirit. Bruce thought 
it 'criminal' that the War Cabinet had failed, in his opinion, to fully consider the 
implications of a French collapse, and consequently he had developed 'a most gloomy 
view of British prospects if France went out of the war'. 64 The seven-page note which 
he produced and sent to the already over-worked Churchill proposing an international 
conference to arrange a peace settlement was not surprisingly very badly received. "' 
Meanwhile, as the calls escalated from Halifax for Churchill to consider the merits of a 
settlement with Germany, within the DO itself the vastly increased tempo of the war 
was beginning to tell. 6e Aside from the general day-to-day management of the 
department and almost hourly requests from the Antipodean Dominions for a strategic 
appreciation of the situation, there were new tasks to be handled such as finalising 
61 Whiskard to DO, 27 May 1940, DO35/1003/2/11/1/IB; John Robertson & John McCarthy, 
Australian War Strategy 1939-1945 (Queensland: 1985) pp. 75-80 
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how operations might continue following an invasion. 67 At the same time the quite 
plainly vacillating Menzies had just started the first of what would prove to be three 
attempts to initiate a 'peace' initiative involving the United States. " For at least one of 
the British High Commissioners serving in the Dominions, the hard to follow situation 
demonstrated 'a want of correlation' from a 'badly overworked department'. 69 
The position was further complicated by the information coming from the War Office. 
On several occasions during the first six months of the war, members of the War 
Cabinet in London had suggested that the Dominion governments be induced to 
commit troops to the Western Front. 70 Each time though, it had reluctantly been 
recognised by the British ministers concerned that the obvious benefits this would 
bring notwithstanding, there was little enthusiasm for the project outside Whitehall. 
Now, with a dire shortage of equipment in Britain making it impossible to accept the 
Dominions' offers to send more troops, there was confirmation that 'the entry of Italy 
into the war appears inevitable'. " 
Aside from re-emphasising the difficulties of fulfilling the already restless Dominion's 
requests for military supplies, this carried obvious wider strategic considerations. And 
not just for South Africa, but also in terms of the British government's continuing 
strategy in regard to the Far East. 72 There were also potential constitutional issues to 
consider as, with the experience of the outbreak of war against Germany still clearly in 
their minds, the DO's legal experts now rushed to revise the procedure for the issuing 
67 WHC, 28 May 1940, D0121/8; Memorandum, May 1940, D035/548E/22/9/3 
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of a new declaration of war by the Dominions against Italy. 73 It was clear to many that 
heightened sensitivities needed to be taken into account far more than had previously 
been the case, especially, following its close brush with neutrality, in the South African 
case. An acceptable solution was found though, in spite of the difficult circumstances 
prevailing, and Italy's entry into the war in mid-June passed off with considerably less 
concern within the department than had been the case nine months beforehand. 
The Effects of the Fall of France 
For the High Commissioners in London, aside from continuing efforts to strengthen 
their own position, their attention remained squarely focussed on the implications of 
France's demise. With the Dominion governments being advised by the British War 
Cabinet, following a visit by Churchill to the front in mid-June, that 'the French are 
now on what must be regarded as their last line', their respective representatives in 
London were poised to make a bold move. 74 They had become aware that the Chiefs 
of Staff reports which included 'action recommended in a certain eventuality', actually 
dealt with how to respond to France's surrender. These they now duly requested 
access to, again demonstrating the resolve which had grown within the group not to 
be overlooked in the Allied policy making process. 75 To have not allowed them to see 
these documents would have carried dangerous implications. Most obviously it would 
provide substance to their complaints about the paucity of information distributed to 
them, a possibility fully understood by Caldecote. Having promised to do what he 
could, the next day he went before the War Cabinet warning his peers that 'it was not 
enough to tell [the Dominion governments] all that had passed, they must be treated as 
full partners and their assent must not be taken for granted'. 76 
Based on his previous period as Secretary of State this was a somewhat 
uncharacteristically bold move. Nonetheless Caldecote's efforts on this occasion 
" Dixon to Ronald (FO), 10 June 1940, D035/1003/8/13; ibid. minute by Gamer, 13 June 1940; 
minute by Stephenson, 14 June 1940; see Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939- 
1952, pp. 43-44 
74 Telegram to Dominions, 12 June 1940, D035/1003/2/11/1/113 
's See P. M. H. Bell, A Certain Eventuality (London: 1974) p. 31-54; WHC, 12 June 1940, DO121/8 
76 Ibid., WHC, 12 June 1940; WM(40)165,13 June 1940, CAB65/7 
112 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
A Change in Britain's Government and the Role of the Dominion High Commissioners 
produced quick results with both the High Commissioners and the Dominion 
governments being given details of the two Chiefs of Staff reports later that day. " 
From the tone of the meeting's minutes however, it was clear that Churchill was 
unhappy about the manner in which the decision had been forced upon him, something 
that had the potential for later repercussions. What was perhaps worse though was 
that the documents the Dominion governments and High Commissioners had received 
from the 'charming old man' in charge of the DO did not make for especially pleasant 
reading. '' And, as the department had feared, there was a poor reception to the news 
they contained. This was that the deteriorating situation made it unlikely British force 
would be sent in the first instance to the Far East in the event of a Japanese attack. 
For the DO much of the following week would e spent attempting to calm the 
heightened worries of the two Antipodean Dominions. 79 As on previous occasions, of 
the two countries concerned, New Zealand's was the more measured official response 
with the authorities there officially renewing their pledge of 'every form of assistance 
within our power'. 8° But in a separate private telegram, formally addressed from the 
Governor-General in order to emphasise the gravity of the matter, it was made clear 
that the news had generated considerable political dismay. $' For the most part this was 
because the long-standing premise of British assistance had 'formed the basis of the 
whole of the Dominion's defence preparations'. In attempting to ease these fears all 
the DO could do was to point to the fact that the current situation was more serious 
than had ever previously been anticipated. 82 Assisted by Batterbee, acting in his 
capacity 'not as United Kingdom High Commissioner but as the friend of New Zealand' 
n Telegram for Dominion prime ministers only, 14 June 1940, D035/1003/2/1 1/1/1B; WHC, 13 June 
1940, DO121/8; Chiefs of Staff Report, June 1940, WP168(40), CAB66/7; Chiefs of Staff Report, 
June 1940, WP201(40), CAB66/8 
78 WM(40)165,13 June 1940, CAB65/7; Dairy, 3 June 1940, Waterson Papers 
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" Governor-General to Caldecote, 15 June 1940, DO35/1003/11/4/2 
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and with the despatch of reassurances by London that there 'would be a review if the 
position in the Far East should become threatening', the situation was resolved. 83 
So much so in fact that, despite the continuing view within the highest levels of the 
DO that New Zealand had 'never put a foot wrong from the start', the government in 
Wellington now determined to reiterate their loyalty to Britain. Their offer to send a 
special mission to Washington to try and secure American support was however 
rejected out-of-hand by the FO for whom such a move would only 'provide ammunition 
for the Isolationists'. "" The DO was therefore obliged to politely decline the offer, at the 
same time taking the opportunity to register a mild, private rebuke to Batterbee for 
'having gone rather too far' in his efforts. 85 
Seeming somewhat overwhelmed by the pressures associated with leading a coalition 
government, for Menzies the disclosure of British intentions was sufficient to induce 
apparent panic. This was most visibly demonstrated, once again, by his often 
contradictory statements. 86 Described earlier in the year by the British High 
Commissioner in Canberra to his peers in the DO as 'having no more backbone than a 
jellyfish', there was apparently no reason to alter this assessment. Indeed there was an 
especially poor reception to his insistence that, should Hitler suggest terms on which 
he would be prepared to conclude peace with the Allies, the United States should be 
approached for guidance, 'no matter what form it might take'. 87 Twenty-four hours 
later however, in a note to his High Commissioner in London, he was willing once more 
to follow Britain 'whatever sacrifice victory may demand'. 88 But news the following 
day that in any Franco-German peace agreement, French possessions in the Pacific 
"' Batterbee to DO, 18 June 1940, D035/1003/11/4/4; Machtig to Phillips, 22 June 1940, 
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might be allotted to Japan, had him once again' desperately looking towards the United 
States for assistance. 89 
Bearing in mind his obvious unease, there appeared little that could be sensibly 
undertaken by the DO to calm him. All that was done therefore was to thank the 
Australian leader for his comments and pass on to him an FO report. This made it clear 
that the British government had 'received no indication that the enemy are at present 
contemplating a peace offer'. ` In terms of any lasting calming effect this however 
appeared to do little and within the department it was decided to prepare another 
telegram, this time in Churchill's name. No doubt it was hoped that this might instill in 
the Australian leader some greater measure of resolve. 91 Certainly this new message 
produced some respite, for at least a time, in the flow of telegrams from Canberra. This 
was just as well for soothing the Antipodean Dominions' distresses was not the DO's 
sole preoccupation. 
Whilst Smuts' encouraging comments were still providing considerable cheer to 
Churchill, a quorum of the High Commissioners had continued to campaign for a 
greater involvement in the management of the war. 92 Only hours after Marshal Pdtain, 
France's third leader in as many months, had signed the armistice with Germany, 
Halifax found himself apologising to an angry Waterson and Bruce for not being able to 
see them. In so doing he explained rather caustically that he had 'been and am [still] 
overwhelmed with appointments on several matters that seemed very urgent'. 93 This 
explanation was apparently not sufficient, however, to forestall another request for a 
meeting being submitted shortly afterwards. Now viewed by at least one of the High 
Commissioners as 'a fatuous... ineffective old man and an insult to the Dominions as 
Secretary of State', with this Caldecote had little choice other than to request that 
Churchill himself might discuss recent events with the Dominions' representatives. " 
89 Menzies to DO, 18 June 1940, D035/1003/1/3/7 
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In agreeing that there would be a meeting, 'although not for a month, the prime 
minister made his views known about the High Commissioners' attempts to involve 
themselves more closely in managing the war effort. This he did most clearly by 
informing his Dominions Secretary that he would subsequently be required to attend 
the War Cabinet on just two days a week, when the Chiefs of Staff visited. This drew 
an astonished Waterson to bitterly complain that 'the PM clearly did not understand the 
part the High Commissioners were playing'. 95 The truth of course was that Churchill's 
move was the most obvious indication so far that he was entirely aware of what they 
were doing. The one obvious beneficiary of this decision, despite having to face the 
increased anger of the Dominion representatives in London, was Caldecote for whom it 
appears to have come as something of a blessing. The weary Secretary of State had 
grown convinced that he was little more than 'postman and correspondent', having yet 
to receive even a personal minute from his prime minister who not officially contact 
him until mid-August. 96 
A similar sentiment may also have been shared elsewhere within his over-worked 
department. Machtig, the DO's deputy-head, continued to find his superior 'a delightful 
chief, completely unperturbable and cheerful in the most desperate moments and 
crisis'. 97 But at the same time the summer months of 1940 had been 'a dreadful 
strain, that left everyone at the Office feeling rather tired'. The High Commissioners 
were not without blame, 'stamp[ing] outside [Caldecote's] door if kept waiting for 
meetings [which] seldom achieved a temperature above tepid'. 98 But, for this angry 
group, the prime minister's rebuff was a new call-to-arms, one which seemed only to 
re-focus their energies and ensure that further confrontation would follow. 
The Way Forward 
With the Battle of Britain poised to begin and preparations to repel the now anticipated 
German invasion intensifying, there were pressing matters to consider. In Smuts' 
95 Diary, 28 June 1940, Waterson Papers 
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assessment this included Operation CATAPULT, the -'necessary' attack carried out 
against the French fleet at Oran in the first week of July by elements of the Royal 
Navy. To him it represented both an end to France's agony and the beginning of efforts 
to restore it and its 'sick people who were [now] in need of moral nursing'. 99 Following 
further study of the revelations contained within the Chiefs of Staff 'certain 
eventuality' reports, for the Antipodean Dominions their escalating concerns over Far 
Eastern strategy were the more urgent priority. These anxieties worsened with the 
news, at the end of June 1940, that the authorities in Tokyo had called for the closure 
of the Burma Road, the only route still open to supply the Chinese government in 
Chungking in their war against Japan. 
When asked by Churchill for his opinion about the demand, Robert Craigie, British 
Ambassador in Tokyo, warned that unless it was carried out, war was probable, one 
which according to the Chiefs of Staff could at this stage only result in further 
disaster. 1°° Menzies was in full agreement, Batterbee reading the telegrams in 
Wellington finding it 'tragic that egged on by Bruce he should adopt so weak and 
defeatist an attitude'. 1°' His counterpart in Canberra meanwhile could only despair that 
'Australia was still fast asleep. 102 The High Commissioners in London were however of 
a similar mind to the Australian leader urging 'retreat and concessions' from the DO 
and making daily representations to Caldecote that some form of settlement should be 
reached. Their primary concern was that Britain should 'not give way over China if it 
means that Japan would be encouraged to attack us later', a possibility which they still 
hoped could be negated by keeping the United States well informed. Bruce, finding the 
situation 'fraught with risks', thought even this was not enough his solution being 'full 
and frank negotiations with the Soviet authorities', although in this suggestion he 
found himself a lone voice. 103 Only with Caldecote's assurances that Tokyo was likely 
" Smuts to Churchill, 12 July 1940, D035/1003/11/1/36; ibid., Churchill to Smuts, 13 July 1940; see 
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to accept a proposal of a three month closure of the Burma Road were the Dominion 
representatives sufficiently reconciled to, at least temporarily, switch their attentions. 
How to respond to a long-anticipated German peace offensive had been a regular 
debate for the High Commissioners ever since they had begun daily meetings at the 
war's outset. 104 With a compromise with Japan now apparently likely, the focus 
switched to a lengthy telegram from Smuts giving views on a possible move by Hitler 
to offer some form of settlement. Seizing upon this Waterson once more put forward 
for discussion a matter about which there were strong views, not least that 'the old 
order in Europe was dead'. 1°5 These arguments were delivered with such a degree of 
unanimity as to leave the DO in little doubt that there was 'keen interest in the 
problem', although no great certainty on how best to proceed. 1°6 A private note to 
Waterson however ultimately proved sufficient in the first instance. At some length 
this outlined the main features Britain desired for post-war re-organisation, namely 
some form of a 'United States of Europe' along with more general disarmament and 
economic and social improvement. 107 Following this the High Commissioners' 
attentions were once again free to return to the long-anticipated meeting with the 
prime minister. 
In late July Churchill finally met with the group for an hour-long discussion devoted 
entirely to events in the Far East. His argument was two-fold, the first part being that 
the agreement over the Burma Road had been made purely to gain time in the hope 
that the United States would soon be able to take a stronger line in the Pacific. In the 
meantime the neutralising of the French Navy's vessels at Oran and Alexandria earlier 
in the month freed British ships to proceed east for the protection of Australasia if 
required. 108 Although still reiterating his intense dislike for the prime minister, even 
Waterson seemed sufficiently impressed by the encounter to afterwards privately 
describe Churchill as 'the man for the moment... [his) desire reflecting the purpose and 
104 WHC, 6-12 October 1939, D0121/6 
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spirit of the people'. 1°9 Despite this there is little reason to believe though that the 
discussion actually did much to assuage the Dominions' anxieties. 
Only three days later, following advice from his senior staff, Caldecote again found 
himself having to warn his unhappy prime minister. Now it was believed within the DO 
that neither Australia nor New Zealand would permit the imminent despatch of troop 
convoys intended for the Middle East unless some form of Far Eastern appreciation 
was supplied to them. 1° This message may help to account for the unannounced 
meeting that took place the next day between Lord Halifax and the Dominion High 
Commissioners. "' Perhaps held to help ease their once again mounting insecurities, 
during the encounter the foreign secretary talked at length about the War Cabinet's 
current discussions, outlining the alternatives which he felt existed in the Far East. 
Afterwards even the normally fainthearted Bruce was willing to announce that Australia 
would now be prepared to support 'a policy of standing up to Japan while she was still 
heavily engaged in China', a remarkable vo/te face in the light of some of his earlier 
comments. "2 With the news that an appreciation of the Far Eastern situation would be 
sent to the Dominion capitals in early August, these comments were most likely the 
result of a growing sense amongst the High Commissioners that they were making 
progress with their wider goal. ' 13 
Their satisfaction may have been added to by an announcement now made by the 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. With the prime minister travelling to Placentia 
Bay off Newfoundland to meet with the US president, Franklin Roosevelt, Caldecote 
informed the Dominions' representatives of his intention to take a more vigorous 
attitude towards the Ministerial Committee on the Middle East which Churchill had 
recently formed. ' 14 Chaired by Eden, the Secretary of State for War, and assisted by 
Amery, now Secretary of State for India, and Lord Lloyd, the Secretary of States for 
109 Diary, 26 July 1940, Waterson Papers 
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the Colonies, at the end of July this body had invited Australia and New Zealand to 
deploy any forces they could spare to the Middle East. Caldecote did not apparently 
view this move as taking the matter seriously enough. Such 'concern at the apparent 
lack of active policy' was seen as evidence by Waterson that the High Commissioners 
had 'stirred up the old boy since we have had him'. 15 Doubts still remained as to 
whether their respective governments had been informed in advance or not and what 
priority would be applied to deciding upon requirements for equipment. But it was with 
an almost self-congratulatory tone that the Dominion High Commissioners subsequently 
noted Australian and New Zealand forces were to be moved to Egypt-116 
Pressure on the DO's staff was meanwhile growing. They faced not just with the High 
Commissioners' unrelenting demands for greater recognition but also the Battle of 
Britain during which the Office's staff had had to 'withdraw to the air-raid shelters on 
several occasions'. "' Liesching for one was glad when, in August, the prime minister 
ordered that the Administrative Grade of the Civil Service should take a fortnight's 
leave as 'the sight of a pen and paper was making him feel physically sick'. 18 Machtig 
apparently felt it necessary to stress to a former colleague that the department was 
'still a very happy place in spite of the strain, immense hours and exacting conditions, 
and everybody remains sane and balanced'. 1' There was no denying however that in 
light of the demands being placed upon it, the DO was now badly undermanned 
leaving the PUS looking forward to 'obtaining some promising material who for some 
reason or another are unfit for military service'. 120 This extra assistance would be 
needed for, as Churchill met secretly with Eden and Margesson, the Chief Whip, to 
discuss possible replacements for the thankless Caldecote, there was little sign of any 
reduction in the workload. 121 
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The Implications of MENACE 
On a number of occasions throughout the summer months of 1940, with the DO's 
concerns continuing to be largely ignored, the British government failed to inform the 
respective Dominion governments of the policies it intended to pursue. The offer of 
union made to France in June and the ultimatum delivered to the French naval forces 
prior to the beginning of Operation CATAPULT were the two most obvious examples. 
Although, in the first case, very few British officials had been informed in advance, the 
incredulity within the DO was so severe that Caldecote allegedly threatened to resign in 
protest. 122 As Liesching noted, 
No Dominion government could conceal that fact that it had not been given time to 
express its views. The feeling on this ground would be one of insult and humiliation [and 
to] all opponents in the Dominions of the Imperial connection [it] would prove that so 
called Dominion autonomy was a mockery. 123 
Both decisions were nonetheless for the most part accepted within the Dominion 
capitals themselves, it being understood that the speed at which events were 
developing had not always allowed for any prior forewarning of British action. News of 
Operation MENACE, however, the attempt to seize the West African port of Dakar 
from Vichy French control, was not so well greeted. With this announcement all of the 
Dominions were deeply concerned about the manner in which the operation had been 
handled and the lack of information they had received. '24 
Churchill himself would later admit to having only kept Smuts informed of events and 
this only amounted to one telegram of a personal nature, an omission which would 
later prove a particular source of embarrassment. 125 In fact in the days immediately 
prior to the operation's launch in late September 1940 there are no minutes to be 
found on the subject in the available DO archives, the first reference only coming after 
'u Gamer, The Commonwealth Office, p. 201 
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the raid had failed. 126 If the Dominions had realised that they were also being kept 
entirely uninformed about the still fluctuating debate between the prime minister and 
Eden as to whether the Australian troops already garrisoned in Britain should be 
despatched to the Middle East, they would likely have been even angrier. 'Z' 
When the Dominion prime ministers were finally fully informed of what had taken place 
at Dakar and, specifically, the degree to which the enterprise had proven a great 
failure, there was a strong reaction. This was most pointed from Menzies, despite the 
domestic political ramifications of the aborted raid appearing to be less damaging for 
him than for his counterparts in Canada or the Union of South Africa. Whilst Ottawa 
feared what reaction the attack on French territory and shipping would produce in 
Quebec and Smuts was worried about emphasising the strategic value of Dakar to the 
enemy, Australia could claim few such strategic concerns. Menzies' specific interest 
lay with the cruiser HMAS 'Australia' which had been used in the operation without his 
being informed in advance. With the full backing of Bruce in London, this was however 
more than sufficient cause for him to at once fly into a fury. '28 
For the DO, already worried about the potential for 'misunderstandings' which could 
arise when composing the obviously urgent reply, the suggestion that Churchill 
regarded Menzies' criticisms as a personal attack brought still greater cause for 
concern. 129 Had the prime minister known that the Australians were not the only ones 
being critical of him the Office's sense of trepidation might have been worse. Waterson 
confided to his diary that the 'Dakar business [had been] an even more grisly failure 
than one thought - the whole thing bears the stamp of WSC, a good idea badly 
executed'. 13° The position was not aided following the presentation to the High 
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Commissioners of the telegram it was proposed' to send to the Dominion leaders. Upon 
seeing it they were united in their 'gloom', Massey complaining to Caldecote that the 
whole 'atmosphere left him with a feeling of uneasiness'. 13' Both Bruce and Churchill 
had meanwhile left Menzies in no doubt about the anger his outburst had generated in 
certain quarters in London. With Smuts choosing this point to pass on to his fellow 
Dominion prime ministers Churchill's earlier personal message, it was perhaps fortunate 
therefore that the Australian leader took an early opportunity to pursue a more 
conciliatory approach. 132 The outcome of this was that by the beginning of October, 
correspondence on the matter had quickly ceased. All that remained was a final kind 
acknowledgment to the Australian prime minister and a request from his British 
counterpart that he be forgiven 'if I responded too controversially to what I thought 
was somewhat severe criticism'. '33 
Although Anglo-Dominion relations had once again been safely restored, the episode 
had provided a renewed indication of what the DO faced, a department where 'life was 
pretty hectic and Eric Machtig overwrought'. 134 Having apparently spent the last few 
months sleeping through many of the daily High Commissioner's briefings, for 
Caldecote there would however be no need to worry about this difficult situation any 
further. 13' The announcement, at the very beginning of October 1940, of his move to 
the Lord Chief Justice's chair as part of a major reconstruction of the government 
carried out following Neville Chamberlain's resignation on health grounds, was well 
received within the ranks of the Dominion representatives. 136 Duncan, the Governor- 
General in South Africa, whilst also pleased at his departure, could not understand why 
Churchill had not felt sufficiently confident to have gone even further and removed 
'some of those whose only claim to remain in high office is that they were once 
"' WHC, 1 October 1940, D0121/9 
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fortunate enough to get there' . 
73' He was ' delighted however in the choice of 
replacement as Secretary of State: Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, who, as Lord Cranborne, 
had resigned from Chamberlain's cabinet in 1938 alongside Anthony Eden in protest at 
the government's foreign policy. 138 
Since before his first government appointment as Paymaster General in Churchill's 
initial wartime Cabinet, Cranborne had been a popular figure within Whitehall. The only 
exception was among certain arch-Chamberlain supporters, such as Kingsley Wood, 
who dismissed him as one of the 'glamour boys'. 139 But as far as the High 
Commissioners were concerned the reaction was decidedly mixed. Massey thought him 
'an admirable choice for the post', Waterson was openly unimpressed and Bruce, who 
only five months before had made it clear to his prime minister that he preferred 
Malcolm MacDonald or even David Lloyd George to fill the role, preferred to reserve 
judgement. t4° Australia's representative in London did so reluctantly only because 'the 
view that Cranborne has ability, guts and only needs opportunity to prove himself has 
been strongly put to me'. ` Whatever their respective verdicts though, the Fifth 
Marquess of Salisbury, or 'Bobbety' as he was known to the majority of his peers, 
would subsequently make an invaluable contribution to Anglo-Dominion relations. 
Indeed he would quickly assert himself as one of the most influential Secretaries of 
State to ever work in the Office. 
The connection between Churchill and his newly appointed Dominions Secretary was a 
long-standing one. Ever since Robert Cecil had acted as an adviser to Queen Elizabeth 
I, his family had enjoyed a significant role in British political affairs. The Third Marquess 
of Salisbury, Cranborne's grandfather, held the distinction of having been prime 
minister on three occasions. He had also been the man who had finally destroyed the 
career of Lord Randolph Churchill. For this reason, according to one who knew him 
"' Duncan to Lady Selbourne, 8 October 1940, Duncan Papers 
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well during the wartime period, '[the prime minister] could never quite make up his 
mind whether to admire the House of Cecil or resent it on his father's posthumous 
behalf'. "' Nonetheless, from an early age, Churchill had established what would prove 
to be a lasting friendship with Lord Hugh Cecil, 'the most intimate friend he ever had' 
and his best man at his wedding. '43 
Even before Cranborne's February 1938 speech to the Commons, following his 
resignation as under-secretary to the Foreign Office, the next generation of Cecils was 
also amongst his closest acquaintances. On that occasion Churchill had been one of 
the first to warmly congratulate Bobbety, a clear demonstration of the degree of 
mutual respect that existed between the two. 144 To close observers, what would prove 
perhaps more significant in terms of their wartime relationship, was their ability to 
'plac[e] political quarrels in a compartment entirely separate from personal 
friendship'. "" This was clearly not always the case, Churchill confiding to his son 
towards the war's end of the difficulties of working with Cranborne who 'might easily 
be ill one fortnight and very obstinate the next'. 14' Whatever the case, from the outset 
of the latter's appointment to head the DO the strength of the relationship between the 
two would often be tested. And in the first instance this would be because of the new 
Secretary of State lost little time support for concerns about the quality and flow of 
information being provided by London to the Dominion governments. "' 
The Flow of Information 
Amongst the conclusions of the 1926 Imperial Conference it had been agreed that the 
Dominion governments would subsequently have individual responsibility for foreign 
142 John Colville, Winston Churchill and his Inner Circle (New York: 1981) p. 223 
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policy. However, lacking money, experience and manpower, on virtually all occasions 
throughout the inter-war period, they continued to depend upon London to keep them 
informed of events as they happened . 
148 For some well-placed Ministers within 
Whitehall, such as Malcolm MacDonald, this was deemed to be a more-than 
satisfactory process for giving Dominion leaders, 'kept fully informed about 
developments [by] telegrams', the opportunity to comment upon, and indeed, influence 
British policy. 149 Even at this stage though the reality was something quite different. 
Indeed as late as 1939 senior figures in London, whilst publicly claiming to be 
providing information, in fact remained almost entirely resistant to passing on anything 
of a sensitive or secret nature, often to the anger of the Dominion leaders. '5° 
The approaching European war had brought with it a much more intensified discussion 
of the subject. As Secretary of State throughout much of 1939, on several occasions 
Caldecote had been angered by the amount of information he discovered was being 
withheld from the DO for onward distribution. In fact one of his last acts prior to his 
replacement by Eden, was to reiterate that telegrams from the FO 'should be available 
in the DO at the earliest possible moment', a request with which his successor was in 
complete agreement. 151 An early change within days of war being declared, in some 
cases while the Dominions were still shaping the proclamation, was the creation of a 
new series of telegrams. The 'Circular DW', issued by the DO, would ultimately remain 
a staple source of information for the Dominions throughout the duration of the war. A 
daily summary of the progress of the military situation, 'of the highest secrecy', it was 
intended to be viewed by the Dominion High Commissioners in London prior to being 
sent on to their respective prime ministers. 15' But although at least one London-based 
Dominion official viewed them as 'admirable for information', within the FO there 
148 See Mansergh, The Commonwealth and the Nations, pp. 32-46 
19 MacDonald, `Interview to the Oxford Colonial Records Project' (Rhodes House Library), p.! 
1S0 Minutes by Lord Halifax and Cadogan, 11 February 1939, FO372/3315; Hankinson to Harvey, 28 
March 1939, F0800/310 
'S' Minute by Hadow, 12 September 1939, F0371/23966; Hankinson to Jebb, 7 September 1939, 
D035/548D/3/128 
152 Telegram to Dominion governments, 7 September 1939, D035/548D; meeting of High 
Commissioners, 8 September 1939, DO121/6 
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remained a sizeable body of opinion which doubted the- wisdom behind the move. 153 In 
fact within the Dominions Intelligence Department (DID), the branch created by the FO 
shortly after the DO's formation to liaise on Anglo-Dominion relations, only one civil 
servant felt otherwise. 
Robert Hadow, who had earlier warned of the possible danger of Dominion neutrality, 
now argued that to not keep the Dominions fully abreast of events ran considerable 
risks. 154 Not least amongst these was what might happen should a situation arise 
where the Dominion governments felt that London was withholding information they 
deemed of vital importance to their security. Even at this early stage in the war any 
assessments that made even vague mention of the nature of the relationship existing 
between the British and American governments were likely candidates for 'omissions'. 
At the same time Hadow believed that keeping the Dominions within the 'inner ring of 
events' would bring them fully in step with British policy. Perhaps the greatest 
advantage though was that the issuing of information in advance would limit the need 
for 'prior consultation to which [they] are technically entitled as our 'partners'... and on 
which they may otherwise insist at some crucial moment. ' But his PUS, Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, was not impressed and quickly dismissed his concerns in an unusually 
virulent manner. '55 
As the months passed, the FO's concerns showed few signs of diminishing and by 
early 1940, privately held reservations were now put directly to the DO in long internal 
minutes written by the two senior officials within the DID, Cadogan and his deputy 
Victor Cavendish Bentinck. From these it became readily apparent that the FO's 
principal complaint had little to do with the actual flow of information, but was instead 
based more upon a grievance that it was not always consulted before the DW 
156 telegrams were despatched. They also adopted a remarkably condescending attitude 
153 Memorandum by L. B. Pearson `Wartime Inter-governmental Consultation and Communication', 
undated (most likely 1940), Pearson Papers (MG26, Vol. 71) 
'' Minute by Hadow, 17 September 1939, F0371/23963; minute by Hadow, 12 September 1939, 
F0371/23966 
iss Minute by Cadogan, 27 September 1939, F0371/23963 
156 Bentinck to Cadogan, 17 January 1940, F0371/25216; ibid., Cadogan to Bentinck, 17 January 
1940 
127 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
A Change in Britain's Government and the Role of the Dominion High Commissioners 
to the Dominions, especially with the suggestion that it could prove difficult 'to avoid 
telling [them] everything we know and at the same time... keep them sweet'. 15' 
Nonetheless and no doubt mindful of its still relatively weak position, the DO was 
forced on this occasion to agree that all DW drafts would in future first be submitted to 
their colleagues in DID for the latter to approve the contents prior to distribution. 158 
Despite this concession and his post-war dismissal of the DW telegrams as never 
having 'contained anything really secret', Bentinck remained unconvinced. Throughout 
the spring months of 1940 he therefore continued to seek a broader authority in his 
self-appointed censor's role. 15' As the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, his 
rejection of a string of requests from various British Embassy officials in neutral 
countries, for 'inside' information was perhaps not entirely surprising. ' 60 However in 
May, with the DO already facing complaints from the Dominion High Commissioners 
about the 'volume and quality of the DW telegrams', Bentinck once more returned to 
his earlier complaint. 16' A request by the DO for information for the respective overseas 
prime ministers about the Vatican's position on Italy, led to him complaining that 'it 
might be desirable to refrain from shooting off telegrams to the Dominions containing 
every alarmist rumour that we may receive'. 162 
On this occasion, however, the Office had decided to take a much firmer stand. In a 
long note to his opposite number at the FO Parkinson pointed to the anxiety felt not 
only by himself but also, he claimed, by both Eden and the prime minister, that the 
Dominions should be fully informed of developments 'that were not out of date'. '63 
Reminding Cadogan that the DO was in any case far better placed to decide what 
Ibid., Bentinck to Cadogan, 17 January 1940 
isa Ibid., minute from Dixon, 18 January 1940 
159 Patrick Howarth, Intelligence Chief Extraordinary: The Life Of The Ninth Duke Of Portland 
(London: 1986) p. 135 
160 Bentinck to Ovey, 2 March 1940, F0371/25217; Mallet to Bentinck, 22 March 1940, 
F0371/25218; ibid., Bentinck to Dormer, 2 April 1940 
161 WHC, 4 May 1940, D0121/8 
162 Bentinck to Dixon, I May 1940, F0371/25218 
163 Ibid., Parkinson to Cadogan, 7 May 1940 
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should and should not be sent out, he further warned of a feeling 'both here and in the 
Dominions... that we are sending if anything too little rather than too much'. 184 Offering 
by way of conclusion an apparently veiled threat to take the matter further if 
necessary, an almost immediate issued 'soothing reply' from the FO suggested that the 
point had been taken. Privately however, against the more pressing backdrop of the 
collapse of Neville Chamberlain's government, Cadogan remained adamant, pointing 
still to the need to avoid sending on unsubstantiated information 'so that we may 
neither perplex the Dominions nor leave them to infer that we are perplexed'. ' 65 In any 
case, as was regretfully understood within the DO's ranks, the FO would continue to 
retain the tightest control over the internal distribution of information. '" 
By the beginning of June 1940, there had still been little real improvement, leading to 
further consultations between the departments and an unexpected offer by one of the 
DID's more junior members. During their daily meetings with the Dominions' Secretary, 
'Special Distribution' telegrams were read to the High Commissioners but, normally, 
were not sent on to their governments, leaving the latter reliant upon the memory skills 
of their London representatives. What was therefore proposed was that, despite the 
extra work involved, these 'Specials' could be checked within the DID and those which 
were deemed satisfactory would be distributed to the High Commissioners to Copy. '67 
After some consideration, and perhaps mindful that even he could find no evidence of 
any reported leakages, Bentinck was willing to accept the proposal, although he was 
no doubt comforted in the fact that he would continue to oversee the selection 
process. And, as he once more somewhat condescendingly pointed out to his 
colleagues, there was also some advantage to be gained in 'providing [the Dominions] 
with copies of telegrams [as it] makes them think they are fully informed and keeps 
them sweet'. 168 
164 Ibid., Cadogan to Bentinck, 7 May 1940 
'bs Ibid., Cadogan to Bentinck, 9 May 1940; see David Dilks (ed. ), The Diaries of Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London: 1971) pp. 276-86 
'" Parkinson to Batterbee, 16 May 1940, Batterbee Papers (Box 7/3) 
167 Minute from Sloan, 5 June 1940, F0371/25219 
168 Ibid., minute from Bentinck, 7 June 1940 
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For Bruce this did not go far enough as he felt there still remained little 'opportunity for 
Dominions to initiate proposals without adequate knowledge of all the factors'. 189 But 
with him being as anxious as his fellow High Commissioners for more specific 
information about the situation in France, an agreement was nonetheless quickly 
concluded. 10 And this appeared to work as within a few days he was generally more 
pleased with the new arrangements reckoning the DW telegrams alone gave him more 
detailed information on war operations than all bar the members of the War Cabinet. "' 
In future about sixty percent of 'Specials' would be passed on, in addition to which the 
High Commissioners were to be supplied with 'not more than ten percent' of 'Limited 
Distribution' telegrams containing information of a more general nature. The failure to 
alert the Dominions about the offer of union to France and the ultimatum to the French 
Navy at Mers-el Kebir provided ample evidence however that the passage of 
information was still often a highly conditional process, a point reinforced during the 
abortive attack on Dakar. 
When Cranborne joined the Office in October 1940, he quickly lost little time in 
demonstrating he was not happy to accept this situation any longer. Whilst both his 
wartime predecessors had often shown every willingness to defend the DO's best 
interests, they had proven unable to make much progress on this point. Despite this 
being his first cabinet post the new Secretary of State was, from the outset, utterly 
uncompromising however in his support for his new colleagues and their proposals to 
supply more detailed information. Such an approach quickly helped endear him within 
the department where he was considered 
... to be a man of an unusual range of gifts and accomplishments. .. being the heir to the 
Cecils gave subtlety to his intelligence, quality to his work and robustness to his 
character. He had nothing of the bluster of J. H. Thomas, even less the diffidence of an 
Attlee. But if there was an implicit assumption of superiority and even a strong sense of 
pride, there was never arrogance. On the contrary he had a natural courtesy towards 
169 Note by Bruce, undated (presumed last week of June 1940), DAFP III, pp. 519-520 
10 Minute from Sloan, 13 June 1940, F0371/25219 
Note by Bruce, undated (presumed last week of June 1940), DAFP III, pp. 519-520 
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all... withal he had a lively and amusing mind, with a keen sense of humour. These 
172 fitted him admirably for his post in the DO... 72 
Cranborne was passionate not just in his backing for the Office but also with his 
support of his new colleagues' qualities and professionalism, even to the possible 
detriment of his own position. This he fully demonstrated within a fortnight of his 
appointment in the vigorous defence he made of Gerald Campbell, the British High 
Commissioner in Ottawa whom he had never met, against accusations by Mackenzie 
King and Lord Beaverbrook of incompetence. Although successful in his efforts, in so 
doing Cranborne apparently earned the Minister for Aircraft Production's enduring 
dislike. 173 
Cranborne also set about reassuring the Dominions themselves, not least the Union of 
South Africa and Australia, that he realised the system for keeping them informed was 
still far from adequate. 17" He had written to Waterson only two weeks after his 
appointment to apologise for the latter's not having been told of Eden's October 1940 
visit to Egypt. 175 This step had apparently not been sufficient though to gain him any 
greater credibility in the eyes of the South African who still felt he 'hadn't got the guns 
1 for the job', unflatteringly comparing him to 'a Fourth Form Schoolmaster'. e 
In light of the obviously more bellicose stance now being adopted by the Dominions 
Secretary than before, some form of clash with his Whitehall colleagues was also a 
growing possibility. He had lost little time in demonstrating he held few apparent fears 
of tackling the FO, cautioning Halifax that five messages on foreign policy received 
from Smuts had 'not been met by our side with a great deal of interest' and urging that 
"See Garner, The Commonwealth Office, pp. 163,176-179 
"' See Colville, Churchill's Inner Circle, p. 224-25; Cranborne to Churchill, 16 October 1940, 
PREM3/82 
14 Stirling to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 5 October 1940 in W. J. Hudson & 
H. J. W. Stokes (eds. ), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 193 7-1949: Volume 4, July 1940-June 
1941 (Canberra: 1980) p. 206 (hereafter `DAFP IV') 
"S Cranborne to Waterson, 17 October 1940, Waterson Papers (BC63I. A4.3) 
16 Diary, 4 November 1940, Waterson Papers; ibid., 31 October 1940; Diary, 31 October 1940, 
Woolton Papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford) 
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a better response be made. "' When, in mid-December, - the confrontation finally came 
though it was perhaps surprisingly precipitated by Colonel William Bishop, the DO's 
military liaison officer, and not from outside of the department. 
In early June 1940, Caldecote had presented a paper to the War Cabinet requesting 
that the fullest possible information be given to the Dominions relating to wartime 
developments . 
171 Now, in a lengthy and often critical internal minute, Bishop attacked 
the prime minister's reluctance, first privately alluded to in August, to allow information 
containing 'a high degree of secrecy' to be transmitted to his Dominion counterparts. ' 71 
The refusal by the Service Departments to allow the preparation of a draft telegram 
based on a letter Churchill had recently sent to the re-elected President Roosevelt was 
of special cause for concern. Bishop had thought it to be 'in a class of its own' as a 
general review of the war situation and was anxious to make full use of its contents to 
help reassure the Dominions. 130 The rejection of the request so agitated the DO official 
that he now felt there to be little option other than to urge Cranbourne, 'with the 
greatest respect', to tackle the prime minister directly and ascertain the degree to 
which the earlier conclusions still held good. 
Despite his longstanding relationship with Churchill, the Secretary of State lost little 
time in accepting the suggestion. 1e' This, he confided to his deputy Machtig, was 
because he feared that the prime minister had decided on a policy of communicating 
'as little information as we can hope to get away with and preferably then only in reply 
to specific requests'. 18' During the preceding month Cranborne had received a number 
of personal minutes all complaining about the amount of information being passed on 
to the Dominions. On one occasion it had been suggested to him that a stark message 
outlining the real figures for captured German U-Boats should be delayed, it being 
"' Cranborne to Halifax, 24 October 1940, F0371/25224 
18 `Information for the Dominions', 5 June 1940, WP192(40), CAB66/8 
19 Colonel Bishop to Holmes, 15 December 1940, D035/1003/2/11/25 
180 Bishop to Machtig, 10 December 1940 within `Information for the Dominions', WP466(40), 
December 1940, CAB66/14 
18' Pimlott, Diary of Hugh Dalton, pp. 120-122 
182 Machtig to Cranbourne, 20 December 1940, D035/1003/2/11/25 
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better 'to let sleeping statistics lie'. 183 With these no doubt in mind, but unaware of 
private discussions in Whitehall that favoured his becoming the next Ambassador in 
Washington, following Lord Lothian's death, the Dominions' Secretary duly sent a 
personal note to Churchill just two days before Christmas. 
In it he argued that, as far as the four Dominion prime ministers were concerned the 
'policy of sharing our knowledge with [them] contributes to gaining their confidence 
and ensuring practical co-operation'. 184 It is unclear how much this willingness to 
challenge Churchill affected the Dominions Secretary's standing in the prime minister's 
eyes although it would seem probable that some damage was done. Not much 
opposition had been anticipated from his new Downing Street neighbour, as recently as 
July 1940 Churchill's own conclusion being that because of his ill-health 'there is not 
much [to be said] for burdening [Cranborne] with the duties of serving as a member [of 
the Cabinet]'. 185 The oft-quoted reply sent from Downing Street on Christmas Day 
1940 however appeared to be a stern rebuke. The prime minister cautioned of 'a 
danger that the Dominions Office staff get into the habit of running a kind of 
newspaper full of deadly secrets', requesting as a result that 'before anything of a very 
secret nature is sent out' it be submitted for approval. 18' The assessment of the DO's 
unofficial historian was that this reply was something Churchill 'clearly cherished 
composing'. Throughout the rest of the department, it was understood that there 
would be no changing his mind and little to be gained from 'returning to the charge... at 
the moment'. 187 
With the point emphatically won, there was still however little apparent willingness 
from the prime minister to demonstrate any measure of goodwill to his government 
colleague. Dismissing the value of the DO in conversation with, of all people, Bruce, 
1B' Churchill to Cranborne, 12 November 1940, Chartwell Papers (CHAR20/13/8); ibid., Churchill to 
Cranborne, 1 December 1940; Churchill to Cranborne, 21 December 1940 
184 Ibid., Cranbourne to Churchill, 23 December 1940 
185 Churchill to Halifax, 28 July 1940, Chartwell Papers (CHAR20/13/8) 
186 Ibid., Churchill to Cranborne, 25 December 1940 
197 Minute by Holmes, 30 December 1940, D035/1003/2/11/25; ibid., minute by Stephenson, 1 
January 1941 
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Churchill also appeared set on limiting the possibility of any further challenges. 188 As a 
result Cranborne's future attendance at high-level meetings now became the next 
subject to be tackled, the request being made to the Secretary of State that he miss 
Tuesday War Cabinet meetings. This was because these were held 'exclusive for 
[those] who alone bear responsibility for policy apart from its execution' and Cranborne 
was not one of these people. 18' Whilst some of his senior departmental colleagues took 
a little comfort from the knowledge that, following the pre-Christmas approach, 
Churchill 'had been kinder... in approving draft telegrams sent to him than he was 
before', the Dominions' Secretary had little option other than to agree. '9° 
With their efforts therefore rebuffed, one final issue therefore remained for the 
department to resolve. This was dealing with Massey's persistent enquiries about the 
possibility of restoring the distribution of the Air Ministry Summary to the High 
Commissioners. 19' Having passed this request on to Downing Street, where it was not 
surprisingly rejected, the thorny subject of the quality and flow of information being 
supplied to the Dominions once again become a subject which, within Whitehall, was 
mentioned in the DO alone. But in this environment it would remain a conversation that 
was never far away as interest from within the Dominions mounted still further. 192 With 
the start of a new year and his acceptance of a longstanding invitation to visit Britain, 
it would not be long before Robert Menzies would again begin to campaign for greater 
consultation by London. But this was not his sole agenda though, as soon would 
become clear. For the Australian prime minister had set himself upon securing a much 
greater personal role in the running of Imperial affairs and the ultimate goal of a 
permanent position for himself in London. 
'S$ Note by Bruce of conversation with Churchill, 18 December 1940, Lord Bruce War Files 
'e9 Churchill to Cranbourne, 7 January 1941, D0121/119 
190 Ibid., Machtig to Cranboune, 9 January 1941; Cranbourne to Churchill, 8 January 1941, 
D0121/1OA; minute by Cranbourne, 12 January 1941, D035/1003/2/11/25 
19' Ibid., minute by Cranborne, 12 January 1941; Cranborne to Churchill, 13 January 1941, 
D035/1003/2/11/25 
192 Minute by Holmes, 13 April 1941, D035/1012/28/1/1; minute by Machtig, 3 April 1941, 
D035/548F/27/55 
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The Role of Australia and Proposals for a Second Imperial War Cabinet 
The First Imperial War Cabinet 
During the First World War there were two clear phases to the 'consultative co- 
operation' carried out by the British government and its Dominion counterparts. ' The 
first of these, from the war's outbreak in August 1914, saw frequent visits being made 
to London by various Dominion cabinet ministers including a majority of the prime 
ministers. 2 Following the worsening of the Allied strategic position on the Western 
Front in the spring of 1917, this level of contact was deemed insufficient and a 
meeting was convened to be chaired by the British leader, David Lloyd George and 
involving all of the Dominion prime ministers. During this Imperial War Conference, as it 
was termed, and at further subsequent gatherings held until mid-1919, the opportunity 
was taken to hold sessions of an Imperial War Cabinet. According to Sir Robert 
Borden, the then Canadian prime minister, this was 'a Cabinet of Governments [in 
which] every Prime Minister (sic) who sits around that board is responsible to his own 
people'. In his view executive power still remained at all times with the Dominion 
leaders themselves. ' 
Although experimental in both form and procedure, the authorities in London hailed 
these gatherings as successful examples of Imperial unity. " In the Dominions the 
reaction was not so positive. Indeed whilst the experience allowed the respective 
Dominion leaderships an opportunity to claim that they had provided assistance, and 
even some direction, during a moment of great crisis for the British Empire, it also 
served to exacerbate some long-held concerns. Fears about the creation of any device 
through which the British government might attempt to make unilateral, binding 
decisions had existed long before the 1911 Imperial Conference. Indeed they went 
' See H. Duncan Hall, `The British Commonwealth of Nations at War' in Elliot & Duncan Hall, The 
British Commonwealth at War, pp. 29-32; W. David McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations: 
Origins and Impacts, 1869-1971 (London: 1977) p. 177; Madden & Darwin (ed. ), The Dominions and 
India since 1900, pp. 34-49; A. J. Stockwell, `The War and the British Empire' in John Turner (ed. ), 
Britain and the First World War (London: 1988) pp. 3 6-48 
2 See Beloff, Imperial Sunset, pp. 218-220 
3 Robert Borden to Empire Parliamentary Association, 2 April 1917, quoted in Robert Laird Borden, Memoirs: Volume II (London: 1938) p. 691; see H. Duncan Hall, Commonwealth (London: 1971) 
pp. 146-176 
` See Maurice Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914-18, Volume II (London: 1961) pp. 657-663; 
Hall, Commonwealth, pp. 160-176 
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back to the previous century and Joseph Chamberlain's proposals for an Imperial 
Council. ' Throughout the interwar period these continued with a persistent and marked 
reluctance to allow subsequent Imperial Conferences, now held at regular intervals, to 
be viewed as anything more than non-permanent meetings of a purely advisory nature. 6 
Australia alone argued that greater co-operation was needed and, specifically, an 
improvement in the relationship between London and the Dominion governments. By 
the late 1930s there was a growing call from Canberra that the level of consultation 
was insufficient to meet the requirements of the worsening European situation. 
Following the 1938 Munich crisis, Robert Menzies, the then Australian Attorney- 
General, placed himself at the head of a campaign for a united British Empire foreign 
policy. His proposals for a 'permanent Imperial Secretariat' were consistently rejected, 
however, by a majority of the other senior figures in Dominion political circles. ' 
Following the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, it did not take long for 
debate about the issue to soon re-emerge with calls, once again, for a new Imperial 
War Conference, and even a repeat of the earlier Cabinet. In only the war's second 
week, following a report that the Dominion High Commissioners based in London were 
taking 'an unwarrantable gloomy view of the [war] situation', Neville Chamberlain had 
created a committee to 'consider the existing system of collaboration with the 
Dominions'. ' Chaired by the recently appointed Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
Anthony Eden, this group soon put forward a proposal to the War Cabinet that 'a 
Minister of State from each of the Dominions could be spared to visit this country at 
once'. ' Whilst no actual meeting of Dominion leaders was suggested at this stage, the 
visiting representatives would be able to see for themselves the exact situation in 
London and in turn 'report personally to their colleagues on the vast effort' being made 
in Britain. 
s Ibid., Hall, pp. 21-25; see also Judd, Empire, pp. 214-225; Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share (London, 
Third Edition: 1996) pp. 134-140 
6 See Holland, The Commonwealth Alliance, pp. 1-151,167-209 
Skelton to Wrong, 2 March 1939, Pearson Papers 
e WMI5(39), 14 September 1939, CAB65/1 
9 `Report prepared by Committee', 14 September 1939, WP(G)(39) 10, CAB21/874 
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No doubt mindful of an early question raised' in the House of Commons about the 
possibility of calling an Imperial War Council, this tightly defined role reflected the 
views of the DO. 1° Indeed the department was acutely aware of the Dominions 
sensibilities on the subject, with Mackenzie King in Canada known to be especially 
reluctant to be dragged into any form of 'Imperial conclave'. " After only a cursory 
glance at some of the telegrams already received from Gerald Campbell, who had been 
British High Commissioner in Ottawa since the beginning of 1939, Eden had been 
quick to agree with Sir Horace Wilson that the Canadian stance led to two clear 
requirements. Simply stated these were 'to be careful not to appear to be setting up an 
Imperial War Cabinet [and] to avoid having a meeting of this kind at regular intervals'. 12 
But it was nonetheless also widely recognised that some forum or gathering was 
needed. As one senior member of the FO put it, if for no other reason than to 'to 
impress upon the Dominions that they must also pull their weight if victory is to be 
attained'. 13 The importance of the argument made by one leading American Anglophile, 
that 'the less Britain appears to be an Imperial octopus and the more she looks the 
mother of an independent but at all times co-operative family the better', was also 
clear to many. "' Although he was 'always stimulated by a crisis', Mackenzie King was 
in 'a suspicious mood on the subject [of a conference]', and it was therefore agreed 
that preliminary investigations should begin into organising some form of meeting, but 
in a cautious manner. 15 
For the DO there were two main areas which needed to be addressed. One was to 
organise the actual agenda for the proposed London Conference, the other was to 
assemble a group of Dominion statesmen of sufficient standing who could be counted 
upon to engage solely in 'consultation, coordination and cooperation' without causing 
10 `Question by the Rt. Hon. Ellis-Smith to the prime minister', 21 September 1939 (extract from 
House of Commons report, Col. 1061-62) CAB21/874 
" Diary, 21 September 1939, Mackenzie King Papers 
12 Wilson to Chamberlain, 12 September 1939, D035/1003/3/16 
" Minute by Cavendish Bentinck, 4 October 1939, FO371/23963 
" Douglas Fairbanks Jr. to Eden, 18 October 1939, Avon Papers (AP20/7/81) 
's Bickersteth to Euan Wallace (copy to Hankey and Eden), 1 October 1939, Hankey Papers; 
Campbell to DO, 5 October 1939, F0371/23967 
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any serious friction within Whitehall. 1e An assistant secretary, Stephen Holmes, had 
therefore been tasked with ensuring that his governmental colleagues were given 
ample opportunity to put forward matters they wished discussed. This relatively junior 
DO official also had to see to it that his department secured representation at as many 
of the preliminary inter- and intra-departmental sessions as possible, a strategy clearly 
recognisable as an attempt to limit the FO's role. The DO's high profile was officially 
explained away as being necessary because it would be 'called upon to deal with a 
number of now unforeseeable problems'. This it was claimed could only be done if the 
DO fully knew what was taking place elsewhere within government. Whatever the 
case, such a strategy meant an extremely frantic Autumn for Holmes managing a 
punishing schedule of inter-departmental meetings and detailed correspondence with a 
large number of his civil service colleagues. " 
These labours ultimately resulted in a series of meetings during the first three weeks of 
November 1939, something of a triumph for the department in terms of demonstrating 
its ability to operate in the face of wartime pressures. The hard work was also well 
rewarded during the actual gathering of Dominion Ministers, 'none of whom curiously 
was directly responsible for the war effort', where the prevailing atmosphere was 
generally good. t8 The few contentious moments resulted from attempts by the New 
Zealand representative, Peter Fraser, to secure some form of statement on Allied war 
aims, and Australian efforts to compel Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the 
Admiralty, to issue a guarantee that a British fleet would be despatched to Singapore. 19 
Despite eight high-level briefings from a full range of British Ministers and a visit to the 
Western Front in France to see the war situation first-hand, there was however no 
recorded suggestion of any change in existing arrangements. 
There were differing interpretations as to what this lack of response meant. Harold 
Nicolson could only lament that the visiting Dominion Ministers had 'come expecting to 
16 DO to Dominion Governments, 4 October 1939, F0371/23963 
" For example see `Note by Mr. Holmes', October 1939, CAB21/490; Price to Barnard (Board of 
Trade), 14 October 1939, CAB104/247; Hensley (Ministry of Agriculture) to Price, 30 October 1939, 
CAB21/491 
18 `Meetings with Dominion Ministers', November 1939, CAB99/1; see Garner, The Commonwealth 
Office, pp. 197-198 
" WHC, 11 September 1939, DO121/6; WM42(39), 9 October 1939, CAB65/1 
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find the Mother of Parliaments armed like Britannia, [but] merely saw an old lady 
dozing over her knitting while her husband read the evening paper out loud'. 2' For 
those civil servants within Whitehall who had already made their reluctance for greater 
contact with their Dominion counterparts plain, that these effectively unavoidable 
meetings had been carried out with only a minimum of discomfort was only too 
obviously pleasing. 2' The DO also, at this stage content to focus on promoting greater 
contact between London and the Dominion governments, was generally happy about 
the outcome of the Conference. The fact that it had taken two-and-a-half years of the 
First World War to convene a similar meeting, but on this occasion under two-and-a- 
half months, was also cause for some satisfaction. What neither side fully anticipated 
was that, both at home and abroad, this first visit by the Dominion representatives to 
London would have something of a catalytic effect on what had previously been a 
largely apathetic wider establishment. It would not take long before the clamour from 
elements within this group for further such meetings to be convened would develop. 
Growing Pressures from Canberra 
In late February 1940 the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Lothian, wrote to 
his Secretary of State championing the idea of re-summoning the Imperial War Cabinet 
and specifically highlighting the positive impact it might have on public opinion in the 
United States. In Lord Halifax he found an apparently sympathetic ear and in a letter to 
Eden written soon afterwards, the Foreign Minister readily advocated the proposal. He 
noted to his Whitehall colleague that 'the only real question is the most appropriate 
time for holding such a meeting and the practicability of securing the attendance of 
Dominion Prime Ministers (sicl'. 22 
Following their frequently bitter experiences during the Empire Air Training Scheme 
negotiations, the DO's senior civil servants were however far from enthusiastic about 
the suggestion. In a lengthy, and often insightful, minute Stephenson pointed to the 
20 Diary, 2 November 1939, Nigel Nicolson (ed. ), Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters 1939-45, 
(London: 1967) p. 41 
21 Bewley to Machtig, 26 October 1939, CAB21/490; Antrobus to Porter, 25 October 1939, 
CAB21/677; minute by Cavendish Bentinck, 18 October 1939, FO371/23967 
22 Lothian to Halifax, 27 February 1940, D035/998/7/1; ibid. Halifax to Eden, 15 March 1940 
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'constitutional difficulties' which would most likely result from any attempt to 'suggest 
the power of decision should be entrusted to the United Kingdom War Cabinet'. 23 His 
colleague, Eric Machtig, also felt it necessary to warn that 'Dominion feeling during the 
last years has been to indicate that anything in the nature of a super-Cabinet... would 
be unacceptable and would, indeed meet with strong opposition'. 24 With such obvious 
reluctance from his senior advisors, Eden asked what course of action they thought he 
should recommend to Halifax. The answer was 'some alternative such as a visit to 
Canada', which would follow on from the Secretary of State's recent and successful 
visit to Egypt where he had welcomed arriving Australian and New Zealand troops. 
According to one commentator, Eden's position in the Cabinet remained, 'highly 
anomalous, not to say humiliating'. 25 As such it seems reasonable to speculate that, at 
this stage, he would have been anxious to seize upon any opportunity which might 
help him promote himself and the importance of the department he headed. A meeting 
in London drawing from the highest echelons of the Dominions' political ranks would 
no doubt provide an excellent opportunity as, during it, he would clearly play a 
considerable role. With the DO obliged to look closely at the proposals, he therefore 
took it upon himself to approach Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, 
for advice on how best to approach the most difficult obstacle, Mackenzie King. Z" 
With Chamberlain reassuring his parliamentary colleagues of his complete confidence in 
the current state of Anglo-Dominion consultation, it was therefore agreed that Eden 
would first confirm arrangements for a trip to Canada following which invitations 
would be despatched to visit London. 2' With the DO still worrying about the effect of 
this on the Canadian prime minister, it took some three weeks before a telegram was 
ready to be despatched to the Dominion governments. With the department's concerns 
unmentioned, this informed them that the authorities in London intended to hold 
another, higher-level meeting later in the year, probably in July or early August. 28 
23 Ibid., Stephenson to Parkinson and Machtig, 18 March 1940 
24 Ibid., Machtig to Parkinson and Eden, 19 March 1940 
23 See Carlton, Anthony Eden, pp. 151-52; Rothwell, Anthony Eden, p. 51 
26 Stephenson to Eden and Machtig, 30 March 1940, D035/998/7/1 
27 Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-1952, p. 40; Machtig to Eden, 2 April 
1940, D035/998/7/1 
28 Ibid., DO to Dominion Governments, 22 April 1940 
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Before any further arrangements could be undertaken, 'however, the war intervened. 
And with the DO making every effort to keep the Dominion governments informed of 
European developments, as far as possible, the subsequent German attacks on France 
and the Low Countries helped ensure that the issue received little additional high-level 
discussion until mid-May. This pause allowed a recently appointed member of the DO, 
Peter Costley-White, to produce a lengthy summary of the various proposals that had 
been advanced in regard to the reconvening of an Imperial War Cabinet. Following 
Chamberlain's resignation, this had duly been sent to the country's new leader, 
Churchill, in the last week of May. 29 Whilst Menzies was apparently willing to attend a 
conference, 'the obvious reluctance of Mr Mackenzie King and General Smuts to come 
to London' was quite apparent and, in merely repeating the Dominion leaders' 
comments it was clear that at this stage the consensus was against the idea. 3° Indeed 
South Africa's leader in particular was of the opinion that, as 'the war was only just 
beginning... the proposed conference was rather too soon after the meeting in 
November [1939]'. 31 
Having already wrongly assumed that the proposal for a meeting had originally come 
from Mackenzie King, upon reading these comments Churchill instructed the DO that 
he felt 'as things are at present, there is no prospect of the Conference being arranged, 
and consequently the suggestion should not be encouraged'. 32 Whilst the department 
pointed out that the idea for such a meeting had in fact come about as a result of 
pressure from London, it was on this occasion more than happy to concur with the 
prime minister's argument, readily deferring to his wishes. Indeed, writing to Caldecote 
Machtig was able to confide to him that he did not personally foresee any chance of a 
prime ministers conference at any time in the near future. 33 As he was making this 
comment a message to the Dominion governments was being prepared for despatch 
29 Note prepared by Costley-White, May 1940, D035/998/7/11 
'o Garner to Parkinson, 16 May 1940, D035/998/7/9 
" DO to PM, 20 May 1940, PREM4/43A/11 
32 Peck (PM's Office) to Costley-White, 27 May 1940, DO35/998/7/9 
33 Ibid., Machtig to Secretary of State, 31 May 1940 
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informing them that it would not be possible 'to hold 'a conference at this time, one 
which drew no response other than from the authorities in Canberra. "' 
Since his election as leader of the Commonwealth of Australia following Joe Lyons's 
death in March 1939, Menzies, a self-avowed imperialist, had repeated his earlier 
arguments on numerous occasions. During May 1940, despite his precarious domestic 
political position, he had been the one Dominion leader constantly willing to visit 
London. 35 And Churchill's response that this would not be required did little to deter his 
enthusiasm. A telegram sent to London from Canberra in mid-June pointed to 'the 
great comfort [that] would be given if some conference could occur between us and 
other Prime Ministers (sic) on general strategy of empire defence'. 38 Although the 
British leader once more politely declined the request, it was clear that this was an idea 
dear to the Australian leader. Indeed it would not be long before he once again 
returned to the theme. 37 
The scarcity of information provided in advance of the failed attempts to seize the 
Vichy-held port of Dakar in West Africa, in October 1940, gave the Australian leader 
the perfect excuse. 38 In cables received by the DO from the British High Commissioner 
in Canberra, Menzies' position was made abundantly clear. From the war's outset he 
had complained that 'the supply of information was very meagre [and] things were 
happening and would happen which vitally concerned Australia but about 
which... nothing was known until afterwards'. 39 Now a year later, although he was 
apparently dismissive of the need for an actual, enlarged Imperial War Cabinet, the 
Australian prime minister was still anxious for some form of meeting. At this he wished 
to discuss why 'the United Kingdom was keeping the Dominions a bit at arms length in 
the conduct of the war policy'. "" His continuing interest was no doubt in part 
34 Ibid., DO to Peck, 6 June 1940 
3S Note by Costley-White, May 1940, D035/998/7/1 I 
36 Menzies to Bruce, 17 June 1940, DO35/1003/11/3/4 
37 Ibid., Churchill to Menzies, 23 June 1940 
38 See Day, Menzies and Churchill at War, pp. 30-34 
" Whiskard to DO, 20 September 1939, DO121/46 
40 Whiskard to DO, 23 October 1940, D035/998/7/11 
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precipitated by the worsening political situation he faced in the Australian parliament. 
Although he had been unanimously re-elected as leader of his party in mid-October, his ° 
coalition remained almost permanently on the verge of collapse. As one of his 
colleagues bemoaned to a friend in London, this meant most of Menzies' colleagues 
were now 'eager for his blood'. 41 
The DO meanwhile continued to hold with Churchill's view, one also incidentally 
shared by Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner in London, that with the stated 
Canadian and South African positions a prime ministers' conference would remain 
entirely unfeasible. 42 But the same time there was a realisation within the department 
that to 'discourage Menzies [would] have a chilling effect' and, no doubt in light of the 
post-Dakar recriminations, would be 'unfortunate at the present moment'. 43 The most 
obvious compromise therefore was 'to say we would welcome visit [although] to urge 
him to come would perhaps be going too far', and this approach was duly 
recommended to the War Cabinet shortly afterwards. 44 
As news reached the DO that a Supreme War Council meeting was being considered, 
to which various Allied and Dominion governments would be asked to send 
representatives, elsewhere an alternative suggestion had also been proposed. 45 With 
this proposal, made nearly five months after France's surrender had seen the Council's 
suspension, it was hoped that a resolution could be agreed demonstrating the 
continued resolve amongst the remaining Allied combatants to continue the war 
against Germany. During the Spring of 1940 the Office had already discussed the 
Dominions' participation in this form of meeting as it was correctly anticipated that 
their governments were soon likely to request inclusion within the ranks of its 
attendees. "' Approaching the Dominions for their views, only six months later, it was 
4' Sir Frederic Eggleston to Mackay, 8 October 1940, Eggleston Papers (National Library of 
Australia) MS423/1/143 
42 Machtig to Cranborne, 24 October 1940, D035/998/7/11 
Ibid., memorandum by Stephenson, 26 October 1940 
Ibid., memorandum by Cranbome (for War Cabinet), 28 October 1940 
41 Stephenson to Machtig, 30 October 1940, D035/998/7/13 
' Ibid., `Note on Supreme War Council', DO minute, unknown author, April 1940; Diary, 29 April 
1940, Waterson Papers 
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soon evident to the department's officials that'there was now some reluctance about 
even this limited proposal. 
Again it was Mackenzie King who found the idea most distasteful and he lost little time 
in making this clear to London and his Dominion counterparts. " On this occasion, 
however, this latest critical response from Ottawa was not well received by Churchill 
who was now anxious that an image of solidarity should be issued. In fact he was so 
taken aback that he warned Halifax of his intention to 'go forward with the meeting 
with or without the Canadian representative'. "' The recent critical questioning the 
prime minister had encountered from the Dominions over his handling of operations 
against Dakar was only one reason for the mounting sense of exasperation on display. 
Britain's deteriorating wartime position greatly added to his pressures. Italy had just 
launched an invasion of Greece further threatening Britain's Mediterranean interests 
while U-boat attacks against British shipping in the Atlantic were worsening and the 
Luftwaffe's aerial campaign against London was entering its ninth week. 49 
There were also a number of political considerations to be borne in mind. Churchill had 
only recently been warned by an old parliamentary colleague of the growing campaign 
in Westminster to get a Dominion representative into the War Cabinet. 50 This he had 
been advised to strongly reject on the grounds that '[the Dominions] would get swelled 
head; we are the Power House and pander to them enough already'. There were 
certainly signs that support for, at least, some form of Dominions conference was 
widening. For what would prove to be not the last time, Lord Elibank, the former 
Liberal chief whip, had already raised the suggestion before his peers, although as he 
attempted to reassure the prime minister, he had done so solely 'to induce the 
Dominions [to] do more'. 5' 
47 Mackenzie King to Churchill, 31 October 1940, D035/998/7/13 
48 Ibid., prime minister's Personal Minute (No. M282), copied to Cranborne, 4 November 1940 
49 See Churchill, Finest Hour, pp. 422-438; Gilbert, Finest Hour, pp. 876-90 
so Josiah Wedgewood MP to Churchill, 25 October 1940, Chartwell Papers (CHAR20/8/122) 
s' Elibank to Churchill, 10 October 1940, PREM4/43/A/13; see Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-1952, p. 93 
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It was a note from Lord Cranborne, attempting to explain possible reasons behind 
Mackenzie King's mood, which ultimately led to the prime minister's anger boiling 
over. 52 Surprisingly though his ire was directed at his Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs for whom the situation was made especially difficult by the fact he had only 
approached Ottawa for the Canadian leader's opinions after having first secured the 
FO's prior approval. 53 As far as the British leader was concerned using the term 
'Supreme War Council' instead of the Cabinet-agreed 'Conference of Allied 
Representatives' had created a situation which in Mackenzie King's case 'with his 
particular isolation tendencies [it] was a puddle at which he was sure to shy'. 54 The 
fact that none of the other Dominion leaders had been confused by the instructions 
sent out by London did nothing to redress Churchill's astonishment at the DO's 
telegram. With Cranborne refusing to deflect any of the criticism, the situation was 
only resolved following direct intervention from Bridges in the Cabinet Office. Anxious 
that the Dominions Secretary should be 'free of any blame, if "blame" is the right 
word', he informed the prime minister that the error lay with the FO and not the DO. 55 
Whilst this led to an apology of sorts, Churchill's reaction of the previous few days had 
made it quite clear that the whole question of an Imperial Conference was one about 
which he clearly held strong views. 
Menzies and Churchill 
In early December 1940, Churchill's deputy Clement Attlee, stated categorically to the 
House of Commons that the government did not contemplate the addition of a 
Dominions representative to the War Cabinet. 56 Just over a month later Menzies 
nonetheless set out on a journey to London to carry out a 'chancy undertaking' for 
which he had been long planning. 57 Leaving Australia in late January 1941, just a few 
52 Cranborne to PM, 8 November 1940, D03$/998/7/13 
S3 Ibid., Cranborne to PM, 8 November 1940 
sa Ibid., PM to Cranborne, 10 November 1940 
ss Cranborne to PM, 11 November 1940, D035/99817/13; ibid., Bridges to Cranborne, 11 November 
1940; PM to Cranborne, 13 November 1940 
sb See Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-1952, p. 90 
57 Diary, 11 January 1941, Menzies Papers (National Library of Australia) MS4936 
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weeks after the announcement of the Lend-Lease agreement between the United 
States and Britain, there were several reasons behind this venture. A combination of 
the continuing political difficulties he faced at home, personal unease over the nature 
of the relationship Australia enjoyed with Britain and more general fears amongst his 
countrymen about future security in both the Mediterranean and Pacific regions were 
however the three most prominent. 58 Widely known for his complete lack of discretion, 
the Australian prime minister's had previously revealed to the British High 
Commissioner in Canberra his resolve to secure direct Dominion representation in 
London, with him as 'the man chosen' to fulfil the role. 59 Although he had assured his 
parliamentary colleagues that his absence would be 'as brief as possible', his decision 
to travel via Singapore and the Middle East in fact meant that it would be nearly four 
months before he returned home. 6° 
Menzies' arrival in London in late February was preceded by a favourable press 
campaign anticipating his visit which showed little sign of abating once he actually 
reached British shores. "' Meetings with various members of the establishment rapidly 
followed, culminating in a matter of days with a first encounter with Churchill himself, 
the first to have taken place between the two men. The visit Menzies made to 
Chequers did not augur well for the future, however, as the Australian politician found 
his host a 'tempestuous creature' whose attire and general demeanour apparently 
shocked him, the haranguing of the 'holy terror' eventually sending him to bed tired. 02 
Menzies was not deterred though and for the next two months he made every effort to 
ensure he experienced events in Britain first-hand, regularly attending War Cabinet 
meetings whenever possible and generally placing himself centre-stage. 63 
38 See Day, Menzies and Churchill at War, pp-33-40 
59 Whiskard to Inskip, 16 March 1939, DO121/46 
60 Age, Melbourne, 14 January 1941, cited in Day p. 39 
61 Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1941 & Sunday Times, 23 February 1941, Liddell Hart Papers 
(King's College, London) 
62 Diary, 22 February 1941, Menzies Papers 
63 See Day, Menzies and Churchill at War, pp. 63-171 
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By the time of his final meeting with Churchill on the first day of May 1941, the night 
prior to his return to Australia, the knowledge he had gained had left him convinced 
that all was not well at the heart of the Empire. The disastrous Greek campaign, 
following on from the reverses then being suffered by the Imperial forces in the Middle 
East, reinforced this belief. 64 The British decision to intervene in Greece has been well 
explored. 65 In January 1941 the suggestion had generated considerable discussion 
within the DO, and not for the first time, as to whether General Wavell actually held 
the authority to use Australian and New Zealand forces under his command outside 
North Africa. " Previously, in March 1940, it had been agreed that 'questions of policy 
regarding employment of the force should be decided by the United Kingdom and 
Commonwealth governments in consultation' and it was this last point that the 
department was anxious to see preserved. 67 Eight months later, when the possibility of 
sending Dominion troops to garrison Crete was being considered, the DO had obtained 
the consent of the governments concerned and it was now felt that this perhaps 
represented a precedent which needed to be maintained. 68 
Menzies had consequently been approached following his arrival in London for 
clarification as to his opinion. 89 Although very upset at being told by a senior British 
general, during a stop-over in the Middle East, that the Australian troops were 'terribly 
badly disciplined and caused a great deal of trouble', this did not appear to too gravely 
influence his view of the proposed Operation LUSTRE. 70 Indeed after listening to 
Churchill's arguments Menzies announced himself to be 'in favour of the 
undertaking'. " His initial impression of Churchill was positive, his 'qualities [being] 
64 See Callum MacDonald, The Lost Battle: Crete, 1941 (London: 1993) pp. 87-113,186-307; Antony 
Beevor, Crete: The Battle and the Resistance (London: 1991) pp. 30-82,82-226 
65 Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-52, pp. 96-101; David Homer, Inside the 
War Cabinet (Australia: 1996) pp. 48-59; Sheila Lawlor, Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940-41 
(Cambridge: 1994) pp. 167-259 
66 Stephenson to Cranborne, 31 January 1940, D035/1003/2/11/133 
67 DO to Australian Government, 9 March 1940, D035/1000/110/2/22 
68 Minute by Colonel Reid (Dominions Military Liaison), 29 January 1941, D035/1003/9 
69 Ibid., minute by Cranborne, 1 January 1941 
70 Ismay to Brooke-Popham, 15 June 1941, Brooke-Popham Papers (V/1/13) 
71 Menzies to Fadden, 25 February 1941, DAFP IV 
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much greater than we thought', the Australian leader at the same time taking the view 
that there was no doubt that 'Australia is Dominion Number One'. " Having received 
Menzies' advice, and a number of unreconciled doubts notwithstanding, his deputy 
back in Canberra and the remainder of the Australian War Cabinet therefore 
concurred. 73 
During these exchanges between Australia House and Canberra it was stated that 
Churchill had 'definitely instructed both Eden and [General] Dill not to consider 
themselves bound to a Greek enterprise if in their hearts they felt it would be another 
Norway'. "' The prime minister had even reminded Eden, who had been despatched to 
Athens, that 'justifying the operation [on] grounds of noblesse oblige' was not enough, 
it would require a thorough military appreciation before he could encourage the 
Dominions to give their support. 75 Churchill's reservations appeared genuine, even 
Waterson recording that his attitude had been one of 'extreme hesitation until the 
heads of the services said it was the right thing to do for military reasons'. " 
Meanwhile, according to one observer, 'Menzies... didn't seem unduly depressed at the 
precarious position of his soldiers in Greece'. " Much of the reason for this can be put 
down to Menzies' focus remaining upon Churchill. Despite his later description of him 
as a 'great warrior-statesman [and] an unrivalled benefactor to posterity', privately he 
was more scathing about 'the greatest asset and greatest danger' the Empire faced. " 
As he put it to his colleagues in Canberra upon his eventual return, 'Mr Churchill has 
no conception of the British Dominions as separate entities. Furthermore, the more the 
distance from the heart of the Empire, the less he thinks of it'. 79 
'Z Ibid., Menzies to Fadden, 4 March 1941 
'"' Ibid., Fadden to Menzies, 26 February 1941 
74 Ibid., Menzies to Fadden, 1 March 1941 
 Churchill to Eden, 7 March 1941 in Churchill, The Second World War: Vol.!!!, The Grand Alliance 
(London: 1950) pp. 92-93 
76 Diary, 7 April 1941, Waterson Papers 
"Diary, 17 April 1941, Pearson Papers 
78 Sir Percy Joske, Sir Robert Menzies: A New, Informal Memoir (Sydney: 1978) p. 115; Diary, 17 
April 1941, Pearson Papers 
7' Quoted in Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind (London: 1978) p. 63 
148 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
The Role of Australia and Proposals for a Second Imperial War Cabinet 
Consequently, with the military crisis facing British and Imperial forces precipitating a 
political challenge to the British leadership, Menzies was to be found at the heart of the 
intrigues in London attending meetings and discussions with the conspirators. In the 
final hours of his stay, he made his plans clear to Lord Hankey who, having been 
demoted by the British prime minister in May 1940, had allowed himself to become 
centrally embroiled in the campaign to contain Churchill. 8° According to the soon-to- 
depart Menzies there was only one possible course of action to be followed. An 
Imperial War Cabinet had to be summoned after which one of the Dominion leaders 
would have to stay behind 'like Smuts in the last war, not as a guest but as a full 
member'. " Having heard this proposal and discussed it with Sir John Simon, Hankey 
urged Menzies to seek one final meeting with Churchill. The Australian prime minister 
could get 'no change' out of his British counterpart however, much as had been the 
case the previous October, and he departed for North America and the long trip home 
where a political crisis awaited him. 82 
His departure did not however mean an end to the intrigues and, in Menzies' absence, 
the campaign in London against Churchill soon reached its climax. During the first 
week of May 1941, a confidence debate was called in the House of Commons. 83 
Despite the best efforts of such senior parliamentary figures as Lloyd George and Hore- 
Belisha, the vote was won handsomely by the prime minister, a result which can only 
have filled him with optimism about the relative strength of his position. Certainly he 
did not appear taken aback on receiving a telegram from Mackenzie King telling him 
that Menzies, who had just finished a visit to Ottawa, had argued strongly in favour of 
a meeting of Dominion leaders later in the year. 84 The following day, Cranborne felt it 
prudent to warn Churchill of the true nature behind Menzies recent visit, advising the 
prime minister that he should 'have the background, in case you have not already got 
it'. 85 The simple answer that came back to the DO was 'I have got it'. 86 
See Irving, Churchill's War: Volume One, pp. 550-556 
81 Diary, 30 April 1941 &1 May 1941, Hankey Papers 
82 Ibid., 2 May 1941; `Curtin Falls on Menzies', Reynolds, 27 April 1941, Liddell Hart Papers 
(LH 15/4/49) 
83 See Gilbert, Finest Hour, pp. 1083-1084 
94 Churchill to Mackenzie King, 11 May 1941 in Churchill, The GrandAlliance, p. 595 
85 Cranborne to Churchill, 12 May 1941, PREM4/43A/12 
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Having clashed over the supply of information to the Dominion governments at the 
beginning of the year, this brief reply was something of a rare written communication. 
This was even more the case as, since their earlier disagreement, there had been little 
indication that the DO's anxieties had been removed. In March 1941 Cranborne had 
sought approval to send to the Dominion governments an appreciation made by the 
British military authorities of the likely chances of invasion. Once again however 
Churchill dismissed the initiative asking 'what is the point of all this questionable stuff' 
and wondering whether it was in fact needed to frighten the Dominions into doing their 
duty. 87 Whilst there was no further official exchange of comments, it was clear that 
within the DO, if not elsewhere, there remained serious disquiet about the lack of 
provision of 'operational intelligence to the Dominion governments on a secret basis'. " 
Correspondence was in any case about to increase as, although the department was 
apparently keen not to provoke the prime minister, Churchill's reply to Mackenzie King 
that some form of meeting in August or September might be in order, provoked no 
shortage of comment. 89 This somewhat dramatic change by Churchill was perhaps a 
reaction to the growing campaign in Lord Beaverbrook's 'Daily Express' for Menzies to 
stay and the public support for a conference which it helped foster. 9° Reminding the 
prime minister of the previously identified difficulties which simple discussion of the 
idea alone had created, Cranborne remained adamant that 'although [he was] strongly 
in favour of an Imperial Conference', this should only be when it 'can profitably be 
held'. 91 The department had spent the last few months doing its best to dampen 
Bruce's anger about the conference's continuing postponement. 92 Now with his 
certainty that Mackenzie King would remain vehemently opposed to any such proposal 
66 Ibid., Churchill to Cranborne, 13 May 1941 
Churchill to Cranborne, 25 March 1941, Chart well Papers (CHAR20/13/8) 
88 Minute by Holmes, 13 April 1941, D035/1012/28/1/1 
89 Ibid., Churchill to Mackenzie King, 10 May 1941 
90 See Day, The Great Betrayal, p. 134 
91 Cranborne to Churchill, 12 May 1941, PREM4/43A/12 
92 Minute by Cranborne, 4 April 1941, D035/548F/27/55 
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for domestic reasons fully endorsed by the senior officials within his department, the 
Dominions' Secretary clearly hoped to deter further comment from London. " 
The Importance of Mackenzie King and Smuts 
The view that Mackenzie King was the critical figure was certainly not misplaced as 
was shown in a letter, passed on to the DO, in which the Canadian prime minister 
again voiced his predominantly negative views about the whole idea. 94 Within a matter 
of days, as the German attack began on the Imperial forces holding Crete, Cranborne 
himself received a personal letter from Ottawa carrying exactly the same message. 95 
Perhaps not wishing to be accused of hampering the now publicly popular scheme, at 
the end of the month Churchill was still enquiring of both the FO and DO about 'the 
sending of formal invitations' for an inter-Allied council in July. 96 In a long, well-argued 
response, Cranborne sought once again to make the point to Churchill that the issue 
required serious thought. The Canadian leader was 'still clearly very wobbly about 
coming.. . and it is only too probable that faced with a 
definite invitation he would still 
attempt to run out'. 97 The conclusion of the DO therefore remained that any meeting 
should be deferred until later in the year, 'when the issues that have to be discussed 
will, we hope, become clearer'. 
Cranborne had already discussed his views on the question, in private, with Malcolm 
MacDonald who, in April 1941, had been sent out to Ottawa to become the new 
British High Commissioner. 98 In so doing he provided the clearest explanation as to 
why he opposed an Imperial Conference. His comments also provided a vivid account 
of recent events in London for the former Minister for Health. ' Menzies, he was told, 
had formed the lowest opinion of the War Cabinet, not to mention Cranborne himself, 
thinking the former to be an 'utterly feeble and futile' body. Whilst the Dominions' 
93 Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 209 
9a Mackenzie King to Lord Davies, 19 May 1941, D035/999/8/3 
9' Ibid., Mackenzie King to Cranborne, 20 May 1941 
Churchill to Foreign and Dominion Secretaries, 30 May 1941, PREM4/43A/12 
97 Ibid., Cranborne to Churchill, 30 May 1941 
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Secretary agreed with some of his argument, noting' it would be 'valuable for the 
Dominions to feel that they had a watchdog to protect their interests', he felt Menzies 
might not 'have ability of the very highest kind'. 99 Claiming that he was making this 
statement without any malice, this was not his sole cause for caution. As Cranborne 
quite rightly also pointed out, there were more obvious difficulties involved in quickly 
assembling the various Dominion leaders in London. And aside from the logistical 
considerations there was a serious additional disadvantage to be considered. Calling an 
unexpected meeting could lead 'the public here and in the Dominions [to] get the 
impression that there was some new and spectacular development which required 
immediate discussion', a possibility which was deemed 'most unfortunate'. 
That Cranborne should have chosen MacDonald as his confidante was in many ways 
an ironic decision following the controversy which the latter's appointment had caused 
within the DO. On three occasions during 1941 Churchill announced that politicians 
were being sent overseas to fill High Commissioners' posts, claiming that he believed 
the wartime situation demanded that he 'appoint persons of proved Parliamentary and 
Cabinet Experience'. 1°° After some debate about a plethora of candidates including Sir 
James Grigg and Lord Winterton, the decision was made that Lord Harlech, who as 
Ormsby-Gore had been Colonial Secretary, should be sent to South Africa. There he 
would replace Harding who had been forced to resign on the grounds of ill health. 1°' In 
the case of the High Commissioner in Canberra, despite Whiskard doubting whether a 
ministerial appointment would be wise, he was succeeded by Sir Ronald Cross, the 
Minister of Shipping. The newly appointed diplomat immediately set about securing a 
dramatic increase in salary for himself. 1°2 Claims were later made that these 
"Ibid., Cranborne to MacDonald, 31 May 1941, MacDonald Papers 
10° Churchill to Smuts, 3 February 1941, D0121/106. Churchill tried, but failed, to complete his 
change of High Commissioners in July 1941 when he suggested the appointment of Grenfell, a 
Labour MP working in the Mines Department of the Board of Trade. After remonstrations from 
Fraser, who was angered by the proposed removal of Batterbee, it was suggested to the prime 
minister by his deputy that this move might be seen as `providing a place for someone who was not 
wanted at home'. Attlee also, tactfully, suggested that Churchill's apparent intention to offer Lloyd George Grenfell's old post and bring in his son-in-law, Duncan Sandys, to replace him might `look bad in the eyes of those who are always ready to make trouble'. Attlee to Churchill, 18 July 1941, 
Chartwell Papers (CHAR20/34/9); Berendsen Memoirs, Volume 2, Chapter 18, p. 1 
1' Churchill to Cranborne, 5 January 1941, D0121/106; ibid., Churchill to Cranborne, 4 February 
1941; ibid., Churchill to Smuts, 12 February 1941 
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appointments were sensible as they elevated the status of High Commissioner, 
allowing them 'no longer [to] be treated as a mere postman or glorified sales 
representative'. 103 At the time though it was clear that there were many within the 
Office who were 'not too pleased'. Batterbee, out in Wellington, for example 
somewhat sarcastically wondering whether he might soon find himself recalled to 
London to work as a cipher clerk. "" 
The department was not however alone in wondering about the reasons behind this 
departure in policy. To certain commentators within Whitehall, it was fairly obvious 
that this represented an opportunity for the prime minister to dispose of politicians for 
whom he had little time. On hearing the news of Cross's appointment a friend warned 
Rab Butler that he might one day find himself sent to the Falkland Islands. 105 It was 
certainly the case that the Churchill had little time for MacDonald, the first of these 
appointments. Amongst the many misdemeanours he was held to have committed in 
the prime minister's eyes, perhaps the gravest occurred in 1938 when he had 
negotiated the Treaty Ports Agreement with the Irish authorities. For this he was 
instantly likened to 'rat poison'. 1°6 But whatever the reasons MacDonald in fact proved 
an admirable choice to send to Ottawa as Mackenzie King had first met his family in 
1897 and remained a regular correspondent with the young Malcolm, whom he held in 
high regard, for more than fifteen years. 107 
Churchill, meanwhile, had requested that he be sent a minute with 'a case for the 
Cabinet stating forth the pros and cons' about holding an Imperial meeting. It was 
surely little surprise that Cranborne once again used this to forcefully press his 
argument that the suggestion should be deferred. At the head of his list of reasons for 
not issuing 'embarrassing' invitations, he once again placed Mackenzie King's 
103 Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 181 
104 Shannon to Batterbee, 2 July 1941, Batterbee Papers (Box 8); Batterbee to Machtig, 20 February 
1941, DO 121/116 
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reluctance as the most powerful. 1°8 By the end' of the first week of June he was able 
to inform Churchill that the Foreign Secretary also now agreed with him. Eden had 
indeed been persuaded that it might be best 'to postpone calling the meeting of 
Dominion prime ministers till later in the year, when the general situation should be 
clearer'. 109 With Cranborne's thoughts being widely disseminated throughout the entire 
War Cabinet and its surrounding departments, it was becoming increasingly difficult to 
build support for an Imperial Conference. 
With the FO getting reports from as far off as the British Ambassador in Washington 
that 'considerable dissatisfaction [about their situation) was being reported amongst 
Australians and New Zealanders in the Middle East', the Australian leader had 
nonetheless already resumed his campaign back at home. 1° At the same time in 
London there was still considerable support for Menzies from 'a large body of opinion', 
including figures within both the political and military spectrums. Clearly the Australian 
leader continued to remain the best candidate for those in Britain who wished to 
restrict Churchill's role. "' Hankey was but one of these, still confiding in his diary of 
the need to get Menzies and Lloyd George into the government, 'two wise old 
elephants to tame the rogue elephant'. "2 
It was surely little coincidence therefore that Cranborne suddenly widened his 
argument, to include the suggestion that the widely respected Smuts be called upon 
'to come over [to London] at the earliest date convenient to him'. 13 This was a move 
that might have been anticipated from an individual who, like his father Lord Salisbury 
and many other figures within the British establishment, was a great admirer of the 
108 Cranborne to Churchill, 3 June 1941, PREM4/43A/12 
109 Ibid., Cranborne to Churchill, 6 June 1941; Minutes of Advisory War Council Meeting, Canberra, 
28 May 1941, quoted in Homer, Inside the War Cabinet, p. 62 
"'Halifax to FO, 12 June 1941, F0371/27575 
Diary, 5 June 1941, Hankey Papers 
12 General Ismay to Brooke-Popham, 15 June 1941, Ismay Papers (King's College, London) Ismay 
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South African leader. 1' As far back as October'1940 Cranborne had urged Halifax, the 
then Foreign Secretary, of the vital need for ensuring that Smuts did not feel his 
various efforts were 'not being met by our side with a great display of interest' . 
15 
Similar statements had been common since before Churchill had taken power. One DO 
official had highlighted the 'personal ties between the two leaders [which] were so 
strong that there was no thought of contention'. 1" An assistant to Churchill had 
meanwhile put the idea forward, indirectly, to King George VI that, were Churchill to 
be killed, his 'remarkable' South African counterpart would make an ideal 
replacement. "7 With Smuts now officially being sounded out by the British authorities 
about providing more direct assistance, his own High Commissioner in London also 
began to try and draw him more prominently into the debate. 
Throughout 1941 neither Waterson nor Bruce, his Australian counterpart, had shown 
any indication of suspending their campaign to secure greater influence for the London- 
based Dominion High Commissioners. "' The failure in July 1940 to inform the 
Dominion representatives, in advance, that Iceland was to be garrisoned by American 
troops had particularly angered them; as a result Bruce had even threatened to ignore 
the Secretary of State and make his own 'representations in highest quarters'. 19 But 
with the mounting calls for an Imperial presence in the War Cabinet the two men's 
outlook differed. Praised by his colleague in Washington, Richard Casey, for his 'sense 
of reality', Bruce had gone on record, on more than one occasion, doubting the 
wisdom of the 'impracticable' idea . 
120 Although he was far from averse to intriguing, 
his belief remained firmly that the only sensible option was to give the High 
Commissioners a far greater role in the running of the war. Consequently he made 
"' Diary, 6 June 1941, Hankey Papers; General Auchinleck to Ismay, 29 September 1941, Ismay 
Papers (IV/Con/1/IA) 
115 Cranborne to Halifax, 24 October 1940, F0371/25224 
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every effort to keep himself close to the centre of events whilst at the same time 
looking to counter proposals that might threaten his position. 121 
South Africa's representative had a similar agenda in regard to promoting his own role 
but using a different method. With the DO asking Smuts whether he could visit London 
to provide 'support, presence and advice', Waterson warned his prime minister that 
there were continuing deficiencies in the system. 122 With the advice from South Africa 
House being that it would be 'most useful if as far as possible at least one Dominion 
prime minister were here, possibly in rotation, to sit in the War Cabinet', Smuts turned 
for advice to his old friend Duncan, the Governor-General. Recognising that there was 
a genuine need for the Dominions to be kept in touch with 'the inner circle of decision 
and information', the latter immediately doubted whether Waterson was 'standing up 
to the rush of popular sentiment as he should'. 123 
This conclusion must have been akin to the South African leader's own thoughts. The 
next day Smuts response to his representative in London was that, whilst he shared 
his concern about Churchill and 'the almost impossible burden he is carrying practically 
alone', he was mindful of [the prime minister's] reservations about the need for an 
Imperial War Cabinet. 12" Before officially advising the DO that he would be unable to 
come to London, in his usual insightful manner, Smuts also suggested that Waterson 
would be well advised to 'be careful about Bruce perhaps starting an episode in 
Australia which might prove embarrassing to [Menzies]'. t25 
With the reminder that 'it would be difficult to press Mr Mackenzie King to come 
against his will, if General Smuts is in any case unable to attend', Cranborne was now 
in a position to ask Churchill formally whether the conference could continue or not. '26 
121 Cranborne to Churchill, 5 June 1941, D035/1009/446/1121 
" Churchill to Smuts, 13 June 1941, PREM4/43A/16; Waterson to Smuts, 11 June 1941, Waterson 
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'Z' Duncan to Smuts, 15 June 1941, Duncan Papers 
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Having been given an unimpeachable excuse ' the prime minister finally felt able to 
support his Secretary of State, surely the result he had wished for all along. Indeed he 
now even went so far as to advise against extending an invitation to Menzies alone to 
return to London. 'Z' Churchill's private secretary, something of an advocate of the 
Australian leader's qualities, was therefore left to advise the DO the next day that 
Mackenzie King's and Smuts' inability to travel would soon be publicly announced 
making it 'not seem possible therefore to have much of a conference'. 128 
There was however still one potentially serious problem threatening what had proven 
an otherwise successful strategy. Cranborne advised Churchill that the discussions 
with Smuts and the Canadian leader had been of a private character, warning that as 
such 'it might be embarrassing for them to have a blunt announcement made that they 
are unable to come' . 
12' A telegram was duly despatched to Ottawa and the other 
Dominion capitals. This informed the various prime ministers that, in light of the public 
interest which the issue had aroused, Churchill urgently needed to make a statement 
on the matter. It went on to advise them of what it was intended to say in light of 
what had been received from certain of them. 130 
Almost immediately this had been done, it was clear that the DO had been right to 
maintain its cautious approach. Faced by growing domestic hostility about what was 
perceived as an apparent lack of enthusiasm for travelling to London, Mackenzie King 
had been upset by the language proposed to explain his absence. 13' So aggrieved was 
he that he requested some mention be made of the entirely different nature of the 
current war as opposed to the last, this in his view being the determining factor which 
made a conference unnecessary. 132 Churchill did not however feel able to go in to too 
many details, preferring to merely point to the inability of the Dominion leaders to 
. Z. Ibid., Churchill to Cranborne, 17 June 1941 
128 Colville to Garner, 18 June 1941, D035/999/8/2; see Colville, Winston Churchill and His Inner 
Circle, pp. 174-175 
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attend. Doing otherwise might well have accentuated the continuing domestic debate 
and, as it stood, the version of events he had offered neatly placed elsewhere the onus 
of responsibility for the decision not to proceed. In fact the only concession he was 
willing to make was to offer an entirely private endorsement to his Canadian 
counterpart that he had been correct to question the need for a meeting at this stage. 
Indeed although the British leader thought it would eventually need to take place, a 
meeting would probably not be possible until some much later stage of the war, as 
was ultimately the case with the May 1944 London prime minister's conference. '33 
In the last week of June 1941 the culmination of this extended passage of events took 
place. Despite the continuing failures in North Africa, Churchill was able to stand 
before the House of Commons and explain how, having been invited, 'the exigencies of 
their work in their respective countries' made it impossible for the various Dominion 
prime ministers to visit London. 134 If further explanation was needed he was happy to 
develop his statement hoping his colleagues would understand that his counterparts 'of 
important and powerful Governments with their legislatures and the whole war effort 
of their peoples to guide, find great difficulties in meeting here simultaneously'. With 
the explanation duly delivered and the launching of the German attack against Russia, 
he must now have believed that the Imperial conference proposal would be allowed to 
fall into abeyance. Although already of the opinion that 'if there was not a war on, we 
would have a hell of a row', Waterson for one recognised just how marginalised the 
Dominions' position had become. 135 With Cranborne once more struck down by illness, 
prohibiting his involvement in official government business, their collective status and 
representation in London had reached a new nadir. One last confrontation with 
Canberra and the increasingly isolated Menzies still however remained to be resolved. 
Menzies' Final Challenge 
Following his somewhat unexpected despatch to Canada, Malcolm MacDonald had lost 
little time in providing the DO with as much information about Canadian affairs as he 
133 Ibid., Churchill to Mackenzie King, 23 June 1941 
"" Ibid., Statement to the House of Commons by Churchill, 24 June 1941 
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could. 1' On the first day of August 1941 he sent Cranborne three lengthy, confidential 
memoranda which he had spent much of the previous month composing. So sensitive 
did he feel these to be that he attached to them a strong plea not to pass on anything 
that might upset Churchill. This he urged because 'his position in the Dominions is 
tremendously strong and it would be a minor disaster if a quarrel sprang up between 
him and one or more of the Dominion Prime Ministers (sicl'. 137 The warning was 
prescient as each note dealt with potentially controversial subjects; although the third 
of them still remains unavailable for inspection because of its references to Menzies' 
activities in Ireland, the other two make for interesting reading. 138 
The focus of the first was the then prevailing political situation in Canada and it made 
it clear that Churchill's June statement to the House of Commons, in which he 
announced that Mackenzie King could not visit London, had not been well-received in 
Ottawa. Indeed despite MacDonald's assertion that the Canadian leader 'admired [him] 
enormously', there were those in the Canadian cabinet who had subsequently 
described Churchill as 'a cad' for the manner in which he had spoken. In the draft of 
his memoirs, the British High Commissioner later asserted that, in his view, Churchill 
generally regarded his Canadian counterpart as 'a pygmy [and] with a touch of 
contempt'. 13' At this particular juncture however he made no comment, instead 
preferring to stress to Cranborne that it was essential Mackenzie King was 'handled 
extremely well'. 
This was in no small part because the latter had finally bowed to calls that he come to 
London and the planning for this first wartime visit was now well-advanced, it being 
scheduled for late August. This decision had not been made until after he had rejected 
the proposals contained within a telegram which Menzies had sent in mid-July 1941 to 
both Mackenzie King and Smuts. The subject of the second note, in the telegram the 
Australian prime minister had privately outlined his concerns about the manner in 
which the war was being run from London, specifically referring to the need which he 
16 MacDonald to Cranborne, 18 May 1941, MacDonald Papers 
MacDonald to Cranborne, 1 August 1941, DO121/68 
18 Ibid., `Note No. 2', MacDonald to Cranborne, 1 August 1941; `Note No. 1', MacDonald to 
Cranborne, 1 August 1941 
"9 Draft Memoirs, date unknown, MacDonald Papers (121/10/10); ibid., `Note No. F, 1 August 1941 
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believed existed for some form of Dominion representation in the British War Cabinet. 
MacDonald had apparently urged the Canadian leader to attend the proposed gathering 
in London, confiding to him that both he and Halifax were intent on travelling back to 
Britain, an idea subsequently blocked by Churchill, but Mackenzie King was 
unconvinced. 'ao 
After a month spent reflecting upon the idea, it was once again rejected by the Ottawa 
government. According to the British High Commissioner this was because, aside from 
his already much-avowed support for the existing system, the Canadian prime minister 
'disliked this attempt to drag him in as an aid to the realisation of Mr Menzies' personal 
ambitions'. 141 What had finally undermined MacDonald's efforts was Churchill's 
departure by Royal Navy battleship for his first conference with President Franklin 
Roosevelt, held off the coast of Newfoundland. "" With no desire to be accompanied 
by his Canadian counterpart, the British prime minister had deliberately kept details of 
his mission vague, only telling them he was going at all because of Sir Edward Bridges' 
pleas. '43 
For Cranborne all of this information and analysis that had been supplied by MacDonald 
was invaluable, the knowledge that Mackenzie King intended to delay his arrival in 
London until after Churchill's return being particularly significant. This was because it 
gave the DO an opportunity to settle on a strategy for dealing with what the Secretary 
of State recognised to be a final effort by Menzies to gain a permanent position in the 
War Cabinet. 1' As he explained to his colleague, the material from Ottawa confirmed 
the conversation he had himself had with the Australian leader back in May. This 
discussion had first hardened his attitude particularly when Menzies had made the 
extent of his ambitions quite obvious. Indeed he has freely told Cranborne, one of 
"' Diary, 16 July 1941, Mackenzie King Papers; Garner to Martin, 14 July 1941, Chartwell Papers 
(CHAR20/27/36); ibid., Churchill to Cranborne, 18 July 1941 (CHAR20/27/38) 
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Churchill's ministers and friends, that 'if necessary he would give up the prime 
ministership of Australia and after the war enter British politics with a view ... of 
becoming the leader of the Conservative Party'. It was little surprise therefore that this 
scheme to supplant the British leader infuriated the Secretary of State who roundly 
condemned Menzies for a 'not very pretty role' motivated 'to a considerable extent by 
personal motives'. 
With 'The Times' claiming that Australian politicians were 'not so foolish as to think 
that their leaders can direct the war effort more fruitfully than the leaders of Britain', 
Menzies now appeared increasingly desperate to be invited back to London. So much 
so that he asked Bruce to 'have a confidential chat with Beaverbrook' to assess his 
prospects. 145 Despite Cranborne's fears and his absence from London, Churchill was 
fully aware however of all of that was happening. 146 Indeed in his terse reply to an 
enquiry from the War Cabinet in London, which had again debated the matter, about 
the renewed possibility of holding a meeting of Dominion prime ministers, he made it 
only too clear that he was not about to let Menzies profit from the situation. ' 47 Peter 
Fraser, the New Zealand leader, was already paying a visit to London to meet the 
British government, Smuts was in Cairo and Mackenzie King was due in Britain before 
the month's end, but in replying to his deputy, Clement Attlee, Churchill categorically 
dismissed the idea. He also took the opportunity to mention his amazement over why 
his colleagues would 'think why we should be justified in summoning [Menzies] half 
way round the world by air for only three or four days conference'. 148 
The DO meanwhile continued to do all that it could to support the prime minister's firm 
stance. At the same time although perhaps reluctant to tell Churchill the extent of 
Menzies' intrigues, the Dominions Secretary appears now to have become reconciled to 
discussing the scheme with his close colleagues. This was apparent in a minute he 
sent to Eden in mid-August, one of the so-called 'Yes-Men' whom Menzies had so 
ias The Times, 13 August 1941, Liddell Hart Papers; Menzies to Bruce, 8 August 1941 in W. J. Hudson 
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indiscreetly referred to on numerous occasions. 19 Having been earlier sounded out by 
Cranborne as to his thoughts, the potential constitutional problems that any move to 
include Menzies in the War Cabinet might entail were now highlighted. 150 It was also 
made quite clear that the Australian leader's motivation had little to do with just 
support of Imperial interests. Eden was clearly concerned by what he heard, his 
secretary Oliver Harvey noting his particular worries about Menzies' potential return to 
London and a likely attempt 'to [try and] get into English politics via the War 
Cabinet'. 151 
Following the conclusion of his meeting with Roosevelt and his return to London, one 
of Churchill's first acts was to despatch a telegram to Canberra. 152 In it he made it 
unmistakably clear to Menzies that, were he to decide to visit London once again, he 
would only be permitted to attend the War Cabinet in the same manner as with his 
earlier visit. And in so doing this privilege would only be extended to him so long as he 
remained as Australian leader. This final point perhaps reflected the degree to which 
Menzies' increasingly tenuous hold over his political position in Canberra had become 
common knowledge. 153 Now a subject of widespread debate in Whitehall, common 
agreement amongst some of the 'Yes-Men' held that he only had himself to blame. 154 
With events in the Australian capital moving towards their conclusion, Mackenzie King 
was arriving in London. As MacDonald had once again taken the opportunity to point 
out to Cranborne just days before, the Canadian prime minister had been consistently 
supportive of his British counterpart throughout the long-running affair. 15' The High 
Commissioner in Ottawa hoped his Secretary of State would be sure to mention this 
loyalty to Churchill if the opportunity arose. Although oblivious to this dialogue taking 
149 Diary, 14 April 1941, Menzies Papers; Diary, 17 April 1941, Pearson Papers; Diary, 1 May 1941, 
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place between Ottawa and London, Mackenzie King saw in his visit to London an 
opportunity to discuss Menzies' proposals in person with one of his Dominion 
colleagues, the New Zealand prime minister Peter Fraser. 
Described by the High Commissioner in Wellington as 'outwardly dour and of 
combative experience [but] really shy and modest underneath', Fraser had in fact 
remained in Britain purposely to meet Mackenzie King. 158 Now speaking privately to his 
Canadian counterpart he made it quite clear that he felt it would be inappropriate 'to 
give the impression that people here can't do the job'. 15" Having been to a number of 
War Cabinet meetings, he told Mackenzie King he had found them to involve 'the 
freest and frankest discussion and expression of view'. 158 Not only did he therefore 
disagree with Menzies arguments, he was adamant that there was 'no need for an 
Imperial Conference', a view he also shared with Attlee. Smuts had meanwhile been in 
touch with Churchill again, championing the merits of the commonwealth system. He 
once more argued that 'by its decentralisation, it was well situated for waging war' 
and where 'diffused leadership in all parts is blessing rather than a handicap'. 15' With 
this message there was now confirmation that three of the four Dominion prime 
ministers agreed with the British prime minister that no justification existed for calling a 
conference at this stage. 160 
Menzies had however left himself with little option other than to press forward. And 
with a marked deterioration in relations with Japan, he had finally managed to secure 
support from his cabinet colleagues that he should return to London to seek some form 
of Dominion representation in the British War Cabinet-16' But as he did so Mackenzie 
King and Churchill were moving closer and closer to one another, the Canadian 
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reassuring his host that 'we [in Canada] were more in sympathy with the views of the 
UK government than we were for example with the views of Australia'. 18' This 
sentiment was strongly agreed with by Massey who, during recent months, had 
somewhat assiduously kept himself at a distance from the conspiracies of certain of his 
fellow High Commissioners'. 163 Attending a luncheon given in Mackenzie King's 
honour, he afterwards noted that the on-going controversy had been 'an entirely false 
issue.. . only really promoted by those who want to use it as a means to reorganise the 
War Cabinet here'. 184 Later he would record how glad he was that it had been his 
prime minister who had 'given the quietus to the ill-thought out proposal... which has 
been marked by such woolly thinking'. 765 Indeed so good were relations between the 
two leaders that Mackenzie King felt he 'would [not] be betraying any trust but rather 
doing my duty' in orally sharing the private memorandum that Menzies had sent him 
some five weeks before. 16' Only later would he ask that his part not be recorded 
formally as he didn't want Menzies 'to think I had not been square with him'. ` 
With the Australian leaders' plans blocked in London the outlook for him seemed 
hopeless and the untenable nature of his situation was, in fact, soon fully 
demonstrated. Although he had the backing of his cabinet for his plans, the influential 
Advisory War Council was less enamoured and with an even division in the House of 
Representatives, his detractors in the opposition were able to reject his last pleas to be 
allowed to travel back to London. '68 According to Cross 'Ministers [had] desired to part 
with him on various grounds, including bitter personal enmities, ambitions of would be 
successors, Menzies' alleged lack of capacity for decision and action, and his lack of 
popular appeal'. 169 When he had been sworn into office in April 1939 Menzies had 
expected his government to last for only six weeks. But in the crucible of domestic 
162 Diary, 22 August 1941, Mackenzie King Papers 
163 WHC, 22 August 1941, DO121/11 
164 Diary, 22 August 1941, Massey Papers 
165 Massey to Pearson, 12 September 1941, Pearson Papers 
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politics, with the media constantly challenging' his abilities, his opponents could now 
no longer be silenced and the Australian prime minister was finally forced to resign. 170 
Although he remained privately 'quite outspoken about Menzies' zeal to get to London 
instead of staying with his own people', in front of his colleagues and with the 
challenge at an end, Churchill was now somewhat less angry. He quickly contacted his 
former adversary, now reduced to the role of Minister for Coordination of Defence, to 
offer his thanks 'for the courage you showed and the help you gave ... during these two 
terrible years'. "' About the Australian High Commissioner on the other hand, whose 
fellow South African agitator was already preparing to recant some of his previous 
errors to Smuts, he was less generous. Bruce was 'an able fellow but a troublesome 
sort', an indication of the degree to which Churchill may have felt some of Menzies' 
resolve had originated in London. 172 There were however few doubts though about the 
heartfelt thanks that Mackenzie King received from Churchill for his assistance upon his 
eventual return to Ottawa. 173 
The Canadian prime minister was not the only person to emerge from the episode with 
his reputation enhanced. From early May onwards when he had first learnt of the full 
extent of Menzies' ambitions, Cranborne had maintained a scrupulously supportive 
stance of his prime minister. Irrespective of whether this had actually improved his 
somewhat damaged relationship with Churchill or not, it is clear that the Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs had not viewed this episode as an opportunity to 'mend 
fences'. Instead, more than anything, he was just glad to see an end to it writing to a 
close Whitehall friend on the last day of August that it was better that the threat from 
Menzies had been removed. The Australian had made 'more of a hash of things than 
one would have thought possible' but throughout the summer months his 'intriguing 
[had been] a constant danger'. 174 It is likely that Cranborne would have been even 
""See Menzies, Afternoon Light (London: 1967), pp. 14,52-54; Martin, Menzies, pp. 373-378 
"' Churchill to Menzies, 29 August 1941, D0121/19 
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more appreciative of the outcome if he had known the degree to which his father had 
been involved in the intriguing. The elderly Lord Salisbury had attended at least one 
meeting with Hankey earlier in the summer where he had agreed that Menzies 'would 
be useful'. "" 
Within the DO anxiety was however fixed on how the department should proceed if 
the new prime minister in Canberra demanded the right to send a minister to sit in the 
War Cabinet. This was 'an obviously impossible proposition', even to Dominion 
observers in London. 1' And it is transpired the Office would not have to wait long for 
an answer. 
"'Diary, 6 June 1941, Hankey Papers 
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Calm Before the Storm?: The Fadden 'Rump' Government 
In terms of Australia's domestic affairs, the period immediately prior to Robert Menzies' 
enforced departure from the centre of political life was a tempestuous one. Arriving 
back in Canberra in late May 1941, the Australian leader soon found himself facing 
immense pressure over the situation which had developed in the Middle East. During 
his visit to the UK, the DO had attempted to keep him as fully informed as possible. 
But the news just days after his return that Crete had finally fallen with the surrender 
of thousands of Australian, New Zealand and British troops, left Menzies looking 'about 
as happy as a sailor on a horse'. ' Also aware that the 9`h Australian Division was 
surrounded in the North African port of Tobruk, his mood would not have been helped 
by reports that insufficient logistics support had been provided to Australia's forces 
throughout Operation LUSTRE. This claim had also been reported in the country's 
media along with the assessment that it had significantly contributed to the operation's 
eventual defeat, greatly embittering Australian public opinion. ' It was perhaps hardly 
surprising therefore that, following the completion of the Syrian campaign in late July 
1941, the Australian government requested that its remaining troops in the Middle East 
be brought together to operate as one force. ' Seeing to it that this happened and 
securing Britain's agreement that an Australian ministerial representative be allowed to 
attend the War Cabinet, were therefore the two key tests for Menzies' successor. ' 
It was as a compromise candidate that, in October 1940, Arthur Fadden had been 
appointed to become leader of the Country Party. As a result he had been made 
Treasurer in Menzies' coalition government and ultimately, during his colleague's 
London visit earlier in 1941, acting prime minister. In the view of Ronald Cross, the 
British High Commissioner, 'you couldn't meet a better chap in a bar [than 
Fadden]... streams of rollicking smut... good-natured, shrewd, likeable [and] means 
' Cranborne to Churchill, 22 April 1941, PREM3/206/1-3; see Sir Arthur Fadden, They Called Me 
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2 See Day, The Great Betrayal, pp. 153-155; David Homer, High Command. Australia's Struggle for 
an Independent War Strategy, 1939-1945 (Sydney: 1992) pp. 100-113; Halifax to FO, 12 June 1941, 
F0371/27575 
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well'. 5 To many of his political colleagues he was in fact a natural choice for leader, 
regarded as a much safer and more popular individual to lead than the incumbent. 
There is even some suggestion that he might have encouraged this view, working at 
the head of the Canberra-based conspiracy which helped bring about Menzies' eventual 
downfall. ' 
Whilst he may have liked him on a personal basis, on a professional level Cross 
however warned his colleagues in the DO that Australia's new leader had 'hardly any 
real thoughts of his own'. ' Fadden also faced a parliamentary that refused to form a 
'national'- government and was clearly restless for further change. Indeed, with the 
new government entirely dependent on the support of two Independent MPs, like its 
predecessor, the forthcoming Budget debate which had to be concluded in September 
1941 seemed to offer every opportunity for the Labour Party to challenge for power. 8 
With such frailty it was surely little surprise that many contemporary observers saw 
the new administration as, at best, a stopgap measure, the common held view being 
that it would only be 'a matter of time before the Government would be in Curtin's 
hands'. ' 
Despite the obvious weakness of his position, Fadden nonetheless lost little time in 
tackling relations with Britain. His High Commissioner in London had already advised 
him that the government there were opposed to the admission of anybody, other than 
a prime minister, into the War Cabinet and he had suggested that the matter be 
dropped. t° Fadden's first act though was to inform Churchill that he wished to send an 
Australian minister on a special mission to argue his country's point of view. " Britain's 
leader had apparently anticipated such a move once it had become clear that a change 
' Cross to Cranborne, 20 January 1942, Emrys-Evans Papers 
6 See Martin, Menzies, pp. 364-365 
'Cross to Cranborne, 20 January 1942, Emrys-Evans Papers 
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in leadership in Canberra was imminent, and he had begun drafting a lengthy response 
well in advance. 'Z Although the DO had little input in its preparation, this carried the 
department's full support. First congratulating the new Australian leader on his 
appointment, it then went on to repeat what had previously been said to Menzies. 13 
Each of the Dominions had already been asked to register their views on the subject 
and, aside from Australia, all had replied that they did 'not desire... representation [and 
were] well content with present arrangements'. As far as Churchill was concerned 
therefore, he was happy for Fadden to send anybody he wished as a 'special envoy'. 
This visitor would be treated with 'utmost consideration and honour', however, they 
would have no special access to the War Cabinet. 
Even according to one of the Dominions' representatives in London, who had himself 
previously agitated for greater representation, this was now entirely the right line to 
adopt. The South African High Commissioner had come to believe that anybody other 
than a Dominions prime minister would find participation in the War Cabinet 'not only 
useless but embarrassing since [it] is an executive body and cannot wait whilst a 
member refers things to another body for instructions'. 14 Although not entirely certain 
about the merits of 'the British PM telling the Australian PM where to get off', 
Waterson therefore hoped that Fadden would take Churchill's comments in the 'right 
spirit'. 15 He nonetheless privately urged his own prime minister to consider making 
'tactful representations' to his new Australian counterpart to stop 'rocking the boat'. 16 
Smuts was reluctant to intervene however, believing that Mackenzie King, who was 
still in London, would be far better placed to 'forestall the trouble' of potentially 
'awkward constitutional questions'. 
Whilst this discussion was going on Churchill had followed up on his earlier stiffly 
worded message to Fadden with a much more restrained dispatch. In it he attempted 
again to reassure the Australian government with the promise that Britain 'would never 
'2 Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 211 
13 Churchill to Fadden, 29 August 1941, PREM4/50/4A 
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let you down if real danger comes'. " This appeared to have some helpful effect as, in 
response, Fadden offered the barest suggestion of an apology. Indeed his explanation 
for the earlier confrontational telegram was that 'when a threat comes closely home, 
local security is the predominant thought in people's minds'. 1' If this was an attempt at 
developing a more conciliatory line, however, it did not last long. The following day, 
Australia's new leader once more returned to his earlier position and, for support, he 
now highlighted discussions which had taken place during the 1937 Imperial 
Conference, in so doing effectively issuing an ultimatum to London. 19 Although neither 
the Union of South Africa nor Canada had endorsed it, the Australian delegates at the 
meeting four years before apparently thought they had secured a firm commitment 
from the Committee of Imperial Defence. This was that, in wartime, Dominion 
representation at the heart of the Empire would be broadened to offer them a greater 
say. Although appreciative of the efforts made by the Dominions' Secretary, the 
authorities in Canberra were now prepared to attempt to apply this interpretation as 
liberally as possible. The British government was therefore warned that the point had 
come where 'direct consultation on higher questions is a better method than dealing 
through a third party who is not a member of the War Cabinet'. 
With his knowledge of the wider Dominion outlook on the matter, Cranborne's views 
on the subject remained much as they had been throughout Menzies' summer 
intrigues. Indeed, following Fadden's first telegram, he had thought that the Australian 
government should be encouraged to say that they were 'sending an envoy on a visit 
of exploration and enquiry with regard to subjects of special interest to Australia'. 20 
This suggestion would be as opposed to the authorities in London issuing a more 
definite invitation. Although he chose not to share this analysis with Churchill, he had 
made similar views clear enough during the previous summer months. A new message 
from the Australian leader entirely changed the situation, forcing the Secretary of State 
to produce a lengthy assessment. 2' 
"Churchill to Fadden, 31 August 1941, DAFP V 
'a Fadden to Churchill, 4 September 1941, D035/1010/476/3/30 
19 Fadden to Churchill, 5 September 1941, D035/999/8/15 
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According to Cranborne, whilst it would have been more convenient if the authorities 
in Canberra had chosen to adopt the same attitude as the other Dominion 
governments, they had not, and the British War Cabinet was now faced with a 
potentially far-reaching question. Simply put this was whether 'constitutional niceties 
or considerations of political convenience [could] override the fundamental strength of 
[Australia's] claim'. To reject such a request would 'leave a sense of rankling injustice' 
which might affect the Australian war effort and, worse, 'could endure long after the 
war is over and poison the relations between the two countries'. Reluctantly therefore, 
and with the acknowledgement that both the two previous Australian leaders had 
deliberately pushed Whitehall into a corner, Cranborne could only recommend that 
Fadden's modified proposal be accepted. 
As might have been expected, given previous instances involving an ultimatum, 
Churchill quickly became angered and even perhaps a little flustered, his reply revealing 
an ignorance of the new Australian prime minister's name. 22 But whilst Fadden had 
crassly misread the mood in London, an irate Churchill nonetheless appeared to fully 
grasp the need 'to treat these people, who are politically embarrassed but. .. sending a 
splendid army into the field, with the utmost consideration'. He therefore authorised 
that the necessary arrangements be made to receive Sir Earle Page, the former leader 
of the Country Party, who had already unanimously been selected by the Australian 
cabinet to be the first visiting representative. 23 It was clearly stipulated, however, that 
his involvement in discussions in the British War Cabinet would be restricted solely to 
those matters which concerned Australian interests. 
In the DO, where it was generally agreed that this was the best course to follow, the 
decision was greeted with much apparent relief. There was also an agreement not to 
tell either Bruce at Australia House or Cross in Canberra as to the department's exact 
position. 24 This was because the relevant documents dating from 1937 had been 
ZZ Churchill to Cranborne, 6 September 1941, PREM4/50/5 
Z' `[Page] was no polished Bruce. He was a country doctor, who, having made good in Macquarie 
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examined leading to an internal review of the' accuracy of the Australian argument. 
Indeed it was in fact clear that discussions which had taken place then had gone no 
further than raise the possibility of the 'reconsideration' of the Imperial War Conference 
and Cabinets constituted during the First World War. 25 Australian arguments were 
clearly therefore based on an entirely inaccurate premise. As the matter appeared to 
have been resolved for now it was felt it would be best to move on and welcome Page 
in order to 'satisfy Mr Fadden and Australian public opinion'. 26 The prime minister in 
Canberra had therefore successfully secured his first objective. His second still 
remained outstanding. 27 
Following another approach by Menzies in August 1941, Churchill had signalled that he 
had few real objections to seeing Australian forces combined together. He reiterated 
however that he would be extremely loathe to allow any movements which affected 
the garrison at Tobruk. 28 The importance of the town lay in the fact that, apart from 
the much smaller facilities at Benghazi, it represented the only satisfactory port along a 
thousand miles of North African coastline. In April 1941, an unanticipated German 
advance into Cyrenaica had isolated the 9th Australian Division, the 18" Brigade of the 
7th Australian Division and some British troops. This remained the case throughout the 
summer despite the best efforts of General Thomas Blarney, the GOC Australian 
Imperial Forces (Middle East). Having been appointed as Deputy Commander-in Chief 
Middle East at the end of April 1941, the agenda he subsequently pursued was to 
secure greater access to information and bring about the aggregation of Australian 
forces within the region. 29 His claims that his troops in Tobruk were no longer 
medically capable of defending the town and should therefore be replaced was 
however somewhat dubious in substance. 30 
25 Minute by Stephenson, 8 September 1941, D035/999/8/13 
26 Cranborne to Machtig, 10 September 1941, D035/999/4 
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The appointment as prime minister of Fadden promised -Blarney the prospect of greater 
success. Fadden at once informed his governmental colleagues that little action had 
been taken to resolve the poor situation in Tobruk and, as it had been highlighted by a 
senior Australian military figure in the Middle East, he intended to resolve the matter. 31 
Doing little more than expand upon some of Menzies' earlier comments, Fadden 
therefore advised Churchill that he wished to announce the withdrawal had been 
completed by mid-September. He also offered a warning to London of the 
consequences of inaction and 'any catastrophe occur[ing] to the Tobruk garrison' in 
the meantime. 32 With his belief that 'Australia would not tolerate anything shabby' and 
'play the game if the facts are put squarely in front of them', the British prime minister 
agreed to the move. 33 But the condition was made that any withdrawal would only 
follow confirmation from his commander on the ground that this would not hamper his 
operations, and this was not forthcoming. Indeed it was reported to Churchill that, 
aside from Blarney, there was agreement from every other military figure who had been 
approached. This included General Sir Claude Auchinleck who, in July 1941, had 
succeeded General Sir Archibald Wavell as Commander-in-Chief Middle East. As far as 
he was concerned to 'attempt any further relief of Tobruk garrison, however desirable 
it may be politically, is not a justifiable military operation'. 34 
Oliver Lyttelton, who had been appointed as Minister of State in the Middle East also 
at the end of June 1941, was even more forthright in his rejection of the request. 35 His 
advice to the War Cabinet was that no British commander would have considered the 
idea of relief, the reason for Australian insistence being the anxiety of the authorities in 
Canberra 'to take out a political insurance policy'. 36 Similar sentiments were also 
31 See Sebastian Cox, `The Difference between White and Black': Churchill, Imperial Politics and 
Intelligence before the 1941 Crusader Offensive', Intelligence and National Security, Volume 9, 
Number 3 (July 1994), pp. 413-415 
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shared by, amongst others, Eden and his private secretary. "' Already somewhat wary 
of 'the miserable Australians', Cranborne also appeared to concur. This was most 
apparent in a warning offered to his Cabinet colleagues of a growing feeling in 
Canberra's political circles, stimulated by the domestic media, that the country's troops 
were bearing the brunt of the fighting in North Africa. 38 
With this discussion and the backing of various technical arguments, such as the lack 
of moonless periods in the coming weeks, Churchill therefore approached Fadden again 
asking him to once more reconsider. At the same time it was confirmed that if still 
insisted upon, the garrison would be withdrawn 'irrespective of the cost entailed and 
the injury to future prospects'. 39 The Australian leader could not be swayed, however, 
and, despite Churchill's 'flowery phrases', his cabinet found London's case against 
withdrawal 'unconvincing'. 40 Upon hearing this news the British leader at once 
contacted his ministerial colleague in Cairo telling him how 'astounded' he was by the 
continuing intransigence. He also asked Cranborne to contact Cross and advise him to 
refuse discussion of Tobruk and avoid any personal reproaches. "' Only after further 
reflection and with the general military situation dominating his thoughts was Churchill 
willing to make allowances 'for a government with a majority only of one faced by a 
bitter opposition'. 
Auchinleck on the other hand remained greatly upset by the decision to accept 
Australian demands and he appears to have been entirely embittered by Blarney's 
attitude. So much so in fact that it was only with some apparent difficulty that he was 
persuaded not to resign. The prime minister only managed to do this by pointing out 
that 'any public controversy would injure foundations of Empire and be disastrous to 
our general war position'. With this threat from one of his senior generals in mind, 
Churchill decided to embark upon one final effort to try and persuade the Canberra 
"R. James (ed. ), Victor Cazalet (London: 1976), p. 264; Diary, 15 September 1941, Harvey Papers 
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government to allow its last two brigades to remain in Tobruk. Despite being told about 
Auchinleck's near-resignation, this effort once again proved unsuccessful. `' Indeed, 
Fadden was even more adamant in his refusal to waiver, leaving the British government 
with little option other than to acquiesce. 
According to a somewhat unrealistic DO assessment, made near the war's end, this 
conclusion to the episode caused 'a great deal of fuss' and left many Australians 
'feeling rather ashamed'. "' There is little evidence to support such a view as, in 
October 1941, attention in Canberra was predominantly concerned with Fadden's 
future political prospects. Indeed following the prime minister's failure to secure 
support for his Budget proposal, the fragile nature of his government was only too 
apparet. His decision to resign, a mere six weeks after he had taken power, therefore 
came as no real surprise. 44 With the UAP no longer able to govern, the Governor- 
General looked to the Labour Party, which had won by far the most seats in the 
September 1940 general election, inviting John Curtin to form a new government. 
The Curtin Government and British Policy in the Far East 
Despite having been out of power for ten years, in sitting on the opposition benches 
and, later, participating in the Advisory Council, the Labour Party had managed to 
retain a considerable presence in Australian politics. The manner in which it had 
conducted itself since the outbreak of war, however, meant that there were some 
concerns within the DO about the new government's calibre. "' Cranborne had himself 
lamented, earlier in 1941, that these were 'men who were entirely isolationist in their 
view and thought of nothing but the protection of Australia'. 46 Certainly Curtin himself 
had been quoted in the British press back in August 1939 as being entirely opposed to 
the idea of Australian involvement in a European war and the sending of troops 
'Z Churchill to Fadden, 29 September 1941, PREM3/63/2; ibid., Fadden to Churchill, 4 October 1941 
Minute by Pugh, 25 July 1945, DO35/1767/944/3 
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175 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
The Approach of the Pacific War and the 'Inexcusable Betrayal' 
overseas. "' The prospects for a period of easier Anglo-Dominion relations were not 
therefore good for a department which, after the trials imposed upon it during the 
summer months, remained busier than ever despite now being nearly twice its pre-war 
size. 48 
In early July 1941 a long insight into how the DO was faring had been sent to 
Batterbee in New Zealand by his former deputy who had recently returned to London. 49 
According to Geoffrey Shannon, Machtig was 'very cheerful and chubby and since his 
marriage wearing a carnation every day', Stephenson had 'aged more than most people 
but remains imperturbable', whilst Liesching was 'as vigorous as ever'. Stephenson's 
physical decline was at least in part attributable to a developing gastric ulcer which 
hospitalised him for two months in September, placing an even greater burden on the 
apparently uncomplaining Liesching. 5° The department's ability to function effectively 
with this reduced manpower was soon to find itself even more fully tested. 
At least one report received in London from a visitor to Canberra had suggested that, 
as a parliamentarian, Curtin 'didn't have the brains of Menzies'. 51 Wider opinion though 
was generally less critical of the former journalist and trade union organiser who had 
been jailed briefly for anti-conscription activity during the First World War. 52 Having 
first been obliged by his party colleagues to take a vow to abstain from alcohol, by the 
time Curtin took power in early October 1941 the 55-year old politician had been 
Australia's opposition leader for five years. Writing to the Secretary of State some 
years later however, Cross recounted that the new prime minister 
47 The Times, 25 August 1939, Liddell Hart Papers 
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... had never before held any office in any Government, nor had any of his Ministers 
except Mr Beasley and Mr Forde. As a wartime administration his Cabinet had the further 
defect that only one of them had served in the last war, and he at that time had been a 
Scotsman domiciled in Scotland. I called on him at once [and] found him very watchful, 
so watchful that I was reminded that it was an age old plank of the Labour platform that 
they would 'never toe the Whitehall line'. 53 
That the relationship with London might prove difficult was evident in Curtin's earliest 
act as his country's leader as he responded to yet another request from his British 
counterpart to postpone the final withdrawal of the Australian garrison from Tobruk. 
Although Churchill pointed to the fact that all available resources were needed for the 
imminent Allied operations in North Africa, the authorities in Canberra were still 
adamant that their remaining forces should be brought together. In so doing Curtin's 
almost cursory rejection effectively confirmed that the entire argument over the 
garrison's relief, which had now so poisoned Anglo-Australian relations, was based 
more on political intrigues rather than genuine military considerations. 54 At the same 
time it was clear that the Labour Party appeared to have entered office with few new 
ideas, adopting broadly similar policies to those of its predecessor. Reports to London 
talked of a growing body of opinion within Australia itself that did not think the 
country was 'yet doing all she could'. 55 This in fact continued to be the case up until 
December 1941 and the declaration of war against Japan. 
Something which Curtin did appear to have more forceful views about however was 
Britain's defensive commitments in the Far East, a longstanding subject for discussion 
between London and the Antipodean Dominions. Since 1923 successive Australian and 
New Zealand governments had been reassured by their London-based counterparts that 
the stationing of a Royal Navy fleet at the Singapore Naval Base and the safeguard of 
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ss 'Report by Colonel G. Grimsdale on Visit to Australia', 10-23 October 1941, W0208/2062; see 
Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965 (Cambridge: 1967) pp. 42-49; 
Ross, John Curtin, pp. 222-223 
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that facility ranked only second to the defence of the British Isles themselves. 58 But 
this guarantee had always carried with it a huge caveat, first revealed at the 1911 
Imperial Conference. During the London meetings the Admiralty had complained about 
the Dominions' inability 'to comprehend the true principles of naval policy' and 
reiterated that the situation in the Pacific would always be 'absolutely regulated by 
events in the North Sea'. 57 
By April 1939 increased European tensions meant a variety of previously unanticipated 
questions now had to be considered. One result of this was that at the Pacific Defence 
Conference held in Wellington, only qualified assurances were offered to the Dominions 
that a fleet would still be sent. The following month, in May 1939, a private 
acceptance was reached within the Committee of Imperial Defence that the 'Singapore 
Strategy' was apparently no longer viable. 58 A few weeks later a similar conclusion 
was reached amongst the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee. There was however no 
official indication to the Dominions themselves of this, indeed as far as they were 
concerned the strategy still held good. 59 
The decision of both the Italian and Japanese governments in September 1939 to 
remain as bystanders in the World War and not side militarily with Germany, meant 
that the Royal Navy could, in the short term at least, be deployed mainly in home and 
56 The Review of Imperial Defence and the Far Eastern Appreciation, two major documents produced 
by the British Chiefs of Staff as preparation for the 1937 Imperial Conference, are prime examples of 
this reassurance; see W. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base (London: 
1979) pp. 129-131. See also John McCarthy, `Singapore and Australian Defence, 1921-1942', 
Australian Outlook, Volume 25 (1971), pp. 165-179; Ian Cowman, Dominion or Decline: Anglo- 
American Naval Relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 (Oxford: 1996) pp. 37-39 
s7 'Imperial Naval Policy', Committee of Imperial Defence (Minutes of 123`d Meeting) quoted in 
Donald Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914 (Baltimore: 1965) p. 279 
58 Committee of Imperial Defence (Minutes of 355`" Meeting), 2 May 1939, CAB2/8; Report of the 
Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (53`d Meeting), 20 June 1939, CAB27/625; `Appreciation on the Far 
East', June 1939, CAB104/70; see Raymond Callahan, `The Illusion of Security, Singapore 1919- 
1942', Journal of Contemporary History, Number 9 (April 1974), pp. 77-81; Ovendale, Appeasement 
and the English Speaking World, pp. 243-249 
59 See Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (Australia in the War of 1939-1945: Army Volume 4) 
(Canberra: 1957) pp. 6-12; S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan: Volume 1, The Loss of 
Singapore (London: 1957) pp. ] -22 
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Mediterranean waters. B' This also allowed the British -government to offer renewed 
guarantees to the Dominion delegates who visited London two months later that the 
Far East remained higher on the list of strategic priorities than the Mediterranean. 
Although Australia's representative returned to Canberra with his anxieties apparently 
assuaged by a sympathetic memorandum prepared by the First Lord of the Admiralty, it 
was clear that within the DO concerns remained. 81 Within months it was evident why 
following France's rapid collapse, the subsequent entry of Italy into the war and the 
increasing deterioration of relations with Japan. 
As it had long feared, the outcome of these developments was that the department 
found itself now having to tell the Dominion prime ministers that it was most unlikely 
that a fleet could be spared for the Far East. 62 The DO's own assessment had been 
that such news would be far from well received and the first to duly signal their dismay 
was the New Zealand government. Only after promises that the situation would be 
quickly reviewed should actual hostilities with Japan appear imminent did some of the 
anger subside. 63 Australia's representative in London was not so easily pacified though, 
complaining bitterly to his prime minister about 'the complete reversal of the United 
Kingdom's naval policy in the Far East'. 64 Such was the tone of Bruce's criticism that 
General Sir Hastings Ismay felt obliged to intervene. This he did by forcefully reminding 
the Australian that nobody had foreseen France's collapse which removed both her 
fleet and her naval bases from previous strategic calculations. 
Considering that Churchill was now Britain's leader this was perhaps an odd line for 
Bruce to have adopted. In November 1939 he had privately noted his belief that the 
then First Lord of the Admiralty's wartime strategy would be 
60 Malcolm Murfett, `Living in the Past: A Critical Re-examination of the Singapore Naval Strategy, 
1918-1941', War and Society, Volume 11, Number I (May 1993), pp. 91-93 
61 Diary, 3 November 1939, Lord Bruce's War Files; `Memorandum by the First Lord of the 
Admiralty', 20 November 1939, WP89(39), CAB66/2; Eden to Chamberlain, 18 November 1939, 
F0372/23572 
62 DO to Dominion prime ministers, 13 June 1940, D035/1003/2/1 1/1/1B 
63 New Zealand government to DO, 15 June 1940, DO35/1003/11/4/2; ibid., Machtig to Vice-Admiral 
Phillips, 22 June 1940 
64 Bruce to Menzies, 3 July 1940, Lord Bruce's War Files; Ismay to Bruce, 4 July 1940, DAFP IV 
pp. 13-15; see Dixon Memoirs, Batterbee Papers (Box 20/5) 
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... to win... in the European theatre with a' full concentration of our forces and not 
dissipate them by trying to deal with the situation in the Far East at the same time. His 
view would be that having won the war in the western theatre we could then 
concentrate the whole of what would probably be, unless we had suffered a major naval 
disaster, our overwhelming forces upon restoring the situation in the Far East. 65 
However, little reference was made of the subject by London for many months and 
even then it was made in the vaguest terms. 66 Although Cranborne was acutely aware 
that the situation was not 'very impressive', only in late August 1941 did Churchill 
inform Fadden that the Admiralty was finally thinking about stationing a naval unit in 
the Indian Ocean. 67 Curtin had been pleased to hear this news whilst still in opposition, 
indeed he was fully supportive of the argument that the key role of an Australian 
representative in London was 'to insist on the location of a strong force of capital ships 
east of Suez'. 68 As prime minister he therefore pressed that his British counterpart now 
make good on his earlier promise, urging him to include a modern ship. 89 Despite 
continuing opposition from senior naval figures surrounding him, Churchill agreed, 
informing Curtin towards the end of October 1941 that the RN's latest battleship, the 
Prince of Wales, would join the battlecruiser Repulse. 70 
Although on this occasion the British prime minister agreed, there is no real evidence to 
suggest that his views had changed from two years before when he had stressed to 
Chamberlain that 'on no account must anything which threatens in the Far East divert 
us from the prime objective'. " This represented a significant change from 1923 when 
65 Diary, 20 November 1939, Lord Bruce's War Files 
66 See Murfett, `Living in the Past', pp. 94-95; Callahan, `The Illusion of Security', pp. 82-86 
67 Minute by Cranborne, 25 August 1941, D035/1079/5; Churchill to Fadden, 31 August 1941, DAFP 
V, pp. 92-93 
6e Advisory War Council Minute, 12 September 1941, DAFP V, pp. 106-108 
69 Ibid., Curtin to Cranborne, 16 October 1941, p. 149 
70 Ibid., Churchill to Curtin, 26 October 1941, pp. 153-154 
" Churchill to Chamberlain, 25 March 1939, quoted in A. J. Stockwell, `Imperialism and Nationalism 
in South-East Asia' in Brown and Louis (eds. ), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV; 
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Churchill had argued that to not defend the Pacific Dominions with a Royal Navy Fleet 
would be 'an act of desertion, of abrogation of duty and of ingratitude both cruel and 
fatal'. 72 By November 1939, when he produced his often ambiguous memorandum on 
Australian Naval Defence, he was even more convinced that whilst fighting Nazi 
Germany it would not be possible to make commitments in the Far East. 73 Two years 
later therefore, the main reason for his agreement to now send an albeit limited naval 
force to the Far East was one he consistently applied during the first nineteen months 
of his wartime premiership. This was that the United States would ultimately enter the 
war on the side of the Allies and in likely 'tak[ing] charge in the Far East' send 
supporting vessels. 74 Within the DO the future significance of the US was fully 
recognised by Cranborne who also held that the authorities in Washington were the 
only ones who could threaten Japan. 75 The question perhaps figuring more prominently 
in the Secretary of State's mind, however, was whether the Roosevelt administration 
could be induced to use American strength. 
Cranborne's concern drew heavily upon his knowledge of the problems faced by his 
department when handling the Dominions' relationship with the United States. On the 
one hand there was the New Zealand High Commissioner in London raging about 
'toadying to a power which only acted in accordance with its own selfish and 
commercial interests'. " On the other however was Canada which, even before the 
signing of the Ogdensburg Agreement between Mackenzie King and President 
August 1939, quoted in D. C. Watt, `Churchill and Appeasement', in Blake and Louis (ed. ), Churchill, 
A Major New Assessment, p. 202 
'Z `Singapore and the Empire', 1923, Chartwell Papers (CHARS/338) 
" Minutes of Meeting with Dominion Representatives, 20 November 1939, CAB99/1 
74 For example Winston Churchill, `Singapore - Key to the Pacific', 24 March 1934, Evening 
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1937, Evening Standard (CHAR8/570); WM103(41), 16 October 1941, CAB65/23; Peter Lowe, 
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Roosevelt in August 1940, was recognised within Whitehall, albeit reluctantly in some 
quarters, as enjoying a special relationship with the Washington administration. " 
Generally speaking, as one astute commentator put it just weeks after the outbreak of 
war, the US-Dominions relationship would always be complicated. 7' This was because 
the Dominions were at the same time 'both jealous and contra-wise' admirers of all 
things American. They recognised that securing US support was a prerequisite to 
winning the war and consequently they campaigned hard for closer links. 79 But as they 
were often kept deliberately on the fringes of the discussions that gained momentum 
throughout 1941, they were also initially wary of the longer term implications. 80 One 
example was the proposed Atlantic Charter when the Dominion governments were 
nowhere near fully informed of what was being agreed upon by the British leadership. 8' 
All of this was of course especially embarrassing to the DO, the complaint being 
passed to the WO that 
... so long as the Dominions are kept in the dark, they are apt to misconstrue the reasons 
for our actions. .. and to suspect us of ulterior motives which, apart perhaps from our wish 
to ensure absolute secrecy about future plans and operations, do not exist. 82 
Despite this warning, discussions for the proposed Lend Lease agreement in 1941 
again largely took place without the Dominions. In part this was because the United 
States preferred to deal just with one set of negotiators, but there was also a desire by 
"Anonymous minute, 30 January 1940, F0371/24252; see Fred Pollock, `Roosevelt, the Ogdensburg 
Agreement and the British Fleet: All Done with Mirrors', Diplomatic History, Volume 5 (1981), 
pp. 203-205 
78Minute by Hadow, 17 September 1939, F0371/23963 
79 Harding to DO, 27 May 1940, D035/1003/2/11/1/IB; Menzies to DO, 16 June 1940, 
D035/1003/11/3/3; Batterbee to DO, 18 June 1940, D035/1003/11/4/4; WHC, 6 February 1941, 
DO121/11 
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81 Machtig to Cranborne, 23 August 1941, D035/1002/48/2; Garner to Martin, 29 August 1941, 
DO35/1002/48/3; Attlee to Churchill, 12 August 1941, CAB66/18/13 
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the British government to retain ultimate control of the distribution of loaned 
materials. 83 Although arrangements ultimately improved, the minimal access initially 
given to the newly available equipment left the Dominions angry at the DO for 'not 
pressing their case hard enough'. 84 As Cranborne had campaigned especially hard for 
them to be included, such criticism was unfair. 85 It is however clear that the lack of 
involvement in the first instance ensured that there was a subsequent reluctance to 
demonstrate any great enthusiasm for the Lend Lease scheme. 
At the same time, within both the Office and amongst certain Dominion politicians, 
another view emerged about the possible implications of closer co-operation with the 
US. This was that it would quite likely have potentially onerous consequences for post- 
war economic policy, most obviously because of an almost inevitable attack by the 
American government on Imperial Preference. 86 Despite subsequent criticisms of the 
degree to which he sought to encourage the relationship with the US, even Churchill 
was not entirely blind to this danger and what it would mean for the future of the 
British Empire. But there was little else he felt could be done by this stage of the war. 87 
In the case of the recently appointed government in Canberra, it remained far more 
concerned with the worsening situation in the Far East. 88 As with the case of its 
predecessor, aside from the information it received from the DO its other major source 
remained Richard Casey, Australian Minister in Washington. Anxious for a role outside 
of Australia after Menzies' promotion in early 1939 to become prime minister, the 
following year Casey had resigned as Minister for Supply to take charge of what was 
83 Minute by Pitblado, 25 March 1941, D035/1075/279/67; minute by Pitblado, 30 May 1941, 
D035/1075/279/91 
84 Comment by Pitblado at Treasury meeting, 11 December 1941, D035/1076/1; WHC, 28 October 
1941 
" Machtig to Cranborne, 8 December 1941, D035/1014/5; ibid., Cranborne to Machtig, 8 December 
1941 
86 Anonymous minute, February 1941, D035/1074/279/47; notes by Ashton-Gwatkin (FO) for 
R. A. Butler, April 1941 (Conservative Research Department Papers, Bodleian Library) CRD2/28/2; 
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his country's first foreign diplomatic post. 89 He had since proven a great success in 
Washington establishing excellent contacts who told him, at the end of October 1941, 
that the US State Department believed there to be 'very little chance of the Japanese 
undertaking southward offensive in the near future'. 9° Whilst this kind of material was 
eagerly received, the Curtin government believed that their soon-to-arrive 
representative in London would help keep them much better informed of developments. 
This optimism would, however, prove to be largely misplaced. 
The Earle Page Mission and the Worsening Crisis 
Having travelled via the Dutch East Indies, Page had been in Singapore when the 
Fadden government finally fell, attending a conference at which defence measures for 
the Far East region were the main subject of discussion. Despite the change of 
government Curtin asked him to continue with his journey, and Australia's 
representative eventually reached Britain by way of the Philippines, the United States 
and Canada. This choice of route meant that he would not attend his first War Cabinet 
meeting until the last week of October. By the time this happened Mackenzie King had 
already cabled the British leader to reassure him about Page, whom he had entertained 
in Ottawa. The Canadian believed his guest only to be interested in the situation in the 
Far East and he had 'no thoughts of urging any kind of an Imperial War Cabinet or 
representation of Australia in the War Cabinet'. 91 
Information such as this was helpful as it still seemed likely in London that problems 
lay ahead. The DO's unofficial historian has described Page's selection as 'an 
unfortunate choice' for, despite his being an elder statesman with considerable 
domestic political experience 
... he had little knowledge of defence or foreign affairs, no experience in diplomacy - he 
was a doctor by profession [who] owned a cattle station and was Minister of Commerce 
89 Whiskard to Inskip, 19 June 1939, D0121/46; see T. B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War 
(London: 1978) pp. 13 7,140-141 
90 Casey to Evatt, 25 October 1941, DAFP V 
" Mackenzie King to Churchill, 25 October 1941, D035/999/8/18 
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when appointed - and lacked the strength of' character required to stand up to Churchill. 
He was genial, but fussy and rather stupid. 92 
Others who had met him in Australia were more complimentary in their depiction of a 
'straight, kindly country gentleman' who was 'a little inclined to stress the obvious at 
some length and without any pause for interruption'. 93 The media in London meanwhile 
preferred to dwell on 'his hearty laugh, which he use[d] remarkably well as an evasive 
instrument when embarrassed by a touchy question'. 94 In official circles there were 
undoubtedly those who considered Page's presence to be distracting and unhelpful. 
This was perhaps a result of the Australian having arrived before the British War 
Cabinet complaining of the poor state of the defences in Singapore and the 
unsatisfactory assistance he had been given during his journey. 95 There was also some 
disquiet amongst the Dominion High Commissioners who, although not entirely certain 
of arrangements, were unhappy about the preferential treatment being afforded to 
Australia. 98 Apparently ignorant of this, Page quickly settled down to address what he 
thought was his principal objective, influencing 'British policy early enough while it was 
still fluid, so that it would bear a definite Australian colour and impress'. "' 
In the first instance this meant trying to obtain an agreement from Churchill to provide 
reinforcements for the Far East, but he was to make little early progress. The official 
response from the British leader remained consistent, that whilst Britain was 'resolute 
to help Australia if she were menaced', Japan was unlikely to invade. 98 Although both 
advising and actively supporting his newly arrived colleague, Bruce proved equally 
unsuccessful. Indeed at this stage he found himself able to do little more than register 
his concerns about the British government's failure to offer any guarantee to the 
'Z Garner, The Commonwealth Office, p. 211 
93 Brooke-Popham to Ismay, 10 October 1941, Brooke-Popham Papers 
Evening News, 28 October 1941, D03 5/999/8/18 
95 See Page, Truant Surgeon, pp. 310-313; Diary, 5 November 1941, Cadogan Papers (Churchill 
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authorities in the Netherlands East Indies. 99 One of the main reasons for this was 
Churchill's continuing commitment to avoid any action that might be seen as not in 
tandem with the United States. Despite Cranborne's impassioned pleas that reticence 
in offering support to the Dutch could produce a 'painful impression', nothing would 
alter the prime minister's stance. 1°° 
Had he known about it, this stubbornness displayed by his old friend would have come 
as no surprise to Smuts. He had recently asked the South African High Commissioner 
in London to provide an assessment he could see and Waterson had duly reported back 
to Pretoria. In his private note he warned his prime minister that the British War 
Cabinet was a formality, 'a cabinet of one who meets his colleagues twice a week and 
informs them of what is to be done'. 1°' This description harked back to Menzies' earlier 
complaints to his Dominion colleagues, during the summer. The difference on this 
occasion though was that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs was now also 
apparently in agreement and willing to challenge the situation. 
In mid-November 1941, Cranborne sent a strongly worded letter to Churchill and a 
copy of it to Eden. 102 Maintaining the line of his earlier complaints, he warned that the 
point had been reached where the 'problems' facing him were 'really beginning to 
interfere with the smooth working of the Dominions Office'. The most serious of these 
was the degree to which he was being excluded from meetings, such as the War 
Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff Committees. The result of this had been to leave him 
unaware of the general war situation, a shortcoming known to the London-based High 
Commissioners. As the Dominions' Secretary complained this meant that 'if they want 
secret information they tend more and more to go not to me but to other sources 
which apparently talk more freely'. This made Cranborne's position 'a farce' which 
could only be remedied if he were given a free hand to pass information on as he saw 
fit using his discretion not to discuss operational matters or any other inappropriate 
99 See Cumpston, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, pp. 188-189; WHC, 12 November 1941, DO 121/11 
10° WM 109(41), 5 November 1941, CAB65/24; Cranborne to Fadden, 12 September 1941, DAFP V, 
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issues. Although no written reply from the prime minister was forthcoming, later 
events would reveal the significance of the incident. 
At the same time as the Secretary of State was again tackling Churchill, he was also 
having to still keep a close check on Menzies. In July 1941 Alfred Duff Cooper had 
been moved from the Ministry of Information to become Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and the following month he left on a mission to the Far East to investigate 
measures for the co-ordination of defence in the region. As part of his subsequent 
report, he had called for the appointment of a British Commissioner General based at 
Singapore and the former Australian prime minister's name had been proposed, the 
second high-level suggestion that he be given a new role in as many months. ' 03 The 
first had come in early October from the Governor General in Canberra. Lord Gowrie 
had suggested to London that a seat be found in the House of Commons for Menzies 
where 'his wide experience and knowledge of the Australian outlook would be 
useful'. 1°4 Neither Churchill nor Cranborne had been keen on that occasion and the new 
proposal from Duff Cooper found them no more receptive. By questioning what might 
happen should Menzies be required to implement instructions to which the authorities 
in Canberra were opposed, the Secretary of State was able to reject the idea. 105 Other 
attempts were to be made to find a more influential role for the former prime minister, 
most notably in 1942 when an Australian was being looked for to fill the role of 
Minister of State resident in the Middle East. Such was the domestic opposition to this 
idea in Canberra however that his backbencher's seat once more proved inescapable 
and here he was to remain. 106 
The situation in the Far East was meanwhile rapidly deteriorating. With his access to 
MAGIC intelligence decrypts, Roosevelt had known since July 1941 of the adoption of 
a dual policy by the Japanese Imperial Cabinet. This called for negotiations in the first 
instance and military action if they failed. The discussions between the two sides had 
103 Duff Cooper to Churchill, 31 October 1941, PREM3/155 
104 Gowrie to DO, 10 October 1941, DO121/50 
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subsequently proven lacklustre however, no' doubt -at least in part because of 
America's decision to implement a total oil embargo as 'punishment' for the Japanese 
invasion of southern Indochina. 107 This was resolutely supported by Churchill who 
maintained the role of interested bystander throughout the negotiations. In fact with its 
belief that Japan was 'likely to pursue a policy of pinpricks... but unlikely to embark on 
total war', since late 1940 Whitehall had effectively restricted its actions to sending 
vague warnings to the government in Tokyo. 1°8 Although various 'scares' ensured that 
some of the messages sent were, according to Menzies, 'good, direct stuff' which 
emphasised the dangers of going to war, in most instances it was left to the US to 
take the lead. 1°9 
Once more the Dominions were not always fully informed, specifically when these 
warnings were to be issued, despite the DO's complaints that to not do so would leave 
the Dominion governments 'feel[ing] that their hands are forced'. 1O Churchill showed 
little apparent concern about such fears. Indeed by the last week of November, despite 
the growing tension, he seemed quite happy with how events were proceeding. "' He 
was by no means alone now with even Bruce, previously one of the most vocal 
opponents of letting Washington take charge, willing to accept that this was the right 
line to follow, along with his High Commissioner colleagues. "2 Only Page remained 
worried, largely as a result of a 'very depressing' interview he had held with Sir Charles 
Portal, Chief of the Air Staff. The senior British officer had suggested during this that 
an invasion of the Dutch East Indies might not be enough to lead to a declaration of 
107 See John Pritchard, `Winston Churchill, the Military and Imperial Defence in East Asia' in Saki 
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war by London. 1' His guest had been horrified at the idea, warning that if nothing 
happened it would demonstrate how little Australia's and New Zealand's feelings were 
understood and 'break the Empire'. This message was duly passed on to Churchill 
along with a warning of the potential for 'a very serious breach in empire relations'. "` 
But without any sign of American support there continued to be no response from the 
prime minister despite the growing evidence now beginning to accumulate in the last 
days of November 1941 that Japan was poised to attack southwards. ' 15 
In light of this continuing intransigence, where the Far East was concerned a surprising 
inclination to 'follow father' appears to have emerged throughout the Dominions. 1, 
New Zealand's voice was still only rarely raised and even more rarely heard. Meanwhile 
'rampant personal quarrels' and other domestic distractions remained broadly to the 
fore in Canada. The same was also the case in the Union of South Africa where the 
destruction of the country's Fifth Infantry Brigade during action at Sidi Rezegh had 
reignited violent internal debate. But perhaps the greatest revelation was the degree to 
which even the Australian government had fallen noticeably more in line with British 
thinking. "' 
Curtin and his fellow ministers had found many distractions in assuming office, and 
generally positive messages from London and various British visitors had helped ease 
fears of a possible Japanese attack. 1" Such was the growing optimism that parliament 
was told in early November there was no desire by the government to recall the AlF. 
At the same time an earlier decision to send an Armoured Division to the Middle East 
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was also confirmed. 119 Announcements such as these -perhaps helped to explain why 
the complacency amongst the Australian public, which British High Commissioners had 
referred to in the past, had if anything become worse. General Blarney on his 
November visit was shocked at what he saw, warning that his countrymen had 
become 'like a herd of gazelles on the grassy edge of a jungle'. 12° The greatest 
criticism of London came from Dr. Herbert Evatt, Curtin's Attorney-General and 
Minister for External Affairs. Elected to parliament in 1940 he had previously been a 
justice in the Australian High Court from where he had been a vocal supporter of 
greater federal powers. His public censure of Britain's failure speedily to declare war on 
Finland, Hungary and Roumania, each of which had sided with Nazi Germany following 
the latter's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, was but one example. On this 
occasion though Churchill responded with a stiff rebuke to Canberra, forcing even 
Curtin to apologise. 12' 
It was generally the case however that the reports being received in London about the 
Australian leader were good, offering a far more optimistic assessment of his character 
and abilities, and these helped ease any pressure on the DO. In mid-October 1941 
Brooke-Popham once again visited Australia to reassure the new government that the 
British Chiefs of Staff were not neglecting the Far East, subsequently providing a 
thorough analysis of his visit for the authorities in London. ' 22 Following the mission to 
Canada in late 1939, the Air Chief Marshal's next role had been to visit the Union of 
South Africa to arrange its contribution to the Empire Air Training Scheme. In October 
1940 however he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief Far East and it was in this 
capacity that he made his visit to Canberra. Perhaps key amongst the points raised by 
Brooke-Popham in his report to the British government was his highlighting the degree 
to which he had been impressed by the Australian prime minister. Equally encouraged 
was Duff Cooper when in November 1941 he travelled to Canberra to 'tell the 
19 See Ross, John Curtin, pp. 236-239 
120 Whiskard to Eden, 27 February 1940, D035/1003/3/43; quoted in Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes 
of War (London: 1988) p. 262 
121 Curtin to Cranborne, 4 November 1941, DAFP V, pp. 162-163; Churchill to Curtin, 27 November 
1941, DO121/119; Curtin to Churchill, 29 November 1941, DAFP V, pp. 237-238 
122 Brooke-Popham to Sir Arthur Street, 28 October 1941, Brooke-Popham Papers 
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Australians how wonderful they are and how *almost as wonderful we are'. 123 In a 
subsequent private letter to Cranborne he recorded that Curtin was 'a modest, sincere, 
intelligent and honest man and is generally regarded as such'. But with the news, as 
Waterson put it, that 'the Japs have gone over the top', the expanding war would 
soon provide a much stiffer test of both the character and the ability of Australia's 
leadership. '24 
In mid-November 1941 the Australian Chiefs of Staff had presented a report to the 
Advisory War Council in Canberra which made it clear that the defence of Malaya was 
impossible in the event of a major attack by Japan. 125 The outcome of this was a 
strongly worded telegram on the first day of December reminding the British 
government that during the 1937 Imperial Conference it had promised there would be 
strong defences at Singapore. Before any response could be made within a week 
Japanese forces attacked the US Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor along with 
various other British and American targets in the Pacific and South East Asia. 
What was perhaps most surprising about this development was how well received it 
was by many in London. Churchill's opinions on the matter are well known but a 
variety of other figures also saw the turn of events as reason for some optimism. One 
example was the South African High Commissioner who thought there to now be 'a 
reasonable chance of this year being the last year of the war'. 12" Another was an 
anonymous member of the DO for whom it was 'the opening of a new chapter'. 127 This 
commentator also hoped that this change in fortunes would now lead the US to 
'Z' Duff Cooper to Cranborne, 31 October 1941, Cranborne Papers; ibid., Duff Cooper to Churchill, 1 
December 1941 
124 Diary, 7 December 1941, Waterson Papers 
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... realise that it is impossible for it to isolate itself from Europe. On the contrary there is a 
growing sense of joint responsibility with the British Commonwealth for the maintenance 
of peace. 
A young Nicholas Mansergh, serving in the public relations section of the DO, 
apparently agreed with the sentiment. With the advantage of hindsight however, he 
was also able to realise that from this date the war had entered an entirely new phase, 
one in which 'the importance of exclusively Commonwealth organisations declined'. 12' 
Indeed following the Japanese attack, Churchill immediately hurried to Washington, 
against the advice of a number of his War Cabinet colleagues. His intentions however 
were not merely to co-ordinate the finer details of how the new alliance would 
function. 121 He was also anxious to ensure guarantees about the 'Hitler first' strategy. 
More commonly referred to by its short 'ABC-1' title this was originally agreed during 
the Washington Staff Conversations in early 1941 and focussed the future Allies' 
effort on the European theatre, as opposed to any Far East conflict, something the 
British prime minister did not want to see abandoned. 130 
In his absence, the focus of some of those left in London quickly turned to 
reorganisation of the mechanism for the higher direction of the war. Just a day after 
fighting had begun in the Pacific, Page sent a long minute to Canberra assessing the 
many deficiencies that he saw in the existing Anglo-Australian relationship. 13' He also 
took the opportunity to indicate what he felt needed to be done to rectify them. His 
intention, he claimed, was to find a method that would 'enable us to exert influence 
sufficiently early in the formative stage of policy as to modify the war policy itself'. 
The creation of an Imperial War Cabinet was not the method for doing this, instead it 
was essential that a special representative should regularly attend London, staying for 
no more than two or three months. During that time the visitor would be able to 
refresh the memory of the Australian High Commissioner as to preferred domestic 
policy and, with full accreditation to attend the War Cabinet, generally put across 
128 Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-1952, p. 128 
129 See Gilbert, Road to Victory, pp. 1-3; Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory, pp. 475-479 
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Canberra's views. In short he would 'come fora special job, get it done and get away 
while he still has punch'. 
Page had also developed strong views about the position of Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs which he now shared with Curtin. The holder of this office, he 
believed, should be one of the most senior members of the Cabinet, 'in close personal 
touch with the Prime Minister (sic)'. Indeed 'but for his excessive strain and multiplicity 
of duties in wartime', it was clear to the visiting Australian that Churchill should be the 
direct link with the Dominions. The clear inference from all of this was, of course, that 
Cranborne was not able to properly fulfil this role and should therefore be replaced. 
This despite the fact that in Churchill's absence, the Dominions' Secretary was doing 
all he could warning members of the War Cabinet that, in light of recent events, 'the 
Dominions would almost certainly claim to be brought into the picture more fully'. 132 
Before the end of the week, following further criticism of the British handling of the 
Greek campaign, the British authorities found themselves faced with a request that 
Page be more fully utilised. 133 The Australian, having heard the news of the sinking of 
the Prince of Wa/es and Repulse, had meanwhile embarked upon his own efforts, both 
to strengthen his position and secure reinforcements for the new war theatre. ' 34 Later 
reports back to Canberra suggested that Page's conduct during this time had managed 
only to 'create a deplorable impression' and 'exerted little influence insofar as Pacific 
Strategy and Australia's needs were concerned'. 135 He did however manage to secure 
guarantees that troops and planes would be diverted from the Middle East as well as 
an agreement that he would be given access to all of the facilities Curtin had 
requested. ' 36 
132 WM132(41), 20 December 1941, CAB65/20 
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Meanwhile, with mounting press comment in London about Australia's reaction -to 
developing events, there was great disquiet within Whitehall about the tone of the 
telegrams being received from Canberra. 137 in a report sent to the prime minister in 
Washington, Attlee advised that recent messages were 'both critical and querulous' 
and contained 'demands and allegations made not on the basis of ascertained facts but 
on unspecified information and prior assumptions' . 
13'3 This was happening at a time 
when the atmosphere in London had become extremely tense with 'the old gang of 
Chamberlainites... fanning up each other's animosities against the Churchill 
government'. 139 In this environment Attlee's conclusion was now the same as had 
been long held by Cranborne, the Labour politician stressing to the prime minister that 
some form of closer co-operation could no longer sensibly be resisted. 140 
There was another factor to be considered, however, following a further complaint 
from the Middle East. Lyttelton had been extremely critical of General Blarney's 'weak 
and ingenuous' conduct during the earlier Tobruk dispute, even going so far as to 
suggest that the Australian had deliberately set out to cause problems. "' By 
December, with Blarney growing ever more impatient with his British colleagues, the 
situation had considerably worsened. Indeed the government in Canberra was told by 
its senior military officer in the Middle East that, in his opinion, the Dominions were 
looked upon 'as appendages of Great Britain [which] had difficulty in recognising the[irl 
independent status'. "" To the British Minister of State in the region he was equally as 
forthright in repeating such views, leaving Lyttelton increasingly adamant that there 
was no other option than to replace the 'impossible' Blarney. '43 
137 'Australia is Right', 21 December 1941, Sunday Express, Liddell Hart Papers; ibid., `Blunt Words 
from Dominions', 23 December 1941, Daily Mail 
18 Attlee to Churchill, 23 December 1941, PREM3/63/3 
19 Diary, 19 December 1941 in Pimlott, Hugh Dalton Diary, p. 337 
140 Attlee to Churchill, 23 December 1941, PREM3/63/3 
1' Lyttelton to Churchill, 18 September 1941, PREM3/63/2; see John Hetherington, Blarney: 
Controversial Soldier (Canberra: 1973) pp. 194-195 
142 Quoted in Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 63 
143 Lyttelton to Churchill, 22 December 1941, PREM3/63/3 
194 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
The Approach of the Pacific War and the 'Inexcusable Betrayal' 
At this point Cranborne remained of the opinion that to approach the Australian 
government outright with such a request would 'create a first class row'. 144 His advice 
therefore was to contact Curtin, advise him that Blarney and Auchinleck did not get 
along and suggest that the former might therefore be better utilised elsewhere. Shortly 
after Christmas Churchill duly prepared a personal note for his counterpart in Canberra 
relaying exactly the message suggested by his Secretary of State. 15 But at the last 
minute it was not sent, the reason for this delay being the British prime minister's 
desire to first resolve 'other difficulties' with Australia. This delay proved timely as in 
the interim Curtin asked that Blarney be allowed to return home to take command 
there. 14' The incident was indicative however of how far the relationship between the 
two countries had deteriorated and in the weeks to come it was to get worse. 
Reorganising the Anglo-Dominion Relationship 
Brooke-Popham, one of the many official British visitors to Australia during the latter 
half of 1941, had warned Whitehall of the growing need to make his hosts 'feel that 
we in England look upon them as definitely part of one Empire'. "' It was implied, 
somewhat prophetically, that were this not to happen there would be a risk of them 
'slipping out. On Boxing Day the Australian prime minister sent a telegram to both 
Roosevelt and Churchill calling directly for American assistance and indicating that the 
authorities in Canberra would be happy to accept an American commander in the 
Pacific. The following day, a special 'New Year' article contributed by Curtin to a 
leading Melbourne newspaper went further, including within its text the statement that 
'Australia looks to America, free of pangs as to our traditional links and kinship with 
the United Kingdom'. 148 
Ibid., Attlee to Churchill, 23 December 1941 
"S Ibid., Churchill to Curtin, 27 December 1941 
146 Attlee to Churchill, 28 February 1942, D0121/10B 
147 Brooke-Popham to Sir Arthur Street, 28 October 1941, Brooke-Popham Papers 
148 See Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne, pp. 324-325; Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian 
Foreign Policy (Melbourne: 1988) pp. 25-26; Eric Baume, `Australia's Political Trend', The 
Fortnightly, Number 151 (January-June 1942), pp. 97-106 
195 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
The Approach of the Pacific War and the 'Inexcusable Betrayal' 
This was not the first time an Australian leader'had referred to the Dominions' right to 
look elsewhere other than London for foreign policy guidance. One of his predecessors 
had expressed the view as soon as he had become prime minister that, where the 
Pacific was concerned, his government needed 'to maintain its own diplomatic 
contacts with foreign powers'. 149 In both May and June 1940, Menzies had reiterated 
this view in a series of calls to Roosevelt in which he urged the United States to 
intervene directly in the Pacific and secure a peaceful resolution with Japan. 15° The DO 
had been able on that occasion to ensure that these appeals received only scant 
attention. 15' Curtin's new statement, at a time when Churchill was in Washington 
meeting with the US president, could not be so easily handled. 
Returning to a familiar argument, Cranborne's immediate advice was that if friction 
was to be avoided, the Dominions would have to be given greater representation in the 
decision-making process in London. 152 Having instructed Attlee to inform the War 
Cabinet of how 'deeply shocked' Curtin's 'insulting speech' had left him, Churchill was 
clearly however not in any mood for compromise. Travelling with the British leader, Sir 
Ian Jacob was in general agreement with his angry retort. While he noted that his 
companion had never really understood Far Eastern problems he also felt that 
'throughout the war the Australian government [had] taken a narrow, selfish and at 
times craven view of events in contrast to New Zealand. 153 Much of the annoyance 
may well have been generated by Curtin's decision to make his views known publicly. 
This ensured considerable press coverage in Britain for a subject Whitehall had 
previously done its best to contain, the ensuing debate leaving little doubt about the 
deepening divide affecting the Anglo-Dominion coalition. ' 54 Although Batterbee was 
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able to reassure the DO that there was unlikely to be panic in New Zealand similar to 
that which he was hearing about in Australia, the situation was clearly very tense. '55 
Matters were not helped by the arrival of a long-delayed stark message from Cross. '56 
The British High Commissioner could only see a war effort suffering from 'the triple 
handicap of lack of political leadership, a shoddy and irresponsible press and a number 
of trade union leaders reaping a dirty harvest out of the war'. Having taken a few days 
to consider these comments, Machtig thought it all 'a desperate picture'. 15' Cranborne 
was also downcast, hoping that as the report had come by sea and was therefore 
considerably dated, the Japanese entry into the war might have created a more 
positive effect. 158 The situation in Canberra clearly left him unhappy, his conclusion 
being that the government there could do little other than 'squabble, grumble and 
blame others, in particular us'. And his mood was little improved, as he told Churchill, 
by the knowledge that people in Britain had been greatly shocked by the recent 
Australian outburst. Indeed so negative had the public reaction been that the 
Dominions' Secretary had felt obliged to ask the Ministry of Information to discourage 
further press speculation wherever possible. 15' Further difficulties faced Cranborne, 
however, when, on the final day of 1941, Sir Earle Page came to visit him once again. 
During the last three weeks, Australia's ministerial representative in London had clearly 
thought a great deal about his earlier message to Curtin and how to improve 
Australia's influence. In discussions he had held with Attlee, Bridges and Ismay, he had 
already been able to secure promises that all FO papers would be made available for 
him to inspect at the Cabinet offices. 16° Perhaps emboldened by his success, Page now 
took the opportunity to share, explicitly, some of his revised views about closer Anglo- 
Dominion collaboration. 1e' These centred on the idea of a Dominions minister becoming 
iss Batterbee to Machtig, 21 December 1941, Batterbee Papers (Box 7/2) 
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a member of the Defence Committee and direct representation in the Ministry of 
Supply. He also thought it imperative that each Dominion should have a man 'of 
considerable standing' within the FO allowing each to view papers and have the 
opportunity of indicating their respective countries' attitudes. And, whilst he was sure 
that his ideas would subsequently be adopted by the other Dominions, in the first 
instance these improvements should be restricted to Australia alone. 
Cranborne was also told in person at this meeting, and not for the first time by a 
visiting Australian, that a junior minister such as himself was not a suitable person to 
be the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Page's considered opinion was that it 
should instead be somebody who was a member of both the War Cabinet and the 
Defence Committee. Indeed in future the position would have to be 'regarded as 
second only to the Prime Minister (sic)'. Although the Dominions' Secretary might 
easily have taken this as yet another personal attack on his performance, he instead 
remained affable, seeing 'some force' in his Australian visitor's arguments. 162 He was 
even prepared to again berate, in writing, his government colleagues, as he had done 
since October 1940, about the continuing need for closer liaison between Whitehall 
and the Dominion High Commissioners. Using the latest approach by Page as support, 
he therefore recommended the appointment of a representative from within the FO, 
with the rank of under-secretary, to act as a liaison. One of the new appointee's duties 
would be to keep in close touch with his opposite number at the DO providing a 
potentially vital service. This would be helpful not just for the Dominions but, as was 
rather caustically pointed out, it would also aid a department which still did not often 
'come into consultation in the earlier stages'. 
Whilst this internal debate continued, Cranborne had been correct in his assumption 
that Page would waste little time in sending his revised proposals to Canberra. In his 
message he also advised that Bruce, who had closely assisted him, should be made the 
permanent accredited representative. Although Curtin rejected the latter suggestion, he 
did adopt the others that were offered, informing the government in London of his 
desire to now appoint a representative 'with the right to be heard in the War 
162 `Lord Cranborne's comments on Sir Earle Page's proposals', 2 January 1942, F0954/4 
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Cabinet'. 163 With this formal request the Dominions Secretary decided to approach one 
of his predecessors to discuss a possible overhaul of the existing system. 184 With his 
writing to Eden, Cranborne's views were revealed to some of the senior members of 
the FO and their reaction was decidedly unenthusiastic. Having already shown himself 
to be reluctant to accept any strengthening of the Dominions' role in policy making, 
Bentinck was once again notable in his comments. The most critical was that he felt 
Cranborne's proposals would achieve little other than 'please the Dominions'. 165 
Forgetting his earlier complaints, he was also now concerned that the FO would be 
unable to undertake the envisaged role as 'without intimate knowledge of the 
conditions in various Dominions and the mentality of respective governments we 
should be likely to make mistakes'. 
Although generally dismissive of Page's original plan, another of Bentinck's colleagues, 
was more optimistic about the Dominion Secretary's suggested modifications. 18' This 
anonymous individual recognised that a clear problem existed for the DO which was a 
'channel for the discussion of policy, the finished article', but 'does not take much 
hand in the processing of the raw material, in the formulation of policy'. As with 
Cranborne, his solution was to find a method to allow the Dominion leaders to suggest 
amendments at a much earlier stage, an alteration which he hoped might prove more 
acceptable to all concerned. All sides seemed to agree though that the issue had now 
'assumed big proportions politically' and, hence, would need discussion with Churchill 
on his return from the United States. 
The prime minister, however, was fully occupied at this stage with further Australian 
complaints. During his Washington discussions he had agreed with Roosevelt's 
proposal that General Sir Archibald Wavell be appointed Supreme Commander of the 
ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) command area, despite some obvious 
163 `Memorandum on Machinery of Consultation', Page Papers; Curtin to DO, I January 1942, 
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indifference amongst certain of his War Cabinet colleagues. 18" This decision had not 
appeared, however, to especially anger the already sensitive authorities in Canberra 
until they learned that Wavell's responsibilities had been amended to exclude Australia 
and Papua New Guinea. This left the Australian leadership angered by what was felt to 
be the ignoring of its security. And further consternation was caused with news that 
the naval command of the Australian and New Zealand area of the Pacific, given to the 
United States Pacific fleet, did not extend as far as the former's eastern coastline. 
Another angry exchange of telegrams between Curtin and Churchill therefore followed, 
the net outcome being an insistence from Curtin that amendments be made to include 
his country within the new command area. 168 Once more offering his assurance that 
Australian interests were constantly considered, Churchill would not agree, however, 
and instead requested a week's pause to consider the scheme in closer detail. "" Still in 
regular contact with the visiting British mission, Casey was told by his Minister for 
External Affairs that this was not the ideal solution. A delay would likely receive a 
'very hostile' reaction 'in the event of further and probable setbacks' . 
170 Despite this 
severe view, Australia's representative in Washington nonetheless saw this 
development as a good opportunity to again press the authorities in London for greater 
Dominion representation. "' 
The situation in the British capital had however changed and a similar view no longer 
existed amongst the Dominion High Commissioners. 172 Even Bruce and Waterson were 
now quite firmly of the opinion that the regular sending of Ministers to attend the War 
Cabinet was not practicable. Although still fearful of the potential consequences of 
Churchill 'centralising everything in himself', the latter was especially vehement in his 
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advice to Pretoria not to support the idea. "' Only Page agreed with Casey, his thinking 
having been broadly the same as that of his colleague in the US during the preceding 
five months. He was at the same time beginning to achieve some British backing for 
his plans, his discussions with Ernest Bevin proving 'the most stimulating and 
satisfactory talk [he] had with any Empire statesman since coming to Britain in the last 
twenty years'. "` With the Minister of Labour's suggestion that the FO should absorb 
the DO making it 'the second office in government', and his offer to support 'a united 
Empire front', such an assessment was perhaps not surprising. 
After his three week absence, Churchill had meanwhile returned to London to more bad 
news. Whilst in Washington, he had remained confident that the garrison in Singapore 
would be able to hold off a Japanese attack for as long as two months but the 
information he received now suggested otherwise. 1' Informing Curtin that, in his 
opinion, the loss of Malaya had been inevitable in light of the general war situation, 
such an analysis failed to impress the Australian leader. 17' Faced with a worsening 
military position and ever greater criticism from Canberra of his wartime conduct, the 
British prime minister now therefore sought a more conciliatory approach. This involved 
urging his counterpart not to become 'dismayed or get into recrimination', nor to doubt 
'his loyalty to [both] Australia and New Zealand'. ` 
The angry response following reports that it had been agreed to establish a Far Eastern 
Council in London amply demonstrated the ineffectiveness of Churchill's efforts. The 
intended role of this new body was to 'focus and formulate views' which would then 
be passed on to Roosevelt. 1' Canberra had not been informed of this decision until 
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some two days after the authorities in Wellington. 19 It was perhaps not surprising 
therefore that when official confirmation finally arrived it was critically received, indeed 
the Australian War Council quickly declared itself to be in unanimous disagreement 
with the proposal. 18° Canberra instead requested that a Pacific Council be established 
in Washington. 
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs was meanwhile facing difficulties in 
Canberra besides dealing with the government, in the form of his increasingly agitated 
High Commissioner. In a long and often venomous telegram to London, Cross had 
launched a serious attack on the Australian leadership. Relations in the past had always 
been based on 'the assumption that the Commonwealth government shared the spirit 
of Imperial Partnership', but in recent weeks it had become obvious to the former 
British minister that this was no longer forthcoming. Indeed his assessment was that 
there was clear evidence showing 'abuse of the United Kingdom authorities'. Is' To 
correct the situation Cross therefore urged the DO to assist him in gaining better 
access to the Australian War Cabinet and to all telegrams passing between the two 
prime ministers as 'the time [had] come to collect all our weapons and to fight for 
British prestige'. Greatest alarm was reserved however for his final recommendation, 
that economic pressure be applied with a British refusal to undertake 'negotiations of a 
commercial or financial character'. 
Cross had admitted to the Dominions Secretary, shortly after his arrival in Australia, 
that he was 'puzzled' by what he had found. In the intervening period he had endured 
a difficult time, particularly after the Labour Party had assumed power in Canberra. 182 
Much of the reason for this was an ill-advised public statement he made in which he 
reminded his audience of Russia's communist heritage. In so doing even he would later 
recognise that he had tied 'a Tory label around [his] neck. 183 In the prevailing climate, 
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this was ill-advised, particularly in light of the Governor General's warning to the 
visiting Duff Cooper in December 1941 that 'if you start wrong in Australia you can 
never get right again'. 184 Although he was sympathetic to his High Commissioner's 
situation, at the same time Cranborne acknowledged privately that Cross had 'taken to 
lecturing Australian Ministers as if they were small and rather dirty boys'. 185 
This attitude was still visible in mid-January in telegrams sent from Cross to London 
complaining that Curtin had considerably hardened his requests for greater Australian 
representation. 186 On this occasion the most likely explanation for the Australian 
government's intransigence was seen as being Evatt's 'anti-Whitehall prejudice', a 
constant danger during this period. But whatever the provocations had been endured, 
as far as his confrontational proposals were concerned, the Dominions' Secretary was 
aghast. So much so that, almost certainly correctly, he warned that to pursue such a 
line would not bring Australia closer but instead 'give further stimulus to their tendency 
to look to the United States'. 18' Whilst Smuts reassured Churchill that 'a certain 
amount of jitters and unreasoning criticism [from] carping critics' was to be expected, 
it was clear to Cranborne at least that the Anglo-Australian relationship was quickly 
becoming unmanageable. t"' He therefore resolved to make one final attempt to remedy 
the situation. 
The Final Challenge: 'Inexcusable Betrayal' 
Just four days after Churchill had returned to London following his Washington visit, 
the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs submitted two memoranda to the War 
Cabinet, both of which covered the subject of co-operation with the Dominions. 189 
Cranborne had argued with the prime minister since shortly after his appointment back 
in October 1940 about the need for greater information to be supplied to the Dominion 
184 Duff Cooper to Cranborne, 1 December 1941, Cranborne Papers 
'gs Cranborne to Emrys-Evans, 31 August 1941, Emrys-Evans Papers 
186 Cross to DO, 14 January 1942, DO121/50; Cross to Cranborne, 21 January 1942, PREM4/50/7A 
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governments and for them to have a greater role in formulating wartime policy. On 
every occasion his suggestions had been dismissed. Now, in his first paper, his 
government colleagues were warned that 'it would... be a great and possibly disastrous 
mistake... to underestimate the strength of the feeling arising in the Commonwealth [of 
Australia] on this question'. Making the danger worse in his view, there was also the 
potential that 'a rot which started in Australia might easily spread to other Dominions'. 
This was therefore a genuine crisis, 'an issue not merely of machinery, but even more 
of status', which could be averted only through wise statesmanship. Cranborne duly 
recommended, yet again, that if Australia wanted to attend the War Cabinet in London 
it should be granted this right, 'a gesture that would pay us a hundredfold'. The other 
Dominions should also be invited to attend although, like Bentinck, he thought that 
they would probably decline. 190 Representatives would only be allowed to attend 
however if they held their respective governments' authority to actually make 
decisions, a point upon which Churchill had been insistent. 19' 
Even before they had been presented to the War Cabinet King George VI had read both 
of the papers prepared by Cranborne. Together with a subsequent note from Hardinge, 
His Majesty's secretary, to Churchill, warning that the King had been greatly 'alarmed 
at the feeling which appears to be growing in Australia', this was probably decisive. 192 
Up to this point the prime minister had been dismissive of any criticism of his handling 
of the relationship with the authorities in Canberra. In January 1942, whilst 
recuperating from a mild stroke in Florida, his mood had been downright belligerent, 
highly critical of people of 'bad stock'. 19' Just days later he had again rejected the 
need for greater co-operation, arguing that it would not be possible until such time as 
the Australians had put to one side 'their Party feud and set up a National 
Government'. 19" 
190 Note by Bentinck, 12 January 1942, F0954/4 
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In his rapid reply to Hardinge, he now accepted that 'it would be foolish and vain to 
obstruct [Australian] wishes', offering an assurance that he had in fact already heeded 
Curtin's requests. ' 95 This news was welcomed at Buckingham Palace from where it 
was made quite clear that the King would remain an interested observer of how the 
situation developed. 19' A more generally sympathetic mood had spread elsewhere in 
Whitehall with a distinct improvement in attitude apparent even within the previously 
unenthusiastic FO. Cadogan, in trying to decide how to implement Page's earlier 
proposals, now felt the prime objective should be 'to give satisfaction to Australia 
[with] regard to their preference', quite a change from some of his earlier comments. 197 
With Eden's agreement, this would lead ultimately to the defunct DID gaining a 
renewed role. '98 
The only people who seemed less than pleased with the changes following Cranborne's 
bold move were the Dominion High Commissioners. Massey in particular wanted it 
stressed that Australia had assumed the driving role and 'that it was for other 
governments concerned to decide whether they wished to avail themselves of the 
facilities'. 19' Curtin may still have wanted more but the proposals as they stood could 
already cause embarrassment for Mackenzie King in Ottawa. With Jordan still refusing 
to attend meetings with his counterparts because of his 'confirmed inferiority 
complex', Waterson concurred in his diary that 'it should not be made awkward for 
Governments not to accept the offer of Cabinet representation'. 200 Privately the 
Union's London agent was more interested in the proposals. From some of his 
comments it seems fairly clear that his earlier support for an Imperial War Cabinet had 
been based upon the calculation that he would attend it on behalf of South Africa. In 
these Australian suggestions he saw another opportunity for a greater personal role, 
again observing to Smuts his belief that there was 'no reason why the High 
195 Churchill to The King, 22 January 1942, PREM3/167/1 
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Commissioner should not be nominated [as] accredited representative'. 20' The South 
African leader would however appear to have recognized his High Commissioner's 
agenda reminding him that, in his opinion, the Dominions policy should solely be to 
offer Churchill 'wholehearted support in the immense dangers confronting us all'. 202 
There was though still very little evidence of anything like this degree of support from 
Canberra. Far worse was to come as the confrontation between the British and 
Australian leaderships now quickly reached its climax. 
The suggestion that a Far East Council, headed by the British government, be formed 
in London to oversee the Allied response to the war in the region, remained a 
considerable source of irritation to the Australian government. New Zealand was also 
unhappy about this Fraser advising that, although he was 'very sorry to worry' 
Churchill, his government could not accept any proposal which failed to give them 
'direct and continuous' access to the United States. 203 This facility was felt to be 
essential since, only days before, the government in Wellington had accepted that an 
American Admiral would be responsible for the conduct of naval operations in the 
waters surrounding New Zealand . 
20' Batterbee, the British High Commissioner, 
continued to hope that he could secure Fraser's fuller co-operation. 205 In return the DO 
reassured him that they would do their best to provide more information, following his 
complaints about the lack of material he was receiving from London . 
2111 Such efforts 
were secondary as Cranborne, now directly tasked by his prime minister to find some 
form of resolution, had decided that an approach should be made to Roosevelt. The US 
leader was duly informed therefore that Australia and New Zealand both preferred a 
Pacific Council based in Washington. 207 
201 Ibid., Diary, 28 January 1942; Waterson to Smuts, 27 January 1942 
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As this was being done in the last week of January 1942, with the military situation in 
both the Far East and North Africa apparently worsening daily and domestic criticism of 
his leadership growing, Churchill stood before the House of Commons to make a 
lengthy statement. Informing parliament that he considered the debate to be a vote of 
confidence in his leadership, Waterson felt that the prime minister's speech was 'a 
great performance'. 208 So much so that the South African believed if he were now 'to 
change his Cabinet a bit', Churchill's position could not be challenged. Providing a 
detailed analysis of the war situation, during the debate the British leader also took the 
opportunity to confirm that accredited representatives of any of the four Dominions 
would have the right to be heard in the War Cabinet. 20' The following day the message 
was formally repeated to each of the overseas Dominion governments along with the 
news that they were being invited to send service liaison officers to keep in contact 
with the Chiefs of Staff organisation. 210 Whilst the government in Canberra was still far 
from satisfied, after some further discussion it was agreed that with representation 
secured, they would agree to the London-based council. The calibre of the individual 
selected to press their claims would be crucial though, and in the first instance it 
would be the far from convincing Page. 21 
These developments had still done little, however, to reduce the pressure coming from 
the Australian leadership, where wide discontent apparently remained. At the end of 
January the British press carried further warnings from Curtin that with 'too many 
flowery words' from Whitehall, 'patience has limits'. 212 With this renewed use of 'less 
traditional [diplomatic] methods', it had taken just three weeks for Menzies to be 
proven wrong in his assurance to the British public that no Australian prime minister 
208 Diary, 27 January 1942, Waterson Papers 
209 DO to Australia, 28 January 1942, PREM4/43A/14; DO to Australia, 2 February 1942, Chartwell 
Papers (CHAR20/69A) 
210 DO to Dominion governments, 28 January 1942, D035/1010/476/141 
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would 'stand on any platform and attack Great Britain'. 213 What was not publicly 
known was a cable sent from Canberra to London a few days before. 
This carried the suggestion that the evacuation of Singapore would be seen by the 
Australian government as 'an inexcusable betrayal'. 21" This explosive charge originated 
from a secret communication produced by the British prime minister for the three 
Chiefs of Staff. Mooting the possible abandonment of Singapore, it had inadvertently 
been shown to Page who had in turn passed it on to Curtin. 2t' Churchill's initial 
response was indignant, warning his Australian counterpart that he would 'make 
allowances for your anxiety and... not allow such discourtesy to cloud my judgement or 
lessen my efforts on your behalf' . 
21e Although this note was eventually not sent, no 
doubt as a result of DO intervention, its tone made clear how much anger had been 
generated. Others in Whitehall were equally upset with the recriminations. The 
Australian leader, a 'wretched second-rate man... screaming for help', found himself 
castigated along with his countrymen who had 'suddenly woken up to the cold and 
hard fact that [Australia's] very existence as a white country depends not on herself 
Z but on protection from Great Britain'. " 
There were, however, those who felt that the level of consultation with the Dominion 
governments was far from acceptable and it was in fact clear that the groundswell of 
opinion in favour of changes taking place was considerable. 218 A commentary published 
in Round Table in February 1942 concluded that with the widening war, the Secretary 
of State for Dominions Affairs should now be a full member of the War Cabinet. The 
Times also carried an editorial endorsing a more significant role for the Dominions in 
213 See Baume, Australia's Political Trend', The Fortnightly, p. 98; R. G. Menzies, `We Don't Turn 
From You', Daily Express, 6 January 1942, Liddell Hart Papers 
214 Curtin to Churchill, 24 January 1942, Chartwell Papers (CHAR20/69) 
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formulating Imperial policy. 219 At the same time *somewhat fanciful calls began to again 
resurface lauding the merits of an Imperial War Conference and demanding that one be 
called to ensure the rapid agreement of 'improved machinery for consultation'. 220 With 
Mackenzie King still fearful of any centralisation of power and hence reluctant even to 
participate in the Pacific War Council, it can only be imagined how these renewed 
suggestions for a much larger conference were received in Ottawa. 22' 
The effective collapse of resistance in Malaya in any case intervened to bring matters 
to a head. Described by Curtin as 'Australia's Dunkirk', the well-documented defeat 
inflicted upon the garrison defending Singapore had a chilling effect throughout the 
Empire on public and political opinion alike. 222 In the days following, Churchill found 
himself under considerable pressure to implement a serious restructuring of his 
government and when he again faced an obviously hostile House of Commons he had 
already bowed to the inevitable. 223 The public announcement which followed revealed a 
series of changes and although it was claimed these reflected the expanded nature of 
the war, it was clear that their principal role was to help re-instill faltering confidence in 
Churchill's ability to lead. Notable amongst them was the resignation of some formerly 
key figures such as Max Beaverbrook and Arthur Greenwood, the promotion of others 
including Oliver Lyttelton, and the overall reduction of the War Cabinet from nine to 
seven members. Also included amongst the promotions was that of the Labour 
politician Sir Stafford Cripps, who had emerged as a favoured candidate to become 
Dominions Secretary amongst certain of the High Commissioners in London. 224 Seen by 
219 `Commonwealth Control', Round Table, Volume 32 (December 1941-September 1942), p. 221; 
Editorial, The Times, 19 January 1942, Liddell Hart Papers 
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Churchill as one of his most serious potential threats he instead became Lord Privy Seal 
and the Leader of the House. 225 
This did not mean that the Dominions' vigorous claims had been ignored, indeed as far 
as they were concerned there was some especially well received news. Attlee's official 
appointment as deputy prime minister, a role he had been effectively fulfilling for some 
time, also saw him named as the new Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs. With 
Dominion interests now theoretically moved within the War Cabinet, this move was 
clearly aimed at helping finally silence complaints about their previous exclusion from 
the policy making process. 22B This decision marked the formal acceptance of everything 
that had been so passionately argued for by the now former Dominions' Secretary and 
those senior members of the DO who had supported him throughout the previous 
sixteen months. As for Cranborne himself, although apparently at one stage considered 
as the next possible Foreign Secretary, with him again suffering from a bout of ill- 
health he was instead offered the role of Colonial Secretary which he gratefully 
accepted. 227 His considerable achievements at the DO, a department into which he had 
breathed much needed spirit and confidence, would ensure that 'Bobbety' would be 
long-remembered after his departure. It would however be up to his successor to 
implement the changes he had sought to implement and help ensure that the Anglo- 
Dominion relationship prospered in the environment of an expanded global conflict. 
This unfortunately did not prove to be the case. 
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Conclusion 
Just five months after his departure from the DO, as Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Cranborne was called upon to respond in the House of Lords to a motion that 
had been put forward by Lord Elibank. This asked that attention be drawn to the 
maintenance 'of the unity and solidarity of the British Empire'. ' In the short speech that 
he made in response, Cranborne took the opportunity to give his opinion about the 
future of the Anglo-Dominion relationship and where he believed it now stood. 
The successful operation of this [Dominion] conception, of course, puts a great 
responsibility on the Mother country herself. She has got to recognise that her family are 
growing up, and that it is always a very difficult thing for any parents to do with regard 
to any children. They always tend to try and keep their children on leading strings too 
long. Such a course finally leads to friction and alienation of the child. Indeed the child 
may - and in a number of cases does - break away entirely from the family, though the 
passage of time nearly always softens and even wipes away bitterness in later life. We, 
in Great Britain, have had salutary experiences of this kind. I do not wish to go into those 
experiences, but they may have been almost worthwhile if they have taught us an 
essential and invaluable lesson. I think that they have, that we have taken advantage of 
it, and that it has ever since been our aim to make the links between ourselves and the 
daughter nations not rigid and intolerable, but as flexible as possible. 
Clearly reflecting on the events that had faced him over the last few years, this 
statement revealed Cranborne's apparent belief that his efforts, and those of the many 
in the DO who supported him, had made a difference. The evidence however shows 
that, aside from a brief period of improvement, the overall situation actually stayed 
much the same. Indeed by late 1941 it was already clear that a hierarchy had emerged 
in terms of the wartime relationship between the government in London and the 
respective Dominions. 
As Australia was by far the most pronounced in both its support and criticism, it 
appears to have secured the highest level of contact with officials in London. The 
Australian High Commissioner in London even went so far as to claim that within the 
British capital there existed 'a feeling of respect and confidence blended with a little 
awe - very healthy for the English - as to what Australian reactions will be'. 2 The 
1 Extract from House of Lords, 21 July 1942 (Col. 937-981), D035/998/7/48 
Z Bruce to Menzies, 18 October 1939, Lord Bruce's War Files 
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reality however was a considerable difference' between the position Australia felt it 
occupied and the actual situation. Even by February 1940, despite claims from 
Canberra that the British government regarded Australia 'as the blue-eyed boy amongst 
the Dominions', the authorities in Whitehall were in fact already critical of its war 
effort. 3 
At the same time, although Australia had been the first to publicly offer its support to 
the British government in September 1939, within twelve months its attitude had 
begun to change. This was for a variety of reasons, not least the volatility that blighted 
the country's domestic political scene. Robert Menzies' position as prime minister was 
never strong and once he had visited Britain in early 1941, where he was widely feted, 
it seems clear that he was interested in the possibility of staying indefinitely. In an 
attempt to create the correct circumstances to do so however, namely intriguing with 
the British leader's opponents in London, he also highlighted to his colleagues back 
home Churchill's often autocratic nature. With his eventual replacement in Canberra by 
an already naturally suspicious Labour administration, this ensured that the subsequent 
relationship with Whitehall would face even greater pressures. 
The clash between the British and Australian governments following the Japanese 
attack in December 1941 was perhaps the most serious threat to Anglo-Dominion 
relations during the entire war. Within a matter of only weeks of the British War 
Cabinet being reshuffled in early 1942, personal enmity had resurfaced between 
Churchill and Curtin, the Australian prime minister. Such were the tensions that even 
The Times felt it was a pity 'an impression appears to persist in London that Australian 
plain speaking is synonymous with empty grumbling and futile fault-finding'. ` 
According to Machtig at the DO, Churchill later claimed, in February 1943, that he 
generally liked Curtin, 'this eminent and striking Australian personality'., This did not 
prevent him, however, from describing the government in Canberra, shortly afterwards, 
as 'not representative of Australia and quite capable of using for party purposes at an 
3 Eden to Whiskard, 4 February 1940, D035/1003/3/43 
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election anything that would be helpful'. ' Were it not for the fact that Evatt, the 
Minister for External Affairs in Canberra and previously amongst Churchill's harshest 
critics, visited London in mid-1942 and was so charmed by the prime minister that he 
subsequently 'would not hear a word against him', it is debatable just how bitter the 
relationship might have become. ' Nonetheless there was obvious suspicion and even 
hostility with the Canberra government joining their counterparts in Canada in placing 
greater emphasis on the importance of the United States. 
The government in Ottawa, leading the oldest and largest Dominion, maintained a 
deliberately subdued approach throughout the period in question to its relations with its 
counterpart in London. Canadian troops were the first to arrive on British shores, as 
early as mid-December 1939, and the contribution to the war effort they went on to 
subsequently make could not be criticised. The sizeable French-speaking population in 
Quebec, however, had no real sympathy with the British Empire. Fully aware of the 
potential dangers this held, especially were there to be any repeat of the First World 
War's casualty figures, the country's leader, William Mackenzie King, remained highly 
suspicious of Whitehall's motives. Backed by advisers who also, in some cases, had 
serious doubts about Britain's intentions, his fear was that the war would be used as a 
pretext to challenge the idea of Dominion autonomy. This ensured that, certainly until 
his visit to London in August 1941, his support was often far from enthusiastic and 
wherever possible he kept comment to a minimum. Conscious of the growing 
significance of the United States and, with a strong eye to his future position, the 
Canadian prime minister was also keen to do everything within his power to foster 
strong personal relations with President Roosevelt. An in time popular sentiment within 
the country appeared to adopt a similar view; a Gallup opinion poll conducted in 
Canada in June 1942 showed that just 52 percent of those questioned definitely 
wished to remain within the Empire. ' Although there was some Dominion criticism of 
'the habit of prominent Americans... talking as if the British Empire were in the process 
6 Churchill to Attlee, 4 April 1943, PREM3/63/13 
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of dissolution', as the war drew to a close, it became increasingly obvious that the 
relationship would, in fact, never be the same again. ' 
The two other belligerent Dominions, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, 
were, more or less, equally lacking in influence in the hierarchical scheme. In the case 
of the government in Wellington, with its predominantly British-drawn population, its 
distance from the European theatre and the relative inexperience it had in foreign 
affairs, a general acquiescence to the British government was not surprising. The 
intense dislike of fascism developed by successive governments in Wellington was also 
significant, helping to further strengthen its strong backing for British policy. 10 Only 
with Japan's attack on the Far East, bringing the region into the expanding global 
conflict, did first doubts, and then serious questions begin to emerge. But despite calls 
made by the prime minister Peter Fraser for a greater direct role for his country in 
wartime planning, New Zealand's earlier unflinching support helped ensure that its 
standing in London still remained strong. " 
In the Union's case, the controversial manner in which Jan Smuts had become prime 
minister in September 1939 was always likely to place restraints on the degree of 
active support he could offer, a point always fully understood by the DO. 12 Throughout 
the war he faced an organised nationalist opposition that, in many cases, openly 
sympathised with Nazi Germany's objectives; such was the strength of this, it is 
alleged that Hitler broke out in laughter when he heard the Union had declared war 
against him. " As a consequence of this internal discord, there were frequent riots 
within the country making it necessary to place restrictive limits on the Union's role in 
the war similar to those contained within the 1912 Defence Act. This meant that the 
South African military was obliged to operate on two levels, with only those who wore 
'Red Tabs' on their uniforms willing to serve outside of the African theatre of 
Minute by Attlee to Churchill, 16 June 1942, D0121/10B; see Mansergh, The Commonwealth and 
the Nations, pp. 66-75 
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operations. Even so with disasters such as the'surrender of the Second South African 
Division at Tobruk in June 1942 and continuing nationalist pressures at home, Smuts 
found himself obliged to maintain a consistently cautious line. 
The DO clearly therefore faced considerable challenges throughout the war. There were 
many complicated and conflicting agendas amongst the Dominion governments to be 
faced and little interest in them within Whitehall. Tasked with securing the unity of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, this meant the department faced a constant and 
often lonely struggle. The calm resolve it showed, often under extreme pressure, 
nonetheless proved largely successful. This despite the considerable disadvantage it 
suffered as a result of its junior nature and small size. And the fact that many of its 
warnings about the potential that existed for 'confusion' were often misunderstood or 
ignored. This did not prevent it however from continuing to try and create a better 
understanding within Whitehall of what the Anglo-Dominion relationship had come to 
mean in the revised wartime climate from the outset of hostilities. 
Although a variety of reasons made it almost certain that the Dominions would choose 
to support Britain in its second war with Germany in twenty-five years, the doubts that 
existed in South Africa had been largely overlooked within Whitehall. In helping control 
the September 1939 crisis, the DO, which did not share its colleagues' overly hopeful 
assessments, therefore played a pivotal role. It monitored the situation and assisted 
where it could but it was clear that the situation nearly proved catastrophic for British 
planning. Indeed moral ties that were said to have played a vital role were in fact only 
of limited use. 14 And in the highly charged atmosphere, it was the South African prime 
minister General Hertzog who made the critical mistake by not approaching the 
Governor-General at an earlier stage in the debate. The British High Commissioner in 
Cape Town, William Clark, however proved critical in assisting Smuts to overcome 
calls for the Union of South Africa to remain neutral. 
The negotiations for the Air Training Scheme, that followed shortly afterwards in late 
1939, represented the first experience for the department of operating in wartime 
conditions. It responded, for the most part, ably in dealing with what, largely thanks to 
the Air Ministry's approach, quickly developed into a difficult situation. The DO 
14 Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies, p. 323 
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repeatedly tried to warn their Whitehall colleagues about the character of the Canadian 
leader and the problems they could anticipate trying to negotiate with him. These were 
largely ignored however and all the department could effectively do was to monitor 
events, trying to ensure that the situation did not falter too much. Their involvement 
during the final meetings in London in December 1939 perhaps proved critical in 
ensuring that the agreement was finally accepted in the face of a good deal of 
opposition within Whitehall. 
Throughout 1940 the department found itself having to respond to the rapidly 
changing military situation as first Denmark and Norway, then the Low Countries and 
finally France all fell to German forces. With the considerable changes this carried in 
terms of how the war was conducted, the Dominions grew increasingly wary about the 
scarcity of information they believed was being given to them by the British 
authorities. Despite the department's best efforts and some serious arguments with the 
British leader, Churchill could not however be persuaded to allow more. The DO 
nonetheless continued to do everything in its power to remedy the situation as interest 
from within the Dominions continued to grow. 15 
The most interested Dominion politician in this regard was the Australian leader Robert 
Menzies who, from the beginning of 1941, began a sustained campaign to secure 
greater consultation from London. But as the DO quickly discovered this was not his 
sole agenda for he had set himself upon securing a much greater personal role in the 
running of Imperial affairs with the ultimate goal of a permanent position in London. 
From early May 1941 onwards when he had first learnt of the full extent of Menzies' 
ambitions, the Dominions Secretary had however sought to counter these efforts 
maintaining a scrupulously supportive stance of his prime minister. These efforts 
helped ensure that the Australian's efforts were thwarted and with an increasingly 
untenable domestic position he was ultimately forced to resign from his position in 
Canberra. 16 
's Minute by Holmes, 13 April 1941, D035/1012/28/1/1; minute by Machtig, 3 April 1941, 
D035/548F/27/55 
16 See Menzies, Afternoon Light (London: 1967), pp. 14,52-54; Martin, Menzies, pp. 373-378 
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For the DO however this signalled the beginning of a period of much greater pressure 
as the new Australian prime minister demanded the right to send a minister to sit in the 
War Cabinet in London. Differences continued throughout the Autumn of 1941 and the 
Japanese attacks throughout Asia and the Pacific in December only served to 
exacerbate tensions. The Dominions' Secretary led the campaign in London to secure 
greater access and improved communication with the full support of his department. 
And his efforts proved successful when, in February 1942, the British government was 
reshuffled and the deputy prime minister replaced him, suggesting the possibility of 
greater access for the Dominions to the highest echelon of power. 
The appointment of 'Bobbety' Cranborne as Secretary of State in October 1940 carried 
with it a significance for Anglo-Dominion relations that cannot be overstated. It was a 
decisive development as, although it was only his second cabinet position, he brought 
an enormous sense of determination to the highest level of the Office. As one of those 
who knew him well concluded, 'frail in body though he was, [he] made up for it by the 
robustness of his spirit' and he was quick to demonstrate his unwillingness to support 
measures which he believed might harm the DO. " This meant that despite being a 
longstanding friend of Churchili, he was not afraid to tackle the prime minister directly 
on the question of providing better information and access for the Dominion 
governments. This was justified, if by nothing else, by the progressively greater 
contribution these countries were making both in terms of manpower and material. 
Cranborne also however believed that greater physical representation was unnecessary, 
being particularly dismissive of suggestions that a second Imperial War Cabinet should 
be established. Instead what was needed was for London to tell the Dominion leaders 
more of what was happening with the war and, whenever he could, he therefore 
challenged Churchill to be more forthcoming. In February 1942, following the fall of 
Singapore, his efforts finally proved successful as in the major Whitehall re-organisation 
that followed, his department received an apparent elevation of status. There was of 
course a great irony in the February 142 changes and this was that with Cranborne's 
move to the CO, the Dominions lost their most vocal supporter in British government. 
When he returned in 1943 the nature of the war had completely changed. 
" Ronald Tree, When the Moon was High (London: 1975) pp. 54-55 
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The DO had entered the war as the junior department to the CO, but it has been 
shown that even by 1942 the roles had been reversed. The similar nature of DO and 
FO functions would indeed seem to have become more accepted as, with. the 
expanded war, the former became a key conduit in the management of important 
aspects of strategic, economic and even post-war planning. Meanwhile the Office 
remained firm in its support of the Dominion idea, quick to condemn when reports 
were 'written from a "superior" standpoint [that] seems to regard the Dominions as 
strange animals who require special treatment'. 18 During Bobbety's absence it seems 
clear that the department's ability to keep the Dominions fully informed of events was 
again challenged, in part as a result of Attlee's appointment as Dominions Secretary. 
Although the new deputy prime minister lost little time in publicly acknowledging the 
wartime efforts of Britain's 'free and equal partners', within the DO he revealed himself 
to have neither the knowledge for his new role nor the interest, instead appearing to 
those who surrounded him as being 'somewhat aloof'. 19 Despite his membership of the 
War Cabinet, the only time during the entire war the Dominions would enjoy such 
access, Attlee also failed to inspire the High Commissioners, so much so that within 
six weeks of his appointment Bruce claimed to be on the point of resigning. 20 It is 
perhaps almost ironic therefore that it would be Attlee, now as prime minister, who in 
October 1948 promulgated the demise of the terms 'Dominion' and 'Dominion 
governments' to be superseded by 'Commonwealth country' or 'member of the 
Commonwealth'; 'Dominion Status' was dropped in favour of 'fully independent 
Member of the Commonwealth'. 21 
To a man the Dominions' representatives were greatly unimpressed with their new 
circumstances and the expanded War Cabinet that was held, in the High 
Commissioners eyes, only to have changed from being 'a joke' to 'a farce'. " They 
18 Garner to Costar, 4 February 1944, D035/1024/75/23 
19 `Speech at United Warden's luncheon of the City of London', 23 February 1942, Attlee Papers 
(Bodleian Library, Department of Western Manuscripts) MS. Attlee dep. 4, fol. 209-220; Dixon 
Memoirs, Batterbee Papers (Box 20/5) 
20 Diary, 3 March 1942, Waterson Papers; ibid., 28 April 1942 
21 See W. David McIntyre, `Commonwealth Legacy' in Brown and Louis (eds. ), The Oxford History 
of the British Empire: Volume IV, p. 696; the department had already been renamed in July 1947 as 
the `Commonwealth Relations Office' (CRO) 
Z2 Ibid., 5 June 1942; ibid., 25 June 1942 
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were though perhaps naive to expect more for, as at least one London journal had 
pointed out, the change to the system in fact offered little that was new. 23 Ultimately 
it would remain the case that 'the Commonwealth would [continue to] be ruled by 
Britain alone, just as Britain is ruled by Mr. Churchill'. This continuation, it was argued, 
was the result of a 'species of arrogant negligence' for which the British prime minister 
was directly responsible. And without Cranborne to oppose him, Churchill was indeed 
free to again dictate the flow of information and ensure that there would be no 
'pumping [of] pessimism throughout the Empire'. 24 
Although a staunchly self-professed imperialist, the prime minister's views continued to 
draw their basis from an era that was quickly drawing to a close. With his highly 
romanticised, but often conditional view of the Empire, he found it hard to view the 
Dominions as equals. Indeed to certain commentators in London, the British prime 
minister was 'Eighteenth century in many respects' and even his undoubtedly closest 
Dominion confidante, Smuts, could only lament the degree to which Churchill remained 
'obsessed with 1776'. 25 Explaining the character of his friend to Bruce and Waterson, 
the High Commissioners who had battled with him the hardest, for the great South 
African statesman Churchill was 'an actor, an artist... playing his part and [whom] no 
one can stop him'. 26 For a time, however, the DO had managed to do just that, thanks 
largely to the unfailing energy of the department's personnel and the determination of 
its Secretary of State. During a period when very few dared challenge 'the rogue 
elephant', this must surely stand as a lasting testimony. "' 
But perhaps the best comment about the DO's role during the first years of the Second 
World War must surely be that made by Gerald Campbell. Until 1940 Britain's High 
Commissioner in Ottawa, but not originally from the department, he had gone to 
Canada with little knowledge of it other than the generally negative Whitehall view. 
Upon his subsequent departure for Washington, he could only conclude that 'other UK 
Z3 'Imperial War Cabinet', The New Statesman and Nation (14 & 21 February 1942) 
24 Churchill to Attlee, 4 March 1942, Chartwell Papers (CHAR20/67) 
2' Diary, 12 & 19 October 1942, Massey Papers 
26 Diary, 3 November 1942, Waterson Papers 
27 General Ismay to Brooke-Popham, 15 June 1941, Ismay Papers (Ismay V/1/13) 
219 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 
Conclusion 
departments... would have produced secession 'any day- of the week if what was once 
described to me as the "bloody Post Office" had not done a most useful job". 28 And 
whilst the general view appears to remain a blissful ignorance of its activities or even 
existence, it is undoubtedly the case that this was a department that played a major, if 
not largely recognised, role in the successful wartime management of the British 
Empire. 
29 Campbell to Batterbee, 20 May 1940, Batterbee Papers (Box 6/2) 
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An essential ooniition of imp3ricl unity 
to-dey is the lull recognition of the demand of the 
Dominions to be treated as equal in status - if not 
in stature - with ourselves as Ticrtn'. -r nt. tione in 
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not even connected With the ds;. rttent to which the Oversee 
Sattle; rant Office btlonße. no heeitttion in saying 
Chet one Secretary of 3tcte With ore it rli&L entcry Ut. der 
Jeur7ts17 snd one Berss. nent Under Secretary are quite 
inoepeble, under yreoent conditions, of Coping adequately 
with tº, e t-A. great fialde of cork vhlch vere :t present lumfli"i 
toLeethor in the Colonial Office. 
Tiers is on additidnul reason for increnein9 th" 
staff for d2F1ing with the work note done by the Loloniel 
It 
Uffioe. That is tha neoeraity_for keeping the office In 41 
d1 rent , ereona1 tcuuh both with the Domireiona und also Ri th 
the 'kork in t: e Colonies and Proteotoietas. It is most 
: teyire. ble t): at tl. a oocretc: ry of Etc to should visit at leoct 
ona of tha Dominions overt' yeart the etnev Lion the t sll t1is 
trtve1Iing should be done by the Dominion Ulnistere when 
onuavltation it rewired 1, just one of thoe. things which 
offend their eis of sect to imrlied in equal partnership. 
It to no leoe important the t sou, * Yininter should frequently 
wee for himealf t1I work in the Colonies. All this, %obriouely 
1ifl; ornfbWG under present conditions. 
A reorgan1 vt. ton whioh will etrehgthun the otflcs of 
tLe top Is urgently nieded on ptectic&l grounds of the 
ufficie, t o< nduct of the r#ork; quite oytrt from the ouneiddra- 
Lions of Dominion rentisinit aahich call for a olsarar 
sipi"ration of their rffmirs fron the control of tips 
"Colonir1" Office. On the other hand tltvrs ere considerable 
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Al'". I«I r""ýA 
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r 
ý"rý r, 13., " I )rrctIor r to t: ": C? ']- tI0-, till lu2. ProAQj. t 
«n"" r. -Vr of vc" ei. tiral;; reps rote Loº, atlitno 
ort', -n . -; ti, : l; eoreti, ry of' ! stet., it, it eE':: rr, tc 
!: %03. c. 'w, rr tc' tho ccnblhint; of ouch c Poporute office 
ntf. l. "c,, c nt)ti1 ct1"icc;, such is ti-, r, t if i"riisle Uinirter. 
i"cTei. tl, `srrctcr; ý c. r t"restdent of the Council. ! here are 
tarry ; li, "; c+d : uavti. rt* abich All elvitso, 1 think, xriks it 
A, rt ntl? ti--, t t+-. r b iiiiior. e ai,! (.:. lonioi V: Sic. Do should 
k! ro;, !- clo'e c: l; : uc!,. z'ha a. rlctinl; uo1u1: 1c. 1 Urt'iee 
:. "i hrr. r, "r r"ý : ! "<ý"rc. t ")2pr. rtnent r, ru of gQua1 nur vica to bot) 
: "ýi ccrcl., 1 n'ý:. )n"n rltvldoii : Y1t11 tit urn^cesru. ry inconroenierye 
or nelirr,. T)ij l, rono; t b. rildi1 ? or.,. n, tnotq; h icot without 
w^r. *. ct! r: '. c'1Zty, )"ourn tho c-oontit. l r+tckff.. 
'Mm , ru. "on: ýl %v1:: 1o1 I, ttilrefore, rubtait to the 
(j !vt Jr, L1" "t. «hi It" tho Ucrainiou view ohould to fully 
rrreystn#' t.; " t)-o creation o. *. a repnrate Hecietr: s-ohip of ntate 
f^t" Pntrav++r_n Afi^f z,, z. nd of r Dcminioun t"1': 'iuu, Me 
""rnotico ! r. !!; pct Of O MIS* e)-. o: 'ld bt net by ccntiruing 
t" vest ! }: o ner s, 9c"Laryelap in the arme parson uni tits 
(olorir") ^ecrete-ryo!; ip and b, retaining Lien A)or.: inione Ofiloe 
for ! sternal. rdrnlnintrntt's pL! r-, o1eIs en t. jtxL of tlio 
lcn}r, O; 1"+0,! , 
The +ctj: r; l jl-r-r-. er S: n olred r:: ulc: only be two: 
T! io firth "n) it be the rý; "ý Oý tit! ^? rý tI i 1: ' i cl l t. T Tonal. 
! "r. r! 1nnrntnr"«" Unto- Cot stcvy of Utt%t, L, " darii vith 
()ýýI"ilý. ýe Aff; 4ltr" rk? -. (1 to -0, r' Al :! ""u. n es' 1;:; si Urere. n 
t0. Je"nýtt L4T1d, i1. t. sa. .1 "eý; rýr 1". J-A e., ý, l! ttc: i re urgently 
roqutred iii any cnso. The rreoent £°4s"Li&mar: tary Under 
',, evsetnry don, not ; ttenj, t, Oi3rlonded ou loo c. li-eady to with 
to toniEtl 10ertio,, A. to tai(-l' these ratttero, an i it to quite 
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Lml Ct f-, ti o for one to otten; it to t. ivu effoctivc direct 
zupe, rvtnion to tho is%port* t A)1'c of i: czpirj t)eLtlo: naut. 
1" g+ r rl; ll tlo! ý! +l Under tiIora+cr+2'y you tä mitu rs1ly bi in the 
flop-m. of :. Ie, a:. d this would Lnt cover the pveeent 
vrintioftete. rv arrangement by whisii c: junior minister IN 
s, 1 e, tirely different office heee to trj red kobep in 
true'- with Dominion Vila t. oiopiiul R. ffnlrn. 
'th second ohbngo woul"1 Li t; kc ec'pointaent of en 
additional Psr1nnnent Under £ooroUry, to into to enable each 
! *Jill of the ror). to be dirootly in r: 1u 'gn Of it rwl of Caret 
elonr. r. bility und at' the 2"i,; hi to ujºmrxýnont, lt is 
necyr. ec, ry to ren: et. ber t1 art thu J)nirlnimv and Colonial work 
nrn smesntially different In character. as difiersnt as 
the work '01 6t. e foicigu ei'llct from trt. t or the Admlrelty. 
Th-3 Dominions work is entirely joUtiorl snd diplomitio. 
TT',, q Vr 1oniul work is a thulntstrc. tiv' U* rUrective. 1'1ºs 
one IH11n for grout iab1ghL" t i"-1 tn: intße "tnot. The other 
for ini ti ativ: t and irive. 3vß r. IT Use fotume of work were 
not, re it is. s's. r Loo : micY. f , )r ý, r, s >nm, it would oo 
prnoticallr im, Poer. ible to fing' t)oc o'r, ni ho would be squally 
tool in bot): ocyacition. L"arebti"RZ Wvh';. rever adiainietrative 
. nd policy work ui-9 tlir. et oyo, l the eAE-14P Vernon, the 
thinking ahead of policy £. iwsyil tor, C. n to &et neglected 
and ti, runt t, oiso for Lite b I)tany ncottior nnrl were urgent 
vdmtdr, tt-vtivo c1so, ir, iomie it in thi. trot which really 
un, 'orlbib- tue pru ousd GbjSOLion of ! 'ºa Dominions to the 
idea tl+ot uny uiflolul 'iiio "4mIs iLth Cntonir. l oftalro 
should daist with th iºa. 
Appendix Two 
The Scott Report 
(1925) 
222 
{ ,f I. - 
To 
%ii Right HOII. Staxl. y $aldwin, -1t. P. "9 
prtai Ntai"ter, 
31z, 
W were appointed by Tr. arury Miaute of the 
22nd January 2925, in"rtioh you stated that on the rooom enda- 
tioa of the Saorotary of State-for the Colonies you proposal I 
to NO up a Ooid $ta" to "nquis" tato the higher establishment 
of the Menial. offtoo with the following terms of reference: - 
"to oagniro . into. " and report ea* the boat form of orgaAisation for giving effect to the 
polioy of"aresting a-asoretaryship of state for. 
Dominion Relations, separate tpain (but rested 
in the some persona aeýholds)"the"offioi-ofV- 
Secretary of State for the Colonies", 
at It is uadprgtood that the object of this policy 
noe towßrds satisfying Dominion is to make a further adIT 
tooling that, so far is ppesiblso Domintop ßt0 Crown Colony 
?; gble{i "Jpµl4 be oo uideFpd throvfh diffprvnt obonnola 
1n4 by dilfpron$ perpone, We )avo aooox4ipgly kept this 
oone1Opxrtion bore Fs in rpv: 9lwILg the ýi#hj; gptabjisbuent 
of the Qp104181. pfxj0P. au4., l0 uaýI« our , rsgommqndatione. 
of We be bap the adypnt*ge o; dippupeing. the msttera 
tºris1 put 
Jo; 
per tspas 9f, frli, rpnoe w}, ti tbp a*oretsry of 
5t. te for the ColonieR?, the ;l Nentary. yaw. Pecretary, the 
fQ$tag ygriaapeut Unger BtoretaRº,, th; se of the fopr Assistant 
pnda; booreterleso, and. the V2os Chairman of the Overseas 
ßettlement pomwittps, We have also had before us the records 
of thq disaussions on thq organisation of the Ool0ntal Office 
which have *akon plgoe time to timq in imperial 
QM"erMpelot 
4. 
f proRp, al that th e. pffqýrq Of th! Dominions should 
ýo ýdýoý slýtýýý4 Qý a 4dyaxýtt .I p+ý; tmept at the colonial 
Qttioo was ýir4wlß4d at tlq Imppria, Qgftersmoe of 1907. 
LOr4 7P$4. tibon R 4e1rtook so 49 4&9arp4q %hs Dorortrnents of 
thq offXoe as %a havq a 4titinot division 4esling with the 
attal, rq. q. e tug pgloaie0 wtýk rgqponeiblq 00ye; nmentse At the 
same time he pQS. nt04 owl that thorq must b0 at the head a 
ognneoting link petwign the aeyeral pa rta, of anq ottiq*. In 
the result, the Daniniona Depfrtman% of the Qoloniul office 
as movº cQUaVitute4 oaMe $Ato 9xigtono.. 
gý The 4ulstion of Qolonial Office organleatton wes 
again brougi}j uR at the lsýgpeýýal poAterqýpo in 1911, then the 
Qoveyu unt of, Mowr Loalsnq soovgd %hq following -resolutions 
"that its In essential that the Department bf the Dominions 
"ai. m1d be eep4rated fpm `het of the Orown Qolonies and that 
"each Aopertmest i Lo. p 8joo4 udder separate Permanent 
"Under eeorstssý". ýhq Bopretiasy 0t (4 r. xgroourt), 
after describing the'organisattozi of'tbe office which resulted 
from the Oonferenoe of "196?. 'etatöd -that 
he would be prepared 
to accept the proposal to appoint a eooond"Pormanent Under 
gooretary to deal with Dominion hffsirs if it were strongly 
pressed by the 06nfarenov; 'but he. prooeetoQ to Bet out what in 
hill opinion Would We the 4l10adYMntogöa which would iooruo 
from euch an 'ärisngement; interri411y to 'the office and 
externally to the Daniniona. '" }ii 'mphiitiisa the difficulty of 
conducting-on office with "4w6 oo"oqual )ermatient heads, ''the' 
QisadO . Magd of %bd politfoul 
'bead,, vh Fis 'Iteble to ohange at 
any moment, being the only person with comprehensive experience; 
of Dociiniosi'end drown 0o1o2yr buainsrli; - 4ad"of the Permanent 
Under secretary for the . Uointniono being wholly dlyoroed from 
knowledge 
UQW164e Qi the p; pq! o$ipge fa Qrown po. onive, "froteotorotee. 
auQ o$hgr plaoUU oontipoup to the Domtiplong. Tho Ooaferenoe 
apppa; s to bav detexr9a yaf 1 to the View of the ^eoretery 
of Stata., o, qd the matt. Xap not xeeoQ¢. The Quoetion of the 
ootual orgenieation of the Colonial, Otilo9 doep not appear to 
have been rated at any eKbee%uppt Imperipl Conferonoe. The 
rooorde o; auah later dipoueltoie so have taken plaoe show 
$hat, xh$19 pominion PTiips M;. u, letere have eviioed great 
ponoe; n ap to their rpltºt}one with the Imperial Government, ands 
in partýoulur with the British Prime Lftnioter, they have made 
Apo euggeet$on that the internal orgaqteptlou of tho Colonial 
Otiioe in in need of ahun$e, " 
a$ 7hs )ºighor ? 1tubliehmont of the Oolopldt Office 
be1Qw the 3. Qx, tary of Stoty oonslstq of the fgllowing 
o tioorm ;r 
#'arlýaatentary Uiidar 9eareýaq 
1 Peý1+rie{? ý Un. 4er aooretary 
4 4ujataut Moor Seorata'riep of Btute, 
ailoeated as under - 
I to Dominions Department 
-1 to Middle Beat Depertmont 
and 2 to Orom Ooloaiaa ani Proteotoratao. 
One of thiilaat named officers is in charge 0f the'Oeneral 
Department ' to' which 'are' assigned certain subjects affecting 
all Depar$mento'of the Office, e. g. ostabliohmente, pensions$ 
patronage -ariö promotions, honours, poalal, ""copyright, 
telegraph and commercial treaties and oanventions'. together 
with a iltmbo of 'otb. r "cub jests requiring 'oentialirea trist- 
went. 
'V. In order '$0 'a'ampleti the 'picture, reference must be 
made to the Overseas 81ttlesent Department, w'hioh, though 
deriving its authority from the Secretary of State aaa 
transacting 
1 .Jý 
transaottug its business in his name, tots, in its executive 
capacity, to a large extent indapsndently of*the-'0olonial 
Office. This Department is asoistet in its work by on 
advisory Oommittee, containing both official and non-ottiotal 
elements. The 13ooretery of State is the president of the 
Comnitteet the Chairman is another Minister: The Vice 
Ohairman is the permanent official in charge of the Office. 
It is understood that this officer consults at his lisorstion 
the Ministers and officials of the Colonial Offios on any 
questions of polloy that may prise in the course of his work 
affecting the relationp between the DMinion -and Nome 
Ooverwuonteo it will be appreoiatod that the bulk of the work 
of the Ovoro. e" Botitleaent DoPartimonb-! o OQAG@ nV with emigra- 
tion to the Dominions. ' Tt to only oonoorn@4 to a amall'oxtent 
with th" Crown Oolonios and sit regards foreign acuntrie" its 
prootloe io rather to dlooourng" than'%o Iostor imisration. 
Be ? hui ab the present time the aamtul. trsltva work 
oonoerbing the Dominions tu dealt with by -a weparate ' 
Department of the Oolontal Oftioe in abarge of an Assistant 
Under ßooretery. Yho only other buetneoe of this Departments 
and of tbe oftioer in charge of its tu to deal with the affairs 
of the Oo]ontee, Proteotoretee eto, inimedtately oonttguoue 
to the Union of South Airiea and the tlomonw#olth of Australia. 
9t It will be noted that the asparsttea of the 
e4minieirettV* Mark oonneotod with Tominiöno and polo#iloe 
rONDOOl441p ; aophoM AN for ou iha rOMO iout Weir Oqqr#t(%ry, 
fq regar4o 4ubjoot aaat$ 1h+ ox turlbaw "$}p that could 
be tak"u would be to allooate to the Orown Oolonioa aide of 
aha Of4o tlýg %a r1 , 
o, oý. AýýRýi üoý. 1ý ý3R 
. 
i. 9A . "o , aou{ý 
. Li toa anQ the Oq*¢* igs. 1ýD p ý, yatý; a1 * dar äýalti with by 
the 
J 
pht Dominions Department. 
, 
Ibis arrangement hue been male 
aoiely on, ohs 
ýýroýn4a 
o! adaain#ottatir" oqýrenf, ez19 and with 
the particular object 9! segnring ýl}" full ; 990641ý1pn of 
Dominion interestq in aegisiqu of 1? 0; 40y 4 0aß thg49 
territories. 11 would th r"foye appear Of 4oulitfu, "xpgdlonoy 
to disturb are9ant arraxºgqn. u40. 
irurther reference w111 be m4d" later to thq eats 
of lbesq territorias in 0%meotIga with the tunatione of the 
Permanent Under Seprotery. 
10. A. regordg pergonnfl, $hq onj. ý fijrtber *separati on 
that soma be offs uted, would be by havifg. two Seorptarjgo of 
State, two Parliamen%arl Ufder Begreter4oq, 4 µlpd two peiýºý'ºeUt 
Under Seoretari"s. Our tgrms of roferenop imply tha 
creation of separate e"orata ehi q of Bt9te"for D"i*ion 
Relations and for the Ooloni"q<' re"speotively, th twp offioes' 
continuing to be held b7 the some. pereop, }ý tihpat 
circumstances the primary question to which we have: , 
pd4res"ed 
ourselves is ehether or not it is desirable to oPppt. t one 
or more additional Under Secretaries. '. 
11. But before discussing in detail the higher. 
organisation of the offtoe, "we 
wish to call a$tontion j0 a 
consideration affeotin$ : 
the, ' Iola work of the pepartrapn 
}s 'tano" Viso the qmbsta the 
oi the work during the iýat top u, Ne prö 4 ý*X pat 
this has inevitab} r off Id greatly. !o tbv ýº rAýyYMýý 9f 
Ministore 
'0n also been assumed that there is, no que tioo of eppriting certain 
semisos, such as the Laval' Dýpaýºtsentý"" tL" AegIatrl, the Library 
f0äerabl" additions have been lwli' i*o the alministiative staff to cope 
the iaoreg"ä Rojrk" 4 iº! 
"I and 
Mt443.. . f'Aepattuoea1; and the aids 8ettiement Depar mint there are now four Assistant Under Boar"- 
t seifis}s! 8lpr. *! . av q«gpsrq4 ! 
itb ýýo ! 11! Iiýt 
seoretar "o and eight of a rank1lýegniialent to an Assist: 
t, 
8eor"ta31 
the war, The lower administrative staff has boon very subjkjoýp, t 
"'$thsn"4. 
4 
ltiniuters and of the Permanent Ugder $eoratory. 
1$. The Irisk Free State Is nova soli-governtg 
Dominion a" Southern Rhodesia a self-governing Oolony. 
Great Britain has been entrusted with the mandates for the 
lunganyU& Territory and for spheric of the Oameroons and 
Togoland. Northern Rhodesia has also come under the direct 
control of the Office. The mandate for Nauru Is administered 
jointly by great Britain, the Oo, =onweslth of Australia, 
and the Dominion of NOW Zealand. In 1921 the Middle Dopt 
Department was added to the Office to teal with the 
mandated territories of Palestine and Iraq. That Department 
is also concerned with Aden and with questions of Arab policW. 
13. In addition to this aooosgion of territory,, other 
faotorq hale tended to swell. the volume of work, auch as 
the growing complexity of the business 4ealt with, the 
increasing attention paid to Imperial of airs and to the 
economic development of the overseas"possessions# ans the 
".., .',.. it... 
used in many Depenlenoiea for oder . $kiag arrears due to 
the war, or as In Tanganyika, for repairing war damage, 
1C. Again; teile the ffrowth of eleeiiro or partly 
elective Assemblies In the Grown Oolonies results In  ome 
dealing In the volume of routine bust ess to be transaotel 
in the Office, it also gives rise to fresh political 
problems and tends on balance to increase the number of 
questions with which the higher authorities pf the Department 
have to deal, 
tax tam nts U dor S oretar 
1ß" Äa formal allocation of any one to or class 
of work to the Parliamentary Unfer Seoretarr has, ere 
underetandf been made. Obviously the work of this Minister 
y 
for the time being must depend hu large measure upon the 
nespeotive interests and oiroumotanoss of the Aesrotary of 
state and himself. ant'it is probably true to lay that the 
tendsnoy has been for the' Parliamentary Dua'6r'aeoretary' to 
devote his time more'and more eiolusively td the affstre of 
the Orown 0olonies, Protsetoratee, wed Mandated territories. 
Thui he has been left little time in whioh to assist the 
esoretary of 8tati in dealing with workarising out of 
the Dominions Department. We gather that of late years the 
Beoretary of State bee usually dialt frith the work of that 
Department without the intervention 'of the Parliamentary 
Under Seoretiry: 
14. Another oonsegtiienos of the absorption of the 
Parliamentary Under 8eorotary in oolönial' affairs os eeenc: in 
the arrangement until rioeä$ly in foray by xdioh a ltinistär 
belonging to some other Department has taken the Obair at 
meetings of the Overseas Settlement Committee. ' 'These'Outtas 
were performed in 1921 and i929 by the pr: 
5e1t 5*earetary of 
State when holding the offioe of Pinanai'61 sears'tary 'lo the 
Admiralty. Yor a few months after 0otobor 1922, ths'Oheir 
was taken by the Paylt. 1mentary Under seoretary for the 
Colonies, and afterwards' by suooeasive'Parliamentary 
ssoretaziis to the Department af' 0Vofte: i- TrdßO, until the 
present Government *am* 'into offt6s. No tunderstand that 
the seoretary'of State himself'ba  been taking the'Ohair 
lidos äorember last pending 'the 'ooaoluwion'`öi'ither irrarge- 
mints. There is 94 reason b0 doubt that the natural end 
proper* orrsngsmont 'would' be for 'tho ohaiiýtsnehiý 'of this 
Oommtttee to b, held by a 1ýºriisaentary 1h1Qer d4oroialrýy of 
the bolodial 0ifioo. Presumably the Dominions would'share 
this opinion. 
17. 
Our invogtifatione point to tue QcUgkUaion that 
týq prypttpal 4l, voroýr of tho J? If ta ontary Uºdsr Seoretary 
from pominlou a;; and his ý. Pability to sq% as Chairman 
4te. R arq due. mfinlý to of Of overwgsi ßot44«aýnl Conn; 
44q great voLujae of gark whioh nooa. eprlly falls to )lad: 01; 
irbq Oglonial 04e, 
" _Iho 
ingreasq in repent years In the 
nux qr o. ý tarritprtaq $q lie a4minigtered, an4 the pol1110al 
an4 eqo oelio 4ev. lop9ont Qto of the old e4tablisbed 
Op1Qu10oq appWr to Lake it Imp grq_tIvq that under prgsent 
QQ14t%lona Colonial affairs should have, so far as possible, 
the undiv%4.4 attentlgn of onq )Unistar. 
18, jt.. ie gquaUF geqirab]a that g Parliamentary 
U44er &goretary ehoul4. be ßV4ijablo to 891 as Chairmen 
of the pvproeos Astjlgmet}t Oom4sittee spa to keep iq gloser 
jquoh with the York of that Deportmanj that} has been 
foeliblo. in rgoent tJme4. It gould also, no doubt, be an 
p4vantage to the ß oretgry of State, both In Parliament 
en4 Ii; tip' Depa tment i! the memo Parltomortary sear* ary 
were 019 to seetot btiq in the oogqi4oration of poat ton 
gAOqtýonr. 
j? q 14 1*a! Pf Ao abov. "oonjiaergt*ona we are 
of opinion that an gdiv1cn*l Vogt of Parliamentary Omer 
a. oretary, voujd b4 Juoeitied by ro eripg4 '91 1T sp the 
voly t. a1i4 obsrag qr of 4hp work, M! aaauma alaq that ejgh 
}4 *RPOntmeut '4our& 4 welcomed by the Doraioionj whgn its 
}yurpooo ßn4 "oopo were "xplalnodq 
E0t Althqugb, a wIU b. egou, we gontempl, to that 
quo f targontary\Seoretary would be dealing primarily with 
Dominion. and the othor primarily with oolonial affairs, wo 
do 
do not rosnms that th" divioion of dutlos would be in any 
IZN " ri#*a, "l. oo OOaa410u0 must ooous IP Paaliamont and 
ejo ox0 wipp as N94l4 be . aoituq u; 
shy other. 
919 ! 4q 4pp01uapt of a "ooond Parliamentary 8. cr. ter7 
would also BOO 4 !! "! Or to, nr; rw o TtOtts Of 0410051 
01! 1i00 JitA4pt#rv to Aifiaragt Dicta of tb" Hapiii, It Is true 
shat' so.; *; a. o Mini star'4p Oe4A1 Zrom the Oolonta]. 
out,,, he woi14 A01 provi49 th* x"lifC ok4 h appears 
dpsirsbýa. ynt päýa objootio* 1s, 1 rgoly mit by tpp puotio" 
of. aontining those vtat s to porig4 q. whu Parliament to not 
sitting. 
U. _+ har sago bon reprooont. A to us in ey14eno" 
t) st It it we#r 4e9ia. 6 $0, h4yo two Rarliumen%Fry " 
Spprotorigo$ ýt NpY1A too 401; b1 b, of adysntaaohc, when the 
8eoretery of etut" to in tue House of Go=oz one of them 
w*aa mpoabor 9C the #toUss of Lords. This body ogn$gins a 
largo aumbe' of psrpou v. ipod in Imperis7. g; iatre, m4ny of 
whom, l uye bß4 4oiu4 ßomi*istraiiya . s*poriem" $n v rlon* 
parts of the £ pars. It has been suggested that for this 
reason alone, it lo tAOOnlpnieati fo)v tho deb4te0 t* that 
Houß to be tak; u on behalf of the Government by Ministers 
of Departments other $h*u th"1 Qoloniei Ottlee. 
plf ý1°DL e. ý. A6la. lE aeo is . 
23, It to understood that unfj} 199; it weo the 
prootia" for Jbo psawp0U$ Uraper Saorqý#ry to advLog op all 
quoetigtaý pqýir& Mtnipýeýri+l anaioioiý, ý'ble proatipo, 
wo sire intor*O4, w4l 
"IMP FOG aWipd *34449M nº we3re in 
oqr$$. * asO o oºjnn}pd by 4Reýp japj V*49T 6opVjtep4g11 4i!. q$ 
to MLuioi. re1 itt ws. "Opaoially tpe vfpp .; n regpr4 t4 , 
tbo 
Orown 
Crown ldolöny ina- sit fill* 'ia. t wöik. To-dsy 'the Acting 
penffiinent Undetjoiolary ll agsili advising On priottoslly 
all. litntatertal Vapor , 0. 
ß4. the pootilon'i'o tharifori that, at the moment. 
the Perm*fInt Under deoretery In reoeivtng paperr'irom 
iour`Loatetsnt Under*Seöretartee and advising two IRInis term 
thereon: ' We doubt whether, as a pörman. nt`srringement, 
one Pe$manent Under ? aorretary ooulb be ezpiotOd, under 
m0dern'o6dttions, to, deal afteotively in the broadset sen&o 
with questions of policy Doming from four bouroes, w$thout 
any barrier or'-assistance between himself and th n, whilat 
at the-same time remaining available for frequent 
consultations with U histers end ' intorview. 'with Dominion 
and Colonial admintatratora, °'and reserving lilsura to take 
the initiative in cases where methods*of husinisa, or the 
treatmefit of particular subjects, as watoh. d from'his 
pdvotaY'posit! oa, 'seem to räquirb turther'oOrrilation or 
improvement. 
90: lie hav$ therefore reaohed the conclusion that, 
in existing oironmatanace, quite spart from iho 
desirability of meeting-Dominton sentiment. e&aie'ohangs 
in th6i'higher'organisation of, the office is rignlied'in 
Order to' rölieva 'thi' Pirnanent Under' 8ecrstary. 
U. - me*first poa ibility'is'thnt theri ehOuld be' 
two Permanent Under*Beretar1as"ot'egnal'atatus`and salary, 
snob in`obarge', of on'sitirely separate 'Department. , one, 
Under 'Secretary and . Depai4tndit would 46411 ex41uOIve1y with 
Dominion and''the Other 'with''go . onial 'aftaira. Th" arguments 
6 
in favour of this plan may be put In this way. The work of 
the office fallt battirally into these two divisions and 
therefore there should be no diffioulty in making a clean 
out. Moreover Dominion business io different in kind from 
Crown Colony business, the former being largely diplomatic 
end the letter mainly sdmintetrativo. Thus, while the two 
Departments would have some points of contact, there could 
be no insuperable obstacle to complete severance. The 
Permanent Under Secretary for the Dominions Department would 
be able to give hie undivided attention to Dominion mattere, 
and the golf-govurning parts of the 1ipire would be iinslly 
satisfied that their affairs were no longer being 
handled at any stage by officials who were dealing concurrently 
with the entirely different problems of the Dopeddenotes. 
27. We have given moat Careful consideration to this 
plan, but we are unable to recommend its. adoption. 
280 In the first place, while the distinction between 
Dominion and Crown Colony work is well-founded so for as it 
goes, it can easily to over-emphasised. The points of 
contact and the oases of overlapping are both numerous and 
iepdrtant. For example, to refer again in more detail to the 
territories mentioned in paragraph 9t the problems arising 
in the three Protectorates which geographically form 
opolaves in the UuIon of South Africa, and in the PaoIfis 
Islands which form a group of Dependenoiee adjacent to the 
Commonwealth of Austral$a, cannon we oeeume} )e considered 
without the utmost regard being, paid to, t2}o vtows and 
suaoepo1ý11ttiesot phone two 4niops? 
29, Or again, take the question of a naval base at 
Singapore. Sere both the Paolfio Dominions cna the Par 
]ait. rn 
lautern Poeeeeaione are vitally interested. The Vuoi4tion 
iu-alsa. hownd. up witok"s. gsneral subj. a$ ot. th" aetanos of 
tb. Mo»1n as -" vk9lov- --S rthsr, -ap. rtleap the"aattsra Rbiohl 
of ay. bAye alnody NuOitnad.: it has boon foRn4 . Swoon eery to 
ar4a tq Ui. ßaxasýL DpP isutý more-are wnumbar of . 
htdh1Y i* moat u4 . gontrQTqrstal Au`4egt, " ohigb Iatieot 
D '+Ngt1qs1 y $. b9 whQl4". IiD; rT" au . 9h 9o. Ui 
tY. 4d , n%ol. oatITS 
ragqq pýiý1 "4agaaýo 
. 
IaQI397. (p. i. i'ýcptýrv tP. a i" .a, 
itPýtlflýr 
oýgRR17/. tQuq iý, ionin6l e0 uti "u; ). tar 4ý. B*o Aý : ýh" 
work% all Uope. * ttore must requiro the moat careful 
oo-ordtr; atioxq in, troll r ýlýaý 1`ta69e" 4; 24_'W9 . '9444043F 
It 
"ogentla] tb4ºt,. whon U-ntytgre goxe to oonRti4r": gWe4tlon9 
eýfaotý. ý4W:. bAýb.. tWiý1 e Sýýotýiº Q4ý4ýºýall. ýiX .. iýhýaýa 
hayq r t1. bl" t$p , 
ýyý 9at a44 q pe: ýe? ý9 R# ýjýe.. ýosginent 
A4T1aar.. *#ooo mcit X44q., oyor q whojo. Rf4ýo!: lx4.4f to thus 
ob1 tq de; } authoritatively with ouch problem a In their 
two-144 aeDlýýte .. 
*Of, IA 
o loe mp ug4Payut, lie ? try ao*V idtzt aq, 4ý ýt Mpn14 
in *AY 4aM" b" , oao" 1o ; 4ý. rý4" oq +on @ervAge. @.. "uqý, ýNP 49,841 
ý1roýr *nt8. iýoaýýltsY. , "toý.. or 1rQ. +F. ýtpý . tbp 9x'r lttýlalý1... 
wLulý4by %ho Mr ; n4v, 1ýioa, ýýA ý. , 
1a 
. x. lxRýiie . 
t.. Px aýýl" 
014104 of' a. 1 l4, . 
i! ; v0ar494 ý.,, ttý9h! P4ýýýt. b!, ýr+ý! =º 
.d #ý4srn. t xta qt. Äý,. pýtýlipP" -.. t mil.; ý! PaQ lý. toýloý! ,. 
that ogo. gX. ýAý P"rgw ýt .) 4or Ooor"t, ýxi"r'ýaxid . 
d"tioito1y. eW. yo t, o . 0ý 1xß vbýor'it0 of . qi; low ., trraAgoaº", oºao. ;a 
2 . io waul4 Qbrtou. 1x ys"ee4t "4tftiou1tivr. : Ma to*bt, - glr. n 
"q IGIO sQ4oi/. b9$wve;. tä4 two40'sou t0G409 leot'oterlee, 
tbo arxen 44 j echt worst. but oboeaoe c of., riot10o taume0 




t9r difference of opinion mu. It arias sop as to allooation 
of statt. We hard no hesitation in saying that it the two 
i. ` s. rti c 
Parnanent Under ßeoretarioe were unable to agree on office 
mattoru, the ottioienoy. of the Department could not tail to 
be seriously tr aired. 119 as May be asauped, the 
Dominion. Under 8eorata was rogardod as senior to his 
ool14agus, this difficulty would be "zr haeiaed, by the 
fact that the Dominions Statt would tone only a small 
part of the whole. 
31. We cannot therotoro recommend doubling' the post 
of Permanent Under Secretary Of Btate. Arm the point of 
view both of oo-ordinati-vn and of office management, w= 
consider it as: iential that the re°iponei'bilities of 
the 
" .c . 
'" 
.".: 
A: r .'". t. 
i t. 
Permanent Under aeoretary should remain in the hands of 
one person. 
13149 But we think that it is pousibls to devise a 
method of 'relieving the Permanent Under B4öx"etary* gros 
what appears to us to be his preuen' over-burdenoA position 
without in any way dorogating from pia ultimate reponsivility 
for the'rhöle otEoe. " Our rnoommendation Is that there 
should-be a Deputy Under Boorotsry of Btate", ranking'bilow 
the Purmanint'Und'sr ßeöratary and' abov ' the' 4aiiatent Under 
Sioretaries. thi's would be -in odditiönsl post"bn' t)ia 
is-iii, 
of the existing organtaati"on. It 'Is' true" that 'ths' IUthorised 
establishment' of thi" ottibe alreeäy provO*p' for an" ottieer 
of the rank and paj'ot lbpnty Under ßeoratary; but' in fact 
the. officer' she 
theld`'the 
poet until reoontly did not normally 
sot as Dapu, 1y,,, büt as one' öt' thi' lips 'of L. i tstäi4t Vnielr' 
8eor6tarioa, On the tranpt. r'bt this oftieeO't 'other duties 
the poet of "Deputy'wer left 'niitiliotl`o tut i Ziror{oltan was made 
to the rank of Äauiutant Under Bearetery: 
330 We have no intention of att5Jting to lgy. 6qa4 the 
Jreoiee 
a 
pr"oiso canner in whiob the reapeetive work of the Permanent 
Under eaoretary and-his Deputy should be arranged. That 
meat remain ea entislly a matter for'mutsal ariangemant and 
oonsultation, but certain pooº+ible'linir'ot'approach emerg"& 
from our enquiries. The Yernýinont nadir 8ebretery would no 
doubt oontinuo to be stainly occupied with the large questions 
of : polloy asiairig on the 'Dominion aide, and it uonid appear 
theS his A-putt' oonld afford hits the graategit wasure of 
relief by bekin« oft' his hendo the bulk of the ju. otion's 
which ariuu out if the Orown Colony work. We Buggeut that 
the Deputy Unflat 4agrttaq. -m 4 ýý1,, ýbl fiwaýtly to mettle 
or to sand ; orwprd tq thf 
W 
and iý mýary u#td ;.. , ßt+4rgta º on 
the Oolonipl aids the bulk oý thcoo PPP9P.,.. 1{p wCuld" aenQ, 
forward Vo the Pofmpnont tindtr BgorAtýtý, p. Qr ppi ult hlat is 
regard tot Much gUeatlone plQ 1e ate inroi. yp4.18u ee of t} 
highoat iapprtanoa from the point of Yips of Oolonlel 
admini: 4trutiou or had ytaotiona iºpon Dowir14.9n Policy. Buob 
an orrungomont would not of oourue prpol%kdo gi-plvtore from 
gonauiting the ktrwnnont Under Boorotory on epy. qupetiop 
which had not oomq to them; thro gh him, . 
no rtqult. ot them 
prranoemonte ahonld be thatý; wh$lot tho Per z. t, Vpdey 
Beoretury goUld by oontultation and the rgqeikt o; ipfgr"- 
tion keep in touch with purely 0oloniul quodtione, and could 
himuelf doalwith the mout important of L2rm ou thNl= nay 
to Miniatora, he would be relioved ci thq bulk 9f , 
Orown 
Colony work and freed for thu aooro gffsotiye goncidtration 
of Dominion problems. 
34. We venture to think that, No far as the Dominions 
take an intorout in the internal org4niuation of the goloni 
Ofiioa, they are muoh more oonoeru d with the distribution 
ltiniistorial funotionu than with the urrangomtut of the work 
betweon 
c 
between permanent officials. It this Is eon the appointm-int 
of an additional Parliamontary Under Secretary, primarily in 
oonneetion with Dominion affairs, would appear in their eyes 
a more important event than anything which might happen to 
the PermaLnent Under 3eoretaryahip. But we assume that it 
would be not unploaaing to the Dominions to feel that in 
future the Permunent Under Secretary would have more leisure 
to devote to the problems in which they are interested, owing 1 
to the appointment of a Deputy to take Off his hands tho bulk 
of the Crown Colony work. 
Di e bealatant U dar B oretariee and 
OM Y VS 8. " 
D. If our rooommandation* for the ajipoin$ment of an 
additional Parltumontnry Under Soorstery and o Deputy Under 
Eleor#tary were adopted and it were found poaei)le to allooate 
thq work bet4ºeon the Permanent Under Beoretary and the Deputy 
an auggosted above, it Is assumed that in future the Aeaietant 
Under : ooreteriee dealing with the Crown Colonies and the 
Middle ! mat would submit their oases to the Dep)ty Under 
Seoretary, und that the Assistant Under Booretery In charge 
of the Dominions Deportment would oontinue to oonsult the 
Permlknent Under 8eoretory direct. Oar. enquirie" did not 
proceed auffloiontly far to enable us to express an opinion 
upon the number of adeietant Under Beoritaries that would be 
appropriate to the new arrangements recommended. still 
lese are we in a position to offer any observations on the 
number or funotione of the Assistant 8eorgtariva. But 
after experienoe has been gained of the now organiration 
of the highest poets in the office, whatever form that 
reorganieatio. i may take, we venture to suggest that it 
would be desirable to direst an enquiry into the 
administrative , 
", ' i ý` I 
G 
adlßäniatrativo ao`*Dliabaent a" a who1e. Ia ordsy 1o ii. 
AU)th*3r W7 Otors$tQn at pitjsborii, or o geu In soap* q 
datiori or In wtba4e of "o*, or arraogownta of the bustueaa 
of the office ars dsairaple in the interests of efficient 
exºä economical "dm4nistration" 
We or*, ßir 
ýarflflt . TQos' ob*dlmt 
R. R. SCOTT. 
H. P. HA1TILTON. 
R. V. NIND 11OP9INS. 
4. .. 
LOth , brusyr, 1954. 
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The Dominions Office' 
March 1940 
Square brackets denotes salaries; * denotes serving in UK High Commissioners' Offices in Dominions 
Q Secretary of State [E5000] N. E. Costar 
R. B. Ewbank CSI, CIE 
Anthony Eden MC, MP (temporary) 
J. J. S. Garner 
-Private Secretaries [£700] 
W. J. Gamett MBE 
N. E. Archer OBE W. G. Head MBE 
H. T. Bourdillon G. Kimber 
Rear-Admiral Arthur Bromley CMG I. M. R. Maclennan' 
J. P. L. Thomas MP (Parliamentary/unpaid) J. R. S. Macleod D. B. Pitblado 
Q Under Secretaries of State 
N. Pritchard 
R. R. Sedgwick' 
G. E. Boyd Shannon ' 
The Duke of Devonshire (Parliamentary) [£1500] A. W. Snelling 
Sir Cosmo Parkinson KCB, KCMG, OBE (Permanent) G. W. Tory 
[£3000] (serving with HM Forces) 
Q Deputy Under Secretary of State Q Assistant Principals [E275-E625] 
Sir Eric Machtig KCMG, OBE [£2200] M. E. Allen 
E. Anstey 
Q Assistant Under Secretaries of State (serving with HM Forces) 
[£1700] H. T. Bourdillon 
D. G. Brock 
J. E. Stephenson CVO, OBE (serving with HM Forces) 
P. Liesching CMG Hon. F. E. Cumming-Bruce' 
J. M. C. James 
Q Assistant Secretaries [El 150-El 500] Miss E. S. Nicholas MBE 
P. Rogers 
W. Bankes Amery CBE H. V. L. Swanzy 
(seconded to Ministry of Food) 
E. L. Sykes 
M. E. Antrobus OBE (serving with HM Forces) 
(in Dublin with the UK Representative to Eire) 
N. E. Archer OBE Q Staff Officers [E550-E6501 
C. W. Dixon CMG, OBE 
W. C. Hankinson OBE, MC' E. A. Brett 
S. L. Holmes MC R. L. Dixon 
C. R. Price R. A. Hamblin 
H. N. Tait CMG W. E. Noall MBE 
R. A. Wiseman CMG 
Q Accountant 
El Legal Advisor 
W. G. Ives MBE [£650-£750] 
Sir Grattan Bushe KCMG, CB [£1400-£1650] 
Q Registrar 
El Principals [E800-£1100] 
H. W. Thompson MBE [£400-£525] 
P. A. Clutterbuck MC' 
B. Cockram' 
' Source: The Imperial Calender, 1940 (London: 1940) 
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[Source: Joe Garner, The Commonwealth Office, 1925-68 (London: 1978) p. 433) 
Dominions Office 
(circa. 1928) 










Irish Free State 
Economic 
Overseas Posts 




Union of South Africa 
High Commission 
Territories 
[Source: Joe Garner, The Commonwealth Office, 1925-68 (London: 1978) p. 4331 
Dominions Office 
(circa. 1938) 
Secretary of State 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
Permanent Under-Secretary 
Assistant Under-Secretary Assistant Under-Secretary 
Dept A. Dept B Dept C Dept D 





High Commission in Canada 
High Commission in Commonwealth of Australia 
High Commission in Union of South Africa 
Dept E 
Migration 
[Source: Speech by Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, " 
October 1939 (Avon Papers, University of Birmingham) AP2017/51A] 
October 1939 
"The permanent staff of the Dominions Office consists of a Permanent Under- 
Secretary and two Assistant Under-Secretaries of State; below them the Office 
is divided into five departments: 
Department A deals with Political and Constitutional Questions of a war aspect, Foreign Affairs and 
Publicity. It is responsible for making the necessary arrangements for the discussions being held in 
London with the Dominion Cabinet Ministers. It works in close consultation with the Foreign Office 
and arranges for the supply of information on foreign affairs to the Dominion Prime Ministers; 
telegrams reporting the latest developments in the international field are sent to the Dominion 
Governments daily. This department also maintains close contact with the Ministry of Information 
and arranges, in co-operation with the Dominion authorities, for the dispatch of material suitable for 
publicity purposes. 
Department B deals with General Naval, Military and Air Matters, Communications, Civil Aviation 
and Censorship. It maintains close contact with the Service Departments and handles all questions 
relating to the military effort of the Dominion Governments. It will be appreciated that the closest 
consultation with the Dominion Governments is required as to how best to co-ordinate the 
contribution which each of them can make to the common cause. This department is also responsible 
for sending daily to the Dominion Prime Ministers an appreciation of the military situation. 
Depart deals with War Trade, Shipping, Contraband Questions, Exchange Control, Supply 
Questions (including munitions), matters of Export and Import Control and War Legislation 
regarding Shipping and Finance. This department works in close collaboration with the Ministry of 
Supply, the Board of Trade, the Treasury, the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Shipping and the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare. The contribution which the Dominions can make in supplying food- 
stuffs and war materials may well prove to be decisive, and careful forethought is required in 
planning ahead the arrangements to be made. There are at present War Missions in Canada engaged 
in negotiations with the Canadian government and the Dominions Office acts as a clearing house for 
all correspondence with the members of the Missions. 
Department D deals with Newfoundland, Southern Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories. 
Department E deals with Political and Constitutional Questions (not having a war aspect), matters 
connected with the League of Nations, Treaties, Migration work and various miscellaneous 
questions. This Department is also responsible arranging, so far as the Dominions are concerned, for 
the distribution of presents and comforts to men serving in the Forces; as is known, there have been 
many generous offers of assistance in this way from bodies and persons in the Dominions. This 
Department is also responsible for the arrangements in connection with the establishment of the 
Empire Societies War Hospitalities Committee. " 
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"1 }'KOIVMl, ! ºTi'I'. 1JDI: AJW Nf2. ý: PA! JO 105 0? 't l DO I11IQa2 
III 'ell:: r: V"trýJT OF º' . 
The object of thin memorandum in to- indionte the.. 
atnto of propnrodnnuu for czar of the vnrioua Dominione" on-: "' -" ' 
the 1; enornl linon of the npprocintion of the position of the 
United Kingdom and. of coxtnin- fopcri fig " countrie© oontained_1n_^ 
C. I. U. papor-13(16.13. --- Ilofora dnnl-i-nK with-tho-dotailed--= -- ;- 
aituntion au z gr: rdu pui'nonnol aril r. ntorial, it In desirable 
. to attempt aorno eatinatu of 
the probability thnt the 
Dorrtiniona generally and individual -Uoininiono -in. particular-.. __ 
L. 
could in feat be prepared to co-"opornto with the United' " 
Kin, vdom in any mrinwhich the lnttor"miiht-"be-engngad#- 
T1fl ATTITUDE' OF i "t U"i 
TO 11jjRT1OIJ1AXjOjJ Ill Wj 
:;. It in not poaciblo to-define-in--general the. . 'prob- 
-attitude of the Dominions, but it may "boenid 
thai.. the 





In any conflict in which the United Kingdom Were ongaigsa' ; r. 
(und in come canon oven to consider themselves in a:. stat 
of bollI ronoy would do and, at leant ', t, P in oertain' ofhe 
Dominions, greatly on the origins of the oontliot,, j'and; möi+etir', 
--- -- -Particular], y-on-Lhe-ut-ti-tudo-odop-tocl-by4fi"S; int" II 
mont in-tho United Kingdom during the ©t U age "beröreý*1xi, heýr 
actually been declared. If viar came about artör ä'prölö b. 
"- 
period oc negotiation under League of riationa , ma, ohinery; 1 





nil! and at least, ono Dominion'-no a Member of " the (bunch : tiid4: 1 
acting with the *United 1. ingdom in , agroat oomtiinocl;;: (fort 
peace and if the enemy country Tiere an indiepütablcaggro 
in the senao of the Covenant of the -the KeY1ý League" do °"ý'' `' 
Pant, it in difficult' to suppose that the United", K not 
not have . 
the- aotive eupport, of the " Dominions goner illy". ý +' 'rY 
fir: ýS , 
course; it the 'dispute which led to the violation ok; ý}ib ý :;; wes ;" 
J}"tIf 
} 
' ',. -ri'" "ý"Ji 
t,. fya51 
' 





panne rrau one in v; hi ch 'ono or more of the Docninione ma 
:, ctivoly intoro:: tocl, thin vioulrl no doubt havo a most j otont -"- 
uffoct to (Iooiclini the attitude of the Dominion or Dominiono 
concarnod). If, without filly fluch lporiod of nogotintiona, 
there wore a direct attack on the United Kingdom itself, 
nomo at any -rate of the Dominions could. _be, relied.. on 
to "'i 
corno to the aid of the Unitod Kingdom, If, however, there 
: rcie no auch direct attack on the United Kingdom 'and the %var . 
'' 
aomc purely K`uro onn corrnnitment of Ilia ".; c. lcvolo cl out of Pb purely P 
lla jc: cty' a Oovurnmont in the United Kin;: dora, to which-. the. = '- 
liominiorra worn not partioa, und without demo pravioue period? 
of Loal; uo-or__other.. international- offorta_onrbQha3f__ofpeaoe_. 
in vihioh the Dominione had been co-operating with the United-; -`y 
Dominion or 
J; ingdom, thorn might well be uoineLDominiono from which it 
: rouild be impoeoiblo to expect moral uupport-y- still lees aotl 
ö 






TI ' TT TU 0' 111DIVIDUAL DOMINIONS 
1 PAliTICIMI'1014 IF V" AIR 77 
3. Auatrnlia and New Zealand would 'not dlapute : that, ý" 
if the United Kingdom were at vary they, alao, ae ldemb4r6"., bt'i: ' 
the British Oomonnvalth of Hationa would be 
. 
at`'wai%'q: j inQ ' 
i'ttrther, in any tnajor war in which it : waa clear hat1Qereät3ý. 
' 
+ 'Try ':; 'j'h: ':;, "., 
r ti 
would mean dioaotor for the United Kingdom and cone' 
11Z 7 ;;; 1 It 
for the British Hupire an a' whole and all the i"dealn; 9br, - 051. r, 
I 
ioh it etanda, they could be counted. on to. oo-operiito to- 1 %Ih 
the full extent of thoir* available reaouroee. 
t'1vY"''ýCC 
.'- In-thli oae X" "' ýý 
I' Oid 
of ITori Zealand sloop it muot be remanbered 'that the. prenöuta 
Labour Government is a supporter of the principles 'öz oollebtt 
aeourity and of international aceietanoe to vi'ot a-0. 





























the nct; reuoor. 
4. The position of Canndtj would be much more doubt 1. 
'1'hcro is n. uootion of opinion in Canada which holdu that it ' 
ºwould be. pöaciblo for Canada to be completely neutral when 
the United Kingdom- uan at wnr andp even if the Canadian 
Uovcrnmont dlO not adopt thf cxt-tarne vioºrnnd-T; ere --: -- : ` 
rofai od to accept the technical belligerency of Oanäda. ' TI".; j ýýý r. : ': ý. 
the extent to º"ihich_Canafla ºvould be likely to participate; ' 
ýý- actively in the war would depend . on circumatancea. The I. 
attitude or the United Stntoo would largely affect that of, 
Canada, : if . 
tire _United Jtrºteß ticrýro takinL up it position 
ör f"' 
inolntion from what thoy rogaraed an a purely European 
quarrel, the active intervention of Canada would be "rendered;?: "'. '. 
extremely difficult, more oepecially if' there were a., proepeoI;; !. ' 
of the existing United Utntua Neutrality lorialatior _being. 
3`'ý' 
applied to trade with Canada. What would be most likoly''to: ': '; 
bring Canada erhole-heartedly into the war wöuld be a 
conviction that the war represented an attack by. the` eýýemy'ý';,. f 
Power on the ideale of freedom and, democracy arri+ thät: ttie +, `" 
kr 
ry f". '. .' tl, 
ý 
.; " "%X'! '`'ß: 1 
ý4. 'i 'fi' I. 
survival of those k ideale might bo gravely of aliýaredlý 
the failure of Canada to co-operate 1it1, the no " .º" , , ;. f, ý 
in their defence. 
The Union of South Africa would definit l : 'ý' e y' hold: ." ' . +iJ.. '7 
that it" viao poncible for the Union to be com el'!: ' '+ l I''hout tely; . . p e J r 
when the United Kingdom was. at war (thoughf it lib . 'ýx '4;! 
_v 
1 1 . 
`: 
-. 
ued in the Union that this w r ld t 
e `tlý ýI 
K t_ 
a g ou no . pr. oiud 
ý' I r ý use of E3lmonatown by the United Kingdom when? ar) ; 
; ýt! ý 
; 
"British" section of the . population would doiibtleaýý be;: 




ý''' r" 1f; 41' " iýi I P. i `irr 
to come to the aaaiatanoö of 'the United " Kingdomýinjeiý. i: ' 
v: 
7ý 
ý. +rý: " 
ni n= ld ' 'b t t - d ll ý i 
ýf 
'E e o "ýrro 
; genera u ,r anger, u y. he U o people " of.. "th ! fi 1'I. f 'jý 11 . F, 7 
swayed by a 'ooneideration of this nature. Mo 
41'p'! 
gcncrully the uttitude of' tha Union in internntional-affairs 
is njinpathotic townrdn Ucrinany and critical of France* . ..... -ýý--FT 
'Mint, eroulcl be moat likely to decide the nttitude of the 
Union would ba the probable effect of the -vrnr on Africk, --- 
If there wqrp n direct threat to the- Union, nntural, ýy the 
Union viould nct_in self-defence. In the abeenoe of ouch 
77 , 
n direct threat, if it upponrod tlnit tlufro teas a oorious -ý "_ 
rink that . the war might rocult in the mergence or 
-* 1' 
ý, j,:. rnndiacrnunt in Africa of u utrong and militant foreign 
Power in a position to threnton n Union which would be lott', 'I, 
to itn drin rocourcou : fop it u*-dofonco i tho =Union=woult1 =- 
ý, 
probably bo prepared to co-operate with the United Kingdom; 
thous; h even in thi o cane it io noat unlikely that' th Uniöh-; '-, '` 
-;: oulcl be urilling to tn1to any n'--tl- outoiae the litnite; of., z, ktl ýa 
t 
Africa. 
G. The attitude of the Irish Free 9tato vrould± 
depond 1 
to a very great extent upon the general relations between . 
°' 
the Uniton. Kingdom and the Iriah Free State existing at" the ". 3" 




: ýi,. ý;. 
ý.: ,, ý:, 
, ý;; . 
111 
It.. ý 
not ýoimit tho territory _tlie Irish Free State to b 
ac n baoo for attack upon Great Britain by a hostile* Power.; f; 
but, if the oxiating dispute between the United Kingdom-.. and " ;: ";. 
A 
tho Free State ranainea unnoLtitea, . 
1L would bo. usoleea. 'to" 
o$ cot much more than thin or, to look for any extoneilºe 
ý: ý;;; :. ""ý; ý jet;; ,r; {, 
ý 
monaure of active co-operation from the Free State Uoverirn ie t, ` 
and . 
thore to indeed the pöesibility that in eitoh`'oiröt 
ctnncoo the Irish Free State micht definitely deolarei its 
neutrality. At the same time, there are signs thdtt' the 




nations involved in the emergence of dictator 
Atatäe 
d0' -, '; ,. 
}f:. 
if the Irish Free Btato felt thn1. its own position Wee , it: i ;?; ":; ýý; ý 
": 
" : q" ý, 






lrrunpcctivo of the dioputo with thio country, to take- ouch 
:: ºunuuruc of dofenoo no it cont3idoi"od doniPable in Ito oral, 
inturu: a. If, on the other hnnd, a general eottloment rrith:... 
the Irioh Frbc Stnte wore i oachocl, it ohould be' poaeiblo, an 
pc: rt of ouch n oottlement to arrive at- ©otno--urnlorotanding-- ----ý' 
rrlth the Froo Stnto Government Ill rýýärcl tö deföfioe--'-- 
co-opo3"ntion in'. *-time of tsar. 
-----_---_-----ý---Tý 
, 
. Iý fý"_ 
ST1HEUOT11 OF THE' V; J IOii i DOMINION. YQRQI: ü 
7. The following 
"pura:; 
raphn dive the latoot it vailnble 
figureo of protcont strength of the forooc of 'the vurioue 
Dominiono und Southern ithodeoin (and in come canoe poeaible. , 
h' 
dovolopmontc) arul particulärr au to =Lli'e=ý itiýnn öf aÖ1Yi s 
n1ffA 11 A "2.. ' ... aLgy ! 
p. Royal Canadian ilavy: 
4 debtroyrdrä.. _ .. .- --_. 
-.. o} 1 
1 trawler mineowaoper {yR' 
3 auxiliary voneelo. 
(The Canadian üovornmont are considering t}ie 
.. i. :,., Y.::.: 
riurchnno of two more dentroyors from the Royal Navy 
year and four modern minooweopera are being conetruoted.. " t: " ,. " ,. ý(ý 
locally). 
Pormanont Force 4, £36 ý_ . `4ý s'" 
Bon-I'ormanent Militia 45,340 
All man between 10 and 60 are liable , 
tor; abrvfiöeý'{ t. 
ýtf 
in and boyond Cnnada in defence of the Dominion:, .' 
Iti` Dblioe 
ý, " ý, "Al: .: 1 
time rnoruitmont in on a voluntary bnoio, but there la . t-.: 







ýý ý ý ýja 
1 ýý- 








!: +i E: lv 
Air Force: 










11111 "ýw. ý" ". ýý.. aý. 1 .. ý... w +w . l*w wow flit I`t a 'tit. w. l 1.. /'I .. M t.. lw . 1ýýt. I.. .v il+a At .. 10- .I -II 
oboolouccnt. . 
(According to a rooent ctntornont' by the Miniuter 
c'f Dofo»oo the Canadian Air t'orco is to be inoraaood by 
. LVr -IIGb/ IIVi-Vil. L UII1: U bV VU N1U11LLL UUNUI-ULL J4 VU41UUU LLU"-liljj 41ºp 
current financial yonr). 'ý" 
ALI4 ;. " UR 
9. Royal Auctralian Navy: 
4 cruisers 
77- 1 flotilla lender and 4 dentro ers. ' 
1 seaplane carrier 
2 sloops `, 
1 survey shin 
1 oiler 
One of the cruisers, the "Auntrcilia"", a dr ei to t 
be modernized and the actual number of ships in comfiiosion" 
113 
"1 'ý 'fir 1. 
3 orui uero 
1 flotilla loader aril 2 destroyers 1jß;: ý'ýý; ý . }'" 
2 sloops ,: i ;. h 
}ýi; y; ""a. ý 
1 survey ship. 
Pannanent" Forces " 2000 
, 
. 
Militia (Oitinon Force 
, ... 
ýý "ý;, ; 
rte 
Th ti ' fo i d ' 
h 
e pence me rce s ea ign6A to toz it 
nuoleuö of a Field Army of ß . cavalry and 5 irifahtry v? i 
All b t 18 G l * e men ween- and. O are iable, -in, time 
serve in the Citizen Forces, but this jläbility;; Qöeo 












ý, 1 1 1 ý . 1 
1,1 
/{ 
At ? P. 7W1 
oxLc: nc1 to ccrvico beyond tho limito of the Convnonwcnlth. 
Co: npulaory ocrvicu in peace tlr. io hnc+ been euapondod cinöe 
1: º: 'ý 
I 
I.. 
" Air force: :{ "ýýý 
B oriuadrone with a fir:: t_lin©.. atrongth-or-- - -' - ' 
Z, 
4iG aircraft. 
(It is. _iiopod to form 9 more equadrona with' a 
c: trancth of 10: 3 aircraft, making a total first lino ctröi'iýth " 
of 190, by-the end of 1938). 
NEW ZLALArry 
10. -- TTst1-Zonicklid" UiVi ©iörý of " the oýralýNavys-ý- _- :;:.,. .. 




1 mineawooping trawler 
1 depot ohip .'' - .! 
Anny: 
ReGular Forooa 542 




The peace time force is designed 'eo as to 
capable-i-n-t-ine-of-way--of-e1ndi , 41 
mounted rifloo division and 1 mediun artillei'y;. 
brigide p1ua '+ 
coast defence troops. In time of, war all men betweeri 17 
Ware ,. inble to nerve in any part of New Zealand jbut üoäýüöt 
be oompolled to norvo outside it. Oompüloory'nervioe 
peace time hen been suoponded ainoe 1930. 
Mr" Force: ýý ti 
ý" ih'{ 
0 flights of bomber 
4aircraft, 






i nuoleue flight (9' Bairey. III -I? ) for 'nay slily 1. 
i, 
co-operation. 21 . s: 
Some training aircrart. i 
" (In ;K. 
*j 
I vi., 1. i, 11 
a 
.1 








(In ncoordcunco Y"Ith tim recor. unondation Of tho - "'ýy 
Coclirn»e Roport, it lino boon (locided that the Ne w Zonland 
Air Forco uhall concint of 2 por'ianent squadrons of medium 
bomber nii"crni't, with the nocoeuüry rocorvco and repair 
- i'ncili tiou, to be rencly by the- end - of-1039. - -- - --- 
-r, - * 
UNION 01` SOU 'VII %Vill lº 
_. .. 
"11. Arm : -_ 
"' " 
Permanent Porn o' 3,017 
' ' Conet Uarriuon i; i Force " P. 
, _ ": =i 
- ý- 
Active Citi:, on Force 13,6116 "" ' `! "1 
-. inolucling-Air--Foroe--poreonnolr. -____ ._ '- : -- 
Every citizen between 17 aM 60 inclusive in 




ii., 4". yam. t; 
Vif' j( 
of- the_. Union_in__nny_part-oi-_. south__Africa_Mhotheia_wittllri_o 
outaido the Union. The pence time force is, reoruit'ed::; '.,, "'j. Ih`t' 
primarily on a voluntary basis but should' there be an 
insufficient number of volunteers it "onn be 'completed: to' 
1.... m 





(The Union Government have bought 100 i'"Hartf"'ý' . . i, '1i4Rt14tf "ýj' .. 
ý 
9ý ! 
aircraft from the United Kingdom Government and are *;, ' ?ä 
constructing (apart from the. engines) , 100 more for:. traiýi T. 
, ýrý{", ". t17 purposes). 
r'" "bfr: 
181811 FREE 8TA 'r t` ;. G ='ý. r F' 
t., ±. i . 
T. " 1ý 
, f" t't' . ý"tyý 
12. AMx: 
Regular Forces G 9853 4 
Volunteer * Lorca 1©, 000'', 
: 'y`, 4ity a it 
' r. "lyt 
, 
fir 'ý"". 
Srýiy Ipý`ý` `, 
1 
_ ". ".;. ý 
; r;. i;. iky', yý ýys rim " ". .... t 1' .... ý..... _ a 
"ý,. 
..! "i:. ^.. t.,. AP. ="ýr: 1Vii%$. i_, ', t3iLp'i{57.. " .1F. " 
Iýýs 
. 
I. ", L 
4ý ,4 a. 
ýi t. 
Air Force: 
1 oquiudron with 4 aircraft capable of 
uoo in war and 14 suitable ibr uöe in, 
w:, '^" '" 




Pormsüont Force: - 
---- -ý ý"; Iý 'f. ' 
(ýt) 3. t1. A. Police 557 
(b) Staff Corpa 70 
J`tl 
Territorial Force 602 Z 
Air Force: 
6 aircraft (ltnrta) to bö' üeed =ý`ör-ý ,. ý", 
".,, . ý; .,, ý rar:. 
training -purpoooo. 
All citizens are liable to compulsory aerviäe. 
in dofonce of the. Colon; '. f1 o, peace time foroo_ia_, 
recruited primarily on a voluntary bneic, but --ehouldý>; ihereý"i 
ýI ?~' 
be an inouifficiont number of volunto©re, it can be'; b'roiýtOhtý 
up to ontablinhnont by ballot based on compulsory service. iý%ý; i 




Procedure for the 





_-v1 =ý. tuß; December, 3.9li7. 
-- 1 
Dear Edit ä1ä, 
Y enclose 'A copy of the oemorand*t a on p rooslu" 
for 
. 
do4 orwtion of rar revised oa i rssui $ : -or - tbj --_---: - 
aisonsslaa in Dottsrbo lo room yestor&V. 
- Af t-týti- , Apo now, - 
. Dattsi S has drafted a aeaorasndu* wes osr ein wider 
gnastiaa" relating tots possible attit of the 
' -_ 
4 Dcainior s in time at tar, with the Idea ti*$, itthe . 
esöratair at alai, approves, the'rttar eigbt. ös 
äisanaeSd, with flaky a" Vroba11Y ritared,. to a, eei*l 
iataýr 4ayarInatal Or'sittis. " P+ýadia1 a isiýw r 
this pesUci*a S_at. _AOt pray sthg - 
tsý: -. q .: tie 
in raged to 1bß Qaitioa of pros. turn reftrr. * to is. 
the nr... nt mmmmmduma 
Ii" 
. 
aý ! 'ort r "t. ps ar 1ýfi1ý wirrt t'-_ 
1-- . 
sh Dat$" bsu' " Ott tý tim 1ý iriºý ý 
Q1MaNtm with sm as to its 04multlr " 




ýr . _.. 
yrolioimaNT to $ gab-_a didoaesioo. -we should be gsýltot*1 - 
it nm could let us )mvs Jour "iIss cm the artgat to 
-- e°hioh aoýan -Certain asttsre rotted " in ýtbo Ist 
look soal& be tebso in a Doainieu i! Mit D 'tnian Iren 
noottal in u. ssosptsl messe d the tä Y'' tti1$ 
purpo"p I o1o4o o note setting out im4er 
besdinjs the teed of Ist Book action obisb "" have 12 
--- mind.. --- 
As- rOgards Heeding ii tb6 76rss_- ääl iýiý ý- 
-- 
reo4mtly passed . in Canada - would no doubt be -rolev t4i 














Article 1 of the Hague Oonvention of the 1fth Öotdbir, ,"' 
1907v relative to the- Opining Qt Hoatilitieeý -provides-mit .. 
"The Ooatraoting- Pöiers recognise that bottilitivi 








the form_ofeilher a_deolaratton Qý'_1ýi!; _giYing_rea ai 
P' 
ultimatum with a oon4Itional declaration of war" 
International. Law defines a declaration of war as a 'dön =tiýiý 
by one State to another that 
the 
oondition of -peao" -b ti I 
has come to an end and' a condition of war hae 'taken 
t 
flit N 'and the writer holde that such a oo: amunioationmust 
form of a. -written document handod over tothe other " j, `- till, 
through an accredited representative. (Aa-exp2atnid}. 
-_. -. -.. -. _- =-. --'------,... _ý, -_. ý_ `ýý 
.:. ^. v'. ý. 1 .v 121it .. 
dt "! i' 1311{'y 
paragraph 8 below, the observanoe of the rule 
--- - ___Ha. jve_Oonvention_. 
hae_bea by-mo-means-nnivers 




recent years. ) 




r: '. ': .1 
"j 
; 
e. In addition it is customary to. snnouno. ally', 
the nation the exiotenoe of a state of ear: and tö -e at" 
fact to the diplomatic representatives of "netttral', roti i: ý' 
8. " In considering the loan of the deolýralc 
bh'öt' 
in Qe sirable , to etin sh three main 
f ý~ 41 ý ways =ia-"rrälohý: tihiýfYoýti! 
N«, 










-. ýJdonntry or an ultimatum by this . öountry' lbi oe ilK"c 
by 'a declaration of ý war. .,;. "ý" "ý 
(8) There might be a declaration of . War by this 
1 brit 
country or an ultimatum by that country tolýoxýiä ,,! 
by a declaration of war. 
(8) there 'might be an attack on this country li t, : 
any 1'ottsal declaration o! ter. 'ý; I ./ , t`,; 
r u" «-; .I X11, %z 
, tr Fui 
l 
4,4iialnreition of war -on behalf of this oountry eonld -ýý - 
be required in vane (1) aM right also be required In 'oase (a)-. 1, ". 
ainco At would be neoeseary for His Majesty's neprenentative at ."-" 
the foreign oa ital oonoerned to ask tar his p passports . ar4. 
In 
so doing, he would have to make some ntatemont to the foreign `' "" ""'"` 
oovr rnment. -an. -to__his-reaeene, --in-the-oourns--of-which-lib- WI _--. -- 
probably here to any that isle Majesty's Government in the UnItlid 
111rV,, lom considered that a state of war exlAid. 
Bi - The- doadiiint e-reýerreä Lo in paragraph 9 would 
. 
be 
required: whatet! er the oiroumntanoee in which this nountry were " 
involved in war. _- _ . __......... __- _. " ---- --ý: I;: i:: 
1. i ., 111:.: 
f 
ß. It may be caromed that in fact this oountry. " wool `tit ^ :; cýý''"ýJ -`ý-. not go to war except (a) in self-defence, ' i. e. na .a reinli 
öt y am` ýý Fv f; 
actual. -attack 
by . a. -foreign country: or-a=grave=ms =-0f tt 
'., im, 









at for . oaaso,. it=. ir=pooAble=the Fa a 
declaration of war by this country, there would# as in 14114jß` 
_- -an `iz U twa. The form of that ultimatum would b 
detemine " the fors of a . subsequent 
declaration of *r. "tl, G;;: :,. 
7. In considering the question of'provedure#AVin 
" '.. ýý{ý""''fi'r:; ý' 
nroossary to take into account the position in relation to 
,'.. I/ Art` I' 
the constitutional developments within the. British 
,` ii 
1914 it was recognised that the Dominona_mmI ' t`b 
to active participation in war without their consent ý: Ldp 'ý=! 'i: ý.. t. ý, 
was than no doubt that, if one , "; 
f . "i i 'ý; `r Ir 
k : j; 
part of ths' noire was''Vii: 
the thole J *pirs wac at war. There is . now a 
bogy of opinion k l'qy y 
in rosz; -st-ay rate, of the Dominions whidh would too 
it enaald be open to" a, Dominion not merely to dsöline any . tiýJ4 
participation in a war' in which another lleisber o! ". i) Drstisbý 
Oosnonuealth was eisgaged but delinltely to deb]are" iti 
yr nJ 
inch mmtranty in the sense of mot being at' . war 
a 1 
-ilf 
eirematanses" This view has "n ver 
been,. aeoepOa' ` 
Majesty's Gat t in the united MOM` It round; Wir 
b *b4i nnAoPk mnr of' MR flea'Naty's' OOye*'! Wilt " In tttM"1Trii1eQ; 
f. 
Kingdom in any major orieia to secure that all Hin ilajesty1" 
(ovem ante in the DMInionn would participate eotiri]. y'il1' - 
the event of war" and would nt' the very least' oonaider. th aS1? e 4' 
in a etnto of belligereriey, but it mast' be rl, oognised that- 
114-In nt any rate highly likely that, if the occasion were to 
arias to deölare that thin country was in a state of _war# ---: 
it would be ivpoegible at that moment to sayahöther'soass at 
3. enet of the other fembera of the Commonwealth mulit Maid'. 
themenivee ne iqia ly involved. It could, therefore,. bg 
Important that the forme employed by His majesty's Oov. r i 1. '.. 
in 
. 
the Unitod Kingdom while not being "inoonsistent withh 
view that the Dominions were autaauttioally involved,, should3lbt 
re <<j: 
ý'¬ 
in teams be open to the oonetruotion that the Dominions we 
thereby neoesoarily involved. Zqually'it* would-be n6esiiaý'# 
that' the forma should not be such as to. d artlidg1ti 
Do®inion_Government from issuing its own declaration of' war`''ýý 
if it an desired. In connection with the latter'paittt . 
it 
must be borne in mind that sems Do inlone Act. havs, ` tbAJp : *"o#'"',, 
liiplomntio representatives at certain foreign oipi 
at Berlin there are Union and Irish Pre-. 8tate 
at Rome there is a Union Minister and' at 
__... ----- - 0anadian - Kini et ---- -_ _- ý_-__... --- 
... "E, _ 
00 The inter-Imperial diftioultiei indioated"in. tb 
preceding paragraph would be minimised il,.. in'th'"Irij' 
of thin try being involved in war; eithar"ih"". 
öýa7. a11baý ,: 
proceeded the other aide - case' (n) in pa graph' a` ``' ; 'ý' "' 
nbov* ; or failing that 
If 'there were . no t024aal, Q MOn rM ' . °' ", ý 
of war at all - oise (8) . 
in paragraph t,; -\ As rei0da 
csaee (8) , however, it must- be 'borne lit mind- that 
ik"6* tlla' 
or . 74 «regt War the practice of. lbsuilly declaring w 
i iu 'y Qif. 
L. 
prelnds to hostilities so prom aribta-by. th ft 
X11 
c; eeme, largely' (i! not entirely) to . have ftUaon'. 
In 
and even. in 1914. In the case of the war with Turkey there. 
was. no formal döälnrati on of iar on-either side. " It is ý"" ~ 
very doubtful "thorafore how for we could, count on a- 
foreign country formally declaring 'ear op . this country 
before opening hostilities. - Purther, as regards l, 
case (3j'-lt may be_that, se mentioned in paragraph "4 above; '' 
-r y a formal declaration of war on. the art of tihis obun 
fd 
": ' . 
would be definitely-desirable in order to regttlarisi- ths., , 
position* it in clear, therefore, that' we ieust" enri 
the possibility of a formal declaration of war by this' "' `° J: ' ,: j 
country beint; necessary. "''? ' 3 ":,. 
9. In the light of- the above ýt is neoesairy -to 
aonsider-the-form-of--thfivariouýdoou sen add; : -in-ý -rit4 
partioular1 whether they should refer to a'state ol4ir'? 
11; !; ý` 
" 
-- ---ý-" bei or na King and the foreign Power oonaertied or''to _ 
the Governments or countries: -ý ''. 
10. (a) gltimatuq and (b) Dealaratlofl War: ' ti, 3 1: r'ß 
In 1914 the communications addresoä tö': ths. ý'ýtiý }ý " t, et"ý ".! 3 'fir 
German Government (Annexes A and a) made no_dentiön art- -' 
ýE 
c" 
1 y"' , Vi'f' ý 
ýlý 
the King. The ultimatum referred _to 
fits_uajestgke"ý'r 
" Government, while the actual declaration 
of 
. 
war re rred'ýý 
to a state of war between the re! speotive oounýriei ^, ý; ý: J 
') ý'ý ., S 111 'J 
was no formal document in the- name of -the 'Xis: deolari 
Eiar; t'%ough'Royal Proalazatione issued, -this, oäiÄ " 
dealing with particular subjects _suoh, sh'Tft .' 6st 
itnemy opened' with the recital "whe recs. a etaýd` 
between Us' and .... ".. r.,,,,. ,, "., fti ,,,:,, 
t 
. 
fýi", : sr, r ,., ý. 
11. ? failing regard to the inter"Inperis o6nAId 
mentioned In paragraph 7 It seems: '"inevit*ble phiti: c; iri -P it 19 
C, 
ii, 
event of the necessity arising in tuturej, 'Ahi tproeeQt 
ry 
adopted should be on, the lines or that adöRli 
'-the ultInatus A' "a b -expru ed' 
bn 'be .7 " +.. .. ", 1ý. ý, t", ýl"rs ,4 -tire 
" Ooyei fail- in the United Xing tos. and ibo ; `'fir 
... _. ... r. r ... ++F 
wV... r 
._.. ý..... r «w. tw. _">1. n . YJm, 
JaW _ .. 
iE 
"ý referred to n otate of war -between the. two countries. 
Moreover, it in suggeoted that on general grounds . 
the 
declaration ohould be no worded as to make it olear that .. °' 
thie'oountry was acting in self-derenoe-or in pursuance- F 
of an internntionnl obligation. _. _ ;# !I 
126 7. " - 
. In 
1914 this toolC_tfl Toriq_of. 
_. a_notiriaation_iu'` 
" the "London Geeette" (Annex 0) and referred 
to a state ot;. 
ppmý 
par- brtw. "en 'the re'epr'otive countries. For the reasons 
already given it would seem neoessery, to follow .. 
the aims; :" 
{l ýi;: k 
course on a future oooesion. There would however. ', be; r uss' :ý,,: " lilt( ;: ý, z 
to be said, at any rate in any cone where it-was olear, that: "" 
all the. Memberi-"öf the Commofwds1th would be, part1aipiitii *, " j 
i ^j ' $ 1 
.' 
in the war, for the issue in thin country o! ,a proo im t 
in the name of the King declaring the sir oa, or; "e`' state ' 
of wor was inaivatiiuýýrciýi yý ^ s=ru. ws,.. + ýs 
.-- --- --A _1 rJA--& 
J -- ß. r1 -#1 "1: - 
rirr 1'.; .. ý 541 . ýf 
i'5 1.1 -141 
would be some preoedent for this in the proo dure. a6 pt'ed 
on the outbreak-of the Orimean war when there was. el':! ö 
' Tý'ý . +. , Vii.. ' . ý'"_"' 
Deoleration by Her Majesty whioh was published '': t; 
speoial'suppleaent to the "London Oasette". aVd, apparently; 
read by the I3erjBent at Arme from"the steps öf th ý'`' e "; Röýrilýýýýi; " 
rxohang It would %ie Qesireble# in order to avoid'- 
oonstitutionai dirrxoulties that' aryr suoh Pröölaaatjäi"*- S. "+ 
should. not be addressed to His Ile jestyýs sitb '" 
ýý' 
Patego y of them but should' bn iý In general tt! r10l1 j "''ýý 
ýý 
" `'r' 
referring to "all whom it may oonoern""" It thi", rdör`1 ý`ýýy} 
were bein followed in' the United ' ýt" 8 ed Kingdom It would-'-biýrý} - 4, " 
open-to any Dominion whioh so 'desired, e. g.: tie, vaioii r(, 1, 
outh rio 0 A! ' a, "to arrange' ! or the freue of. 6 i'itaililr: ;, ý'" ýº- .I 
Iti +1' 'ßt proolaaation 'by the King on the advioe of Doi hi6iÄ, ýý 
Slutstirs' addressed' to the oitieine or -she 
pön: 'ý '; 
" ýr ý't 
1 
(v: 




Ia. (d) o eII!. 14 atiQA to ntrai 1ý ºvr ; :; ý ,: 
). referred . to 
the , ',, ý: s; ''" " the form used in 1914 (Annex p 
exiatenoe of. otete of war bntween Rio Majesty end , 
the 7 
foreign power oonoerne&. It the. 'othir 4oouainte rdlirrieä `' r, Y 
-. _ ,__... `...... 
ýý`t"' u! A !Z 1yß " "y' iV 
to Governments or oount'ries". the(log'ioml , oorollary would; 
gel 
that- eiieiýär phrý seo1c- hd 
!' ýýº _, a come önT ýe reiplöyeä"'in the , tt{ý ýft_;: 
tb but the matter In not one or, great üportahöi and: 
question is ono, whioh will require "oonsideration.: in_tbi 
light or. the deeteion - reaohed' on. -the -queitioi o!. pr 
dealt with in the earlier part of the memorandumt's, ail, 
Appendix Seven 
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, UXTIQn Q? aid DoM ;t rý in ; fit ýyttlr or l#Ah. 
:f 
"Oomoon belligerency" has hitherto been-genera 
regarded as one of the iXiois of the 9ritieh;: Oe itM 
and it has been assusred 'thatC -tbe obotjdöý3't 
doctrine would mean the end or the Qo M]th 'tl 
-extant--that an y-Meeeber -of-the-ooaeonenilh-Rt bb. of 
itself neutral when other Members of, the. 
were at nur could no longer be regarded. hN af .ý 
This view is. of _oourse . 
based_ an _the-dontriüs -: this=- 
the JUng ie one and indivisible. Oloik rly , we ought 
to 'do all in our power to uphold this ddotrifo ' ýU 
further we ought to make it the ' ob jeot or du ''dý l` 
to see that no question of Dostinion njM, %j i111 i1ý; 1r 
pructtoe arise, 
" rrl . 
but ifs notwithstanding a11' our Short. one- 
or more of the Da ainions insisted "in 
tbs . 
iýj ýýr 
war on deolaring_their n. utrililp; . 
what ittiýa ' 
are we to take up? Afro we, quits öljar. n 




" . i, prei ý; , 
"' 
severing *from tho Oosnonwa filth . otW. D 1oA'! 
"og 
it? Is there possibly a halt ' -ter. Aotirt $ttwi+ i Ade 
position of a Mss jº of, the . 0oMstotwýºOa1 
h Yid 
have hitherto vMderetood It afid that, 








up in the forauln "not pledged to tight, but 
pludged. to ielp and-not-to ht11dW -Änd if 
-; 
: 
it is impossible to secure the actiro partioipation"'" 
or the Dominions may there not poesiblybe_ 
advantage-to-thin country in being assured that* n:. 
"oertain important nations are pledged not oily 
in no oiroucnotenoos to go to war with us but ; ý. 
nleo-. in no oirownetanoes. to.. give any_aesiotanoe=-"; 
to our enemies, even-if that were the extent: 
the assietanoe they were prepared_to.: giveY. - 77 
&van it Oanada, the Unioff 
. 
of south Afriöo". 
,. 
and the Irish Free Utate oarmot be counted VO MO 
in the event of a war in which the United 
Kingdom was engaged, to aooept tie " doetribo . o!. ' 
"common belligereno3O# there can be tic doubt 
that they would b illing to accept -a hill" y 'i'"' 
{ 
position. What exact e the extent' or thi 
'' 
"half-Way" assistance on oh it; ioald. bi'_rnlýi 
to rely is somewhat difficult to dehne 
might vary with the different. boaýipiona:. In .; ': "1. 
ý "") 
the case of Canada' and the 
allaost certainly be prepared to grant Us % ", _.: 







-: sýº..; -fýý"ý 





faoilitien in Aome Nt nny rate of their hirboure (theta 
in some erictenoo.. for thinking that-the. -Union. reg*rd-"- 
-themselves an pluögod to adopt 
this attitude in the 
case of Dimonotown). in addition to being . prepared 
to 
supply ue 'with i'oq ' . roºir mntüi'iäi-nnd-huff 
tiöne 
to deny their to the enemy. An regards the Irish Free 
State, 14r. -do Valer=i has stated that 
he would not 
alls+rr Irish Free :; trite territory to be, itsed as " beei 
From the International point oP riýoi .; 
'A: 
questions my be raised whether fora ijM aaimtrlOtr 
would be ready to reoogniss suoh a "halt'"Mrsgr" -ý s 
position on the part . of the Dominions. Fore 
for attack on this oountryt as to mori DOeitive j 
aeeietenäa, the question of facilities in the raiernC. I. 
Porto preeento a difficult problem, sn i pending 
ooaning discussions it is not possible to atteaspt`, any 
forecast of the solution that nay be- reaohedI but 
there seems no reason to suppose that the Irish Pre. 
Otate would not be . prepared 
otherwise. to. take.. up _ift'. __. 
attitude -similar-to- -thet-outlined- in-the-preoe "fý "r 
sentence of this paragraph. 
?" ýýý''ý h': 




-C ý, % 
accustomed to regard the relationship of the ')(ember.. 
or the aor nuealth we something unique and abnormal, 
incapable of boin1j fitted into the ordinary oonoýpti0tid__ 
i :. of internut. loual. lna, that probably one more 
nbnor litt' would not surprise them. Moreover,. -it-In--- 
- ýý 





"benevolent neutrality "- if the Attitude Abore__ 
ontlini d on 1iö öo daooribod - and the foreign . 
nntion or nationo at war with ua_rettieed to -. 
recogni, e nuch an nttitude on their part, th. only' 
likely result troulci be that the Dominions in question 
would doomr or later be drown into tho wer on- 
our-side. ..... 
Looking at the matter from the military 
anpeot, war has bsoome more and more's, matter 'Of 
the maohine_and_of-omit lone; -and-it äm7 bo that in 
10 
ýý -- ý "- -.. 
ý" 
ý <. 
_. . -ý. '- 
i ; i: '1 
.t iý: 





the warn of the future. a enpply of. nnmitioue' racy be 
even more important than the supply' of awns far more 
men will be required to inanufaoture the aeroplane and ; ', ... 
the tank than to rann there. Now that jhs DntteQ ý9lates'markst 
to closed to us as a Douro* or nnpl"n: 
--"----- .--- aar-ao 
"l gtýeýi the Neutrality Act is in ibroe and In 
any case it Must remain a do%tMl_ 
mare than ever tapo3 tent that ee should "o , tar k. 
oanada` within the O siesnwealth . 
that ehe can bi " 
oomtted . on as a potential source of war 
materials: ` 
Canada as a benevolent neutral, anypüring ti 
w th 
monitions, is not so valuable as Oanada aotively 
belligerent, but shs iP worth a good deal, 
::, 
thia 
second United 13tatee. On the defenoe "idee'. the ; :. " ý.;, 














I1 1 1[ 
i1 





rvqujre ammufage o7CAºrilnatison" 
assweption that in a major war all the Dominions 
would untor the war simultaneously with us" ... 
Ir 
there in tiny doubt about this asuurzptiIM the 
problems arising out of that döubt wbuld*"sssm-to- 
.1 
"U: . uLMII4*. 
t; fr E12 
Thera le podeibly one more aspect of the 
Matter to be.. oonsiderod. 'Looking ahead #' with -tºhe . 
political side at least of the I. iague of äationi 
crumbling before our eyes, should' we not-be wine. 
to preserve a certain fluidity or conception with 
regard to the Ooinmonwaalth raliltiönihipt"-sir ýf eire 
Lampoon has suggested that some more Of attaol r 
to the British Camnonwealth may be the. -solution;, ö! 
the 
- 
ggrptian problem, and the probliai of 'Ira q . 
ii tir# r 
ai*llar to that of Rgypt: . In each case-Uh lös { off.; ,, 
authority by the League has not 
ohanoes or suooess or the present solutt4 of, '.. 
problem. Under the terns of the prpssnt 
Rgypt and 'Iraq are plödged (not-to rLght, '"'bnt) 
come to our assistance to-1 ee -- 
us facilities in any war in which we 'are "" a 
not contrary to the League Covenant : or th. P 
Paris In faotp theii position is . -Very aLrj1ar+' 
j 
the "half-way" position outlined above. * 1'hie"rte' 
be thought a somewhat tar-fetohid 'f "a oOris1d "ratloW 
but i* the present state., of international if! 'aik `.; 
it may be wiss' at times to moan the poa'slitlttl6i 
on the horizons 
On the other hand, the öbjeotionr', 
especially at the present time, to whittling aw '.. 
t 










any of the duties end. -responsibilities of the ti} 
)4 bars of the British Ooewýomaeelth are so 
obvious that it is unnecessary to elaborate them. 
If, however# me might very probably be the esse, _ . 
it would be Impossible in an emrgenoy to preserve r_ 
the reoögoitien of those reoponsibiiities as tbay---" 
have -hitherto-been -undo retoods_true_rriedgmwould 
NOeI' to lie -In- our reoogniiing the 'fact. and 
seeing. how beet we bould got the metiseim of' 
.. . 93 
" advantage from the now situationº - ý" E; ,; " ý; 
Prom every point of view the subjoot' is 
ý! '' 
ý nr ' 
one or enoh'yaraawubl -ieqýerlMýO*=ýhiº! -1_11 ý! , °: 
be explored by an, Inter », that i! ought to 
departmental. Committee without delays ý'ý 
`' 
Dtoei . r, 191?. ; i; '}! r 
'ado 1,1a, " 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
(1) PRIMARY MATERIAL 
(1.1) Unpublished: Official Documents 












The Colonial and Dominions Office List, Number 79 (London: HMSO, 1940) 
Commonwealth Relations Handbook, 1952 (London: HMSO, 1951) 
Commonwealth Relations Handbook, 1967 (London: HMSO, 1966) 
(1.1.2) Bodleian Library, Oxford: Dept. of Western Manuscripts 
Conservative Research Department Files (CRD 2/28/2) 
Archives of British Conservative Party (X. Films 63/5) 
(1.1.3) Rhodes House Library, Oxford 
Oxford Colonial Records Project: Interview with Malcolm MacDonald (MSS 
Brit. Emp. s. 533) 
(1.1.4) Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa 
Dominions Office Original Correspondence (D035) - Microfilm 
(1.1.5) Australian Archives, Canberra 
Australian Government Cabinet Minutes (Volume 7) CRS A2697 
(1.2) Unpublished: Private Papers 
(1.2.1) United Kingdom 
Abrams Papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) 
Alanbrooke Papers (Liddell Hart Archives, King's College, London) 
Lord Attlee Papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford: Dept. of Western Manuscripts) 
MS. Attlee 
Lord Avon Papers (Birmingham University) 
Harry Batterbee Papers (Rhodes House Library, Oxford) 
Brooke-Popham Papers (Liddell Hart Archives, King's College, London) 
Cadogan Papers (Churchill Archives, Cambridge) ACAD 
Neville Chamberlain Papers (Birmingham University) 
Chartwell Papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CHAR 
W. H. Clark Papers (London School of Economics) 
Colville Papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLVL 
Hubert Cowell Papers (Rhodes House Library, Oxford) 
Duff Cooper Papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) DUFC 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 228 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
Sir Lionel Curtis Papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford: Dept. of Western Manuscripts) 
MS. Curtis 
Charles Dixon Memoirs (Rhodes House Library, Oxford) RHO. C94 S387 
P. Emrys-Evans Papers (British Library) ADD. MS. 58240 
Hankey Papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) HNKY 
Harvey Papers (British Library) ADD. MS. 563998 
Liddell Hart Papers (Liddell Hart Archives, King's College, London) 
Inskip Papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) INKP 
Ismay Papers (Liddell Hart Archives, King's College, London) 
Eighth Viscount Galway Papers (Nottingham University) 
William Jordan Papers (New Zealand High Commission, London) 
Malcolm MacDonald Papers (Durham University) 
Malcolm MacDonald Papers (Rhodes House Library, Oxford) 
Martin Papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) MART 
Fifth Marquess of Salisbury (Lord Cranborne) Papers (Hatfield House) 
Sir John Simon Papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford: Dept. of Western Manuscripts) 
MS. Simon 
Oliver Stanley Papers (British Library) ADD. MS. 56398 " 
Lord Woolton Papers (Bodleian Library, Oxford: Dept. of Western Manuscripts) 
MS. Woolton 
(1.2.2) Overseas 
Carl Berendsen Papers (Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand) 
Lord Bruce Papers (Australian Archives, Canberra) AA1969 
Clark Papers (Cape Town University) 
Duncan Papers (Cape Town University) BC294 
Frederic Eggleston Papers (National Library of Australia, Canberra) MS423 
Peter Fraser Papers (National Archives, Wellington) Series One 
C. D. Howe Papers (Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa) MG27 
Mackenzie King Papers (Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa) MG26 
Vincent Massey Papers (Toronto University) B87-0082 
Massey Family Papers (Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa) MG32 
Sir Robert Menzies Papers (National Library of Australia, Canberra) MS4936 
Sir Earle Page Papers (National Library of Australia, Canberra) MS1633 
Lester Pearson Papers (Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa) MG26 
Thomas Skinner Papers (National Archives, Wellington) Series One 
Jan Smuts Papers (National Archives, Pretoria) 
Air Vice Marshal Steadman Papers (Directorate of History, National Defence HQ, 
Ottawa) 
Charles Te Water Papers (National Archives, Pretoria) A78 
Sydney Waterson Papers (Cape Town University) BC631 
(1.3) Unpublished: Manuscript Thesis 
William Stevenson, The Origins of the British Commonwealth Air Training Scheme 
from 1923 to December 1939 (University of London, 1981) 
(1.4) Published: Official Documents 
J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy: Volume 2 (London: HMSO, 1957) 
W. K. Hancock & M. M. Gowing (eds. ), British War Economy (London: HMSO, 1949) 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 229 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
W. J. Hudson & H. J. W. Stokes (eds. ), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937- 
1949: Volume 5, July 1941 - June 1942 (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publication Service, 1982) 
W. J. Hudson & H. J. W. Stokes (eds. ), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937- 
1949: Volume 4, July 1940-June 1941 (Canberra: Australian Government Publication 
Service, 1980) 
H. Kenway, H. J. W. Stokes & P. G. Edwards (eds. ), Documents on Australian Foreign 
Policy, 1937-1949: Volume 3, January-June 1940 (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publication Service, 1979) 
David R. Murray (ed. ), Documents on Canadian External Relations: Volume 7, 
1939-41 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1974) 
R. G. Neale (ed. ), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937-1949: Volume 2, 
1939 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976) 
Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (Australia in the War of 1939-1945: Army 
Volume 4) (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957) 
S. Woodburn Kirby, History of the Second World War., Volume 1, The War Against 
Japan (London: HMSO, 1957) 
(1 
. 5) Published: Memoirs and Diaries L. S. Amery, My Political Life: Volume 2, War and Peace, 1914-1929 (London: 
Macmillan, 1953) 
Clement Attlee, As It Happened (London: Heinemann, 1954) 
Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: Volume 3, The Reckoning (London: Cassell and 
Co. Ltd., 1965) 
Harold Balfour, Wings over Westminster (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1973) 
Gerald Campbell, Of True Experience (London: Hutchinson and Company Ltd., 
1949) 
Lord Chandos (Oliver Lyttelton), Memoirs (London: Bodley Head, 1962) 
John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Volume 1,1939-41 (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1985) 
John Colville, Winston Churchill and His Inner Circle (New York: Wyndham Books, 
1981) 
Stephen Constantine (ed. ), Dominions Diary: The Letters of E. J. Harding, 1913-1916 
(England: Ryburn Publishing, 1992) 
David Dilks (ed. ), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-45 (London: Cassell 
and Co. Ltd., 1971) 
Charles Eade (ed. ), Churchill by His Contemporaries (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1954) 
Sir Arthur Fadden, They Called Me Artie (Melbourne: Jacaranda, 1969) 
Maurice Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914-1918: Volume 2 (London: 1961) 
Earl of Halifax, Fullness of Days (London: Collins, 1957) 
Lord Ismay, Memoirs (London: Heinemann, 1960) 
Sir John Wheeler-Bennett et al, Action this Day: Working with Churchill (London: 
Macmillan, 1968) 
Robert Rhodes James (ed. ), Chips: Diaries of Sir Henry Channon (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967) 
R. James (ed. ), Victor Cazalet (London: Collins, 1976) 
Percy Joske, Sir Robert Menzies: A New Informal Memoir (Sydney: Angus & 
Robertson, 1978) 
B. K. Long, In Smuts Camp (London: Oxford University Press, 1945) 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 230 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
Malcolm MacDonald, Titans and Others (London: Collins, 1972) 
Vincent Massey, What's Past is Prologue (Toronto: Macmillan, 1963) 
Lord Moran, Struggle for Survival (London: Constable, 1966) 
Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light (London: Macmillan, 1967) 
G. Heaton Nicholls, South Africa in My Time (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961) 
Nigel Nicolson (ed. ), Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, 1939-1945 (New York: 
Athenum, 1967) 
Sir Earle Page, Truant Surgeon (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1963) 
Lester B. Pearson, Through Diplomacy to Politics: Memoirs, 1897-1948 (London: 
Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1973) 
Ben Pimlott (ed. ), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1939-1945 (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1986) 
Jean Van der Poel (ed. ), Smuts Papers: Volume 6- December 1934 to August 1945 
(London: CUP, 1973) 
Deneys Reitz, No Outspan (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1943) 
Charles Ritchie, The Siren Years: Undiplomatic Diaries, 1937-45 (London: 
Macmillan, 1974) 
Geoffrey Shakespeare, Let Candles be Brought In (London: MacDonald, 1949) 
Ronald Tree, When the Moon Was High: Memoirs, 1897-1942 (London: Macmillan, 
1975) 
(2) SECONDARY SOURCES 
(2.1) Biography 
Claude Bissell, The Imperial Canadian: Vincent Massey (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1986) 
Lewis Broad, Sir Anthony Eden: The Chronicles of a Career (New York: Thomas 
Crowell, 1955) 
David Carlton, Anthony Eden (London: Allen Lane, 1981) 
John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory (London: BCA, 1993) 
Anne Chisholm & Michael Davie, Beaverbrook: A Life (London: Hutchinson, 1992) 
I. M. Cumpston, Lord Bruce of Melbourne (Melbourne: Longman, 1989) 
Blanche E. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour, 1906-1930 (London: 
Hutchinson, 1936) 
David Dunn, Anthony Eden (London: Arnold, 1997) 
Cecil Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne: Man of Two Worlds (London: Heinemann, 1965) 
John English, Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson: Volume 1 (Toronto: 
Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989) 
Eric Estorick, Stafford Cripps: A Biography (London: Heinemann, 1949) 
Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill: Finest Hour, 1939-1941(London: Heinemann, 
1983) 
Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill: Road to Victory, 1941-1945 (London, Heinemann, 
1986) 
W. K. Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force, 1919-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge at 
the University Press, 1968) 
Alistair Horne, Macmillan: Volume 1,1894-1956 (London: Macmillan, 1988) 
Patrick Howarth, Intelligence Chief Extraordinary: Victor Cavendish Bentinck 
(London: Bodley Head, 1973) 
W. J. Hudson, Casey (Melbourne: OUP, 1986) 
A. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Volume 1,1894-1943 (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1993) 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 231 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
Sir James Merchant (ed. ), WSC: Servant of Crown and Commonwealth (London: 
Cassell and Co., 1954) 
Clive Ponting, Churchill (London: BCA, 1994) 
Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986) 
J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record: Volume 1,1939-44 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1960) 
Andrew Roberts, 'The Holy Fox: A Life of Lord Halifax (London: Macmillan, 1991) 
Norman Rose, Churchill: An Unruly Life (London: Simon and Schuster, 1994) 
Lloyd Ross, John Curtin (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1977) 
Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume 3,1931-63 (London: Collins, 
1974) 
Victor Rothwell, Anthony Eden: A Political Biography (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1992) 
Clyde Sanger, Malcolm MacDonald: Bringing An End to Empire (Montreal: McGill- 
Queen's University Press, 1991) 
J. C. Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts (London: Cassell & Company, 1952) 
Ronald Tree, When the Moon was High (London: Macmillan, 1975) 
C. M. Van den Heever, General J. B. M. Hertzog (Johannesburg: A. P. B. Bookstore, 
1946) 
(2.2) Canadian History 
Ted Barris, Behind the Glory (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992) 
J. M. S. Careless & R. Craig Brown (eds. ), The Canadians 1867-1967 (Toronto: 
Macmillan Canada, 1967) 
Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-57 (Canada: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1976) 
John Cowan, Canada's Governor-Generals, 1867-1952 (Toronto: York, 1952) 
David Dilks, Britain, Canada and the Wider World (Canada House Lecture No. 4, 
1978) 
John Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume 1,1909 to 1946 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990) 
Greg Donaghy, Parallel Paths: Canadian-Australian Relations Since the 1890s, 
(Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1995) 
W. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the RCAF, 
Volume 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) 
Spencer Dunmore, Wings for Victory (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1994) 
James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) 
John Golley, Aircrew Unlimited (London: Patrick Stephens Ltd., 1983) 
F. Hatch, The Aerodrome of Democracy (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 
1983) 
J. L. Granatstein, Canada's War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) 
John Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume 1, The Early Years, 
1909-1946 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990) 
Norman Hillmer, 'The Outstanding Imperialist: Mackenzie King and the British 
(Canada House Lecture Series No. 4,1978) 
Peter Lyon (ed. ), Britain and Canada, Survey of a Changing Relationship (London: 
Frank Cass, 1976) 
Desmond Morton, Canada and the War (Toronto: Butterworth and Co. Ltd., 1981) 
Brian Nolan, King's War., Mackenzie King and the Politics of War, 1939-45 (Toronto: 
Random House, 1988) 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 232 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
C. P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict,. 1921-48 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1983) 
(2.3) Australian History 
E. M. Andrews, Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia (Canberra: ANUP, 1970) 
E. M. Andrews, The British Commonwealth and Aggression in the East, 1931-1935 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987) 
Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: OUP, 
1988) 
Judith Brett, Robert Menzies' Forgotten People (Australia: Macmillan, 1992) 
Carl Bridge (ed. ), Munich to Vietnam: Australia's Relations with Britain and the 
United States since the 1930's (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991) 
Frank Cain (ed. ), Menzies in War and Peace (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1998) 
David Day, Menzies and Churchill at War (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 
1988) 
David Day, The Great Betrayal, Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War 
1939-42 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988) 
Michael Dunn, Australia and the Empire 1788 to Present (Sydney: Collins, 1984) 
P. G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, The Making of Australian Foreign 
Policy, 1901-49 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983) 
Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990) 
Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-41 (Canberra: Australian War 
Memorial, 1952) 
John Hetherington, Blarney: Controversial Soldier (Canberra: Australian War 
Memorial, 1973) 
David M. Horner, Crisis of Command: Australian Generalship and the Japanese 
Threat 1941-43 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978) 
David M. Horner, High Command, Australia and Allied Strategy (Sydney: George 
Allen & Unwin Australia, 1982) 
David M. Horner, The Commanders (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin Australia, 1984) 
David M. Horner, Inside the War Cabinet: Directing Australia's War Effort, 1939-1945 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin Australia, 1996) 
David M.. Horner, Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the Making of 
Australian Defence Policy (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2000) 
Stuart Macintyre, The Oxford History of Australia: Volume 4,1901-42 (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 1986) 
A. F. Madden & W. H. Morris-Jones (eds. ), Australia and Britain (London: Frank Cass, 
1980) 
T. B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1978) 
John Robertson & John McCarthy, Australian War Strategy, 1939-45 (Australia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1985) 
Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967) 
(2.4) South African History 
Martin Chanock, Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1900- 
1945 (London: Macmillan, 1977) 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 233 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
Ronald Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908-48 (London: Macmillan, 
1972) 
David Killingray (ed. ), Africa and the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1986) 
D. W. Kruger, The Making of a Nation, A History of the Union of South Africa, 
1910-61 (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1969) 
H. Martin & N. Orpen, South Africa at War; Military and Industrial Organization and 
Operation in Connection with the Conduct of the War (Cape Town: Purnell, 1979) 
Sara Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations Between the Two World Wars 
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1987) 
George Visser, Ossewa Brandwag: Traitors or Patriots (Cape Town: Macmillan 
South Africa, 1979) 
(2.5) New Zealand History 
M. P. Lissington, New Zealand and Japan, 1900-41 (Wellington: A. R. Shearer, 1972) 
W. P. Oliver (ed. ), The Oxford History of New Zealand (Wellington: Open University 
Press, 1981) 
Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand (London: Penguin Books, 1959) 
(2.6) General Imperial History 
Glen St. J. Barclay, The Empire is Marching (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976) 
Corelli Barnett, The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great 
Nation (London: Macmillan, 1986) 
Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset: Volume 1, Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921 (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970) 
Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset: Volume 2, Dream of Commonwealth, 1921-42 (London: 
Macmillan, 1989) 
George Bennett (ed. ), The Concept of Empire (London: Adam and Charles Black, 
1953) 
Hector Bolitho (ed. ), The British Empire (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1947) 
J. M. Brown & Wm. Roger Louis (eds. ), The Oxford History of the British Empire: 
Volume 4, The Twentieth Century (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 
P. J. Cain & A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-90 
(London and New York: Longman, 1993) 
G. M. Carter, The British Commonwealth and International Security (Toronto: Ryerson 
Press, 1947) 
Colin Cross, The Fall of the British Empire (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968) 
John A. Cross, Whitehall and the Commonwealth: British Departmental Organisation 
for Commonwealth Relations, 1900-1966 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1967) 
Phillip Darby, Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American Approaches to Asia 
and Africa, 1870-1970 (Yale: Yale University Press, 1987) 
Roy Douglas, World Crisis and British Decline, 1929-1956 (London: Macmillan, 
1986) 
R. Palme Dutt, Britain's Crisis of Empire (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1949) 
William Elliot and H. Duncan Hall (eds. ), The British Commonwealth at War (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943) 
Lord Elton, Imperial Commonwealth (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946) 
Empire Information Service, Origins and Purpose: A Handbook on the British 
Commonwealth and Empire (London: HMSO, 1946) 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 234 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
Sir George Fiddes, The Dominions and Colonial Offices (London: 1926) 
John Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982) 
Joe Garner, The Commonwealth Office, 1925-68 (London: Heinemann, 1978) 
Donald Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1965) 
Sir Percivale Griffiths, Empire into Commonwealth (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 
1969) 
H. Duncan Hall, Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of Nations 
(London: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1971) 
Walter Phelps Hall, Empire to Commonwealth: Thirty Years of British Imperial History 
(New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1928) 
W. K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Volume 1, Problems of 
Nationality, 1918-1936 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937) 
Heather Harvey, Consultation and Co-operation in the Commonwealth (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1952) 
H. V. Hodson (ed. ), The British Commonwealth and the Future (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1939) 
H. V. Hodson, The British Empire (London: RITA, 1942) 
Robert Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-1939 (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1981) 
Sir Cecil Hurst (ed. ), Great Britain and the Dominions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1928) 
Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (London: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1994) 
Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service (Cambridge: Cambridge at 
the University Press, 1938) 
Sir Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Office (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1956) 
Denis Judd, Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874-1932 
(London: Macmillan, 1968) 
Denis Judd & Peter Slim, The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth (London: 
Macmillan, 1982) 
Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience (London: Harper Collins, 1996) 
A. Berriedale Keith, Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions, 1918-1931 
(London: OUP, 1932) 
John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993) 
Anthony Kirk-Greene, On Crown Service: A History of HM Colonial And Overseas 
Services, 1837-1997 (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1999) 
Martin Kitchen, The British Commonwealth and Empire (London: Macmillan Press, 
1996) 
Paul Knaplund, Britain, Commonwealth and Empire, 1901-1955 (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1956) 
J. M. Lee & Martin Petter, The Colonial Office: War and Development Policy (London: 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1982) 
Wm. Roger Louis, In the Name of God Go! Leo Amery and the British Empire in the 
Age of Churchill (London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1992) 
.w 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 235 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
Frederick Madden & John Darwin (eds. ), Select. Documents on the Constitutional 
History of the British Empire and Commonwealth: Volume 6, The Dominions and 
India Since 1900 (London: Greenwood, 1993) 
Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth and Nations (London: RITA, 1948) 
Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External 
Policy, 1931-39 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952) 
Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime 
Co-operation and Post-War Change, 1939-1952 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1958) 
Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1969) 
J. D. B. Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966) 
W. David McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations: Origin and Impact, Volume 9 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977) 
James Morris, Farewell the Trumpets (London: Faber Press, 1978) 
Anne Orde, The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial 
Decline (London: Macmillan Press, 1996) 
Ritchie Ovendale, Appeasement and the English Speaking World (Cardiff: University 
of Wales Press, 1975) 
Ritchie Ovendale, The English Speaking Alliance, Britain, the United States and the 
Dominions, 1945-51 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985) 
Gerald Palmer (ed. ), Consultation and Co-operation in the British Commonwealth 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934) 
Cosmo Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within (London: Faber and Faber, 1947) 
F. W. Perry, The Commonwealth Armies, Manpower and Organisation in Two World 
Wars (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988) 
Edward Porrit, The Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom of the British Overseas 
Dominions (London: OUP, 1922) 
Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1983 
(London: Longman Group, 1975) 
David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled (London: Longman Group, 1991) 
James Brown Scott, Autonomy and Federation within Empire: The British Self 
Governing Dominions (Washington D. C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1921) 
Derek Tangye, One King: A Survey of the Dominions and Colonies of the British 
Empire (London: George G. Harrap & Col. Ltd., 1944) 
Anne Thurston, Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth 
Relations Office and Commonwealth Office (London: The Stationary Office, 1995) 
Frank H. Underhill, The British Commonwealth: An Experiment in Co-operation 
Among Nations (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1956) 
Eric Walker, The British Empire: Its Structure and Spirit (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1944) 
K. C. Wheare, The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1942) 
James Williamson, Great Britain and the Commonwealth (London: Adam and 
Charles Black, 1945) 
(2.7) General History 
Paul Addison, The Road to 1945 (London: Pimlico, 1994) 
Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (Gloucester: Sutton, 1984) 
Antony Beevor, Crete: The Battle and the Resistance (London: John Murray, 1991) 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 236 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
P. M. H. Bell, A Certain Eventuality (London: Saxon -House, 1974) 
P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Longman, 1986) 
P. M. H. Bell, France and Britain, 1940-94 (London: Longman, 1997) 
Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: Macmillan, Third Edition, 1988) 
Robert Blake & Wm. Roger Louis (eds. ), Churchill: A Major New Reassessment of 
His Life in Peace and War (London: Oxford University Press, 1993) 
Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980) 
K. Bourne and D. C. Watt (eds. ), Studies in International History (London: Longmans, 
1967) 
Robert Boyce & E. M. Robertson (ed. ), Paths to War: New Essays on the Origin of the 
Second World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) 
Raymond Callahan, Worst Disaster: Fall of Singapore (Delaware: University of 
Delaware Press, 1977) 
'Cato', Guilty Men (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1940) 
John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (London: Macmillan, 1989) 
Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Volume 1, The Gathering Storm (London: 
Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1949) 
Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Volume 2, The Finest Hour (London: 
Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1949) 
Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Volume 3, The Grand Alliance (London: 
Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1949) 
Richard Collier, The Years of Attrition (London: Allison and Busby, 1993) 
John Colville, Winston Churchill and His Inner Circle (New York: Wyndham Books, 
1981) 
Donald Cowie, War for Britain: The Inner Story of the Empire in Action, September 
1939 - September 1940 (London: Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1941) 
Ian Cowman, Dominion or Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations in the Pacific, 
1937-1941 (Oxford: Berg, 1996) 
Charles Cruickshank, Greece 1940-41 (London: Davis-Poynter, 1976) 
David Dilks (ed. ), Retreat from Power: Volume 1 (London: Macmillan Press, 1981) 
David Dilks (ed. ), Retreat from Power: Volume 2 (London: Macmillan Press, 1981) 
M. L. Dockrill & B. McKercher (ed. ), Diplomacy and World Power, Studies in British 
Foreign Policy 1890-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
Saki Dockrill (ed. ), From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima (London: Macmillan, 1994) 
M. R. D. Foot (ed. ), War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour of J. R. Western 
(London: Elek Books, 1973) 
F. R. Gannon, The British Press and Germany, 1936-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971) 
David Irving, Churchill's War: Volume 1 (Australia: Veritas, 1987) 
Christopher Hill, Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy, 1938-1941 (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
Robert Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900-70, 
(London: Fontana Press, 1996) 
Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France, 1940 (London: Macmillan, 1969) 
James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (London: Longman, 1984) 
Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945 (London: Fontana Press, 1989) 
Rene Kraus, The Men Around Churchill (New York: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1941) 
Richard Langhorne (ed. ), Diplomacy and Intelligence During the Second World War, 
Essays in Honour of F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 237 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
Sheila Lawlor, Churchill and the Politics of War, - 1940-41 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) 
Ronald Lewin, Churchill as Warlord (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1973) 
Peter Lowe, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War (London: OUP, 1977) 
Callum MacDonald, The Lost Battle: Crete, 1941 (London: Macmillan, 1993) 
William Manchester, Winston Churchill: The Caged Lion (London: OUP, 1988) 
Geoffrey McDermott, The Eden Legacy (London: Leslie Frewn Publishers, 1969) 
W. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base (London: 
Macmillan, 1979) 
Alan S. Milward, The Economic Effects of the Two World Wars on Britain (London: 
Macmillan Education, 1972) 
Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-71 (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1981) 
Keith Neilson & Roy Prete (eds. ), Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord (Canada: 
Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1983) 
Ian Nish (ed. ), Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-52, Papers of the Anglo-Japanese 
Conference on the History of the Second World War (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982) 
Anne Orde, The Eclipse of Great Britain, The United States and British Imperial 
Decline, 1895-1956 (London: Macmillan, 1996) 
R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, British Policy and the Coming of the 
Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1993) 
A. R. Peters, Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office, 1931-1938 (Aldershot: Gower, 
1986) 
David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41 (London: 
Europa Publications, 1981) 
Reynolds & Kimball (et al), Allies at War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) 
William R. Rock, Chamberlain and Roosevelt, British Foreign Policy and the United 
States, 1937-40 (Colombus: Ohio State University Press, 1988) 
Stephen Roskill, The Navy at War, 1939-1945 (London: Collins, 1960) 
(. Stewart, The Battle for Crete (London: OUP, 1966) 
John Sweetman (ed. ), Sword and Mace: Twentieth Century Civil-Military Relations in 
Britain (London: Brassey's Defence, 1986) 
Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978) 
John Turner (ed. ), Britain and the First World War (London: OUP, 1988) 
D. C. Watt, Personalities and Policies (London: Longmans, 1965) 
D. C. Watt, How War Came (London: William Heinemann, 1989) 
A. J. Youngson, The British Economy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960) 
(2.8) Articles 
'Commonwealth Control', Round Table, Volume 32 (December 1941-September 
1942) pp. 215-221 
'Whitehall and the Commonwealth: The Distribution of Departmental 
Responsibilities', Round Table, Volume 45 (1954-1955), pp. 213-219 
'Churchill', Round Table (March 1965), pp. 103-105 
Christopher Andrew, 'Churchill and Intelligence', Intelligence and National Security, 
Volume 3, Number 3 (July 1988), pp. 181-193 
Mark Arnold-Forster, 'Chanak Rocks the Empire: The Anger of Billy Hughes', Round 
Table, Volume 58 (1968), pp. 169-177 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 238 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
Eric Baume, 'Australia's Political Trend', The Fortnightly, Number 151 (January-June 
1942), pp. 97-106 
Norman Bentwich, 'The British Commonwealth and Colonies', The Fortnightly, 
Number 151 (January-June 1942), pp. 202-208 
Carl Bridge, 'R. G. Casey, Australia's First Washington Legation, and the Origins of 
the Pacific War 1940-42', Australian Journal of Politics and History, Volume 28 
(1982), pp. 181-189 
Raymond Callahan, 'The Illusion of Security: Singapore 1919-42', Journal of 
Contemporary History, Volume 9 (April 1974), pp. 73-92 
John W. M. Chapman, 'Pearl Harbor: The Anglo-Australian Dimension', Intelligence 
and National Security, Volume 4, Number 3 (July 1989), pp. 451-460 
John Charmley, 'Churchill as War Hero', International History Review, Number 13 
(1991), pp. 96-110 
Donald Cowie, 'Arms and the Empire Overseas', The Quarterly Review, Number 273 
(July-October 1939), pp. 306-320 
Sebastian Cox, "'The Difference between White and Black": Churchill, Imperial 
Politics and Intelligence Before the 1941 Crusader Offensive', Intelligence and 
National Security, Volume 9, Number 3 (July 1994), pp. 405-447 
Martin van Creveld, 'Prelude to Disaster: the British Decision to Aid Greece, 
1940-41', Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 9 (1974), pp. 65-92 
Nicholas J. Cull, 'Selling Peace: The Origins, Promotion and Fate of the 
Anglo-American New Order During the Second World War', Diplomacy and 
Statecraft, Volume 7, Number 1 (March 1996), pp. 1-28 
Robert Dallek, 'Allied Leadership in the Second World War: Roosevelt', Survey, 
Volume 21, Number 1/2 (Winter-Spring 1975), pp. 30-36 
Alex Danchev, "'Dilly-Dally" or Having the Last Word: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill', Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 22 
(1987), pp. 21-42 
Alex Danchev, 'Waltzing with Winston: Civil-Military Relations in Britain in the 
Second World War', War in History, Volume 2, Number 2 (1995), pp. 203-230 
John Darwin, 'Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between 
the Wars', The Historical Journal, Volume 23, Number 3 (1980), pp. 657-679 
David Day, 'Anzacs on the Run: The View from Whitehall, 1941-2', Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, pp. 187-202 
David Day, 'H. V. Evatt and the 'Beat Hitler First' Strategy: Scheming Politician or 
Innocent Abroad? ', Historical Studies, Volume 22, Number 89 (October 1987), 
pp. 587-603 
David Day, 'Loosening the Bonds: Britain, Australia and the Second World War', 
History Today (February 1988), pp. 11-17 
J. J. Dedman, 'Defence Policy Decisions before Pearl Harbor', Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, Number 13 (1967), pp. 330-346 
David Dilks, 'Allied Leadership in the Second World War: Churchill', Survey, Volume 
21, Number 1/2 (Winter-Spring 1975), pp. 19-29 
Raymond Dumett, 'Africa's Strategic Miinerals during the Second World War', 
Journal of African History, Volume 26 (1985), pp. 381-385 
P. G. Edwards, 'S. M. Bruce, R. G. Menzies and Australia's War Aims and Peace Aims, 
1939-40', Historical Studies, Volume 17, Number 66 (1976/7), pp. 1-14 
P. G. Edwards, 'R. G. Menzies Appeals to the United States, May-June 1940', 
Australian Outlook, Volume 28 (1974), pp. 64-70 
um 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 239 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
Arthur Fadden, 'Forty Days and Forty Nights: Memoir of a Wartime Prime Minister', 
Australian Outlook, Volume 27 (1973) pp. 3-11 
H. Noel Fieldhouse, 'Canada's Foreign Policy', The Fortnightly Review, Number 146 
(July 1939), pp. 17-27 
Michael Graham Fry, 'Agents and Structures: The Dominions and the Czechoslovak 
Crisis, September 1938', Diplomacy and Statecraft, Volume 10, Numbers 2&3 
(1999), pp. 293-341 
Richard J. Grace, 'Whitehall and the Ghost of Appeasement: November 1941, 
Diplomatic History, Volume 3 (1979), pp. 173-191 
J. L. Granatstein & R. Bothwell, "A Self-Evident National Duty': Canadian Foreign 
Policy, 1935-1939', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume 3, 
Number 2 (January 1975), pp. 112-120 
Sean Greenwood, 'Caligula's Horse Revisited: Sir Thomas Inskip as Minister for Co- 
ordination of Defence, 1936-1939', Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 17, Number 
2 (June 1994), pp. 17-38 
Albert Grundlingh, 'The King's Afrikaners? Enlistment and Ethnic Identity in the 
Union of South Africa's Defence Force During the Second World War, 1939-45', 
Journal of African History, Volume 40 (1999), pp. 351-365 
H. Duncan Hall, 'The Genesis of the Balfour Declaration of 1926', Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, Volume 1 (1961-1963), pp. 40-52 
I. R. Hancock, 'The 1911 Imperial Conference', Historical Studies, Volume 12, 
Number 47 (October 1966), pp. 67-79 
Sir Keith Hancock, 'Empire, Commonwealth, Cosmos and His Own Place: The 
Smutsian Philosophy', Round Table, Volume 60 (1970), pp. 443-448 
Paul Hayes, 'British Foreign Policy and the Influence of Empire, 1870-1920', Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume 12 (1984), pp. 102-124 
J. F. Hilliker, 'Distant Ally: Canadian Relations with Australia During the Second World 
War', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume 13 (1984/5), pp. 46-67 
Norman Hillmer, 'Anglo-Canadian Relations, 1927-1939: Representation and 
Responsibility in the 'New Era' of Empire', Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
Seminar Paper (1971) 
Norman Hillmer, 'A British High Commissioner for Canada, 1927-1928', Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History (May 1973), pp. 339-356 
Norman Hillmer, 'The Outstanding Imperialist: Mackenzie King and the British', 
Canada House Lecture Series, Number 4 (1978) 
H. V. Hodson, 'British Foreign Policy and the Dominions', Foreign Affairs, Volume 17 
(July 1939), pp. 753-763 H. V. Hodson, 'Collective Security and Empire Defence', 
United Empire, Volume 30 (1939), pp-20-28 
David Killingray, 'The Idea of a British Imperial African Army', Journal of African 
History, Volume 20, Number 3 (1979), pp. 421-436 
Donald Lammers, 'From Whitehall after Munich: The Foreign Office and the Future 
Course of British Policy', The Historical Journal, Volume 16, Number 4 (1973), 
pp. 831-856 
P. J. Marshall, 'Imperial Britain', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
Volume 23 (1995), pp. 379-394 
John McCarthy, 'Singapore and Australian Defence 1921-42', Australian Outlook, 
Volume 25, Number 2 (August 1971), pp. 165-180 
John McCarthy, 'Australia: A View from Whitehall, 1939-45, Australian Outlook, 
Number 28 (1974), pp. 318-331 
r 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 240 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
John McCarthy, 'The Imperial Commitment', Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, Volume 23 (1977), pp. 178-181 
Malcolm McKinnon, 'Equality of Sacrifice: Anglo-New Zealand Relations and the War 
Economy', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume 12 (1983), pp. 54- 
76 
Reinhard Meyers, 'Britain, Europe and the Dominions in the 1930s: Some Aspects of 
British, European and Commonwealth Policies', Australian ' Journal of Politics and 
History, Volume 22 (1976), pp. 36-50 
Keith Middlemas, 'The Effect of Dominion Opinion on British Foreign Policy, 1937- 
1938', institute of Commonwealth Studies Seminar Paper (1971) 
Malcom H. Murfett, 'Living in the Past: A Critical Re-examination of the Singapore 
Naval Strategy, 1918-4'1, War and Society, Volume 11, Number 1 (May 1993), 
pp. 73-103 
John B. O'Brien, 'Empire vs. National Interests in Australian-British Relations during 
the 1930s', Historical Studies, Volume 22, Number 89 (October 1987), pp. 569-586 
John O'Brien, 'Conditional Loyalties: Australia, Ireland and the Decline of the 
Dominions Office', Institute of Commonwealth Studies Seminar Paper (1990) 
R. A. C. Parker, 'The Pound Sterling, the American Treasury'and British Preparations 
for War, 1938-39', English Historical Review, Volume 98 (1983), pp. 261-279 
G. C. Peden, 'The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment 
Reconsidered', Historical Journal, Number 27 (1984), pp. 405-423 
Fred E. Pollock, 'Roosevelt, the Ogdensburg Agreement and the British Fleet: All 
Done with Mirrors', Diplomatic History, Volume 5 (1981), pp. 203-219 
Richard A. Preston, 'Military and Defence Development in Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand: a Three-way Comparison', War and Society, Volume 5, Number 1 
(May 1987), pp. 1-21 
Roland Quinault, 'Churchill and Australia: The Military Relationship 1899-1945', INar 
and Society, Volume 6, Number 1 (May 1988), pp. 41-64 
David Reynolds, '1940: Fulcrum of the Twentieth Century? ', International Affairs, 
Volume 66, Number 2 (April 1990), pp. 325-350 
John Robertson, 'Australian War Policy, 1939-45', Historical Studies, Volume 17, 
Number 69 (1976/7), pp. 489-504 
John Robertson, 'Australia and the 'Beat Hitler First' Strategy 1941-2: A Problem in 
Wartime Consultation', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume XI, 
Number 3 (1983), pp. 300-321 
Stephen Roskill, 'Imperial Defence, 1910-1950', The Round Table (November 1970), 
pp. 451-461 
Angus Ross, 'Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter? New Zealand and the 
Commonwealth in the Inter-war Years', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 
Volume X (1972), pp. 28-44 
Eric Siepmann, 'The Neutrality of South Africa', The Nineteenth Century (September 
1939), pp. 85-92 
Sir Herbert Stanley, 'Colonial and Dominion Office Administration', Public 
Administration (October 1938), pp. 420-427 
James L. Sturgis, 'What's In A Name?: A Perspective on the Transition of Empire/Commonwealth, 1918-1950', The Round Table, Volume 334 (1995), pp. 191- 205 
Ann Trotter, 'The Dominions and Imperial Defence: Hankey's Tour in 1934', Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume 2 (1974), pp. 318-332 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 241 
Managing the Dominions: The Dominions Office and the Second World War, 1939-1942 
Kosmas Tsokhas, 'Protection, Imperial Preference, and -Australian Conservative 
Politics, 1923-39', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume 20 (1992) 
pp. 276-294 
Kosmas Tsokhas, 'Dedominionization: The Anglo-Australian Experience 1939-45', 
Historical Journal, Volume 37, Number 2 (1994), pp-65-87 
P. B. Waite, 'French-Canadian Isolationism and English Canada: An Elliptical Foreign 
Policy, 1935-39', Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 18 (1983/4), pp. 132-141 
D. C. Watt, 'Imperial Defence and Foreign Policy 1911-39', Journal of-Commonwealth 
Political Studies, Volume 1 (1961-1963), pp. 266-281 
Philip Wigley, 'Whitehall and the 1923 Imperial Conference', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Volume 1 (1972-1973), pp. 223-236 
(2.9) Review Articles 
David Carlton, 'The Dominions and the Gathering Storm, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Volume 6, Number 2 (January 1978), pp. 172-175 
John Charmley, 'Reassessments of Winston Churchill': A Reply', The International 
Histo Review, Volume 18 (1996), pp. 371-375 
L. H. Gann, 'South Africa and the Third Reich', The International History Review, 
Volume 14, Number 3 (1992), pp. 518-525 
Robin Prior & Trevor Wilson, 'Reassessments of Winston Churchill', Ih. Q 
International History Review, Volume 18 (1996), pp. 113-126 
ßI81. 
IYYJYýI. 
Andrew Stewart, King's College 242 
